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Abstract
Foreign policy, seemingly by definition, has an exclusive concern with the 'foreign' or that 
which is outside the state. This thesis, however, seeks to demonstrate that foreign policy, 
like every other state apparatus, has significant, though often subtle, effects on its 
populace. This thesis seeks to investigate how these effects may be conceptualised, and 
maps the domestic influence of foreign policy in terms of discipline and social control. The 
degree to which the objectives of foreign policy and the practices obliged by national 
security shape those in whose name they operates is extensive. Given the priority attached 
to issues of national security in Western democratic states, the apparatus of foreign policy 
can be considered as pervasive as those orientated towards internal governance. Using 
case studies of the cold war and 'war on terror1, this thesis argues that foreign policy affects 
its citizens through the formation of human agency, the securitisation of domestic space 
and the regulation of populations. This thesis demonstrates that these are all processes 
that link individual and national identity via foreign policy discourses.
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Introduction
Alan, it's not just a few Middle Eastern bastards at the weekend, it's 
thousands. Cronulla is a very long beach and it's been taken over by this scum.
It's not a few causing trouble. It's all of them.
-Alan Jones, Sydney radio host reading an email on-air, 20051
On December 11, 2005 the southern Sydney beachside suburb of Cronulla was visited by an 
outburst of violence and a break-down in public order. The Australian public watched in 
surprised horror as the latent tensions within Sydney's communities flared into open 
conflict that was widely described in the media as the 'Cronulla riots'. Two groups who 
identified respectively as patriotic white Australians from the southern beaches and ethnic 
Lebanese Australians from the western suburbs targeted one another, in so doing drawing 
in unwilling bystanders who happened to bear passing physical resemblance to either 
group. The violence was triggered following the assault of two lifeguards by a group of men 
of 'middle-eastern appearance'. It was also argued that this violence was a product of many 
months of sexually demeaning insults directed against young white women at beaches by 
groups of youths who were of 'middle-eastern appearance'. As a result a mass 
demonstration of up to 5,000 people -  mostly white males -  gathered, brandishing
1 Quoted in David Marr, "Alan Jones: I'm the Person That's Led This Charge", The Age, 13/12/05. Accessed from 
www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/12/12/1134236003153.html on 9/10/2009.
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Australian flags and chanting nationalist and racist slogans. The crowd violently assaulted a 
number of individuals, who in many cases were not even necessarily of 'middle-eastern 
appearance' but were identifiably 'non-white'. In retaliation, convoys of cars from the 
western suburbs sought to enter Cronulla forcing the police to set up road-blocks and 
check-points effectively locking down many southern suburbs of Sydney.
This was not a random outbreak of violence. It was a carefully staged cultural and media 
event that was given impetus by a range of stereotypes drawn from the wider foreign 
policy discourse of the war on terror. There was widespread coordination of the event. 
Widely circulated text messages encouraging people to take part in "Leb and wog bashing 
(sic)" were read out on radio and published in newspapers.* 2 Right-wing media personalities 
encouraged a "community show of force" to reclaim southern beachside suburbs.3 Beyond 
this, however, the wider international context of the war on terror played a vital role in 
precipitating the conflict. Since the September 11th, 2001 attacks in New York and 
Washington (9/11), Australia had been subject to a range of measures designed to counter 
the threat of terrorism. These included expanded police powers, increased surveillance, 
restrictions on immigration and the granting of asylum, as well as a range of social 
awareness campaigns. This created throughout the Australian population a distinct image 
of a threatening terrorist other that was of 'middle-eastern appearance'. Five months prior 
to the violence in Cronulla, the threat of terrorism had been brought closer to home by the 
London bombings of July 7, 2005. The reorientation of the threat from 'terrorists abroad' to 
'home-grown terrorists' added a national security dimension to tensions that already 
existed between Sydney's communities.
The representation of the terrorist threat through foreign policy seems to have played a 
role in precipitating the break-down of order that occurred in Cronulla. Stereotypes of 
white masculine patriotism and a Muslim threat to Western values that had been deployed 
throughout the war on terror coalesced with a range of existing local issues to generate an
Kenneth Nguyen, "Jones 'incited' Cronulla Violence On Air", The Age, 11/04/07. Accessed from 
www.theaee.com.au/news/national/iones-incited-cronulla-violence-on-air/2007/04/10/1175971098057.html
on 9/10/09; see also Scott Poynting, "Multiculturalism at the End of the Line?", paper presented at Everyday 
Multiculturalism Conference, Macquarie University, 28-29 September 2006, pp. 2-4. Accessed from 
www.crsi.mq.edu.au/news and events/documents/scottpoynting 000.pdf9/10/09.
3 Steve Price quoted in Scott Poynting, "What Caused the Cronulla Riot", Race & Class, vol. 48, no. 1, 2006, p. 
86 .
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outburst of public violence. Foreign policy became entwined with domestic processes of 
identity, social regulation and order. It reinforced and produced social stereotypes and 
provided a rationale for public behaviour to which some groups adhered to, some rejected, 
but all were aware of. In this sense, foreign policy is no different from domestic policies and 
social forces that likewise inform cultural stereotypes that shape and regulate social order.
Research puzzle
This thesis takes as it starting point the observation that foreign policy, like other state 
apparatuses, affects its own citizens. However, this thesis begins by recognising that the 
links between foreign policy and domestic order are rarely clear. Foreign policy is 
considered a cause of domestic politics only insofar as it responds to external threats -  
quite often imminent -  to those within. Foreign policy seeks to counter these external 
threats for the well-being of the domestic population. Accordingly, foreign policy is an 
aspect of governance that differs - that is, is thought to differ - from all other functions of 
government insofar as it focuses on external relations rather than those that occur within 
the territorial borders of the state. Foreign policy is seen as being connected to those it 
seeks to represent only to the extent that it responsibly serves their best interests on the 
world stage. These foreign relations tangibly manifest in diplomatic, military and trade 
relations between states. Given this external orientation, foreign policy is often understood 
to operate on behalf of, but not upon, domestic populations.
Observations made throughout this thesis of both historical and contemporary politics 
suggest, however, that these assumptions are distinctly not the case. The goals of foreign 
policy are at any point in time clearly articulated in government policy, in political rhetoric, 
and represented widely in the media. In acute moments of foreign policy crisis these goals 
-  indeed these obligations -  are near impossible to avoid. Two instances of foreign policy 
crisis will be examined in this thesis to demonstrate this point. The first is the cold war 
threat of Soviet communism as it manifested in Britain throughout the late 1940s and 
1950s, and the second instance that will be examined is the post-9/11 threat of terrorism 
as it emerged in recent United States politics. In each of these cases the external threat 
became very palpable and a number of governmental measures were put in place to try to 
halt the threat posed to the nation-state. Whether or not such 'domestic' counter­
terrorism measures constitute a genuinely 'foreign' policy is of course up for debate. 
Regardless, however, of the outcome of such a debate, the effects of foreign policy are not
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limited solely to the construction of instrumental policy. As with domestic governance, the 
effects of foreign policy are not limited to the impact of expected results on the intended 
audience. There are, to use an economic term, positive and negative externalities 
associated with foreign policy making. Thus, other than a long-standing tradition within 
International Relations for treating the 'foreign' and 'domestic', the 'internal' and 'external' 
as separate realms, in which there are different political modes of operation, there is no 
substantive reason why foreign policy will not affect domestic order.
Despite this, the effects of foreign policy on relations within the nation-state are absent 
from the disciplinary study and practice of International Relations. Herein lies the puzzle 
and the paradox. International Relations is ill-equipped to identify these effects of foreign 
policy, which manifest in the relations within states and requires an analytical inversion of 
the effects of foreign policy inwards. Foreign policy is of central importance to International 
Relations yet there is no systematic recognition or analysis of its effects on the citizens and 
the social order that it is mandated to preserve. Not oniy is foreign policy the enduring 
concern of International Relations but it also has the potential to enact significant domestic 
social effects. In a time of imminent threat foreign policy becomes quite possibly the most 
visible aspect of government policy-making. As well as reaching large cross-sections of the 
population, foreign policy also carries with it a great deal of gravity given the urgency of 
national security priorities. Foreign policy is thus a highly visible and pervasive element of 
governance. The question for this thesis is, how might these effects of foreign policy upon 
domestic populations in Western liberal democracies be conceptualised and what are the 
implications of these effects for domestic order?
Questions and outline
The preceding discussion suggests that the analysis of foreign policy can be equally inverted 
in order for us to acknowledge and understand the connection between an 'external' 
foreign policy and an 'internal' social order. Thus the central proposition addressed in this 
thesis is: Foreign policy, like every other state apparatus, affects its own citizens. This is 
followed by the question: How might this be conceptualised and what are the effects of it 
on domestic order? Given that the effect of foreign policy on domestic order is a seemingly 
obvious proposition, as examined briefly in terms of the Cronulla riots, Chapter 1 seeks to 
grasp why it is that foreign policy is understood as being solely external in orientation. 
What it is about sovereignty that produces in International Relations, a divide so distinct
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that the 'domestic' and 'international' realms are seen as intractable to the extent that 
they are thought to be mutually exclusive? Chapter 2 turns to the question of the 
constitution and control of individuals as they exist inside nation-states. How is the order 
and regulation of individuals and populations understood? This chapter asks to what extent 
are social theories of control, particularly the work of Foucault on discipline, biopolitics and 
governmentality, applicable to an understanding of foreign policy as a determinant of order 
and regulation? Chapter 3 seeks to bring the conclusions from chapter 1 and chapter 2 
together in order to determine a theoretical framework for the thesis' case studies. In 
particular, Chapter 3 will ask, how can foreign policy be understood, across the boundaries 
of inside and outside, as an element of governance that engenders domestic regulation and 
control?
The second part of this thesis investigates the questions addressed in the preceding part of 
the thesis by applying this framework of foreign policy discipline and control to recent and 
contemporary foreign policy challenges faced by major Western nation-states. These 
chapters and the case studies they contain do not seek to provide full and comprehensive 
accounts of how foreign policy shapes domestic social order in any given place and time. 
Rather, these chapters offer a series of specific and detailed portrayals of the processes of 
regulation and control that function as minor parts of a much broader milieu of what this 
thesis refers to as foreign policy discipline. Chapter 4 investigates how anti-communist cold 
war foreign policy shaped and controlled individuals and the wider public in early cold war 
Britain. In particular, this chapter seeks to analyse the relationship between foreign policy 
and human agency. It does so by looking at the British Foreign Office's secret Information 
Research Department, which operated from 1947-77. It also highlights a particular 
individual, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, examining how foreign policy imperatives 
combined with a range of personal and political issues to shape his political agency.
Chapters five and six shift this examination of the effects of foreign policy on domestic 
order and control during the cold war towards contemporary case studies of the war on 
terror. These two chapters address the question of how war on terror foreign policy shapes 
and controls individuals and wider populations. In particular, they examine the social 
mechanisms of security and regulation that instil this national security obligation on a 
domestic audience. Chapter 5 explores how these changes regulate the movement of 
individuals and groups and construct territory. This chapter highlights what can be referred 
to as a discourse of 'superempowerment', which suggests that individual actors or small
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groups can enact disproportional effects on the space around them. It examines the 
attempt by the popular television show 24 to conceptualise a way to respond in kind to the 
threat of superempowered terrorism and the subsequent influence of this show on the 
popular US debate over torture. The wider effects resulting from attempts to secure 
borders in light of 9/11 will also be addressed. Chapter 6 explores the socio-medical 
literature on the effects of 9/11 and subsequent responses, particularly as they affect 
overall health of the population. Particularly, it highlights the effects that occur within the 
home and upon children. It then examines the mediated psychological effects of terrorism 
and counter-terrorism on the wider population, addressing in particular the consequences 
stemming from the colour-coded terror alert system.
Argument and themes
This thesis argues that the objectives of foreign policy extensively shape domestic social 
order. It suggests that foreign policy facilitates, both overtly and with subtlety, the 
organisation of domestic populations by linking individual and group identity to issues of 
national security. This is done in a way which is less explicit, but equally as pervasive, as 
governmental processes of internal governance. In making this argument this thesis draws 
on five major themes. The first is that of sovereignty. Modern practices of sovereignty 
produce a dichotomised view of global politics and an individualistic view of subjectivity 
defined with reference to the nation-state, wherein the effects of foreign policy on 
domestic populations is overlooked. Secondly, this thesis is concerned with the processes 
of regulation and control that occur within a liberal democratic order. Foreign policy needs 
to be understood in the context of social processes of restraint and self-governance that 
operate amidst a concern freedom and rationality. The third theme addressed in this thesis 
is agency. The processes of regulation and control enacted by foreign policy shape 
conceptions of agency according to salient national security obligations. The fourth theme 
of this thesis is that of space. It focuses on the influence of foreign policy objectives 
conceptualisation of spatial relations and the regulation of mobility. The final theme 
addressed in the thesis is population. Foreign policy will be articulated in terms of a 
biopolitical process that seeks to ensure the health and well-being of the population as a 
whole. Employing these themes, this thesis will argue that that foreign policy enacts an 
extensive range of processes that maintain everyday social order.
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The first part of the thesis proceeds initially in conceptual terms, demonstrating why, in 
mainstream International Relations, foreign policy is not understood as being connected to 
domestic order. The study of politics has a long tradition of separating the domestic from 
the international realm, a practice that this thesis argues stems from modern 
understandings of sovereignty, and the relationship that this understanding engenders 
between the individual and the state. This inside/outside dichotomy not only obscures the 
domestic operation of foreign policy it is also generates a much more subtle mode of social 
control. The regulatory effect of foreign policy discourse in this sense is not simply a 
process of information transfer but rather an active constitution of subjecthood. This 
process of the social constitution of individual and group identity can be understood using 
Foucault's ideas of control and regulation. Foucauldian concepts of discipline, biopolitics 
and governmentality are able to demonstrate the extent to which foreign policy pervades 
and is implicated in domestic order. These concepts will be used to highlight the way in 
which government policies enact wider social regulation and control throughout societies 
and indeed across geographical and jurisdictional borders.
The second part of the thesis engages case studies that demonstrate the implications 
foreign policy has for domestic order. These processes of control and order enacted by 
foreign policy can be understood in terms of effects on human and group agency, space 
and population. Foreign policy in cold war Britain fed into a politics of intrigue and intense 
personal scrutiny characterised by pervasive narratives of political agents and 
conspiratorial collusion. Foreign policy discourse creates linkages between pragmatic party 
political interests and global ideological conflicts, bracketing diverse and perhaps otherwise 
unrelated actors within a perceived collective consensus and intent. More recently, the 
post-9/11 perception of a foreign terrorist threat has altered processes of spatial regulation 
and control. Small groups of dedicated individuals are now perceived as being capable of 
enacting the kind of political effects associated with state actors, so long as they are willing 
to violate social and legal constraints that define 'normal' behaviour. In so doing, this 
changes the assumptions about what an individual can carry out in a given social space. In 
turn, policies designed to combat foreign terror give rise to highly regulated spaces that 
shape the formation of individuals and communities. As well as affecting space the war on 
terror foreign policy also shapes and regulates populations. Attempts to mediate the 
psychological effects of 9/11 and subsequent measures to prepare and protect populations 
against further foreign threat enact a range of wider social consequences. The threat of
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terrorism and attempts to mediate it shapes individual identities, and when linked by the 
prerogatives of national security discourse, it can also shape populations as a whole. 
Overall, this thesis argues that foreign policy can be seen as a discourse that is a powerful 
source of knowledge and authority that, when connected to national security obligations, is 
very hard to challenge. Foreign policy in this sense informs and shapes a wide range of 
political and social practices in ways that are obvious and overt, but also in ways that are 
subtle and nearly unrecognisable.
Approach
This thesis examines a point of coalescence between International Relations, political 
theory and sociology, specifically the intersection of foreign policy analysis with studies of 
social order and social control. Bringing together these connected approaches allows this 
thesis to focus on foreign policy, a key concern of International Relations, while also 
grasping those processes that lead to the creation and shaping of social order. In short, the 
approach this thesis takes allows an analysis of foreign policy within a conceptual 
framework that rejoins the formerly disparate realms of the foreign with the domestic, and 
the external with the internal. In doing so, it encourages a focus on the effects of foreign 
policy on the latter, rather than the former, of these binaries. The analysis of foreign policy 
undertaken here, therefore, is not a traditional study of foreign policy that examines the 
everyday politics and consequences of externally oriented programs on the relative 
standing of nation-states. Nor is it a study of foreign policy that examines the reception of 
these policies by specific countries, or by the international community generally. It is not 
strictly a study of how a foreign policy platform impacts upon world order. Instead, it 
examines the inverse effects of foreign policy upon the nation in whose name it acts. This, 
therefore, requires a different approach so as to grasp the connection between foreign 
policy and domestic social order.
Towards this end, this thesis draws from a number of approaches, given that there is not a 
clear and established methodology for analysing these inverted effects of foreign policy. 
There are, however, two central but related elements to this examination of foreign policy. 
Firstly, an analysis of discursive representations of threat, danger and risk to the nation- 
state and secondly, an investigation into the social effects of foreign policy discourse on 
individuals and the wider population. Given that the intended significant impact of foreign 
policy is on other states, the effects of foreign policy within the state are inherently subtle
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and often not immediately obvious. Were they direct and starkly manifested, this effect 
would be more readily studied and accounted for in political analysis. Foreign policy sets 
out priorities in the pursuit of the best interests of the nation abroad. A key element of this 
articulation is determining imminent and possible threats to national security. Threats and 
concerns about the security of the state are more immediately visible and pressing than 
potential benefits such as economic gains from trade policy. Foreign policy and associated 
fields of national security discourse thus constitute a field of knowledge that carries great 
authority given its focus on the continued survival of the state. It is the social and political 
consequences resulting from the status of this knowledge, knowledge defining what is 
threatening to the nation-state, that this thesis suggests will have significant consequences 
for internal order.
The analysis of foreign policy undertaken in this thesis takes place within a political space 
defined and ruled by liberal democratic government. In this sense, foreign policy is not 
operating within the context of the presupposed anarchy -  or at ieast strategic motivations 
-  of state actors in International Relations. Nor is the state, for the most part, deliberately 
using foreign policy to intervene in domestic politics. Foreign policy thus does not operate 
in an unregulated political and social environment but neither is its operation characterised 
by authoritarian impulses. Rather, in this thesis foreign policy operates within the context 
of a liberal order, which entails a more complex social milieu than is often understood to 
exist in either the discipline of International Relations or the international anarchical realm. 
Michel Foucault's concern with knowledge, discourse and power and the ability for such 
relations to enact processes of production, regulation and control within a liberal order 
gives his ideas great purchase with regards to the aims of this thesis.
Accordingly this thesis engages with a range of theories from the continental philosophy 
tradition, particularly coming together around the work of Foucault. In order to grasp the 
entwining of foreign policy with processes of order and social regulation it is necessary to 
critically engage with the constitutive dynamics of liberal order. This is a long-standing 
concern of continental philosophy, which has long sort to understand the multitude of 
processes that give rise to governance both within and beyond the immediate jurisdiction 
of the sovereign state. In particular, the work of Foucault has sought to understand the 
subtle processes of production and social control that stem from mechanisms of 
governance. It is not simply, however, the direct effects stemming from formalised 
regulation and control that are of concern to Foucault. Policies and programs enacted by
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government bureaucracies and other institutions take on wider cultural meanings and 
enable a range of social forces when distilled into a recognisable field of knowledge and 
expertise.
Foreign policy can thus be similarly understood in Foucauldian terms as a series of 
mediated effects that shape and regulate domestic order. In and around the work of 
Foucault this thesis not only finds a workable theoretical approach but also finds traction 
within the discipline of International Relations. Critical scholars within International 
Relations have employed Foucault in order to understand how various practices in global 
politics constitute identity. This thesis builds on this concern with the relationship between 
global practices and local identity by seeking to provide a concrete connection between 
foreign policy and the domestic processes of order. This connection between foreign policy 
and order is not simply a case of the former representing the interests of the latter, but 
rather a case of foreign policy actively producing domestic order. The framework 
developed in this thesis offers a way of understanding what is an indivisible connection 
between a nation's foreign policy and its internal social order.
Significance
Anyone who travels through airports or via major transport hubs in cities like London, New 
York or Sydney is aware of the overt effects of foreign policy and national security on these 
highly regulated spaces of domestic order. This thesis highlights that these obvious 
manifestations of foreign policy and national security commitments are only very explicit 
parts of an extensive range of effects on domestic order. When considered in terms of the 
wider processes of order and social control, the effects of foreign policy are much more 
extensive than just the intensification of surveillance around certain strategic sites. There 
are subtle effects of foreign policy that pervade many facets of everyday life. This thesis 
offers a framework for understanding these effects, which implicate both global discourses 
of foreign policy and its localised effects on order. In short, this thesis articulates, 
conceptualises and demonstrates the effects of foreign policy on the social, physical, 
cultural and psychological dimensions that constitute domestic order. It does this by 
analysing the effects of foreign policy on human agency, the regulation of the movement of 
people, and the health and well-being of the population.
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PART I
Conceptualis ing foreign policy as domestic  discipline and  control
11
Chapter 1
Sovereignty and the modern subject: theory as practice
This thesis is concerned with developing an understanding of the ways in which a state's 
foreign policy affects, and in particular contributes to the organization of, its own domestic 
sphere. This proposition may seem at first entirely self-contradictory. A fter all, as those 
schooled in the dominant traditions of International Relations (IR) would know, foreign 
policy, seemingly by definition, has an exclusive concern w ith the foreign, the international; 
that which is 'outside' the state. This chapter will challenge these perceived contradictions, 
by posing the question 'why is it understood that foreign policy does not affect domestic 
order?' In doing so, this chapter will highlight that the processes which demarcate foreign 
and domestic policies exist and thrive w ithin the foundations and practices of traditional IR 
theory. By demonstrating that the separation of domestic and international realms is an 
ongoing process of partitioning, this chapter w ill render immediately suspect the 
proposition put forward by orthodox discourses of modern sovereignty that the domestic 
and international remain logically and naturally separate. Consequently, this chapter will
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demonstrate that the seemingly clear-cut divisions between the domestic and international 
realms bewilder attempts to grasp the complex practices of modern sovereignty.
This chapter will highlight these contradictions through a critical engagement with 
mainstream accounts of the formation of modern state sovereignty and the emergence of 
domestic and international spheres. It will do so by engaging two critical processes: a 
genealogical investigation of sovereignty, and an investigation of the discursive practices 
which consolidate historical practices of sovereignty. An understanding of the operation of 
sovereignty here is vital. After all, it is the contemporary practice of sovereignty that 
continues to generate the inside/outside view of IR in which foreign policy is seen as 
exclusively externally focused, having no bearing on domestic order. The genealogical 
accounts of sovereignty will highlight that accounts of International Relations rely on 
sovereignty as a fixed ontological premise, when instead it should be regarded as being 
historically determined and contingent. By drawing attention to the role that this 
interpretation of sovereignty piays in establishing the international and domestic spheres, 
this chapter will highlight the need to question the accepted dynamics of International 
Relations, in particular that of foreign policy being a tool to mediate the domestic and the 
foreign.
The account of sovereignty presented here is not meant to be an account of the actual 
nature of sovereignty as such. Rather this chapter can be seen as an account of how the 
concept is used in understanding and interpreting politics. For as Jens Bartelson argues, 
"the concept of sovereignty is so firmly linked with the epistemic and ontological 
foundations of political enquiry, that it can hardly be touched without simultaneously 
evoking questions about these foundations. " 1 Before further exploring the nature of this 
claim it is important to evoke a sense of how this thesis will approach the questions of 
knowledge and discourse that Bartelson refers to. This is an important question in regards 
to the aims of this thesis, for when knowledge and discourse are seen in this way and 
modern sovereignty is re-examined in this light, many of the reoccurring tendencies within 
international politics can be attributed to these practices. These tendencies include the 
simplification and instilling of a superficial order onto ambiguity, so that black and white 
dichotomies and binary discourses are created where otherwise there might be a variety of 
shades of grey. A contemporary incidence of this can be seen in the politics of 'us' versus
1 Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 238.
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'them' in pursuit of the objectives of the 'war on terror', a practice that relies on simplified 
and starkly oppositional notions of 'inside' and 'outside' that overwhelm the complexities 
of sovereignty's operation. It is such questions about the foundations of otherwise familiar 
practices that I wish to explore here in the analysis of sovereignty to establish an 
understanding of the logics that are at play when discussing international politics.
International Relations, global politics and discourse
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms -  in short, a sum of human relations which have been 
enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which 
after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are 
illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors 
which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their 
pictures and now only matter as metal, no longer as coins.
- Friedrich Nietzsche2
The study of international relations is understood to be a discipline that is concerned with 
politics that are predominantly external to the domain of the sovereign state. 3 Despite 
these seemingly clear-cut parameters, conceptual and cartographical difficulties abound 
when the entire globe has been claimed, mapped and placed under sovereign rule of one 
state or another. If the globe is divided spatially how are 'relations' between these entities 
to be understood? If it is spatial, exactly what space do these relations take place in? 
Where is the international and what location is occupied by its supposed anarchy? These 
are the foundational questions which we must ask if we are to begin to map international 
relations. However, if the study of international relations is limited to simply diplomatic 
relations and conflicts between states (the traditional concerns of high power politics), 
then this is a narrowly defined scope of relations. It is not one that is likely to provide a 
comprehensive account of global interactions. At the point where it attempts to give an 
account of global politics, the field of study moves beyond something that can no longer be 
accurately described as 'international relations'.
2 From "on Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Arnold Kaufman (New 
York: Viking Penguin, 1976), p. 47.
3 For the purposes of Australia's Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 (which as an Australian subject I intend to abide by 
throughout this thesis) "the term international relations means political, military and economic relations with 
foreign governments and international organizations", insofar as it draws on the definitions provided in section 
9 of the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004. For more information see the 
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005 -  Bill Digest, no. 64, 2005-06, accessed from www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/Pubs/ 
bd/2005-06/06bd064.pdf on 4/10/06.
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International Relations, therefore, is better understood as a broad discourse on global 
politics, rather than a portrayal of the distinct reality of relations between nation-states.4 
At least that is how it will be treated in this thesis, given that the traditional approach is not 
the most encompassing description of the range of concerns that the discipline engages 
with. The traditional approach to International Relations also warrants the capitalized 
appellation as it is most commonly treated as a proper noun. Such accounts of 
international politics that are firmly rooted to the dichotomies of international and 
domestic elevate the study of this discourse such that it is seen as scientifically validated 
and sure. These accounts of International Relations suggest meaningful interactions 
between kindred nation-states and in this sense it at least privileges the status of states in 
global politics if it doesn't actually actively exclude various non-state actors. By treating 
International Relations as a field of discourse instead of a discrete reality, I am allowing 
these implicitly dispersed 'facts' of International Relations to be contested as well as 
allowing the overall coherence of its narrow reading of Western intellectual and historical 
experience -  writ large across the globe, most noticeably in cartographic script -  to be re­
examined. Thus for one to write within the discipline of International Relations, having 
noted its discursive nature, does not require an acceptance that this appellation is 
unproblematic, or even to accept it at all.
Indeed many of the key assumptions of International Relations in this chapter will be 
highlighted as being part of a dominant discourse rather than 'reality' as such. This thesis 
recognizes that the theorisation of politics is hard to distinguish from how it 'is' in any kind 
of reality. Indeed political institutions and events can often be seen as acting according to, 
or on the basis of, knowledge that has sought to theorise similar institutions or events. In 
this way, many theories can be self-actualising, giving rise to the reality that they seek to 
describe. Many tenets of the pragmatic 'realist' school of thought, rather than being 
responses to reality, can be seen in this way to be as utopian and idealistic as those of the 
counter-posing 'naive liberal' position. Viewed this way, liberalism and realism can be seen 
to constitute what can be broadly described as the traditional or foundational positions in 
International Relations.
4 When referring to discourse it means the formation of particular modes of speaking, subject positions, 
common concepts and objects of concern and the authority that each of these assumptions then carry with 
them. Thus it entails ontological and epistemological assumptions and endows the discourse with 
power/knowledge characteristics.
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Approaching foundational positions from the perspective of discourse highlights that 
knowledge is constantly being produced and reproduced; it is never fixed and secure, nor 
can it claim to be born from an ahistoricaI truth. If this sounds as though it is overstating 
the size and concentration of the 'orthodox straw-man' that is about to beaten with the 
linguistic turn stick, then some perspective on the intellectual position of these ideas 
should be briefly overviewed. Take sovereignty and foreign policy -  two of the main 
concerns of this chapter -  for example, which are traditionally understood respectively as 
the exclusive right of authority and as a series of prescriptions for how a country will deal 
with others outside its borders. These meanings are pretty much clear-cut and well- 
established. Examining both the process of construction and the discursive representation 
of knowledge of traditional accounts of International Relations will not destabilize meaning 
irreparably, but it does allow for some variation in the way that it may be thought about.
Defining discourse is not as simple as providing a definition. If it were the following offered 
by Jacob Torfing might suffice:
[discourse is the relational totality of signifying sequences that together 
constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be said and done.
The notion of discourse cuts across the distinction between thought and 
reality, and includes both semantic and pragmatic aspects. It does not merely 
designate a linguistic region within the social, but is rather co-extensive with 
the social.5
While this definition contains the major elements of what discourse means in the sense 
that it will be used here, it clearly needs some elaboration and is perhaps understood best 
in relation to further definitions. What this definition of Torfing's suggests, however, is that 
discourse provides a coherent and meaningful context into which statements and actions 
can be understood and for them in turn to be seen as connected with what is real. This 
process of social contextualisation, however, is not objective, nor apolitical. According to 
William Connolly, discourse can be seen as a mechanism that prescribes, legitimises and 
empowers a particular understanding of the world over others.6 Consequently, the nature 
of discourse is not as simple as a mere definition.
Discourse is something more complex than just forms of communication. According to 
Ernesto Laclau discourse includes not just speech and writing but any institutional process
5 Jacob Torfing, New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 300.
6 William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (3rd edn.) (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1993), p. 2.
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"in and through which social production of meaning takes place. " 7 Discourse, in 
manifesting knowledge, inscribes the bodies and the actions of individuals who act within 
its field with certain routines and practices that become meaningful, often designating a 
place within an overall hierarchy. So while discourse directly manifests in speech and 
writing, it is more complex than this. Indeed discourse is potentially of boundless 
complexity when understood as being located within individuals' bodies and social 
practices. The manifestation of discursive practices within such contexts may be evident 
even within the smallest minutiae. So while this may be the case, the philosophical task is 
not to reify the complexity of discourse but to explore it. Perhaps then, with a broader, 
more social understanding of discourse in mind, Jim George suggests that it can be seen as 
"a broader matrix of social practices that gives meaning to the way people understand 
themselves and their behaviour. [It] generates the categories of meaning by which reality 
can be understood and explained. " 8 Further, "discourse makes 'real' that which it  
prescribes as meaningful. " 9
Discourse is thus complex and multi-faceted. Vivienne Jabri suggests that the study of 
discourse reveals the way in which individuals employ "interpretative schemes and shared 
worlds of meaning in the reproduction of discursive structures of signification and 
legitimation. " 10 Discourse produces a context in which meaning can be interpreted and in 
this sense it is more than just processes of speech and writing for it manifests in the bodies 
and actions of individuals, actively constructing politics. Bradley Klein captures this, 
suggesting that
to be engaged in discourse is to be engaged in the making and remaking of 
meaningful conditions of existence. A discourse, then, is not a way of learning 
'about' something out there in the 'real world'; it is rather, a way of producing 
something as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, 
meaningful. Discourse create[s] the conditions of knowing. * 11
7 Ernesto Laclau, 'Populist Rupture and Discourse' (transl. by Jim Grealy), Screen Education 34, pp. 87-93, cited 
in Diane MacDonnell, Theories o f Discourse: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 4.
8 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)lntroduction to International Relations (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner), pp. 29-30.
9 George, Discourses o f Global Politics, p. 30 (emphasis original).
10 Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1996), p. 94.
11 Bradley Klein, "Strategic Discourse and Its Alternatives," in Center on Violence and Human Survival Occasional 
Paper (New York: 1987), p.4, cited in George, Discourses of Global Politics, p. 30. See also Bradley Klein, 
Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1-12.
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Discourse in this sense is implicated in the creation of the conditions of objects of 
knowledge and in what manner these are to be understood and valued.
Through its role in determining what has meaning and what is 'real', discourse intertwines 
itself with the notions of epistemology and ontology. Epistemology and ontology can be 
very briefly defined respectively as 'how we claim to know what we claim to be real'. While 
this may sound trite, epistemology and ontology are at their most fundamental about 
investigating claims to knowledge and reality. Epistemology relates to how knowledge 
comes to have authority and meaning, and which kinds of knowledge and logic is seen as 
valid. Perhaps oversimplifying slightly, it is the attempt to create an "overall 
correspondence or correlation between... words to things, or knowledge and reality. " 12 
Epistemology is what causes science, for example, to be deemed a more credible form of 
knowledge in comparison to fairy tales and myths. Ontology focuses on the foundational 
objects that are seen as the basis of the reality within that sphere of knowledge. Ontology 
designates the prime units of concern, in other words, the basic currency of knowledge. 
Epistemology and ontology are interrelated through discourse; the epistemological nature 
will play some part in determining the nature of the units of analysis that are privileged 
insofar as it is likely to provide the supporting logic that makes the focus of knowledge 
seem to be common sense. A secure ontological foundation is similarly required in order to 
base epistemological claims, as without a logical corresponding 'reality' the knowledge 
claim will seem baseless. 13 The relationship between discourse, epistemology and ontology 
will be more clearly demonstrated in the context of International Relations through a 
thorough-going analysis of the modern discourse of sovereignty.
International Relations has largely been dominated by a positivist approach to knowledge 
that has favoured states as the primary actors. The positivist approach to knowledge, a 
positivist epistemology, attempts to replicate scientific surety within social and interstate 
relations through an adherence to some combination of rationalism and empiricism. This, 
in turn, seeks to ground knowledge claims via reference to conceptually theorized or
12 McDonnell, Theories of Discourse, pp. 64-65.
13 For further discussion of ontology and epistemology with particular reference to, and emphasis on the 
implications for, International Relations see Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond" in, Steve Smith, Ken Booth 
and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: positivism and beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), pp. 11-43.
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impartially observed trends within historical fact.14 Viewed according to this positivist logic, 
the prime ontological unit, that is, the main actor in International Relations is seen to be 
the state whose utility and pre-eminence can be observed as far back as the Peloponnesian 
War, but also throughout the Enlightenment and, more recently, global modernity. The 
interdependence of ontology and epistemology within the discourse of International 
Relations will be more thoroughly demonstrated in the context of foreign policy in Chapter 
3. The discussion to follow in the next section will demonstrate how sovereignty has come 
to be taken for granted, particularly within International Relations' theories of the state. It 
will do so by questioning the ontological grounds upon which these claims are based and 
the epistemological logic through which this assumption is generally taken to be 'common 
sense'. For now, it is sufficient to say that there is a complex and interwoven relationship 
between these terms, one in which a discourse will necessarily have an implicit and 
corresponding epistemological logic, grounded in certain ontological claims as to what 
constitutes the central subject.
These understandings of discourse as they relate to International Relations and social 
theory more generally draw from the thinking of Michel Foucault. This influence is 
particularly evident in the way that it is seen to function in a manner replete with social and 
political power. Discourse according to Foucault is "a form of power that circulates in the 
social field and can attach to strategies of domination as well as those of resistance."15 
Discourses in this sense are much more than
ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of 
subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and 
relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and 
producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and 
conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern.16
For Foucault, discourse or discursive fields are an intense site where conflicts over power 
and knowledge take place. The drive for an ascendant discourse, which he describes as the 
'will to truth', "tends to exert a sort of pressure and something like a power of constraint"
14 For more on the influence of positivist-empiricism within international relations see Jim George, "The Study 
of International Relations and the Positivist/Empiricist Theory of Knowledge: Implications for the Australian 
Discipline" in Richard Higgott, (ed.), New Directions in International Relations? Australian Perspectives 
(Canberra: Canberra Studies in World Affairs, 1988), pp. 65-142.
15 Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby, Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press), p. 185.
16 Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 108.
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in an a ttem pt to  u tter a well-ordered and 'true ' discourse.17 The discursive field, in this 
sense, can seen to be a warlike state where the victor emerges possessing legitimate 
knowledge or a claim to  tru th .
Consequently, power and knowledge are connected inextricably and is accordingly often 
w ritten  as power/knowledge. For Foucault, this is the case because "power and knowledge 
directly imply one another... there is no power relation w ithout the correlative constitution 
o f a field o f knowledge, nor any knowledge which does not presuppose and constitute at 
the same tim e power relations."18 In addition to  the symbiotic relationship between 
power/knowledge, Foucault eschews any objective or material conception of power. Power 
fo r Foucault, is not something that can be possessed, rather it is a relationship that is 
enacted in discourse and social interaction. Discourse can thus also be understood in terms 
of its relation to  power. Power in this context is "a dynamic of control and lack of control 
between discourses and the subjects, constituted by discourses, who are their agents. 
Power is exercised w ithin discourses in the ways in which they constitute and govern 
individual subjects."19 Power, understood as a knowledge practice or claim to legitimate 
knowledge, can be exercised through discourse in order to shape and control individuals. 
The subject in this sense is created through the process of discourse. Crucial to grasping the 
nature o f this relationship is to appreciate that this dynamic is not a form of sovereign 
violence or overt coercion but rather a highly modern practice, a subtle process of social 
normalization.
A number of d ifferent ways of understanding such modern techniques of social control, 
including those articulated by Foucault, w ill be discussed further in Chapter 2. For now, 
however, it is enough to say that in an attem pt to elucidate some of the more finely 
insinuated consequences of modern sovereignty and foreign policy, this thesis will not just 
focus on these phenomena as mere objects of knowledge, but also on their surrounding 
discourses.
17 Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse" in Robert Young (ed.), Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader 
(Boston Mass.: Routledge & Kegan, 1981), p. 55 [pp. 48-78].
18 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (transl. by Alan French) (London: Penguin 
Books, 1991), p. 27.
19 Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory, p. 113.
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Construction of state sovereignty and the modern subject
The way in which sovereignty is thought about plays a pivotal role in determining the scope 
of political options and theoretical debates. That is, the long tradition of separating the 
domestic from the international in the study of politics continues to reinforce this division. 
This section will demonstrate that it would not be a major overstatement to say that 
modern sovereignty has come to determine the field of reality in which politics is 
practiced . 20 Further, this ascendancy defies simplistic explanations. The advent of modern 
sovereignty was not a singular foundational event; it is not enough, for example, to point to 
the Treaty of Westphalia in order to gain an understanding of modern sovereignty. The 
affirm ation and reaffirmation of sovereignty is an ongoing process. Walker describes this 
process as a series of "spatiotemporal resolutions through which the early-modern 
accounts of political community were constituted, and then formalized by the principle of 
state sovereignty." 21 Further, these processes have "become so firm ly rooted in modern 
thought and practice" tha t they cannot be distanced from  the way in which they are in turn 
being thought about. 22
W hether one agrees w ith it or not, modern sovereignty and its manifestation within the 
confines of the state are unavoidable. Indeed, the notion of agreeing w ith it or not is 
redundant as its very principles are implicated in the way that knowledge and reality is 
understood. The question is rather to  what extent this pervasive notion is comprehended. 
As Walker suggests,
[t]o  understand the elegance of the resolution of all philosophical options by 
the principle o f state sovereignty, at least to the satisfaction of the modern 
imagination, is to  understand how we find it possible to th ink about the 
struggles for political identity that seem so pressing around us. 23
This pervasiveness of the modern conception of sovereignty can be attributed to the way in 
which it has become ingrained into how key actors and units of analysis are thought about 
in political theory and International Relations and the manner in which the related histories 
are told. In the face of this intractable pervasiveness, this section will seek to highlight the 
flaws in the logic of sovereignty. These fundamental illogics can be seen in the constitution
20 R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), p. 173.
21 Ibid., p. 17.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 178.
21
and operation of sovereignty and in many of the seemingly intractable debates in politics 
that it gives rise to. Thus, this section will look "to destabilize seemingly opposed categories 
by showing how they are mutually constitutive and yet always in the process of dissolving 
into each other."24 This will highlight that some of the seemingly impermeable concepts, 
while pervasive, do not exist as given in global politics.
An extended focus on the question of sovereignty is warranted in order to understand the 
central foundations of the orthodox theorisation of international politics. For as Ashley 
argues, and as will be demonstrated here, (1) modern political life is dependent on the 
sovereignty of the state, and (2) knowledge is dependent on sovereign man.25 For example, 
the predominant existing assumptions regarding sovereignty suggest that the international 
realm is to be characterized as anarchic. Consequently, that which is not subject to 
sovereign rule is subject to anarchy. Furthermore, in order to make this deduction -  some 
realists would even suggest induction -  from the assumption of sovereignty, a positivist 
theory of knowledge is required so that the logic of the binary equation 'that which is not 
sovereignty is therefore anarchy' can be followed. Analysis of modern sovereignty and the 
modern subject is thus essential for understanding the foundational ideas inherent in 
International Relations.
In his genealogy of sovereignty Bartelson highlights three stages in the way in which 
sovereignty has been understood; renaissance, classical and modern.26 These three stages 
correspond with Comte's articulation of the 'Law of the Three Stages' of the mind. Comte 
sought to trace the three main epistemological standpoints of the mind and its 
interpretation and interaction with the world.27 In echoing these, presumably Bartelson is 
implicitly highlighting the interplay of an epistemological world-view and its interaction
24 Ibid., p. 25.
25 Richard K. Ashley, "Living on the Borderlines: Man, Post-structuralism and War", in James Der Derian and 
Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), International/lntertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (New 
York: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 259-321.
26 It is important to emphasise here that Bartelson is not attempting to trace the actual history of what history 
is or has been but rather in true genealogical fashion he is seeking to identify the dominant ways in which it has 
been thought about. This said, it would not be correct to say that "any resemblance to reality is purely 
coincidental", rather there a strong likelihood that actuality of sovereignty will resemblance the way in which it 
is thought as the two are interrelated and interdependent. His genealogy by focusing on the way in which 
sovereignty has been thought about emphasizes the role that this thinking plays in its constitution and that it is 
not a fixed, foundational concept.
27 Comte argued that there were three stages of the human mind; theological, in which primitive and 
supernatural explanations were provided for the origins and nature of things and society is ruled by priests; 
metaphysical, which is dominated by an Enlightenment appeal to universal truths, where hopes rule over 
empiricism and; the scientific or positivist stage where laws based on observation of the world are formulated 
and society is reshaped according to these principles.
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with its ontological grounding in sovereignty. This interplay will be borne in the course of 
this chapter. The first stage of sovereignty, renaissance, sees no unified discourse on 
sovereignty, but rather a scattered array of superstitious paradigms of rulership that 
eventually formed together under the general theory of the state. The second stage, 
classical, sees states emerge as particular and indivisible units, governed under the general 
theory of the state and firmly overseen by the transcendent presence of the sovereign. 
Under the third conception man replaces the King/God figure as the source of knowledge 
and as the locus of sovereignty. In overthrowing the classical regime the modern stage sees 
the sovereignty of man bestowed unto the state under the 'general will' and in doing so, 
allegiance to the state assimilates the differences between all prior communities.28 Some of 
the legacies of the second stage are relevant here, especially the emergence of the notion 
of a 'foreign' policy of the state, which will be explored in Chapter 3, in tracing the 
connections between foreign policy and Enlightenment thought. It is, however, the 
commentary on the third stage, modern sovereignty, that is most important here.
The constitution of sovereignty, in such a way that it is linked to the modern state, is one of 
the most powerful ordering principles in international politics. The emergence of the 
sovereignty of modern man was quickly divulged to the state under the guise of 
representation of the 'general will'. In this way the new secular state in many ways 
resembled the state as it was under the sovereign King/God figure. In contrast with the 
non-secular conception, however, modern sovereignty functions not simply as a way of 
understanding reality but as a tool that can be used to change it.29 The advent of modernity 
heralded an application of science and reforms, rather than the fatalistic acceptance of 
providence, enabling sovereign power to actively work towards the betterment of man. 
Modern sovereignty accordingly emerged amongst the wave of Enlightenment rationality, 
a systemic attempt to expose myth and create order and knowledge. Sovereignty is not a 
recent phenomenon, but what is relevant here is the modern manifestation of sovereignty 
and associated implications it has, firstly, for the way that international politics is imagined 
and, secondly, the way in which the internal subject, or the self, is created.
28 Bartelson, A Genealogy o f Sovereignty, p. 242.
29 Ibid., p. 189.
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Construction o f  modern state sovereignty
Theories of international relations tell us less about the character and 
consequences of state sovereignty than the principle of state sovereignty tells 
us about the categorical structures of international relations theory.
- R.B.J. Walker30
The construction of modern sovereignty gives rise to a series of enduring dichotomies in 
international politics. This stems from the contradictory or paradoxical foundational 
premises upon which sovereignty itself is based. These dichotomies not only inform the key 
debates in International Relations, but also define the discipline as distinct from other 
disciplines. The study of the effects of foreign policy is not seen to overlap with the study of 
the formation of domestic order. This is the case because sovereignty plays a contradictory 
role as the ontological foundation for orthodox accounts of both International Relations 
theory and political theory. International Relations theory sees sovereignty as a foundation, 
pre-existing within the states that make up the international system.31 The contradiction is 
revealed, however, when accounts of the emergence of sovereignty within political theory 
suggest that sovereignty emerged as communities sought to protect themselves against 
the vicissitudes, violence and anarchy of the outside world.32 This distinction is elaborated 
by Walker;
the claim to state sovereignty, is the crucial condition that both permits and 
encourages the constitutive distinction between two traditions of thought 
about, and analysis of, modern political life: (1) a tradition of properly political 
thought on the one side and (2) a tradition of international relations theory on 
the other.
This distinction between inside and outside, whether made explicitly, as it 
usually is in the theory of international relations, or tacitly, as it usually is in 
texts about political theory, continues to inform our understanding of how and 
where effective political practice can be advanced.
The sovereignty of state is, of course, often taken to be the most important 
fact of life in a world of more or less autonomous authorities. Indeed it is so 
important that it is usually taken for granted, left as an abstraction or a 
technical venue for legal squabbles.33
Thus two, at times overlapping, traditions of political thought can be discerned, particularly 
as relates to sovereignty. Far from suggesting the irreconcilability of the traditions of 
international and domestic politics; that one is 'right' and the other 'wrong', this hints at
30 Walker, Inside/Outside, p. 23.
31 Bartelson, A Genealogy o f Sovereignty, p. 21-35.
32 Ibid., p. 35-44.
33 Inside/Outside, p. 13.
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the arbitrariness of their construction and also that sovereignty may not be as fixed nor as 
foundational as is traditionally thought. This contradiction and paradox is something that 
Bartelson highlights as he explores the power/knowledge relationship that surrounds 
modern sovereignty.
This tension between political theory and International Relations theory points to the 
contestation over power and knowledge. This poses particular challenges and even 
disincentives for pursuits like the present one that seeks to investigate the accepted 
relations between international and domestic politics. This is particularly the case when 
one seeks to speak about sovereignty in a way that straddles both the international and 
domestic political disciplines. Further, it means that it is very hard to avoid the questions of 
the nature of sovereignty and knowledge. Bartelson's work is instructive in this regard. By 
tracing the interplay of different understandings of the notion of sovereignty, his analysis 
allows a series of reoccurring discursive practices to be highlighted as a distinct orthodoxy 
in the way it is understood in International Relations. He also highlights that this 
understanding has relied on sovereignty as an unproblematic ontological base for its 
analysis.
Bartelson highlights the complex interdependence between sovereignty and the power of 
knowledge which facilitates the ongoing constitution and reconstitution of the modern 
state. Firstly, the power of sovereignty to "organize political reality through a demarcation 
of inside from outside, same from other" is contingent upon a recognizable and 
authoritative knowledge form that renders it intelligible. 34 Without this "sovereignty 
cannot exist" for its status as a truth or reality would not be verifiable by those observing it 
if there were no common language through which it could be comprehended. 35 Secondly 
and quite paradoxically, the verifiability of knowledge requires a fixed foundation on which 
to base these claims, in short, sovereignty. "Without a proper form of sovereignty, 
knowledge loses its power to organize reality, and to constitute objects and fields of 
enquiry as well as criteria of validity and truth . " 36 In establishing this paradox Bartelson 
demonstrates that there is an interplay of power and knowledge surrounding sovereignty, 
especially when it comes to its ongoing manifestation in the modern state. For Bartleson,
34 Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 244.
35 Ibid., p. 2.
36 Ibid., p. 83.
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"state sovereignty depends not on the presence of a foundational political community but 
on practices of power-knowledge which help constitute this apparent foundation. " 37
This interdependence of modern sovereignty and power/knowledge can be expressed also 
in terms of the nature of the way in which it is thought about, that is, its reliance on a 
foundational epistemology. The emergence of modern sovereignty can be seen as a series 
of processes that tie together the epistemology and ontology of sovereignty in ways that 
make the concept of sovereignty as a foundational notion seem unproblematic. The first 
element of Bartelson's argument described above -  the need for a recognizable and 
authoritative knowledge form -  is the power over the way in which sovereignty is known, 
the power to define its epistemology. The second of element of his argument -  the need 
for a fixed foundation on which to base this knowledge -  is the basis upon which 
knowledge claims are made, the power to define its ontology. The paradox that Bartelson 
identifies arises because the fixed ontological foundation that the knowledge claim 
requires is the one that was affirmed in making that claim. Expressed in these terms, the 
emergence of modern sovereignty is an epistemological shift that is accompanied by an 
ontological shift, the simultaneous movement of the two being what makes this 
manifestation of sovereignty on one hand intelligible and on the other seamlessly 
maintains it as a political foundation. This further affirms the point that Bartelson 
continually illustrates throughout his work; that the way in which sovereignty is understood 
is only made possible by accompanying knowledge practices that make sovereignty 
intelligible.
In a further layer of paradox, however, without the manifestation of modern sovereignty 
the epistemological and ontological shift would not be possible as the modern subject 
would not be able to emerge. With the shift from classical to modern sovereignty, language 
is no longer simply a means of representing a God-given reality but rather is reality. 
Language as it is wielded by the sovereign man -  the modern subject -  has the ability to 
bring reality into being, to shape reality and to create its place in history; knowledge 
becomes more constructible through the medium of language. As will be seen in the next 
section modern sovereignty gives rise to the modern subject, man as the creator 
(emancipator and enslaver) of his own reality. Under this conception, the sovereign state is
37 Richard Devetak, "Postmodernism" in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), Theories o f International 
Relations (London: MacMillan, 1996), p. 184.
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no longer constituted by a metaphorical relationship between a sovereign King/God figure 
and an abstract space. With sovereignty transferred to the individual man, it becomes 
depersonalized and dispersed throughout the social body. This dispersal, however, does 
not leave the social body in a state of flux or anarchy as ideologies such as community, 
nation, race and even democracy can be used to relate each man to the state, giving form 
and shape to the dispersion of sovereignty. Particularly when united and shaped in this way 
toward a common purpose modern knowledge transforms sovereignty into an organizing 
principle of reality; nation states and political community are created, homogenized and 
defined against those who do not cede sovereignty to that state.
The paradox surrounding the constitution of modern sovereignty is important for this 
chapter as it allows a distinct way of thinking and speaking about international politics -  an 
orthodoxy -  to be identified. By showing that modern sovereignty relies on the 
simultaneous movement of epistemology and ontology it goes some way to untying the 
two concepts and highlighting that sovereignty is not a fixed foundational concept but 
rather subject to historical developments in the way in which it is thought about. The 
defining of distinct ways of thinking and fixed ontological foundations continues to give rise 
to quite a distinct body of knowledge surrounding International Relations. This orthodoxy 
encompasses the traditional theories of International Relations -  Realism, Liberalism and 
Marxism -  which all claim fixed foundations for their understanding of the world. This 
foundational orthodoxy can be captured under what is called the positivist approach to 
International Relations.
In order to articulate the positivist approach to politics it is worth briefly returning to the 
final of the three stages of human thought of Comte and Bartelson with which the section 
began. While he does not explicitly state it as such, Bartelson's use of the three stages of 
development as formulated by Comte shares many similarities. Ultimately what Bartelson 
is seeking to articulate in regards to the third stage can be described as the positivist 
epistemology of modern sovereignty. The term positivism was initially coined by Comte in 
what he described as the third and final, or 'scientific' stage of the human mind. Whilst 
positivism has developed since its initial articulation, Comte's articulation constitutes the 
first aspect of positivism, one that
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is still an assumption that dominates the discipline of International Relations 
insofar as scholars search for the same kinds of laws and regularities in the 
international world as they assume characterise the natural w orld .38
In addition to this concern w ith the unity of science, positivism can be seen to  have three 
additional main principles. Firstly, there is a distinction between facts and values; secondly, 
there are regularities in the social world that can be discovered and then theorized; and 
finally that tru th  can be determined by an adherence to an empiricist epistemology, that is 
by reference to  'facts' determ ined in the course of the pursuit of the second principle.39
W ithout probing too deeply into the lim itations of positivism, problems can be seen initially 
in the paradoxical nature of the foundations of its knowledge claims. For any so-called 
'object' to be observed it requires a particular kind of knowledge in order fo r it to be known 
but likewise knowledge requires a basis in some kind of foundation. Take for example the 
following paradox:
how do I know that an object is navy blue if I don't actually know what navy 
blue looks like w ithou t reference to an already existing navy blue object; is my 
navy blue the same as everyone else's navy blue?
This fact of navy blueness cannot be 'known' outside of a reference to  a social reality. That 
is, any foundation of positivist knowledge is not neutral or objective but prone to the 
subjectivities of the observer. A claim to  foundational tru th  is instead an adherence to a 
particular epistemology, which in turn simultaneously privileges and relies upon a 
foundational ontology. In this sense the lim itation of positivism stems from it being a view 
that carries the very same inherent paradoxes as modern sovereignty. Indeed, this is 
because it is the practical manifestation of this very same mindset when it is applied to the 
pursuit of knowledge. The practical manifestations of the lim itations of this kind of 
theorizing will be borne out through this thesis in the general account o f International 
Relations and typified in specific examples of binary discourses such as the security-liberty 
and realist-liberal debates.40 These debates will be highlighted in Chapter 3, however the 
general tendency is tha t while portrayed as occupying polar opposite positions these 
positions are in fact premised upon the same foundational assumptions.
38 Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond", p. 14.
39 Ibid., p. 16.
40 Bartelson describes the tension of the realist-liberal debate as stemming from the foundational assumptions 
of the sovereign state within an international system, which gives rise to the contradictory "prophecy of 
anarchy" and the "promise of universal domestication" in A Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 244.
28
Ashley is also alert to the contradictions inherent in the constitution of the 
sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy. In articulating what he describes as the 'anarchy 
problematique' Ashley highlights three crucial problems that result from the modern 
practice of creating a domestic space within the sovereign state. Firstly, given that the 
sovereign state is neither pre-existing, nor independent of historical experience, in order to 
"stabilize the sovereign grounds of legitimate violence in modern politics", a domestic 
domain of 'sovereign man' needs to be enframed and order inscribed within it .41 This 
practice of ordering and enframing leads to the second and more crucial point. In order to 
create a domestic society,
it is necessary to exclude or silence those [resistant] voices that would expose 
this rendering of 'man in domestic society' for what it is: a representation 
imposed in history and through arbitrary practices of exclusion.42
That is "differences, discontinuities, and conflicts that might be found within all places and 
times must be converted into an absolute difference between a domain of domestic 
society." 43 Finally, Ashley highlights that the practice of representation involved in the 
creation of the domestic will reinforce such practices globally, which in turn further 
naturalize and dehistoricise this practice.44 These problems stemming from the practice of 
modern statecraft have profound implications for the way in which the individual is 
understood and gives rise to a particular kind of citizen who is constructed along the 
dichotomies of sovereignty/anarchy, inside/outside and self/other that have been 
observed here. It is in this way that we see the emergence of the modern subject.
Construction o f the modern subject
The emergence of the modern subject is often linked to Kant's epoch shifting theory of 
transcendental idealism. According to Bartelson, "from Vico and Kant onwards, man 
emerges as the sovereign creator of his representations and concepts; in short, of the 
world he -  the modern subject -  inhabits. " 45 This shift in the epistemic standpoint of man in 
relation to his world coincided with the shift in the location of sovereignty from the King to 
the secular state, via modern man. This powerful shift in the locus of sovereign power saw
41 Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique", 
Millennium, 1988, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 256.
42 Ibid., p. 257.
43 Ibid., (emphasis original).
44 Ibid.
45 Bartelson, A Genealogy o f Sovereignty, p. 188.
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a change in the relationship between the state and the individual. In what is a somewhat 
paradoxical figuration, on one hand, man became the rational and emancipated subject, 
capable of reconfiguring the world according to principles of knowledge. On the other 
hand, however, despite there being -  to varying extents -  a heralded move away from 
instances of overt state control and coercion, thinking man now subjected himself to a 
range of his own methods of restriction and control. Thus the work of Kant offers an insight 
into how the emergence of the modern subject opens the way for radically progressive 
outcomes but can also dramatically close down the perceived scope of reality and tend 
towards conservatism.
The implications of Kant's critique are extensive, as it "effectively pulled the rug out from 
under the mind's pretensions to certain knowledge of things in themselves, eliminating in 
principle any human cognition of the ground of the w orld . " 46 For whilst human experience 
was "structured by largely unconscious principles, [these] principles were not absolute or 
timeless... [and] none could claim a priori access to the universe's intrinsic nature . " 47 Tarnas 
describes the Kantian revolution as "awaken[ing] man to  a new, more adventurous reality, 
yet also radically displacing man... from genuine cognition of that cosmos. " 48 This latter 
feature can tend to  function in a conservative manner when these man-made and 
subjective truths are portrayed as timeless and certain. In this sense it opened the way for, 
on the one hand, the self-critical and emancipatory potential, but also, on the other, the 
ability of the human mind to delim it itself in the process of the creation of its own reality.
This extremely potent mindset represents the creation of the modern subject, one who is 
simultaneously transcendent in the ir ability to reason, yet also limited by the powerful 
forces of specific interpretations of history, language, science and time. In short, the 
modern subject is now known and predicted through the same technologies that are 
designed to provide for emancipation .49 In this sense then, modern man's transcendence -  
the will to power, as Nietzsche described it -  is regulated by the pursuit and categorisation 
of knowledge. Bartelson suggests the perspective of the rational subject
46 Richard Tarnas, The Passion o f the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas that Have Shaped Our World View 
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), p. 351.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 348.
49 A range of ways through which to interpret this paradox of emancipation and limitation of modern man will 
be further explored in Chapter 2.
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invites dreams of transcendence or emancipation: the state is the result of 
crime organized on a huge scale, propelled by massive violence. But so is the 
citizen-spectator himself, since he is a modality of the same historically 
determined subjectivity; his estrangement can only ever be partial, and he 
cannot be emancipated completely from this iron cage of modern sovereignty, 
without, as it were, simultaneously losing knowledge of himself.50
This account of the modern subject and its relation to modern sovereignty to some extent 
defines the individual as we know it, and thus ourselves today. The link between a 
foundational ontology and epistemology through modern sovereignty becomes even more 
integrated as it defines not only the geographical understanding of where one is, but it is 
also essential to how one is able to know oneself. White describes this mindset as the 
'metanarrative of subjectivity' . 51 Grasping fully the logic of this mindset, it begins to emerge 
just
how strongly Western thought is oriented to the consciousness of a subject 
(singular or collective) who is faced with the task of surveying, subduing, and 
negotiating his way through a world of objects, other subjects, and his own 
body.52
The emergence of a modern subjectivity, and in so doing the reaffirmation of territorial 
sovereignty, has thus very powerfully enshrined the binary, dichotomised positivist 
worldview into the fundamental basis of global politics.
Accordingly, it becomes clear how the emergence of the brilliant rationalism of the modern 
subject can be quickly turned in upon itself. This account echoes what Foucault calls a 
technology of the self.53 The emergence of a technology of the self sees the decline of 
identity known "through a system of signs denoting power over others [in favour of a] 
sovereignty that one exercises over oneself. " 54 In this way, what begins to emerge with the 
advent of modern sovereignty is not just a broad state sovereignty over citizens but one 
that is also a far more specific kind of sovereignty that citizens exercise over themselves, a 
sovereignty of the self. Thus the sovereign processes by which the idea of a 'foreign' policy 
become intelligible equally construct the modern subjectivity of the individual.
50 Bartelson, A Genealogy o f Sovereignty, p. 44.
51 Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 6.
52 Ibid.
53 Michel Foucault, Hermeneutics o f the Subject: Lectures at the College de France, 1981-1982 (New York: 
Picador, 2005), p. 333; see also Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (eds.), Technologies of the 
Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault (Massachusets: University of Massachusets Press, 1988).
54 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: Care of the Se//(New York: Random House, 1984), p. 85: 
See also Toby Miller, The Well-Tempered Self: Citizenship, Culture and The Postmodern Subject (Baltimore, 
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 42.
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Sovereignty and the binary nature of things
In its original form, when it was given to men by God himself, language was an 
absolutely certain and transparent sign for things, because it resembled them.
The names of things were lodged in the things they designated, just as 
strength is written into the body of the lion, regality in the eye of the eagle, 
just as the influence of the planets is marked upon the brows of men: the form 
of similitude.
But though language no longer bears an immediate resemblance to the things 
it means, this does not mean it is separate from the world; it still continues, in 
another form, to be the locus of revelations and to be included in the area 
where truth is both manifested and expressed.
Foucault, The Order of Things55
This chapter has sought to address why it is that the conduct of a state's foreign policy is 
not understood to affect its domestic order. Highlighting the role that sovereignty plays in 
obscuring the effects of foreign policy on internal domestic order goes to the conceptual 
core of International Relations. The idea that the operation of foreign policy would shape 
its own domestic sphere is anathema to International Relations, for it is a discourse that 
plays out in a number of starkly oppositional formations; inside and outside, domestic 
policy and foreign policy, self and other and many others. 56 This dualistic logic finds a 
secure basis in the modern sovereign state, from which it continues to authoritatively 
spring, weaving throughout much of everyday discourse. These dichotomies can be 
attributed to the positivist approach to knowledge, which as demonstrated in the 
preceding section, secured an ontological and epistemological foundation in modern 
sovereignty and its juridico-legal logic. Indeed, such a dichotomised world-view could be 
described as being inherent to the empirico-positivist metaphysic. This, however, is not a 
point worth making just in itself. What can be demonstrated by illustrating this 
metaphysical commitment to a dichotomised logic is that a particular pattern consistently 
emerges in the nature of discourses while ever they adhere to this epistemological 
standpoint.
55 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1994) 
p. 36.
56 These others might include, but are not exhausted by the following; realism/liberalism, 
pragmatism/utopianism, domestic/international, political theory/international relations theory, good/evil, 
reason/irrationality, win/lose, fact/theory, practice/theory, USA/USSR, capitalism/communism, 
tradition/modernity, modernity/fundamentalism, West/East, orient/occident, developed/underdeveloped and 
core/periphery.
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According to  Hindess and Hirst, positivist discourse is commonly characterized by circular - 
and thus u ltim ately incoherent -  binary logics. 57 This dichotomised logic is thus not unique 
to modern sovereignty; it has a lengthy tradition throughout Western philosophy, w ith 
major points of reference being the Platonic dualism of thought and the Cartesian 
rationality that characterized the m ind/body d istinction . 58 This trad ition of dichotomised 
logic that is carried throughout Western philosophy can be seen as a vital forebear to 
modern positivist logic as it informs the understanding that there is an objective external 
reality that can be verified, understood and categorised according to scientifically rational 
and empirical methods. The modern understanding of sovereignty is significant in regards 
to the modern construction of knowledge because it both demonstrates this positivist 
characteristic, whilst further perpetuating it through its role as the ontological foundation 
of the current, primarily state-based order. Thus the com m itm ent to the binary logic of 
positivism in the modern era is w ritten into the seemingly natural order of things.
Only by analysing modern sovereignty in terms of the very logic that it stands for does the 
contingent and contradictory nature of sovereignty become apparent. Sovereignty is 
understood to stand in opposition to the anarchy of the international realm. In this 
hierarchical dichotomy it is normalised as a locus of order and legitimacy, while all that is 
considered 'outside' the state is disciplined as disorderly and threatening . 59 The process 
through which sovereignty is privileged is not a process of differentiating sovereignty and 
anarchy. It is a process through which sovereignty is recurrently constituted and constantly 
reaffirmed as part of the natural order, an a historical foundational underpinning. By 
viewing sovereignty instead as a product of historical and discursive construction, the 
tendency w ith in  much of modern International Relations discourse to form  oppositional 
positions can sim ilarly be seen as a result of these same historical processes. This does not 
make stepping out of the positivist outlook straightforward, but it does lessen the 
obligation to maintain a deferential a ttitude towards what might be otherwise seemingly 
clear-cut distinctions. Instead of seeing the dichotomous tendency as 'how things are', it 
can instead be treated as an orthodoxy. Thus, despite having not yet developed any clear
57 Barry Hindess & Paul Hirst, Mode of Production and Social Formation (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 13-18, 
cited in McDonell, Theories of Discourse, p. 65.
58 Walker, Inside/Outside, pp. 127-130; George, Discourses of Global Politics, pp. 18-22 and 4-49; for more 
information on the concept of dualism in philosophy see "Dualism" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Accessed from plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/ on 30/04/09.
59 Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State", pp. 229-230.
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normative position, a post-positivist stance does not automatically entail following -  or 
even rejecting in entirety -  what is in essence an entrenched orthodoxy.
This entrenched conservatism is particularly evident within the discourses of International 
Relations. Indeed, some of the clearest manifestations of this dichotomised logic are 
evidenced in International Relations, which has prompted critical scholars to describe it as 
the 'backward discipline' . 60 Given the mutually reinforcing constitution of modern ontology 
and epistemology within the sovereign state, the sense of certainty it bestows is very 
strong within International Relations. Sovereignty acts as the basis and ensures the primacy 
of key bipartisan notions such as the territorial state. From the dichotomised logic of the 
sovereign state stem many of the key concepts, dynamics and debates within the discipline 
that were mentioned in the opening of this section. Furthermore, in most instances such 
binary discourses are formulated in terms of the opposition of an idealist or explicitly 
normative stance against a realistic, practical or even pessimistic conception of the world. 
This can be clearly seen in the structure of the great ideological and theoretical struggles 
mentioned above. Even with regards to spatially determined dichotomies this pattern 
tends to hold equally; within realist thinking there is the binary distinction between the 
internal and external world. The latter is founded in a state of nature which is starkly 
distinguished from the peaceful sovereign realm where there is a suspension of the harsh 
real world of politics. Similarly, within liberal internationalist thinking, the repressive 
climate of the domestic realm, characterized by the rule of the Leviathan is contrasted with 
global civil society or even the perpetual peace of global government.
Thus it becomes increasingly apparent that the discourses surrounding International 
Relations tend to be based upon fundamentally similar assumptions as a result of the 
formulation of state sovereignty according to dichotomised positivist logic. Despite the 
seemingly irresolvable differences between the various sides of the first 'great debate' of 
International Relations there are a number of common points of agreement that tend to 
give rise to familiar patterns of politics, patterns that many have been inclined to call 'laws'. 
The account offered in this chapter, however, seeks to highlight the historically-contingent 
nature of the discourses of state sovereignty, and those that stem from it, as well as the 
role that power and knowledge have played in excluding alternative narratives of global
60 Mervyn Frost, quoted in George, Discourses o f Global Politics, p. 16.
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politics. Indeed, such critical readings of the dynamics of this dichotomised discourse mean 
that its structural logic can be articulated.
This chapter has highlighted the contradictory nature of modern sovereignty and its 
production of dichotomized depictions of the international, the state and the subject. The 
study of International Relations has a foundational tradition of separating the domestic 
from the international realm, a practice stemming from a modern reading of state 
sovereignty and the form ation of the individual subject within this internal order. 
Understanding the dualistic logic of International Relations and the sovereign foundations 
upon which these distinctions are based suggests that the form erly certain boundaries of 
inside/outside, domestic/foreign sovereignty/anarchy are rather more ambiguous and 
permeable. Indeed, the fundamental identity of the poles of each of these binary equations 
cannot be determined w ithout reference to the other. This understanding of the 
production of boundaries provides an excellent basis from which to fu rther explore key 
notions such as foreign policy and how it may be understood in terms of its ability to affect 
domestic populations.
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Chapter 2
Conceptualizing foreign policy and social control
This chapter offers a number of ways in which the constitution and control of society can 
be understood. These frameworks are able to make the effects of foreign policy on 
domestic social order intelligible, foregrounding the approaches that will be employed 
throughout the thesis. In addition to highlighting the effects of foreign policy on social 
order, these approaches all shed light on the way that Enlightenment rationality and 
modernity act upon the self. As was detailed in the previous chapter, the advent of modern 
subjectivity enabled reason in individuals and productivity throughout society; an 
emancipation that was, however, subject to its own internal constraints and regulations. It 
is this other 'dark side', the dynamic of control and regulation within modern social 
processes that this chapter is concerned with.
It is the contention of this thesis that foreign policy equally has an 'other side'. It is not, 
however, the zero-sum costs that are exacted within the international arena that are of 
concern here but rather the attendant processes of constitution and regulation that occur 
domestically. Foreign policy can equally be understood in this light as a modern apparatus
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of governance, designed to achieve security and prosperity for its constituents. In seeking 
to detail the way in which the alternative regulatory and control dimensions of 
Enlightenment rationality and modernity are thought to act upon the self, this chapter can 
be seen as offering a genealogy of sorts, which renders the other 'dark side' of modernity 
intelligible. Such accounts will equally enable this other side of foreign policy to be 
considered in subsequent chapters.
As the effects of foreign policy upon the self is likely to occur within the domestic political 
realm, the following accounts will draw from sociological traditions and from accounts of 
politics that describe the workings of internal politics. Insofar as democracy is portrayed as 
the apogee of Enlightenment reason and the highest stage of political freedom and 
emancipation, it seems apt that the first point of departure in this genealogy of sorts is an 
early study of a functioning republic, America.
Tocqueville and democracy
The effect that modern technologies can exert upon a social body was observed and 
ominously described by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 19th century.1 Whilst Tocqueville 
occupies a high place in the canon of conservative or libertarian accounts of the 
effectiveness and liberty of the American political system,2 his observations offer poetic 
and sophisticated accounts of the machinations of control and dangers of tyranny within a 
liberal democracy. Tocqueville's initial journey to the United States in 1831 was undertaken 
in order to study the US prison system and assess its viability for France, which as we will 
see later in this chapter offers a thematic link with Foucault's studies of the prison system.3 
Tocqueville's earlier observations of the American prison system bears a resemblance to 
the broader observations he makes of the organization of American society in his later 
studies. Describing the order of a prison, Tocqueville's vivid recollection was that
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (ed. and transl. by Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop) 
(London: Folio Society, 2002).
2 Tocqueville, Democracy in America is a key text in introductory political science courses in United States 
Universities. See also the website for the magazine The Tocquevillian, accessed from www.tocquevillian.com/ 
on 11/09/05.
3 Gustave de Beaumont & Alexis de Tocqueville, On the Penitentiary System in the United States and Its 
Application in France (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964 [1831]). For further exploration of 
the link between these two French authors, Dominick Lacapra, History and Reading: Tocqueville, Foucault, 
French Studies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) and Sam Turner, Discourse and Silence in 
Tocqueville's Study of American Penitentiaries, 1998. Accessed from xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/ 
foucault/frnt.html on 08/09/2005.
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the discipline is perfect... it is a tour de force which is reborn unceasingly and 
which has to be reproduced each day, under penalty of compromising the 
whole system of discipline.4
While the account of Tocqueville suggested that the threat of overt coercion and harsh 
punishment played an important part in maintaining the social order, he placed more 
emphasis on the fact that the inmates were restricted in their communications with one 
another and were subject to constant surveillance.5 These observations of the technology 
of control clearly amazed Tocqueville but at the same time left him with a profound sense 
of disquiet that was more clearly articulated in his later study.
Tocqueville's 1835 study, Democracy in America, is a wide-ranging and widely read account 
of the workings of the liberal democracy of the United States. As well as thoroughly 
addressing the functioning of the various political and social institutions, he highlighted 
threats to American democracy that he felt had no precedence in history nor expressions 
to describe it.6 For Tocqueville "old words [such as] despotism and tyranny" were not 
suitable, yet this threat was still a "kind of oppression."7 In attempting to define it, he 
described "an innumerable crowd of like and equal men.... [e]ach of them withdrawn and 
apart."8 Elevated above this crowd he saw "an immense tutelary power... absolute, 
detailed, regular, far-seeing and mild."9 This power simultaneously sought to "prepare men 
for manhood", whilst “ keep[ing] them fixed irrevocably in childhood," that is, it shaped 
their development in such a way that made them manageable.10 This tutelary effect "little 
by little steals the very use of free will from each citizen."* 11 In addition, Tocqueville saw the 
operation of this new social technology upon individuals as distinct from the despotism of 
absolute government.12 Despotism was enacted crudely on the body, whereas "in 
democratic republics tyranny... leaves the body and goes straight for the soul."13 Again, this 
is an attempt by Tocqueville to articulate an account of the more subtle technologies of 
social control.
4 Quoted in George Wilson Pierson, Tocqueville in America (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 68.
5 Ibid., p. 67.
6 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 662.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 663.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Thomas L. Dumm, Democracy and Punishment: Disciplinary Origins o f the United States (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 134; see also Michael Rogin, "The Tranquilizing Text?", Political Theory 17(1), Feb 
1989, pp. 141-148.
13 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 244.
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From his observations of the United States, Tocqueville ultimately observed that 
democracy could act in a very oppressive manner. Democracy had the potentia l to be 
"more centralized, powerful, and unanimous than any absolutist regime" especially in 
regards to those who were seen as deviant or non-citizens . 14 Tocqueville highlights the 
plight of groups against whom the weight of public opinion had turned. The firs t were 
those internal others who hold views that dissent from  the majority. In a democracy like 
America, according to Tocqueville
the majority draws a formidable circle around thought. Inside those lim its the 
w riter is free; but unhappiness awaits him if he dares to leave them... [to the 
extent that] he finally bends under the effort of day and returns to silence as if 
he fe lt remorse for having spoken the tru th . 15
This highlights the impact that the majority has on thought and its role in constituting a 
"tyranny of the majority " . 16 The second were the 'o ther tw o races' who "are American 
w ithout being democratic... in the midst of the [white] democratic people . " 17 One 
interpretation of Tocqueville's view of democracy hoids that "violence and coercion has 
been withdrawn from the centre of the polity, and sent to preside over the internal and 
external borders of the white man's covenant. " 18 This remarkable account of the power a 
democracy can exert upon its citizens underlies the concern of this chapter to  describe 
such additional aspects of enlightened thinking.
The observations by Tocqueville of the power of modern institutions of control are 
particularly valuable as he is able to avoid viewing them as 'normal'. Many of the 
observations of Tocqueville seem to shock and astound him and appear genuinely alien to 
him. Ultimately, however, the intim idation or even reverence w ith which Tocqueville holds 
these technologies restricts the extent to which he is able to conceptualize this power in a 
broader context. As the power of modernity over its own citizens is fu rther probed in this 
chapter it w ill become clear that the estrangement that Tocqueville experiences does not 
necessarily stem from an obvious difference between France and America. His insightful 
observations more likely stem from  the fact that as a foreigner he is to some extent 'o ther' 
from the American system and is not a product o f the identity that he describes and
14 Dario Melossi. The State o f Social Control: A Sociological Study of Concepts o f State and Social Control in the 
Making o f Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 102.
15 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 244.
16 Ibid., ch. 7.
17 Ibid., p. 303.
18 Ronald Takaki quoted in Melossi, The State of Social Control, p. 102.
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accordingly is able to self-reflect upon it, given critical distance. This also suggests that the 
observations of Tocqueville were not entirely a sign o f his immense prescience but rather 
were a result of his distance from it. This awareness of modern rationality as a mindset or 
even an ideology and the role it plays in social organisation is a central concern for this 
thesis and can be further seen in theories of alienation.
Alienation and the self
Alienation has been used in a wide variety of contexts and w ith d ifferent in tentions . 19 
Alienation can refer to feelings of unease or hostility from  or toward another person, 
loneliness, physical separation from  an object, or even the legal transfer of property. Here 
there will be a shift away from  these general descriptive usages toward the specific, older 
theoretical understanding of it, whereby it can offer an account of the way in which 
processes driven by modern rationality act upon individuals and social groups. In that 
context then alienation is best used in the various senses that it was employed by G.W F, 
Hegel, in the early writings of Karl Marx and by such existentialist writers as Martin 
Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. The general usage amongst these writers depicts an 
alienation from  the self as a result of rational practices or thought. According to these 
theorists, self-alienation manifests in a number of ways culminating in alienation from 
faith, labour or society more generally.
Hegel's initial concern w ith alienation stemmed from  the break-down of an authentic 
connection between man and God. Hegel argued that understandings of God were being 
imposed by authority rather than the thought of the individual. He saw this as a situation 
where individuals were less likely to understand the ways in which they interrelated w ith, 
and were actively involved in, shaping the external world. This a ttem pt to objectify what 
Hegel viewed as the projection of the thoughts and truths of the subject represented a 
symptom of man's self-alienation .20 Hegel's observation offers an early concern w ith the 
implications that result from claims to knowledge and in this sense it can also be seen as a 
criticism of control exercised on an individual by an authority. He suggests that the 
acceptance of knowledge is determined by authority not by the reasons behind it, giving
19 Richard Schacht, Alienation (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. lix-lxv.
20 Richard Schacht, "Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and the Future of Self-Alienation" in Felix Geyer and Walter R. Heinz 
(eds.), Alienation, Society and the Individual: Continuity and Change in Theory and Research (New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1992), pp. 1-16.
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rise to a status quo and undermining the critical capacity of philosophy to question and 
initiate change. 21 For Hegel “the objectivity of the deity increased in direct proportion to 
the increase in the corruption and slavery of man", which brings about a world where men 
are passive onlookers alienated from their faith and from one another. 22
Marx continued this concern of Hegel's in his early writings, but shifted the concern of 
alienation from the broad issue of the objectification of man to the more applied 
separation of man's labour from the end product. Marx describes how the alienation of 
man from his labour via money and the market allows the material production process to 
create social classes whereby control is limited to the elites. On one hand the alienation in 
the work of Marx attempts to move away from a grand theoretical explanation of mankind 
to a specific political mode of analysis. This focus not only provides an excellent insight into 
the effect of the rationality of the capitalist production process on the individual but also 
illustrates the role this process itself plays in individualising and controlling workers. On the 
other hand, however, this specific focus is fixed firmly within the sphere of labour relations. 
The strength of Marx's analysis derives from his insights into the process of an individual's 
alienation from labour and the application of this to the constitution of class structures. 
The question for this thesis is whether this analysis can be extended beyond the class 
analysis to the operation of foreign policy and consequent alienation of individuals, 
particularly insofar as Marx's analysis of class allows him to connect individual alienation to 
a broader class analysis. In short, Marx offers significant insight into man's alienation from 
labour but this class-based analysis is not as flexible as other perspectives on alienation.23
Heidegger's concern is with man's existence in the world, what he describes as 'they-self. 
The 'they-self' is a self that is not properly individual but rather made up of everyone and 
no-one in particular. For Heidegger this form of existence is "not only tempting and 
tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating. " 24 This conception of alienation is more 
concerned with the ontology of being, rather than class divisions and the control of labour. 
That is, his concern is explicitly with self-alienation at a fundamental level. Indeed, the 
Heideggerian state of alienation does not change the self into something else, but rather
21 Alvin W. Gouldner, Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory, ch. 6.
22 Hegel quoted in Georg Lukacs, The Young Hegel (London: Merlin Press, 1975), p. 18.
23 Schacht, Alienation, pp. 113-114.
24 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 222.
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into another form of self, one that is "entangled in itself. " 25 The alienation of the 'they-self' 
is seen as constantly tempting and requires ongoing self-reflection or 'uncanniness' in 
order to maintain an 'authentic' self. In Heidegger's account of alienation, it is not so much 
an external force exerting control over the individual but rather a mindset that is relatively 
freely adopted by the individual under which they then unconsciously exert control over 
themselves. The power and uneasiness of Heidegger's understanding of alienation is that, 
like the account provided by Tocqueville, the sense of alienation is as likely to be as 
prevalent within a democracy as in other, less enlightened, forms of political and social 
organization.
Sartre does not offer a very consistent understanding of alienation. Indeed his usage of it 
varies across his works.26 Generally speaking his concern is more applied than Hegel or 
Heidegger and is often concerned with the effect that labour and capitalism has on the self. 
Sartre does, however, broaden its usage to include the totalizing processes that produce a 
generalised alienation "through the praxis of others, and through his own praxis as other, 
the domination of man by matter... and domination of matter by man. " 27 Der Derian offers 
a rationale for this broadening by Sartre, suggesting that
since all types of praxis are alienable or potentially hostile, the concept of 
alienation is expanded by Sartre to include other forms of domination through 
alienation. This means that there are multiple, often overlapping mediations at 
work in all sectors of society.28
Der Derian's interpretation of Sartre suggests that alienation can be used in ways that are 
more flexible than Marx and perhaps more applied than Hegel or Heidegger. This ultimately 
rudimentary articulation suggests that Sartre's discussion could potentially offer a broad- 
based understanding of control, which might be called an 'alienated society' along the lines 
of the 'disciplinary society' articulated by Foucault.
While the theory of alienation has been often used in political theory to describe domestic 
social processes, it has not been widely used to understand foreign policy. Der Derian is an 
exception to this. In his writings on diplomacy, he holds that the interrelations between
25 Ibid., p. 223.
25 Schacht, Alienation, pp. 218-230.
27 Jean Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason: Volume One. (transl. by Alan Sheridan-Smith) (Verso, NY: 
2004), p. 152.
28 James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy o f Western Estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1987),
p. 26.
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nation-states are also evidence of a kind of alienation. Der Derian revises the English School 
of IR, particularly the work of Hedley Bull on diplomatic culture, suggesting that "it is 
difference, deviance and otherness which constitute and reveal the need for a diplomatic 
culture. " 29 While something of a progressive element within orthodox IR, the English School 
maintains a solely external focus to its accounts of international politics. The English School, 
like realists, see the international realm as anarchic in the sense described by Thomas 
Hobbes. Drawing, however, on the ideas of Immanuel Kant and Hugo Grotius anarchy is 
mediated by the practices and laws of a society of states. Deviating from the English 
School, Der Derian draws on the insights of Foucault, arguing that various historical and 
linguistic modes of diplomacy have in fact produced the estrangement of states from one 
another. Accordingly, Der Derian's use of alienation begins to explore how external 
diplomacy may affect the self insofar as it is implicated in the historical construction of 
states as discrete inviolable entities. What is needed in turn is to be able to capture the 
effect of foreign policy upon the internal social order of the state.
W eber and the ‘iron cage'
The Weberian understanding of the 'iron cage' highlights similar themes as the analyses of 
alienation, particularly as it relates to the power of rationality over society as it is enacted 
through human labour. In the context of this chapter, Weber's concern with the effects of 
rationality is important. Weber confronts the restrictive elements of Enlightenment 
rationality, in particular the seemingly cold, inescapable efficiency and reason of 
bureaucracy that Weber describes as an 'instrumental rationality'. According to one author, 
Weber viewed "bureaucratic organization [as] the animate machine that corresponded to 
the inanimate machine of the factory and fabricated the shell of bondage encasing the 
modern worker. " 30 It was this mindset of the capitalist work ethic that Weber felt would 
ultimately constrain the freedom of man and for which he coined the famous phrase 'the 
iron cage' . 31 The iron cage is seen to represent the way in which the human body could 
become trapped as a result of the pursuit of instrumental rationality. This meant the 
human body would not be literally harmed or coercively punished by a controlling state,
29 Ibid., p. 91.
30 Martin Albrow, "The Application of the Weberian Concept of Rationalization to Contemporary Conditions" in 
Scott Lash & Sam Whimster (eds.), Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 
179.
31 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (transl. by Talcott Parsons) (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 181.
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but rather that through the bureaucratic mindset man would become imprisoned by itself. 
In this sense his concern is similar to that of Marx but incorporating the effects of self­
alienation that concerned Hegel and Heidegger.
Weber was also concerned over the effect that instrumental rationality would have on 
traditional values and practices. In accordance with the Hegelian concerns of an alienation 
from faith, Weber felt that the consequence of the rationalisation of society toward the 
goal of efficiency would be the secularisation and ultimately the 'disenchantment' of 
individuals. The attempt to either perfect or reject social traditions would give rise to a 
world devoid of meaning except that which would be provided by external goods. The 
Weberian iron cage provides a powerful and stark conception of the associated elements 
that attend the freedom and liberty of modern reason. His account describes the effect of 
this mentality upon the self-conception of the individual, and the subsequent implications 
for society more broadly. This Weberian analysis strongly informs the thinking of many 
important critics of the power of rationality over the seif, particularly the theorists that 
framed what became known as the Frankfurt School. Before addressing these thinkers, 
however, it is important to touch upon the work of Gramsci, a political activist and thinker 
who was associated with these theorists.
Gramsci and hegem ony
Like alienation, hegemony has a wide and general usage. Unlike alienation, the more 
general usage of hegemony stills retains some of its specific political meaning relating to 
control and domination, although it often lacks the subtlety that its Gramscian meaning 
entails. Antonio Gramsci was a Marxist activist who was imprisoned in 1926 by the Italian 
Fascist government under laws enacted by a declared state of emergency. Gramsci's Prison 
Notebooks have made a major contribution to both Marxism and Critical Theory. According 
to Gramsci, hegemony expands the understanding of class domination and brings it 
together with the idea of 'false consciousness', a concept associated with the Marxian 
understanding of alienation. False consciousness in that sense was a fixation on the 
accumulation of material goods, achieved through labour, at the expense of a broader 
political consciousness. For Gramsci, bringing together the two Marxian notions of class 
domination and false consciousness allowed two understandings of control to be reached;
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coercive control and consensual control, or hegemony. 32 Coercive control is the more 
conventional understanding of literal power or force that can be exercised against 
individuals. Consensual control or hegemony focuses on the processes of control that lead 
an individual to "'voluntarily' assimilate that world-view... of the dominant group. " 33 
Hegemony occurs as a result of broad social and ideological ascendancy that ultimately 
fashions the consent of individuals. This consensual process of control is thus seen to be 
produced and reproduced through a network of apparatuses, culture and discourse that 
are to some extent seen to be 'outside' of the political arena. In this context Gramsci 
describes the state as being "hegemony protected by the armour of coercion. " 34 Thus the 
maintenance of control entails the interaction of force and consent. 35
The Gramscian distinction between consensual and coercive methods of control offers a 
simple yet effective insight into the subtleties of control. While the distinction between 
consensual and coercive control can be drawn, they are fundamentally related. The 
consensual control requires processes of incentive and deterrence, while equally coercive 
regulation cannot be directed against every citizen at once and requires wider processes of 
consent to be effective. Having observed a potent nexus of political and social power, and 
indeed falling foul of it himself, Gramsci envisioned ways to resist it. The strength of 
Gramsci's work lies in its ability to discern subtle methods of control but also to theorise 
ways in which they may be resisted. In seeking both to understand and to resist control 
"Gramsci de-emphasized the politico-military aspects of 'class war' and emphasized instead 
the politico-cultural aspects of hegemony building. " 36 Overcoming the power of coercive 
and consensual control was best pursued not by attempting to overcome the coercive 
powers through armed struggle but rather to shift the consent for the regime through 
'counter-hegemonic resistance' waged via mediums such as cultural or social movements 
or forms of personal resistance. This was seen as best achieved through the very channels 
that hegemony itself was exercised; that is, through intellectual and social movements. 
Through cultural resistance Gramsci offered a path to social and political change that
32 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (ed. & transl. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Noewll 
Smith) (New York: International Publisher, 1971), p. 218.
33 Paul Ransome, Antonio Gramsci: An Introduction (New York: Harvester Wheatsheef, 1998), p. 150.
34 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 262.
35 Roger Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction (revised edn.) (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1991), p. 22.
36 Dario Melossi, The State o f Social Control: A Sociological Study o f Concepts o f State and Social Control in the 
Making o f Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 88.
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seemed less susceptible to the pitfalls of idealistic visions of change identified in the 
critiques of rationality addressed throughout this chapter.
Frankfurt School, rationality and mod ernity
The Frankfurt School is a philosophical and sociological movement that is associated with 
the ideas of Critical Theory. Key thinkers include Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, 
Herbert Marcuse, and to some extent Jürgen Habermas. Like Gramsci, the concerns of 
these thinkers stemmed from a desire to understand the reasons for the failure of the 
revolutionary theories of Marx and the rise of fascism in its stead.37 This breakdown 
between theory and practice was not seen to represent absolute flaws in these theories 
but rather a narrow or one-sided understanding of them. Given such a narrow 
understanding, the project of critical theory was tto critique theories that appeared to be 
one-sided in order to be aware of the side-effects that accompany notions like liberty and 
democracy.38 This approach sought to avoid positivist theorising and instrumental 
rationality, believing it led toward absolutist coinceptions, which regulated humans as 
equally as it freed them. They took particular issue "with any social theory which, under the 
cover of scientific objectivity, effectively conspires with the existing order."39 The Frankfurt 
School critiques were broad-ranging, however, in tthe context of the concern of this chapter 
it is the ability to discern widespread, yet subtle ptrocesses of control that is particularly of 
interest. With this in mind there are two central aspects of the work of the Frankfurt School 
that are relevant here.
Enlightenment rationality
The very same rationality which provides fcor humankind's emancipation from 
the bondage of mythic powers and allow.'s for progressive domination over 
nature, engenders, through its intrinsic character, a return to myth and new, 
even more absolute forms of domination.40
The Enlightenment, particularly in the sense that iit is used by Horkheimer and Adorno in 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment, refers not so much specifically to the philosophy of the 18th
37 David West, An Introduction to Continental Philosophy (Camtbridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 193.
38 This is captured well by West; "genuinely critical theory muiist identify human potentialities neglected within 
the existing social order, and so uncover the 'negative' monments of existing reality -  that moment in other 
words, which promises further dialectical transformation. Neeedless to say, it is this negative dimension of 
present society which is invisible to positive science." Ibid., p. 6i0.
39 Ibid., p. 59.
40 J. M. Bernstein, 'Introduction' in Theodor W. Adorno, The Clulture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture 
(London: Routledge, 1991), p. 4.
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century, but to the processes of technological and scientific domination that ensued. The 
Dialectic o f Enlightenment is an emblematic articulation of Frankfurt School concerns and 
to some extent the key concerns of this chapter. It sought to confront the Enlightenment, 
highlighting the workings of its internal logic and the tendency for this logic to produce the 
outcomes other than the objectives that, w ithin modern liberal society, are held in such 
high esteem. In this way it "charged] the self-destruction of Enlightenment. " 41 This very 
ambitious project is one that they describe as "nothing less than the discovery of why 
mankind, instead of entering into a tru ly  human condition is sinking into a new kind of 
barbarism . " 42 The inspiration for turning this critical attention back on the Enlightenment 
can be traced to Friedrich Nietzsche and, like several o f the other thinkers addressed in this 
chapter, Florkheimer and Adorno sought to critique the processes of domination inherent 
within instrumental ra tionality .43
For Horkheimer and Adorno it is this rationality that allows science to develop ways in 
which we can verifiably 'know' the natural world. Based on this knowledge it is possible to 
predict and control nature through processes of domination. In the ir writing, Florkheimer 
and Adorno describe subjective reality as 'nature' and in that context man's attem pt to 
create objective knowledge is seen as an attem pt to remove itself from its nature .44 This 
conception allows them to link and equate enlightened man's domination of nature 
through science with the domination of individuals and society through instrumental 
rationality .45 The result of this is that
[tjhinking objectifies itself to become an automatic, self-activating process; an 
impersonation of the machine that it produces itself so that ultimately the 
machine can replace i t .46
Elsewhere, Florkheimer also states that Enlightenment pursuit of freedom is "identical w ith 
the control of nature in us and outside us through rational decision." 47 For Flabermas there 
is a similar concern to that of his earlier critical theorist counterpart when he argues that 
"[t]he permanent sign of Enlightenment is dom ination over an objectified external nature
41 Emphasis added, Ibid.
42 Theodor W. Adorno & Max Florkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (transl. by John Cumming) (2nd edn.) 
(London: Verso, 1986), p. xi.
43 Ibid., p. 44.
44 Ibid., p. 39.
45 Ibid., pp. 34-42; for an account of the critiques of this formulation see Paul Connerton, Tragedy o f the 
Enlightenment: An Essay on the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 62-79.
46 Horkheimer & Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 25.
47 Horkheimer quoted in Connerton, Tragedy o f Enlightenment, p. 63.
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and a repressed internal nature. " 48 These accounts also maintain that positive 
interpretations of the Enlightenment are accompanied by the tendency for Enlightenment 
rationality to engender control of the processes of decision-making and identity creation as 
equally as it seeks to dominate the processes of nature through science.
The pursuit of instrumental rationality and its tendency toward control and categorisation 
creates what is described as an 'administered society' . 49 The pursuit of the Enlightenment 
progress was seen to be best achieved through a commitment to expert and objective 
knowledge and by participating in the capitalist economy. Many individuals, however, lack 
the combination of time and expertise required to play a genuine part in understanding 
important political and social processes. Thus individuals become "subjected to the 
'technical apparatus' originally designed to serve them . " 50 Whilst the organization of 
society on the basis of achieving efficiency has led to an unprecedented level of social and 
economic productivity, the totalising processes of the administered society has equally led 
to the breakdown of "individuality and particularity" within society.51 According to 
Marcuse, the social implications of an administered society constitute a system of social 
control. 52 In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse shares the concerns of his Frankfurt School 
colleagues that the use of "technology rather than terror" suppresses social processes to 
the point where "the scope of society's domination over the individual is greater than ever 
before. " 53 The influence of the early work of Marx and Hegel is evident in the importance 
he places on 'alienation' in the creation of the subject. According to Marcuse, "[a]lienation 
is the constant and essential element of identity, the objective side of the subject" that 
"isolates the individual from the one dimension where he could 'find himself': from his 
political existence. " 54 Marcuse's account is similar to earlier articulations of alienation, 
highlighting that the instrumental rationalisation of most dimensions of everyday life
48 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourses o f Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), quoted in West, 
An Introduction to Continental Philosophy, p. 62.
49 Craig Calhoun, Critical Social Theory: Culture, History, and the Challenge o f Difference (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1995), p. 31.
50 West, Introduction to Continental Philosophy, p. 62.
51 Douglas Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989), p. 54.
52 See Chapter 1, 'The New Forms of Control' in Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology 
of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).
53 Ibid., p. x.
54 Herbert Marcuse, 'Repressive Tolerance', in Paul Connerton (ed.), Critical Sociology (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1976), p.323; see also Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore Jr & Herbert Marcuse, A 
Critique o f Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).
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creates a range of material and identity concerns for the self that cause it to become 
increasingly depoliticised.
Enlightenment as mass deception
These preliminary articulations by the Frankfurt School of the power of Enlightenment 
rationality over the self can be seen clearly in relation to culture. In a similar manner to 
Gramsci, Frankfurt School theorists viewed the political and social power of the 
Enlightenment logic to be proliferating in a way that was broader and more diffuse than 
would be the case through just 'political' means. The outline of what became known as the 
'culture industry' was laid out by Florkheimer and Adorno in The Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
The operation of control through cultural forms was seen by these authors as a project of 
"mass deception", one that operates both at the level of individual self-deception and at a 
general social level of cultural trends.55 This process of deception through culture was not 
seen as an explicit project consciously waged by elites, but rather the diffusion of 
instrumentally rational approaches throughout everyday culture, which in turn shapes 
knowledge, identity and prioritisation of particular material goals, thus recreating the 
existing order. Exposure to, and participation in, mass culture is accordingly seen as a 
process whereby social groups subject themselves to the power of public and private forms 
of social control.56
This initial articulation prompted a number of more substantial accounts. Following on 
from his work with Florkheimer, Adorno argued that even for those who are able to see 
through the deception of the culture industry, they are not able to be free from it. If they 
act outside of the norms it purveys, Adorno argues, they will be exposed as outsiders and 
accordingly obliged to again submit to the same dominating culture. 57 As well as disputing 
the idea that the potent influence of culture can be avoided, Adorno warns against any 
perception that it can be apolitically consumed.
There is no immediacy of culture: wherever it allows itself to be consumed 
arbitrarily by a public as consumer goods, it manipulates people. The subject 
becomes the subject of culture only through the mediation of objective 
discipline.58
55 Horkheimer & Adorno, Dialectic o f Enlightenment, p. 120.
56 Ibid., pp. 150-151.
57 'The Schema of Mass Culture' in Adorno, The Culture Industry, pp. 82-83.
58 'Culture and Administration', in Adorno, The Culture Industry, p. 112.
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According to Adorno, culture can no longer be seen as just a sector of society but is rather a 
vastly pervasive system of administered norms that "impedes the development of 
autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves. " 59 
Culture thus not only operates as a mechanism of social control, it has become the "very 
mechanism which ties the individual to his society. " 60
The Frankfurt School critique offers a penetrating insight into Enlightenment rationality and 
culture. Their critique demonstrates that the "reason which was to be the means to 
satisfying human ends became its own end, and thereby turned against the true aims of 
Enlightenment: freedom and happiness. " 61 This articulation captures the sentiment of this 
chapter and is suggestive of how foreign policy might operate domestically via the culture 
industry. Indeed, evoking a ghastly apparition Adorno describes
the terror for which the people of every land are being prepared glares ever 
more threateningly from the rigid features of these culture-masks: in every 
peal of laughter we hear the menacing voice of extortion and the comic types 
are legible signs which represent the contorted bodies of revolutionaries.62
This powerful imagery is evocative and begins to capture the complex interweaving of 
culture with looming articulations of danger pervaded by foreign policy. This cultural 
process of control is instructive as to how subsequent chapters will seek to understand the 
effects of foreign policy. Perhaps, however, the Frankfurt School articulation is too severe. 
Furthermore, the concern of the Frankfurt School with the effects that material goods have 
on the organization of society is insightful but not entirely suited to describing foreign 
policy. The framework required to make the domestic effects of foreign policy intelligible 
needs to be both subtle and extensive given that the role of foreign policy in social control 
goes largely unnoticed.
The 'iron cage' revisited
In light of the incisiveness of the Frankfurt School critique and their clear indebtedness to 
Weber it is necessary to briefly revisit the latter. Like the notions of alienation and 
hegemony, the Weberian 'iron cage' metaphor evokes powerful imagery and has
59 'The Culture Industry Revisited', in Adorno, The Culture Industry, p. 92.
60 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 9.
61 Bernstein, 'Introduction', p. 4.
62 Adorno, 'The Schema of Mass Culture', p. 82.
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proliferated widely, achieving a wider audience and more general usage.63 As a result it has 
been argued that something of the more specific understanding it stems from has been left 
behind. Peter Baehr suggests that the metaphor employed by Weber is far more 
sophisticated and modern than the original 'iron cage' translation implies and that the 
original author of the phrase 'iron cage' is the translator, Talcott Parsons.64 The phrase 
Weber originally employed was Stohlhortes Gehäuse and in translating this it seems that 
Parsons may have sought to evoke a particular, emotionally-laden term from 17th century 
puritan Christian literature.bS In doing this Parsons has substituted a meaning that carries 
far more negative connotations than a strict translation might. Literally translated Weber's 
phrase means 'shell as hard as steel'.66 Whilst this does not have quite the same lyrical 
quality it offers some alternative dimensions to the Weberian analysis.
Baehr argues that Weber was trying to describe a much more ambivalent image of 
modernity. In comparison to the 'iron cage', the Weberian 'shell' represents not so much a 
denial of liberty as an organic transformation in which the processes of enclosure and 
restraint are part of the human body itself.67 The idea of the cage represents a more overt 
imprisonment and conscious restriction of the individual, a situation whereby the 
imprisoned can see out of the cage and witness the life they are prohibited from. Contrary 
to this, the idea of the shell suggests more of a narrowing of the available space in which 
life could be lived, a state that man would unconsciously impose on itself in order to feel 
secure. Baehr also points out that steel is a man-made material whereas iron is a natural 
element, seeking to further support the idea that under the revisionist interpretation the 
form of control is something created and imposed by individuals upon themselves.68 In 
another instance Baehr suggests that where the Parsons translation reads 'last stage', it 
should instead read 'last men', drawing on the Nietzschean 'Last Man', a much more
63 For example a 'Google Scholar' search retrieves many articles in the area of organizational management 
offering 'iron cage' puns. Accessed from scholar.google.com/scholar?hl-en&lr=&q=iron+cage&btnG=Search on 
2/3/2006.
64 "The 'Iron Cage' and the 'Shell as Hard as Steel': Parsons, Weber, and the Stahlhartes Gehäuse metaphor in 
the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism", History and Theory 40, May 2001, p. 154.
65 The 'iron cage' metaphor was employed by the 17th century Puritan preacher John Bunyan in The Pilgrim's 
Progress (1678), Ibid., p. 158.
66 Baehr suggest that if Weber had wanted to use a metaphor like that of the 'iron cage' there are German 
phrases that would better capture it than the one he used. The phrase was employed in a context where the 
cage or shell would be worn Tike a cloak', again suggesting that cage did not correspond with the overall 
concept, "The 'Iron Cage' and the 'Shell as Hard as Steel'", p. 163.
67 David Chalcraft, 'Bringing the Text Back In: On Ways of Reading the Iron Cage Metaphor in the Two Editions 
of the Protestant Ethic' in Larry J Ray and Michael Reed (eds.), Organizing Modernity: Weberian Perspectives on 
Work, Organization and Society (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 29-39.
68 Baehr, "The 'Iron Cage' and the 'Shell as Hard as Steel"', p. 162.
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"sated, mediocre and philistine" understanding of humanity.69 This understanding of 
enlightened humanity as being suppressed, passive, managed, unaware yet content as a 
result of the modern technologies of organization and understanding brings Weber even 
closer to many of the established accounts of control.
Theories of social control
Social Control is an established, although contested, sub-discipline of sociology and 
criminology. Broadly conceived in the 1960s it encompasses "virtually all of the human 
practices and arrangements that contribute to social order and, in particular, that influence 
people to conform."70 It has since taken on a narrower focus of social attempts to "define 
and respond to deviant behaviour."71 To some extent it is an attempt to formally enunciate 
many of the themes addressed so far in this chapter and accordingly it is necessary to 
briefly touch upon it here as it can articulate foreign policy's ability to enact forms of social 
control. Whilst foreign policy has never been a primary concern, social control theorists 
have had a long-running interest in the modern techniques of control and regulation like 
many of the authors addressed here, and may be able to offer some insight into how 
foreign policy may be further explored.
The study of social control does not seek to necessarily condemn nor condone practices of 
control but rather better understand them. As suggested earlier, the idea of social control 
in its popular characterisations carries something of a pejorative or perhaps even dystopian 
connotation. The more sophisticated engagements with social control that have been 
highlighted so far in this chapter tend to portray it as an ambivalent or ambiguous process 
rather than something that is overly and necessarily negative. Ultimately, however 
theorists of social control tend to stop short of advocating it as a positive widespread social 
practice, largely because of concerns over domination that have been a central theme of 
this chapter. Gibbs for instance, a sociological theorist of social control, highlights that 
social control is far from the ideal where "benign social guidance or utilitarian principles 
came to prevail over the barbarous coercive regimes of the past,"72 though he maintains
69 Ibid., p. 160.
70 Donald Black, "Introduction" in Donald Black (ed.), Toward A General Theory of Social Control: Selected 
Problems (New York: Academic Press, 1984), p. 4.
71 Ibid., p. 5.
72 Lewis A. Coser, 'The Notion of Control in Sociological Theory' in Jack P. Gibbs (ed.), Social Control: The Views 
from the Social Sciences (Beverley Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), p. 19.
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that it still provides scope through which to work toward some kind of normative 
consensus to control deviancy without having to resort to brutal and coercive means.
The sociological approach to social control offers a range of sophisticated perspectives on 
social control, effectively drawn from familiar perspectives. While the study of social 
control is complex, it can be broken up into two main approaches, structural-functionalism 
and labelling/interactionism. The first perspective is most prominently represented by 
Talcott Parsons, whose original interpretation of Weber's 'Iron Cage' has already been 
discussed here. This structural-functionalist position sees society as being made-up of 
interrelated systems that have real effects on one another through flow-on effects and 
overspill. The processes of social control are seen as normal social phenomenona that are 
"often unnoticed and not necessarily a conscious component of everyday social 
interaction. " 73 Within these social systems individuals are seen to be determined largely by 
the norms and morals of the social structures of which they are a part, constituting a form 
of control. The structural-functionalist position, however, sees these shared morals and 
norms as "ontologically prior to and independent of the social relationships with a given 
society. " 74 That is, morals and norms are not regarded as being constructed through social 
interaction; rather they are fixed structures that society will be formed around. Thus, 
having made insightful and useful articulations as to the role social structures play in 
enacting control and regulation in everyday society, this approach seeks to employ a 
method that can predict and quantify these processes. This logic suggests that because 
individual behaviour is largely determined by structures, these structures can be used to 
understand individuals scientifically. What this position forgoes is an understanding of the 
role that society plays in constituting these norms, in addition to also being themselves, in 
turn, constituted by them.
Interactionism/labelling perspectives on social control are not represented by any cohesive 
theory and are best seen as an approach that adopts less of a totalizing explanation for the 
actions of individuals. Drawing George Herbert Mead's notion of interactionism, Stanley 
Cohen examines the construction of the individual, particularly in relation to the effect that 
social engagements, social status and social symbols have in constructing the sense of
73 Anne R. Edwards, Regulation and Repression: The Study of Social Control (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 
16.
74 Ibid., p. 17.
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self.75 In this sense it is far more subjective and interpretive than the more scientific 
structural-functionalist theories.76 There is a concern with how meaning and symbols are 
constructed and how these in turn construct the individual. The individual is not only 
shaped by social structures but also plays a part in shaping these structures. Cohen also 
develops the idea of 'moral panic' in which perceived deviant or threatening groups are 
labelled and ostracised as a danger to established order and through "linkages between the 
media, agents of social control and public opinion" amplify the standing of the issue far in 
excess of any actual threat they may pose.77 Furthermore, Cohen suggests that moral panic 
can "produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way that 
society conceives itself. " 78 Given that the construction of a foreign policy informs and labels 
what is perceived as threatening and an enemy to the collective society, this broad 
approach can be usefully employed in order to offer insights into the power that foreign 
policy has over its own citizens.
Each of these approaches has constructive observations as to how aspects of modernity 
other than liberty and freedom are integrated into individual behaviour. The structural- 
functionalist approach focuses on the social forces that shape the individual whereby the 
individual will "internalize the core values and norms of their society" and the role this 
plays in allowing individuals to fit into society.79 The tendency to try to observe objectively 
real social forces and quantify the effects that they will have on individuals limits the scope 
for analysing foreign policy as a domestic social force as it is only assumed to be real in the 
international realm. Interactionism/labelling has the scope to offer very specific accounts of 
the construction of the self, but perhaps lacks a concern for how this may be linked back to 
the broad, totalising affects that social forces exert. These sociological interpretations of 
social control offer some insight into these processes but are ultimately set up to deal with 
domestic processes, whether they be domestic structures as in the case of the former or 
highly specific cases of control in the case of the latter. What is needed is an analysis that 
can link the highly specific practices of social control to the totalising practices of national 
or even global discourse.
75 Stanley Cohen, Against Criminology (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1989).
76 Edwards, Regulation and Repression, p. 23.
77 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (St Albans: Paladin, 1973); quotation from Dawn Rothe & 
Stephen L. Muzzati, "Enemies Everywhere: Terrorism, Moral Panic and US Civil Society", Critical Criminology 12, 
2004, p. 328.
78 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, p. 9.
79 Edwards, Regulation and Repression, p. 17.
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The work of Foucault has significantly impacted the understanding of social control. 
Regardless of whether thinkers in this area are for, against or ambivalent to the ideas of 
discipline and govern mentality, these insights have become something of a reference point 
for understanding control. Foucault was able to maintain both a broad-based societal focus 
like that of the structural-functionalists, whilst retaining the more narrow individual- 
focused concerns of the interactionist/labelling approach. The Foucauldian understanding 
of discipline in many ways resembles the approaches of the theorists that have been 
addressed so far. Foucault's work informs the broader themes of this chapter given his 
concern with modern practices that can be seen as unintended or perhaps overlooked 
offshoots of Enlightenment rationality. This sensibility can be seen clearly in his frequent 
reference to the techniques of discipline, biopolitics and governmentality as being forms of 
'technology'. The strength of Foucault's approach is that his critiques don't suggest that 
these various practices should, or even can be done away with. His view of such forms of 
social action seems quite ambivalent as the coordination of action is not the point of his 
critique.
Foucault: discipline, biopolitics and governmentality
Discipline was never more important or more valorized than at the moment
when it became important to manage a population.
- Michel Foucault80
Like many of the other perspectives addressed in this chapter, Foucault is concerned with 
the tendency of modern techniques that are designed to make life better to also act as 
mechanisms of control. For Foucault, this is not so much a separate 'dark side' as an 
unobserved side-effect. Rather than being entirely negative, control and regulation is 
equally important to processes that make life better. This can be seen initially in the notion 
of discipline, which he employs in a manner that offers more subtlety than the literal 
interpretation that is commonly used. His concern is less with what impact the actions of 
others have on the individual, but rather the perception that the individual has of society 
and how this perception causes the individual to alter their behaviour in order to fit in with 
the norms and actions of that society. In this sense Foucault's use of discipline is closer to 
what is commonly referred to as exercising 'self-discipline' or being self-conscious.
80 Michel Foucault, "Governmentality", in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Harvester Wheatsheaf: London, 1991), p. 102.
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In using the term in this way Foucault unearths forgotten meanings and hidden 
implications associated with discipline. In this sense his usage is entirely consistent with his 
broader genealogical approach that underlies much of his later work. The inspiration for 
this is quite apt because by revisiting the once-overlooked genealogies of Nietzsche, 
Foucault recovered the genealogical approach itself. The genealogical approach is not a 
history that attempts to trace origins or construct a linear historical narrative; rather it 
seeks to highlight historical contestations over power and knowledge, to observe the effect 
that power has on truth and offer counter-histories suppressed by dominant historical 
narratives. It also seeks to offer histories for that which "we tend to feel [are] without 
history", that which is seen as an accepted and constant truth throughout history.81 
Something of a genealogical approach has been employed throughout this chapter as it has 
sort to highlight the many instances where the 'dark side' of modernity has been engaged 
with incisively, and often by prominent theorists, but has still not been as widely heard as 
the orthodox accounts.
Whilst no rigid definition of what exactly discipline is will be offered here, there is an 
obligation to convey a sense of the usage of the term and the means through which it 
might operate. According to Foucault:
discipline may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; 
it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of 
instruments, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a 'physics' or an 
'anatomy' of power, a technology.82
The ideas of discipline are most prominently drawn from Foucault's Discipline and Punish, 
or Sur\/eiller et punir in its original French. The original French word for 'discipline' offers 
some indication of how discipline is understood in the Foucauldian context as it bears a 
clear resemblance to the English 'surveillance'. In this sense the Foucauldian understanding 
of discipline can perhaps be seen as something like a form of surveillance; an impassive yet 
ever-present force, as opposed to the more literal corporal action. This is not to suggest 
that the two senses in which it may be used are separate and entirely different, because 
the intended effect on the individuals is quite similar: a change in behaviour or thought. 
The means through which this might be achieved, however, diverge more distinctly as the
81 Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 76.
82 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 215.
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Foucauldian sense concerns itself more with the operation of power, its manifestation 
through discourse and the implicating of the individual as part of the modus operandi.
The Foucauldian notion of discipline functions in a highly efficient manner, to the extent 
that it often goes unnoticed. This is the case because unlike literal discipline where the 
individual is forced into being the subject, the Foucauldian understanding sees the 
individual subjecting themself to  discipline. This is well illustrated using Foucault's analysis 
of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, the example in which he initially observed this 
phenomenon. The Panopticon
is an annular structure w ith a tower at the centre, which contains -  or might 
not contain -  a guard to observe and through this observation indirectly, non- 
violently control the behaviour of prisoners, schoolchildren, hospital patients, 
m ilitary trainees, whomever finds themselves on the other side of the one-way 
gaze.83
The technology of the Panopticon compels the individual to constantly discipline their 
behaviour, given that they could never be sure that they were free from surveillance. 
Accordingly, the Panopticon was said to "automatise and individualise power. " 84 The 
seemingly omnipotent gaze of the Panopticon places the individual in a position where 
they themselves are perpetuating the unbroken psychological effect of the surveillance 
process and the ir subjection to it.
Foucault's thesis based on his reading of the effects of the Panopticon was that society in 
general utilises techniques of panopticism .85 In this sense, a relationship of asymmetry 
exists whereby the regime alters and normalises individual behaviour, yet the individual 
remains in turn largely powerless to influence the regime .86 The individual, following 
regular subjection to this asymmetry, would of their own accord begin to act as though 
they were under constant supervision, monitoring their own thoughts and actions. 
Consequently, panopticism can be seen as "a model of human and/or technical 
organisation [that] is governed by three principles: clarity, docility and u tility . " 87 In one 
sense this gives rise to a very reliable and well run society, a "system of certainty", but in
83 James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War (New York: Blackwell, 1992), p. 30.
84 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 202.
85 See Ibid., pp. 195-228.
86 Alec McHoul & Wendy Grace, A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject (Carlton, Victoria: 
Melbourne University Press, 1993), p. 71.
87 Frangois Debrix, "Space Quest: Surveillance, Governance, and the Panoptic Eye of the United Nations", 
Alternatives 24, 1999, p. 269.
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another it is one that can be stifling in its lack of p lura lity .88 While the critiques made by 
Foucault tend not to extend their analysis of discipline outside the boundaries of the state 
or to foreign policy, his critique is nonetheless incisive as the disciplinary power of 
panopticism can be seen to "pervade m odernity . " 89
Foucault did not explicitly engage with International Relations or foreign policy. Fie did, 
however, address the contemporary practice of security, a central concern in International 
Relations. Foucault suggested the operation of security, the practice of roison d'etat, 
stemmed from the parallel development of an external "m ilitary-diplom atic apparatus" 
designed to manage "the balance of Europe" and an internal policing apparatus designed 
to  maintain good order and stability within a defined te rrito ry .90 The development o f these 
apparatuses, however, is linked. Foucault identifies the seventeenth century, in particular 
the Thirty Years War, as the point at which the modernisation of warfare and policing 
began to take place .91 The maintenance of peace via the European balance of power 
required a new conception of war, professional diplomats and a permanent m ilita ry .92 The 
massive expansion of the state's external security apparatus came at a great cost to its 
subjects, which according to Foucault, necessitated a police force in order to "increas[e] 
the state's forces to the maximum while preserving the state's good order . " 93 Thus both 
the operation of foreign policy and the maintenance of internal security entail a formal, 
externally orientated bureaucracy. It is in this respect the counterpart to internal police 
powers. The effects o f security apparatuses, whether internally or externally orientated, 
however, are transversal, fo r they pervade ideas, norms and discourse regardless of state 
or te rrito ria l borders. Conceived in terms of discipline, the effects of foreign policy are not 
lim ited by the intended scope of, on one hand, foreign policy and police, on the other.
Discipline can accordingly be understood in terms of its relation to  the fundamental 
political ideas of law and security. Nick Butler describes discipline as a form  of positive or 
productive power:
88 Ibid.
89 James Der Derian, "The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance and Speed", International 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, iss. 3, p. 304.
90 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978 (New York: 
Palgrave, 2007), pp. 296-306, 314-315 and 323-326.
91 Ibid., p. 297, 313.
92 Ibid., p. 305.
93 Ibid., p. 314.
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Where law is understood as a negative power (it prevents, it forbids, it 
prohibits, etc.), and where discipline is understood as a positive power (it 
obliges, it prescribes, it incites, etc.), security is understood as neither a 
negative nor a positive power. Instead, Foucault argues, security 'lets things 
happen' and then reacts to this reality in a certain way in order to limit or even 
neutralize its more random, aleatory effects.94
This description of Foucauldian concepts somewhat parallels Isaiah Berlin's schematic of 
positive and negative liberty.99 Employing Mill's distinction between 'freedom from' and 
'freedom to', Berlin suggested the latter, described by him as positive liberty, could include 
self-mastery and the ability to realise personal goals.96 Flere Berlin suggests the productive 
potential of positive liberty, although unlike Foucault he does not envision it producing or 
controlling the subject.97 Foucauldian discipline in this sense goes one step further, 
occupying dual roles as something like positive liberty while also a mechanism of control.98 
This may seem contradictory or paradoxical, for liberty is typically seen as incompatible 
with control. In Chapter 3, however, the interdependence of liberty and security will be 
demonstrated, the genesis of which can be traced back to the contradictions of state 
sovereignty and modern subjectivity outlined in Chapter 1.
The power exercised by the state and many of its institutions are ascribed a prominent 
position in Foucault's analysis. While this may seem like a weakness, his treatment of the 
state is instead a major strength of his work. In attempting to describe broad-based social 
processes authors inevitably come up against this issue of agency, that is, the force or actor
94 Nick Butler, "The Management of Populations", ephemera, vol. 7, no. 3, 2007, p. 475; see also Foucault, 
Security, Territory, Population, p. 47.
95 Negative liberty -  the 'freedom from' -  is the core concept of liberalism as it safeguards the individual's right 
to not be interfered with by external power. Positive freedom is the 'freedom to', the freedom to determine 
one's own actions but it further suggests that these actions (given negative freedom) will be an objective 
representation of the desires of the individual. Further, against the occasions where 'liberty' suggests a paternal 
implication and 'freedom' one that is more essentialised, Berlin uses the terms interchangeably and this will be 
maintained here. See Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969).
96 Ibid.; see also John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" (1859), in John Gray (ed.), John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other 
Essays (Oxford: Oxford University, 1991), pp. 16-17.
97 The essential difference between positively conceived discipline and positive freedom is that the 'freedom to' 
compulsion in the case of Foucault is not seen to be an objective and unaffected judgment of the self, which it 
is in the case of positive freedom.
98 There is some contestation stemming from Charles Taylor's liberal interpretation of Foucault over whether 
Foucault represents a negative or positive conception of freedom, and further whether this conception of 
freedom need be ineluctably opposed to that of power. See for example, Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom 
and Truth", Political Theory, vol. 12, no. 2, 1984, pp. 152-183; William E Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault and 
Otherness" Political Theory, vol. 13, no. 3, 1985, pp. 365-376; Charles Taylor, "Connolly, Foucault and Truth", 
Political Theory, vol. 13, no. 3, 1985, pp. 377-385; Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom", 
Political Studies, XXXVII, 1989, pp. 260-276; and Charles Taylor, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom: a 
Reply", Political Studies, XXXVII, 1989, pp. 277-281.
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that causes this social change." Yet the nature of agency is contested. For example, Marxist 
accounts attribute agency to class structure, while neoliberal accounts see agency in the 
functioning of the free market. Often this issue is not squarely addressed but rather alluded 
to as the result of an unquantifiable amalgam of social forces. Foucault refers to the role 
that the state plays in the creation and legitimation of disciplinary society, which seems to 
suggest that Foucault is ascribing agency to the state. As Ignatieff states, however, the 
strength of Foucault's understanding of agency is that it is
possible to work free of the various traps which the problem of agency has 
caused for historians -  the conspiratorial all-seeing ruling classes of the 
Marxist account; the low rationality model of ad hoc responses to social crisis, 
and the hyper-idealist version of reform as a humanitarian crusade. 100
The question that remains is 'how is Foucault able to ascribe minimal agency to state 
institutions, how are they not acting as agents of social organisation?' The answer to this 
stems from Foucault's suggestion that in the formation of the individual as subject it is the 
individual subjecting themselves to discipline rather than the state.
In describing these processes of control and the role that the state plays, Foucault is not 
ascribing a determining role to the state, but rather a legitimating role at the level of 
discourse. The state institutions are to some extent centrally controlled, but take on a 
discursive life of their own with the authority of the state adding an official legitimacy to 
the discourse, creating the asymmetric power relations of disciplinary regulation. 101 As 
Gordon states "the state has no essence... the nature of the institution of the state is... a 
function of changes in practices of government, rather than the converse. " 102 In this sense 
"Foucault explicitly rejects any explanatory schema in which notions of central state power 
and the economic determination of action play any major role. " 103 This can be seen by 
returning to the example of the legal system. The state is involved in the justice system, but 
it is not "the political apparatus of the modern state that controls the prison system" rather 
it has its own juridical discourse and practices which are officially legitimised and supported
99 The question of agency will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
100 Michael Ignatieff, 'State, Civil Society and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent Social Histories of 
Punishment', in Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull (eds.), Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative 
Essays (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 94.
101 Foucault, "Governmentality", p. 103.
102 Colin Gordon, "Government Rationality: An Introduction", in Burchell, Gordon & Miller (eds.), The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Harvester Wheatsheaf: London, 1991), p. 4.
103 Stanley Cohen & Andrew Scull, 'Social Control in History and Sociology' in Stanley Cohen & Andrew Scull 
(eds.), Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 3.
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by the state. 104 If agency is to be ascribed in Foucault's analysis it would be to each 
individual insofar as they interpret and are implicated in discourse. The seemingly 
coordinated nature of individual actions, suggesting that agency should be ascribed to a 
higher level, stems from the totalising processes of biopolitics and governmentality.
There is some amount of interchangeability and overlap in a number of Foucauldian terms. 
Discipline is fairly clear in its usage. The terms disciplinary society, biopolitics and 
governmentality, however, overlap somewhat and need to be distinguished. Discipline in 
the Foucauldian sense, as we have seen, has to be based within a broader social context in 
order to function and thus a disciplinary society refers to those many people who are 
subjected to that particular mode of discipline, whether it be on the basis of, for example, 
sexuality, fashion or environmental ethics. Biopolitics is derived immediately from what 
Foucault referred to as biopower; that which defines collective subjects as a population and 
co-ordinates the operation of discipline. Biopolitics then are those political effects that 
result from the co-ordination of subjects at the level of the population. For example this 
may include those in the margins, exposed to social and economic danger as a result of not 
being within the specified demographic to attract welfare. Biopolitics is the operation of a 
medical logic (that is, the maintenance of health and the prevention or containment of 
disease) at the level of the population. In a similar way, governmentality is the logic of the 
state and bureaucratic apparatuses. Whilst it may be best characterised this way 
governmentality is not restricted solely to operating through these mechanisms. Foucault 
describes governmentality as the dual operation of individualising discipline and totalising 
biopower. In this way, biopower normalises and co-ordinates populations and within these 
populations individuals operate discipline to control themselves. Thus while all three of 
these terms refer to the operation of the subtle effects of control there is some variation 
amongst them.
Biopolitics can be understood initially in terms of its relation to geopolitics. In many ways 
biopolitics supplants geopolitics but it could also function to consolidate it. Geopolitics is 
the study of politics, geography and resources as they are defined by a particular geospatial 
territory. Geopolitics maintains a long and influential tradition within International 
Relations, Strategic Studies and policy-making because of its ability to analyse the 
boundaries of states and the features of those areas that may affect their relations. The
104 Ignatieff, 'State, Civil Society and Total Institutions', p. 92.
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great limitation of geopolitics is that it can only really comprehend the effects created by 
geography and resources in relation to states and macro actors. It cannot understand the 
complexity of social dynamics and how they impact upon individuals. The concern of 
biopolitics, however, is with populations, their measurement and the formulation of 
policies towards the aim of normalising them according to statistical means. Insofar as it is 
not employed as a tactic deliberately, and it is largely based in statistical measures, it is 
somewhat detached and apolitical in its operation. The calculation of risk, whether in 
relation to insurance premiums, prescription of medicine or deviance stemming from 
illiteracy, for instance, is based on measures of the population. In this way, biopolitics is the 
corollary of drafting policy on the basis of statistics and averages. It is a rationale not a 
causal intent.
While biopolitics has less of an international focus, often analysing subsets within states, it 
is bound ultimately not by geography but rather what can be determined as a population. 
By focusing on the population, biopolitics surpasses the limitations of the geographical 
state as a field of analysis. This does not spell the end of geopolitics as biopolitics could 
even enhance the coherence of geopolitical analysis. For if in the course of its analysis of 
populations its target focused on those populations that are bounded by the state it would 
likely make that population more predictable and more uniform, accentuating what might 
seem to be its geopolitical characteristics. Thus the transition from a primary focus on 
geopolitics to biopolitics, but also the subsequent interaction between them is likely to be 
somewhat obscured as biopolitical normalisation replicates and strengthens already 
existing norms. As will be seen, foreign policy and the norms and obligations it places on it 
citizens give rise to competitive state-based ideologies, in particular nationalism and 
patriotism. These geo-political formations are biopolitical processes as they bring together 
individuals as a population, whose virtue of sharing common practices and values become 
normalised, even to the extent that they become akin to race or a scientific classification. 
The relevance of a biopolitical analysis in the context of this thesis is to identify broad 
unifying tendencies such as the manifestations of ideology and patriotism, which function 
as macro-political counterparts to the micro-politics of discipline. The interaction of 
discipline and biopolitics can in turn be located within a wider governmental logic, or 
governmentality.
Like biopower, governmentality has risen to prominence posthumously as a key element of 
Foucauldian thought. These broader schematics of social production, power and control
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were touched upon in books and collected works but extensive articulations of these 
machinations have only emerged in recently published lectures given at the College de 
France in the later years of his life.105 Governmentality was the closest Foucault came to 
offering a broad explanatory schema of politics. Some interpretations of governmentality, 
for instance those by Mitchell Dean, parallel Habermasian theories of rational 
communicative action.100 Others, such as Nikolas Rose, maintain radical articulations of 
contemporary regulatory techniques.107 While there are perceived differences in its 
operation, the definitions of both the normative and radical reconstructions of 
governmentality ultimately have plenty in common. According to Dean, governmentality is 
"how we think about governing ourselves and others."108 Governmentality is most 
commonly articulated in terms of the twin operations of individual discipline and the 
biopolitics of the population. This can be seen in Agamben's description of governmentality 
as that "which gives form to the life of the people."109 Michael Dillon describes a 
sophisticated system of logic that is able "to regulate and evaluate itself according to its 
changing understanding of the emergent natural processes that it [seeks] to govern."110 
Governmentality in this sense is the form of governance that has long-characterised 
modern life but is articulated in a manner that captures the subtle processes of control 
more effectively than familiar state-based explanations.
This chapter has outlined how processes through which foreign policy enacts domestic 
control may be understood. Employing these frameworks for understanding modern 
techniques of social control renders the 'other side' of foreign policy intelligible. These 
approaches share a common concern for the constitution and control of individuals as a 
result of a commitment to individual rationality and the development of modern 
apparatuses of governance. In particular, Foucault's account of control exercised at the 
level of the individual and at various levels of society is instructive as to how formal 
apparatuses may feed into highly diffuse and subtle processes of social control. Chapter 3
See in particular Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976 
(New York: Picador, 2003) and Security, Territory, Population.
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will expand on Foucault's analysis of discipline, biopolitics and governmentality applying it 
specifically to foreign policy as an apparatus of domestic discipline and control.
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Chapter 3
Foreign policy as domestic discipline and control
This chapter aims to demonstrate how the effects of foreign policy can be understood not 
only between countries but also within. The initial section will highlight the nature of 
foreign policy and its limitations when understood according to an 'either foreign or 
domestic' conception of global politics. This either/or conception of politics relies on the 
dichotomized understanding of sovereignty detailed in Chapter 1. Creating foreign policy 
within the confines of an 'either/or' mentality, where political space is either foreign or 
domestic, not only ensures that foreign policy takes on a bridging or protecting role but 
continually affirms its function as a specific instrumental tool within orthodox IR. In doing 
so, foreign policy practice perpetuates this potent figuration of IR.
Taking this insight as a provocation, remaining sections will reconceptualise foreign policy. 
The first of these will highlight hidden or excluded narratives within this account of foreign 
policy, in order to think beyond the confinement of cartographical and intellectual 
boundary lines that are continually being imposed. This chapter will subsequently highlight 
that foreign policy is a modern apparatus of government, which in navigating international
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diplomacy extensively shapes domestic identity and the structure of domestic society. 
Finally, the creation of foreign policy on the premise of a clear-cut liberty versus security 
distinction will be shown to be a practice that gives rise to a detailed and minute, yet highly 
prolific regulation process by which the domestic population is controlled.
Foreign policy and the international state system
The concept of interest defined as power...provides for rational discipline in 
action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes 
American, British or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible rational 
continuum.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, 19481
The territorially defined sovereign state is what makes the notion of an inside and outside, 
domestic and foreign plausible. The instrumental function of foreign policy within this array 
of traditional 'high politics' bears the very distinctive mark of the sovereign commitment to 
exclusive oppositions. Foreign policy is one the foremost tools of the state directed towards 
this end as its primary function is to mediate the foreign and domestic realms. The concern 
of this thesis is to add an additional dimension of analysis to this understanding, which 
questions the inherited orthodoxy of dichotomous understandings of IR. Instead, it 
proposes to offer an account of the role that a state's foreign policy plays in organising its 
domestic politics. This section will briefly outline the orthodox location of foreign policy 
within IR and then highlight the limitations of this position, opening the way for a more 
wide-ranging interpretation of the influence of foreign policy and national security 
prerogatives in shaping global politics.
Traditional principles of IR give rise to typically limited accounts of foreign policy. This can 
be seen in the words of Morgenthau above, in which he lauds the consistency of foreign 
policy across time and space, when founded upon the self interested pursuit of state 
power. This orthodox understanding of foreign policy sees it as a state response to an 
external necessity, something outside the state that requires a response. External necessity 
is seen to pre-exist the state's interaction with it. Thus, external necessity may be 
generated by a series of disparate or related threats, and they are most likely threats as 
this is the underlying nature of the anarchy in the international realm. Implicit in this then,
1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r Power and Peace (5th edn.) (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopff, 1973 [1948]), p. 5.
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is the inherited presumption, derived from the modern understanding of sovereignty, of a 
relatively uncontested and ordered domestic realm contrasted with a seemingly uncertain 
and disordered external realm. It is this domestic/external, order/disorder dichotomy that 
foreign policy is seen to mediate.
Under this dichotomized conception, foreign policy occupies the space in-between the 
foreign and the domestic. As equally as it is a 'wall' or 'boundary' that separates the inside 
from outside, it also connects states, either through diplomacy or through war. In this 
sense, foreign policy is seen to act as a 'bridge' in IR. Given that foreign policy is largely 
concerned with protecting and mediating external threats from the anarchical realm, its 
primary concern has tended to be military security and war. International legislation and 
interpersonal communication take secondary concern in foreign policy. Such civilities are 
deemed to be a concern of the law-abiding and orderly domestic realm, whereas the 
anarchical realm cannot be realistically expected to abide by sovereign concessions if there 
is no centralised sovereign power to enforce them. Thus, a series of principles that adhere 
to the dichotomies of IR shape the nature of conventional understandings of foreign policy. 
As with the self-perpetuating and mutually reinforcing dichotomies of modern sovereignty 
and the modern subject examined in Chapter 1, so long as the practice of foreign policy 
adheres to the traditional principles of IR it also perpetuates and reinforces particular 
trends in knowledge and practice. In this respect foreign policy is not entirely static but 
rather a reflection of particular ways of understanding IR and as such it has histories in 
which it has operated in a number of different guises.
Aporias o f foreign policy and the self
The accounts of classical and modern sovereignty provided in Chapter 1 depicted an 
interpretation of foreign policy concerned solely with that which is located geographically 
outside the state. According to Campbell it "is this historical narrative of the rise of the 
state in Western Europe which.... has been pivotal in making it possible to talk about 
foreign policy as the external orientation of a pre-established state."2 These cartographic 
representations of inside and outside, however, have been shown to have a history, one in 
which meanings have been contested and binaries have been actively created and 
maintained, in so doing, defining a clear identity for those who constitute that state. Thus,
2 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 1992), p. 41-42.
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as a result of the nature of state sovereignty, Bartelson suggests that "we are left with a 
general theory of the state whose coherence is constantly threatened by its efforts to cope 
with that which is alien and new to it . " 3 This threat to coherence comes as much from 
within the state as it does from without, for the modern state is after all understood as a 
relatively cohesive social body. Internal difference within the state poses a threat to the 
state as difference is meant to be found outside of the state, a threat foreign policy is 
designed to mediate. The way in which the state does this is, on one hand, through its 
obvious foreign policy actions and policies, but then also through the opposition of 
contrasting identities both inside and out, which allows ambiguity to be assimilated or 
sharply distinguished. In this regard the histories offered by Shapiro, Burke and Campbell 
are of great use in highlighting the limitations and contradictions - or aporias - within 
cartographic representation of inside and outside, self and other.
Shapiro's discussion of US foreign policy towards Central America problematises the 
orthodox renderings of snarpiy distinguished categories of inside/outside and self/other, 
exposing it instead as discourses of representation. Shapiro presents an account that
resists absorption into traditional modes of analysing foreign policy, it 
attempts to engage a critical mode, one that treats a discourse in terms of the 
discursive economies in which it participates rather than on the basis of what 
are ordinarily taken as the referents of its statements.4 5
This approach does not take foreign policy to be a simple response to external necessity 
between states. Instead it regards foreign policy as a discourse, processes of representation 
that construct the nature of the foreign other according to historically conceived notions. 
Thus
foreign policy discourse is governed by a historically developed 
representational practice which is primarily geopolitical and this has been 
combined with a way of constituting the Other, which places that other in a 
lesser moral space. 3
In this way foreign policy is self-serving in the sense that it reinforces domestic identity and 
"constructs] a world at the expense of others" inasmuch as it is the pursuit of the rational
3 Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 136.
4 Michael J. Shapiro, "The Constitution of the Central American Other: The Case of 'Guatemala'" in, The Politics 
of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography and Policy Analysis (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 122.
5 Ibid., p. 123.
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external interests of the state.b This approach, however, does not simply seek to "point to 
the moral failings... and simply state as a moral imperative that we should treat the other 
as an equally worthy self" but also highlights the role that foreign policy plays in creating 
the nature of its "subjects, objects and relationships. " 7 Viewed in this way foreign policy is 
not just a process of mediation between two pre-existing political identities but rather a 
discourse in which the two political realms are distinguished and each respective identity is 
made distinct from one another.
Drawing from the Australian colonial experience, Burke offers a history of the creation of 
the Australian subject by presenting it as a series of attempts to externalise internal 
difference. This is initially done through analysing the policies that defined convicts as 
literally foreign to the British.8 The operation of the familiar sovereign logic can be seen 
from the outset in
the British government's desire to rid their island of an entire 'criminal class', 
to cocoon their security behind an apartheid of sea and unfathomable 
distance, [which] conformed to the liberal ontology of Hobbes, Locke and 
Bentham, [positing] a healthy 'Commonwealth' upon the virulent Other of the 
criminal, who could it seemed, be excised from the social body like a cancer.9
By dividing and categorising according to the contrasting characteristics of civility and 
criminality, the British attempted to preserve a cohesive image of the well-mannered and 
urbane British identity in contrast to the external expelled criminal convicts. In this attempt 
to secure the domestic British realm, a commitment can be seen to the binaries of 
inside/outside and self/other in the expulsion of those who were seen as 'other' to a 
separate, geographically external location in what later became Australia. When viewed 
this way the early colonisation of Australia can be seen as not so much a voyage of 
discovery as the creation or invention of a political space. 10 What's more, it was an entirely 
literal attempt to enact a 'foreign policy' against those within the state who were outside 
of the norm and needed to be controlled.
Having claimed the new sovereign realm for the convicts, the formation of a cohesive self 
was at the same time both challenged and yet further propelled by the indigenous
Ibid., pp. 122-123.
Ibid., p. 123.
Anthony Burke, In Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety (Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press, 2001), pp. 1-26. 
Ibid., p. 5.
0 Ibid., p. 2.
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populations. Soon after landing, the convicts and the colonial overseers became engaged in 
fighting w ith the Aborigines, who were in tim e to become the black other with the 
emergence of a more unified white European settler identity. "Thus the colony's first 
serious strategic threats, and its first attempts to assert a strategic control of space and 
economic resources, were made and encountered w ithin the struggle for the nation's very 
in terior . " 11 That is, the foreign threat came not from outside the island continent but from 
within the cartographical boundaries that had been claimed as British sovereign land. 
Having claimed the land as sovereign British territory, the Aborigines were treated as 
foreign to  this new territory. Despite being 'in ternal' to  the emerging colony and taken up 
as a problem that needed to be managed, the Aborigines were nonetheless treated with 
the detached disdain reserved for those considered foreign or threatening. In so doing, 
however, this Aboriginal other, which was at once internal yet foreign created the 
possibilities for the "foundations of the Australian national identity" to  emerge by 
providing a common opposition to the colonialists and convicts . 12 These oppositional 
practices were further perpetuated by the willingness to enter into colonial wars in New 
Zealand against the Maori and throughout the African continent.
In describing the colonisation of America, Campbell frames the policies of the settlers 
towards the American Indians as an antecedent of foreign policy . 13 The early colonial 
policies toward the American Indians by the English sought to  create a domestic identity, a 
self that was familiar to the European experience . 14 This fam iliar identity was in turn 
reinforced in its definition against the otherness of the American Indian, which inevitably 
conformed to  the preconceptions stemming from  the European imagination of the savage 
world 'ou t there ' . 15 In attempting to create a sense of social and political security they
went beyond the dichotomy of enslavement and colonization... the 
interpretation of the difference between self and other that the English 
construed was so complete that even the hierarchical power relations of 
enslavement did not sufficiently mark a clear boundary between the English 
and the Amerindians. Extermination, rather than colonization or enslavement,
11 Ibid., p. 10.
12 Ibid., p. 14.
13 Campbell, Writing Security, Chapter 5. For more on the role of violence and the American identity during the 
frontier wars see Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology o f the American Frontier, 
1600-1860 (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000) and Gunfighter Nation: The Myth o f the Frontier in 
Twentieth Century America (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998)
14 Campbell, Writing Security, pp. 109-116.
15 Ibid., pp. 97-105.
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was the early English response to otherness. When this could not be achieved, 
physical separation was employed. 16
These colonial policy practices of trying to create a physically and geographically 
homogenous political body, however, did not cease after the initial establishment of a 
familiar European colony. Encounters with the otherness of the Africans and with religious 
and political difference also saw the emerging American image challenged by those that 
were defined as being foreign to the self. 17 Similar colonial policies of either elimination or 
integration of these identities were instrumental in defining colonial America. Described in 
this way, Campbell frames these colonial policies as a prototypical manifestation of foreign 
policy. As policies that defined the self and created a distinct cartography, the continuities 
between colonial and foreign policy draws attention to the role that foreign policy plays in 
the production and reproduction of the domestic self.
Campbell describes the process of the emergence of modern practices of foreign policy as 
'discourses of danger'. Prior to the emergence of the secular state, during the ascendancy 
of Christendom, it was the church that offered the promise of epistemological, ontological 
and material security. In order to achieve this "the church relied heavily on discourses of 
danger to establish its authority, discipline its followers, and ward off its enemies. " 18 The 
advent of colonial policies witnessed a transition in the nature of the discourses of danger. 
Whilst informed by inherited notions of the colonized other as pagan or barbarian, the 
policies were increasingly aimed at providing security for a particular colonial identity 
within geographically defined political boundaries. This creation of uniform colonial identity 
required the forced assimilation of indigenous groups. With the emergence of the afore­
mentioned modern sovereignty, there emerged a process whereby "the state project of 
security replicates the church project of salvation. " 19 The practices or policies, which under 
Christendom sought to mediate difference within a particular geography or polity, 
subsequently sought under state sovereignty to mediate difference between geographical 
polities, with drastic consequences for identities of the non-colonial 'other' within.
16 Ibid., pp. 111-112.
17 Ibid., pp. 107-109, 116-130.
18 Ibid., p. 48.
19 Ibid., p. 50.
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In offering this account Campbell turns away from the image of foreign policy as a 'bridge'. 
Campbell instead locates foreign policy as a modern manifestation of a tradition in which 
identity is fashioned in response to a "discourse of danger. " 20
[I]nstead of regarding foreign policy as the external view and rationalist 
orientation of a pre-established state, the identity of which is secure before it 
enters into relations w ith others, we can consider foreign policy as an integral 
part of the discourses of danger that serve to discipline the state. The state, 
and the identity of 'man' located within the state, can therefore be regarded 
as the effects of the discourses of danger that more often than not employ 
strategies of otherness. Foreign policy thus needs to be understood as giving 
rise to a boundary rather than acting as a bridge . 21
Thus Campbell challenges the conventional understanding of foreign policy. What is 
commonly understood unproblematically as 'foreign' policy is instead seen as decisive in 
creating the contours of domestic identity by inscribing the lines between self and other.
By offering this account, Campbell has rearticulated the relationship between the state and 
foreign policy. Given that the state's raison d'etre is to provide security for the self, its 
existence would be made redundant if security were actually accomplished . 22 "The 
constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state's 
identity or existence; it is its condition of possibility . " 23 Foreign policy thus has the ability to 
"instantiate a fictive self that has meaning principally as the negation of difference, and 
which performs a regulative ideal by which contingency can be domesticated and identity 
enframed . " 24 Thus individuals will assimilate aspects of the state's identity, particularly the 
notion of security from external threats w ithin specific cartographic bounds, into their 
fundamental identity. According to Campbell, the role that foreign policy plays in creating 
the boundaries w ithin IR has significant and under-theorized implications for its domestic 
population. Towards this end, the current chapter will seek to fu rther elucidate the 
suggestion that "[f]oreign policy is thus to be understood as a boundary-producing practice 
central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates . " 25
20 Ibid., pp. 48-51.
21 Ibid., p. 51.
22 Ibid., p. 12.
23 Ibid., p. 13.
24 Ibid., p. 136.
25 David Campbell, "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States", Alternatives XV, 1990,
p. 266.
72
Given the accounts offered by Shapiro, Burke and Campbell it is hard to unproblematically 
affirm the conventional accounts of foreign policy. These critical accounts of the operation 
of foreign policy and its antecedents make it hard to separate foreign policy from processes 
through which the domestic identity and society are shaped. Indeed, the clearly 
demarcated binaries of inside/outside, foreign/domestic and self/other seem hard to 
sustain in light of the preceding accounts and given the role that each side of these 
equations plays in constructing and reinforcing the identity of the other. However, in the 
context of the orthodox thinking in IR, based on the state-based sovereign ontology and 
positivist epistemological world-view, this is a provocative and even 'dangerous' claim.26 
For in addition to going against the grain of established theory, it would also be construed 
as being tied to a normative position that would seek to deflect attention away from the 
most pressing contemporary dangers. While such a critical position does not automatically 
entail a particular normative stance, such an accusation is unhelpful to an endeavour that 
seeks to understand the too often ambiguous or contradictory dynamics of contemporary 
global politics. In the interests of a fuller account and to avoid building a 'straw man' out of 
conventional explanations, it is necessary to briefly touch on some of the conventional IR 
perspectives on this phenomenon before further exploring foreign policy's role within the 
domestic setting.
Foreign policy as a domestic tool is not without some theorisation within orthodox 
accounts of IR. Indeed, the seminal realist antecedent, Thucydides, observed that "Greek 
leaders frequently concentrated their efforts on influencing the political climate within 
their own polities rather than managing relations with other Greek city-states."27 Similarly, 
de Tocqueville's 1835 study of American democracy held that this democratic nature 
meant that it was inclined to "impulse rather than prudence" as misinterpretation of the 
actual nature of danger often led to overreaction.28 Kegley and Wittkopf describe such 
accounts as illustrating a scape-goat phenomenon, or in more technical terms, the 
'diversionary theory of war'.29 The diversionary theory of war is the "contention that 
leaders initiate conflict abroad as a way of increasing national cohesion at home by
26 Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2, 1991, 
p. 213,229.
27 Charles W. Kegley Jnr & Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trends and Transformation (9th edn.) (Belmont, 
California: Wadsworth/Thompson, 2004), p. 70.
28 Quoted in Ibid., p. 70.
29 Ibid., p. 70, see also Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique" in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed), 
Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
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diverting national public opinion away from controversial domestic issues."30 For example, 
the declaration of war by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher upon the Falkland 
Islands in 1982 revived sagging domestic opinion polls and opened the way for an election 
win.31 In some respects this is nothing 'new' and is simply highlighting a tendency toward 
totalitarian interventionism or a fascist police state, in which there is a desire for a "state 
capable of looking after itself in foreign affairs, based on a society which was strong, 
cohesive and disciplined."32 Under such a system the national goals of "mobilization of the 
nation, of economic development and of national self-discipline" are subjected to the 
ambitions, whether they be domestic or foreign, of a single directing political will.33 
Regardless of whether this is a new dynamic or a different take on an old one, the orthodox 
response to this would be: that this is not how good democratic politics works and that it 
should not be done. In short, it is an exception to good, normal politics and undermines the 
foreign policy presumption of a properly ordered polity.
The tendency to avoid or simplistically resolve the instances of the ambiguity in giobai 
politics stems from an inability to accord with conventional assumptions of IR. The 
accounts offered by Shapiro, Burke and Campbell suggest that the relationship between 
inside and outside, the lines between foreign policy and domestic policy and the shaping of 
internal order, is not as clear cut as it is often presented to be. Whilst Kegley and Wittkopf 
might reply that these accounts fall into the category of phenomena that would qualify as 
an instance of 'intermestic' politics, issues they describe as being simultaneously 
international and domestic,34 the contention here is that they pose a more thoroughgoing 
challenge. Rather than prompting a proper re-examination of foreign policy and its relation 
to the domestic character of democracies, these are seen within the orthodoxy as one-off 
curiosities within the broader canon of IR. These curiosities are seen as momentary 
exceptions to the norm, instances where accepted laws of IR have broken down rather 
than an indication of something systemic. Such responses to the ambiguity of global politics 
do not sufficiently consider the observation that much of the evolution in IR thought can be
30 Kegley & Wittkopf, World Politics, p. 70.
31 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics o f War (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 117.
32 Brian Chapman, Police State (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 54. See also pp. 106-116.
33 Ibid., p. 120.
34 Kegley & Wittkopf, World Politics, p. 64.
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seen as responses to the inadequacies of the orthodox explanatory schema. 35 Rather than 
seriously engaging the role of foreign policy in shaping domestic politics, fusions of existing 
orthodoxies -  such as the 'intermestic' -  continue to affirm existing dichotomies. 
Responding in this way ensures that momentary lapses in the normal course of foreign 
policy do not disturb the broader narratives.
In instances where more thorough accounts are given they are relegated to political theory 
or incorporated so as to reinforce the orthodox position. One such account can be seen in 
the work of Carl Schmitt. Similarly grounding his insight upon the observation that much of 
modern politics is connected to theological antecedents, Schmitt arrives at a far more 
conservative position than Campbell, Burke and Shapiro. 35 Schmitt seeks to powerfully 
reinforce certain tendencies within the status quo. The defining characteristic of a state, 
according to Schmitt, is the ability to delineate self and other: "the specific political 
distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and 
enemy. " 37 While this initially seems to adhere to the familiar dichotomies that have been 
extensively discussed, there are some extra dimensions to Schmitt's view of oppositional 
politics. Along with his awareness of these oppositions comes a greater sensitivity to such 
politics, leading Schmitt to go much further than traditional accounts of IR. The creation of 
this distinction necessarily requires the presence of a mortal enemy, one that "must not 
only be defeated but also entirely destroyed" in order to more firmly establish the political 
community.38 Such suggestion begins to blur the domestic/international boundary, at 
which point Schmitt's account can still fit somewhere in the realist mould, read as a kind of 
Machiavellian exception from the democratic processes or disregarded altogether as a 
political theory curio. What Schmitt seems to be suggesting, however, is rather a more 
permanent proposal of how to effectively govern within what he sees as limitations of the 
liberal democratic system. In this sense, Schmitt offers not only a damning conservative 
critique of liberal democracy but also a somewhat authoritarian series of options for 
circumventing its machinations.
35 For example see Andrew Moravcsik, "Theory Synthesis in International Relations: Real Not Metaphysical" in 
Forum: Are Dialogues and Synthesis Possible International Relations? International Studies Review, 5 (2003), pp. 
131-136.
36 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Massachusetts: MIT 
Press, 1984).
37 Carl Schmitt, The Concept o f the Political (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1976 [1934]),
p. 26.
38 Ibid., p. 36.
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For Schmitt, the friend/enemy dynamic is crucial in order to define the character of the 
state, for w ithout this the state may lack coherence. Indeed the very character of the state 
as an "organized political entity, internally peaceful, te rrito ria lly  enclosed and impenetrable 
to aliens" requires this existential th rea t . 39 Schmitt argues:
The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly... [h]e is 
nonetheless the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, 
in a specifically intense way, existentially something d ifferent and alien, so that 
in the extreme case conflicts w ith him are possible .40
Schmitt's account o f the friend/enemy distinction thus goes beyond the realm of what 
might be considered comfortable within the conventional scope of IR. But this is not all he 
offers on the subject. Further to this prescription of the necessity of an external enemy for 
the identity of the state, Schmitt also sees the potential for an internal enemy in certain 
circumstances in order to maintain the normal functioning of the state.
The endeavour of a normal state consists above all in assuring tota l peace 
within the state and its territory. To create tranquillity, security and order and 
thereby establish the normal situation is the prerequisite for legal norms to be 
valid.... As long as a state is a political entity this requirement fo r internal 
peace compels it in critical situations to  decide also upon the domestic enemy.
Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an 
internal enemy .41
While Schmitt does not explicitly link the necessity of an external and internal enemy 
through the discourse of foreign policy, he clearly connects them through a discourse that 
seeks to ensure the security of the state both internally and externally.
This question of security inside and outside of the state, the costs of this pursuit for liberty, 
and the connection that this pursuit has to foreign policy, will be further addressed in the 
final sections of this chapter. What has become clear in this section is that foreign policy 
operates according to a particular instrumental logic, that o f raison d'etat, or national 
interest. Foreign policy in this sense is a specialised tool in the management of the national 
interest of the state. Conceived as an apparatus of rule, foreign policy can be shown to 
have a range of subtle social effects upon its constituent population.
39 Ibid., p. 47.
40 Ibid., p. 27.
41 Ibid., p. 46.
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Foreign policy as Enlightenment rationality
The common logic linking modern foreign policy with its antecedent and alternate 
variations is the use of instrumental techniques to deal with those who are different. This 
logic can be clearly seen in the influence of the Enlightenment upon the ideas of John 
Stuart Mill, whose doctrine of liberty articulated key attributes of those who could be 
considered civilised. Liberty for the civilised was two-fold. The inward domain of liberty is 
the freedom and responsibility of individuals to govern themselves through rational 
decision-making, self-improvement and self-discipline.42 Exterior liberty is the freedom 
from governmental constraint, so long as one's actions do not cause harm to others.43 
These are connected insofar as the right to the freedom from constraint assumes the 
presence of rational self-government.44 Mill holds that those who are uncivilised, such as 
children, lunatics and barbarians, do not have a right to such liberties. Over the latter Mill 
suggests that despotism is an acceptable form of government so long as it is their best 
interest.45 Evident in Mill's formulation is the importance of Enlightenment notions of 
rationality in the self-governing of those who are considered civilised members of society 
and the government of others both within and without who are incapable of such conduct. 
On this basis, both the pragmatism of realism, the civilising missions of colonialism and 
later liberal humanitarianism can equally be justified. This integration of Enlightenment 
logic within antecedents of foreign policy has an extensive tradition.
Prior to the emergence of the modern sovereign state, a distinct body of knowledge and 
discourse emerged surrounding raison d'etat. Bartelson describes this development as the 
emergence of mathesis, an early form of positivist logic, which "enabled an analysis and 
tabulation of state interest. " 46 Management of state affairs was limited to weighing relative 
state power, rather than the day-to-day affairs of the populace. The initial administration of 
the state was thus a forebear to the contemporary practice of foreign policy. This largely 
externally-orientated mode of political management was succeeded by a more modern and 
scientific form of political community. This new array of apparatuses managed specific 
individual elements within the state by developing specialties in order to streamline and 
develop expertise within government. At this point, now one of many rationalities of
42 Mill, On Liberty (Newton Abbot, Dover: Dover Thrift Editions, 2002 [1859]), p. 10.
43 Ibid., p. 8, 10.
44 Ibid., p. 10.
45 Ibid., p. 8.
46 Bartelson, A Genealogy o f Sovereignty, p. 187.
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government, foreign policy took on an exclusively diplomatic role, acting as a mediator 
'between' states. No longer the foremost tool in the management of the state, foreign 
policy became the domain of those who excelled in the art of diplomacy, negotiating the 
best interests of the state within the vicissitudes of the European state system. In this 
sense foreign policy can be seen as having emerged from an application of Enlightenment 
principles to the practice of state management.
The legacy of foreign policy is that of a tool fashioned from Enlightenment thinking; it is a 
political technology with national security as its objective. Foreign policy is the external 
diplomatic component amongst a range of instrumentally rational apparatuses of domestic 
political management. Like other tools of government, such as the health system, 
education system and welfare, foreign policy pursues a range of specific policies in-line 
with the general remit of the elected government. Like other bureaucracies it is designed to 
bring together the efforts of a large number of people in a way that is co-ordinated, 
accountable, and productive. In short, it aims to employ Enlightenment principles of 
rationality in ways that benefit the interests of the state that it serves. As highlighted in 
Chapter 2, such highly effective instrumental tools also control and regulate in the attempt 
emancipate and liberate. This can be seen in the ultimate goal of foreign policy, for 
instance, which is the emancipation of members of the state through the attainment of 
peace, an aim which is sought via the pursuit of security. The role of foreign policy as a 
political technology is to represent and defend the subjects of the sovereign state by 
weighing state interests and rationally calculating the benefits that may be won from 
waging war or maintaining peace. In short, the basic premise of foreign policy is that the 
best way to make subjects free is by making them secure.
The point of departure at this stage of the chapter is the question: 'can the provocations 
raised in this chapter be made intelligible?' This is a question that faces challenges on at 
least two fronts. Firstly, in order to answer this question an approach needs to be 
developed that is able to cut through the boundaries of power/knowledge and observe 
politics that can work outside of the binaries of inside/outside, self/other and also move 
amongst less recognised political dynamics and actors. Secondly the provocations on the 
nature of modern and perhaps even more contemporary manifestations of sovereignty call 
for a more sophisticated analysis, one that keeps up to date and up to speed with 
challenging and complex politics. In this sense, both these points reinforce the need for an 
approach that can work within and outside of accepted political methodologies and
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realities. To these ends, and in-line w ith the notion that foreign policy can be seen as an 
instrumentally rational political technology, the next section examines the Foucauldian 
modes of control addressed in Chapter 2 and the insight they provide w ith regard to the 
aporias of foreign policy. The final section will then demonstrate exactly how foreign policy 
can be understood in terms of domestic discipline and control.
Foucault, foreign po licy  and d isc ip lin e
My problem is to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the 
production of tru th .47
- Michel Foucault
A critical analysis of foreign policy informed by the Foucauldian notion of discipline would 
not hold modern disciplinary techniques to be w ithou t merit. Instead, and this is the case 
with the modernity project generally, it would seek to highlight that there are processes -  
good, bad and many ambiguous -  of which we should be aware. George captures this in 
relation to IR:
a celebration of the age of rational science and modern technological society 
cannot simply be disconnected from the weapons of mass slaughter and 
techniques of genocide. Nor can the language and logic o f liberty and 
emancipation be easily detached from  the te rro r waged in the ir name by, for 
example, the major cold war foes, each claiming itself the natural systemic heir 
of the Enlightenment dream.48
This sentiment reflects that o f Foucault, for whom "the 'Enlightenment', which discovered 
the liberties, also invented the disciplines."49 Foucault elaborates, suggesting it is "the 
development and generalization of disciplinary measures, [which] constituted the other, 
dark side" of this new found freedom and rationality.50 In this vein, it is this other, dark side 
of foreign policy that this thesis seeks to highlight, via a reconnection of the pursuit of 
liberty through foreign policy to the discipline it engenders domestically.
The functioning of a modern disciplinary regime may be identified when a complex social 
organisation takes on the appearance of an efficient machine. The role o f discipline in such 
a context is to provide, w ithout the overt use of violence, a set of routines and practices
47 Michael Foucault, 'Questions of Method', in Burchell, Gordon & Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect, p. 79.
48 George, Discourses of Global Politics, p. 141.
49 Ibid., p. 222.
50 Ibid.
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that become natural to individuals. Foucault cites the modern soldier as an exemplar 
subject of disciplinary techniques. 51 During the seventeenth century, soldiers were selected 
according to physical and mental suitability. By the eighteenth century the ideal soldier was 
something that could "be made; out of formless clay, an inapt body, mastering it, making it 
pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit. " 52 Citizens in this 
sense can be shaped according to the exigencies of foreign policy and national security. 
This power, however, is not tyrannical. Foucault draws a distinction between the modern 
usage of discipline and earlier coercive examples such as slavery. 53 The modern forms of 
discipline can be seen to differ from the practice of slavery, insofar as they do not rely on 
the ownership of the individual body. Indeed should even the need for violent forms of 
discipline arise it is a sign that the techniques of modern discipline have become frustrated 
or broken down. 54 The disciplinary processes instead rely on the psychological processes of 
modern rationality, developed according to Enlightenment thinking, which are far more 
efficient in their operation.
The role of discipline is not so much to explicitly control individuals but to shape and 
produce the way in which they 'know'. This involves the construction of what is described 
as a 'regime of truth', a discursive reality or script, whereby rules, codes and procedures 
are written into everyday life. In regards to foreign policy this pertains to external threats 
to the state, the designation of those who are 'other'. This regime of truth forms the 
perceptual milieu of the society in which individuals are imbedded, and thus continually 
reshaped and recreated according to the discourse of external threat and contrasting 
norms of domestic identity. These discursive processes have a panoptic effect, providing 
ever-present 'truths', 'reality', or 'common sense' that the individual is constantly 
subjected to. The individual is thus in an asymmetrical relationship with this discursive 
regime and is in this sense under 'surveillance' from these social norms and expectations of 
the ideal self identity, according to which they subject themselves to discipline. The 
modern individual functions in any number of relationships with various disciplinary 
regimes and whilst they are not 'owned' in any sovereign sense by any one of these
51 Ibid., p. 135.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 137.
54 McHoul & Grace, A Foucault Primer, p. 67.
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regimes, these individuals can become "subjected and practiced bodies" or "docile 
bodies."55
If these descriptions of discipline seem somewhat negative, this need not necessarily be 
the case. As equally as discipline can be seen to reduce human freedom of thought and 
action it generates a remarkable normative consensus and a predictable social 
environment. Conflict and anxiety are reduced greatly and often without individuals being 
aware that regulative technologies have been put in place. There is more to this, however, 
than the concerns of the civil liberties perspectives, which highlight the tensions between 
balancing the competing aims of liberty and freedom with the security and control of 
paternal institutions. Whilst discipline enacts broad and diffuse control, it also allows a 
great level of social efficiency. This control is also enacted in a way that is instilled into 
everyday practices and norms, which are required to be considered and can just be acted 
upon as part of the normal everyday. An institution of paternal control -  such as the social 
welfare system -  in its intervention is relatively inefficient, whereas disciplinary regimes 
operate at the level of norms and morals. Thus, as equally as discipline can be 
characterised as suppressing human freedom and diversity it can also be seen as brilliantly 
and efficiently preventing deviancy and abnormal behaviour. The development of this 
modern technology of power relations can even be seen as a more 'positive' or productive 
form of power,55 as opposed to earlier juridical forms of negative power, the kind that 
Foucault described as "power that says no."57
Externally-orientated institutions, while lacking a formal domestic policy mandate, equally 
shape domestic order. The apparatuses of foreign relations, trade, the military, customs 
and foreign intelligence agencies all have foreign mandates to secure the state by 
identifying and mediating external threats. The designation of those deemed threatening 
to the state -  and consequently those normatively contrasted as patriotic -  equally enables 
regulation. Indeed, the lack of a clear governance mandate means that the discipline 
engendered by the designation and mediation of foreign threats remains politically 
invisible. The operation of discipline is more effective when it is not seen as a rule or 
technology of the state but rather something normal. As was demonstrated in Chapter 1,
55 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 138.
56 West, An Introduction to Continental Philosophy, pp. 172-3.
57 Michel Foucault in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977 
(New York: Random Flouse, 1981), p. 139.
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the operation of sovereignty constitutes the foreign/domestic, the inside/outside structure 
of IR. It is the apparent 'naturalness' of these binary distinctions that render the domestic 
operation of foreign policy invisible, and it is this very invisibility that enables it to operate 
effectively.
Governmentality as control
Governmentality links Foucault's notion of individual discipline with the broader techniques 
of social control that function at the level of the population. Governmentality is Foucault's 
neologism of what can be called 'governmental rationality'. He views modern 
governmentality as the modern manifestation of the classic notions of the 'art of 
government'. For Foucault, the techniques of governmentality have gone beyond raison 
d'etat, diplomacy and generally seeking to maintain or advance one's political position. 
Governmental practices are no longer a process of superficial or macro-level management, 
they have become highly specific and scientific technologies that penetrate deep into the 
everyday of society. Foreign policy can equally be seen in this light. It is the broad logic of 
government that has emerged in place of an outmoded raison d'etat; where previously, 
governmental logic schemed and calculated, it now relies on bureaucratic processes that 
ensure rational and detached judgement.
Foucault's work on governmentality extends the concern with rationality that was seen in 
the work of Weber and the Frankfurt School theorists in Chapter 2. The modern 
manifestations of governmentality in society suggest that power is no longer centralised 
and instead individual citizens play a major role in their own self-governance. In addition, 
however, to the specific instances of discipline, there are unifying practices, referred to as 
biopolitics, which links and 'regularizes' these individual practices at the level of the 
population such that it appears natural.58 To this end, biopolitical practices survey society in 
biological or scientific terms, rather than as a political or social community. This concern 
can be seen in the development of "the globalizing statistical disciplines of economics, 
demography, epidemiology and eventually sociology."59 Governmentality can thus be seen 
as the overarching logic that interacts between specific instances of discipline and human 
sciences to create a dense and interpenetrating web.
58 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 253.
59 West, An Introduction to Continental Philosophy, p. 174.
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These highly efficient series of techniques cause the individual to become simultaneously 
"individualized" and "totalized".60 That is, the processes of control occur in an interrelated 
manner at the individual level of discipline but are coordinated and unified by the practices 
that seek to monitor and observe the population as a whole. Foucault argues that in 
addition to the training provided by disciplinary measures, biopolitical processes seek "to 
control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass... by achieving an overall 
equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers."61 This 
comprehensive attempt to describe the internal processes of control should equally extend 
to foreign policy discourse, which informs national, racial, cultural and religious identity, 
whilst coordinating action at the level of national security. Foucault elaborates this 
governmental control of the population in his examination of the link between war and 
internal social control.
War as a means o f control
If we look beneath peace, order, wealth and authority, beneath the calm order
of subordination, beneath the State and State apparatuses, beneath the laws,
and so on, will we hear and discover a sort of primitive and permanent war?62
- Michel Foucault
In the 'Society Must Be Defended' lecture series of 1975-76, Foucault adopted the premise 
that war could be used as a way of understanding and analysing power relations. Given the 
flexibility and insight of the disciplinary mode of analysis offered by Foucault and the 
prominent concern with war in IR, this suggests a potentially useful extension to his existing 
analyses of power relations. As with discipline, Foucault's analysis of war is not a 
straightforward concern with war in its literal sense, although as with discipline the 
metaphorical usage of the term is closely tied to the traditional usage. War in the 
Foucauldian sense inverts war in its 'battle form' or actual physical combat; instead it sees 
ongoing warlike tensions or contests between various ruptures within society. 63 Foucault 
suggests that "peace itself is a coded war. We are therefore at war with one another: a 
battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently."64 Deploying
60 Foucault, Michel, "The Subject and Power", in Dreyfus & Rabinow (eds.), Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1983) pp. 216-221.
61 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 249.
62 Ibid., p. 46.
63 Ibid., pp. 156-165.
64 Ibid., p. 51.
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such an argument in conjunction with the disciplinary analysis is suggestive of how foreign 
policy discipline might be understood in the domestic context.
Foucault argues that the broader notion of war has been historically purged from normal 
ordered domestic society. In line with the dichotomised understanding of modern 
sovereignty, war is relegated to an external realm where there is an exception from the 
social contract. According to Foucault,
[t]he State acquired a monopoly on war. [The effect of this] was that what 
might be called day-to-day warfare, and what was actually called 'private 
warfare,' was eradicated from the social body, and from relations among men 
and relations among groups. Increasingly, wars, the practices of war, and the 
institutions of war tended to exist... only on the frontiers, on the outer limits of 
the great state units.65
Foucault's point is that this process can be seen to have occurred both in literal and 
discursive terms. Within the sovereign state, literal acts of war were eradicated through 
cessation of the practice due to internal controls that sought to monopolise violence. The 
everyday forms of war were eradicated discursively from what was commonly understood 
as war despite its continuing in practice. The question is, however, what form has this 
'permanent war' taken under the seemingly peaceful edifice of sovereignty?
Foucault's answer to this is a radical and provocative revisioning of sovereign power and 
war. "The war that is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our 
society and divides it in a binary mode is, basically, a race war. " 66 Foucault's re-reading of 
sovereignty, using his notion of war, suggests that what we now know as war has shifted 
dramatically. Foucault's genealogy of war in 'Society Must Be Defended' argues that the 
main tensions had previously been felt not between states, but within society between the 
ruler and the ruled. This social rupture at the time, it was argued, was the main source of 
tension and most common form of war. Whilst it is said that sovereignty put an end to war 
within a geographically defined space, Foucault suggests that this internal war has not 
ceased; it is just that it is no longer seen or heard. Inverting Clausewitz's famous dictum, 
Foucault suggests that if
politics is the continuation of war by other means... [then the internal] role of 
political power is to perpetually use a sort of silent war to reinscribe that
65 Ibid., p. 48.
66 Ibid., p. 60.
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relationship of force, and to reinscribe it in institutions, economic inequalities, 
language and even the bodies of individuals .67
In the same way that foreign policy and war in its 'battle form ' seek to protect the 
sovereign from  external threats, there are more subtle forms of war being waged within 
geographically bounded political communities. The Foucauldian conception of war 
functions as "an internal war that defends society against threats born of and in its own 
body . " 68 This war adopts a biopolitical rather than m ilitaristic strategy, which seeks to 
eliminate "foreigners [that] have infiltrated this society... [and] deviants that are this 
society's by-products . " 69 This end is pursued via an extension, or indeed subtraction of 
biopolitical management.
Foucault sees not only the management of the society, but also an ongoing war designed to 
preserve the self. This resonates strongly w ith the earlier accounts of colonialism as a 
foreign policy practice. The permanent war articulated by Foucault seeks to  defend society 
against threats originating both from  w ithin and w ithou t of the state. Foucault is suggesting 
that the protection of the population carries such potency because the construction of 
populations is akin to that of race. Foucault has previously argued that racism "was used to 
provide an internal social defence against abnormals . " 70 In an attem pt to protect against 
threats (both internal and external) Foucault sees the emergence of state racism, "a racism 
that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own products. This is 
the racism of permanent purification... one of the basic dimensions of social 
normalization . " 71
This can be seen through the use of the biopolitical methods of managing a population. 
Traditionally, the key power of the sovereign state is what Foucault describes as the 'right 
to kill', a monopoly over the use of force within and in order to protect a given te rrito ry . 72
67 Ibid., p. 16.
63 Ibid., p. 216.
69 Ibid., p. 81.
70 Foucault, The Abnormals: Lectures at the College de France, 1974-75, quoted in Stuart Eiden, "The 
Constitution of the Normal: Monsters and Masturbation at the College de France", boundary 2, Iss. 28, No. 1,
2001, p. 102.
71 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 62.
72 Appropriated from Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in Michael L. Morgan (ed.), Classics o f Moral and 
Political Theory (4th edn.) (Indianapolis, IN: Flackett Publishing, 2005), p. 1213; see also Max Weber, The Theory 
of Social and Economic Organization (transl. by A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons) (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1947), p. 154.
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The biopolitical variant of the 'right to kill' is the 'right to make live' . 73 Practices such as 
health care and welfare are designed to extend the average duration of life and decrease 
unnecessary mortality rates. These systems for the maintenance of the population are an 
expression of the 'right to make live'. The withholding of these mechanisms of the 'right to 
make live' facilitates this war against undesirables. While it stops well short of the state 
employing its 'right to kill', it removes 'others' by exposing to greater health, social and 
economic risk those who don't conform to the norms of the population. Through such 
practices, institutions eliminate external and internal threats that are seen to weaken the 
population in question. Thus, conceived biopolitically, war can "function as a principle of 
exclusion and segregation and, ultimately a way of normalizing society. " 74
As well as drawing distinctions between different conceptions of war Foucault suggests 
they continue to be linked. In his general discussion of war he describes how war is an 
ongoing phenomenon on a number of levels from the 'battle form' to the "distribution of 
weapons, the nature of the weapons, fighting techniques, the recruitment and payment of 
soldiers, the taxes earmarked for the army; war as on internal institution . " 75 It is this latter 
point where war in its more familiar sense shifts to something more subtle and typically 
Foucauldian. His genealogy highlights that a modern and sophisticated "relationship of 
force, which has been revealed by the battle and the invasion, was gradually and for 
obscure reasons inverted. " 76 This conception of permanent war in the way that it turns 
against itself is seen by Foucault as "something resembling colonization, or an internal 
colonization, on itself. " 77 This is similar to what Virillio describes as 'endo-colonization' or a 
colonisation of the self. 78 These various articulations suggest that both the 'battle form' of 
war and the more subtle biological counterpart turn back upon the self in ways that are in 
some senses literal, but are increasingly in subtle forms that are not generally recognisable.
Foucault's account of war is not an alternative to discipline but rather an attempt to 
expand and apply his disciplinary analysis. Biopolitical war offers a genealogical account of 
internal social wars against threats that manifest within the state and the way they can
73 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 241; see also See Foucault, "Right of Death and Power over Life", in 
Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, pp. 261-262.
74 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 61.
75 Emphasis added, Ibid., pp. 159-160.
76 Ibid., p. 160.
77 Ibid., p. 103.
78 Paul Virillio, "Critical Space" in James Der Derian (ed.), The Virillio Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 
p. 64.
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rend cleavages within society. This offers some insight into how the 'external' foreign policy 
can become inverted against the self, enacting discipline and form ing powerful social 
cleavages. Read in this way, it can be seen in the kind of analysis offered in this thesis that 
continues Foucault's broad theme of his disciplinary accounts. Here, however, it inverts 
established IR binaries in order to deconstruct them . 79 Foucault's analysis of biopolitical 
war as a means of control demonstrates how his notion of discipline might be applied to 
the power of foreign policy over the self.
The analysis of foreign policy in this thesis therefore suggests that the common 
understanding in IR is too limited. The interpretation of the effects of foreign policy is 
generally confined solely to the international realm. In a step toward a broader and more 
comprehensive understanding the follow ing section inverts the traditional analysis of 
foreign policy in order to analyse its domestic implications w ithin its constituent state. This 
is necessary because if these effects were immediately clear they would be more readily 
observed. The following section w ill offer an analysis that can observe modes of power that 
"remain invisible so long as we treat [them] as sovereignty . " 80 This is the value of Foucault's 
disciplinary analysis as it can be used in order to observe the effects that foreign policy has 
on the norms and values which continually reconstitute the identity of the self and by 
which individuals discipline both themselves and others.
Liberty and security inside/outside the state
Though the weapons maybe pointing out, the effects are clearly fe lt w ithin.
- R.B.J. Walker81
This section suggests that the pursuit of security through foreign policy affects domestic 
liberty. While contemporary political practice renders this statement less and less 
remarkable -  as will be shown in later chapters -  this connection remains under-theorised 
or even disregarded. Given the continued dichotomisation of inside and outside in IR, the
79 See, for example, his earlier inversion of the Clausewitzian dictum above and also his "functional inversion of 
disciplines" in Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 210. In the case of the latter, the literal discipline of the 
individual depends on the legitimacy of the regime, whilst the subtle or Foucauldian discipline inverts this 
disciplinary relationship, such that the self-discipline by individuals who subject themselves to the regime acts 
to constitute and reconstitute its legitimacy.
80 Dana R. Villa, "Postmodernism and the Public Sphere" in, Frederick M. Dolan & Thomas L. Dumm (eds.), 
Rhetorical Republic: Governing Representations in American Politics (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 
1993), p. 234 (pp. 226-248).
81 Inside/Outside, p. 170.
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effects of foreign policy are not seen to permeate domestic order. The impact of 
knowledge and practices stemming from foreign policy, however, enacts processes of 
regulation throughout society that needs to be considered in the context of civil liberties. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the opposition of foreign and domestic can be brought in 
question, so can that of security and liberty. Thus this section challenges both the 
oppositions of inside/outside and liberty/security, highlighting that they are produced as a 
result of the intractability of modern sovereignty. Furthermore, it is these oppositions 
which obscure the effects of foreign policy as a form of security upon what can be narrowly 
described as liberties, or more generally, as social order.
This notion of a balance between liberty and security can be traced to the initial utility of 
the state as the basis for constituting modern sovereignty within its territorial bounds. The 
liberty/security trade-off finds its roots in the initial relinquishing of the sovereignty of 
individual subjects to the state as a representation of the 'general will'. Security/liberty 
then can be seen as a fundamental expression of the social contract, in which individual 
liberty is encroached upon in order to secure some amount of individual and collective 
security.
In domestic politics the pursuit of security is generally seen to come at the expense of 
liberty. The clearest example of this security/liberty dichotomy can be seen in regards to 
police powers but equally in regards to law. Thus the key element of this debate is the 
perceived benefits of regulations that provide order and, presumably, some sense of 
security, contrasted with the value of avoiding the paternal care of the state and an 
accompanying sense of personal freedom and liberty. In this sense, however, the 
security/liberty dichotomy is readily evident also in debates over government regulation in 
regards to welfare and tax. The seeming permanence of this binary gives rise to concern 
over civil liberties, the extent of domestic surveillance and the scope of laws. These 
legalistic and liberalist concerns are valuable in the face of the encroaching state in times of 
war and perceived danger. By limiting the focus to the confines of the state, however, civil 
liberties groups, the traditional left and other progressive concerns overlook those 
dynamics that don't entirely adhere to the bounds of the state.
Before moving on to examine security/liberty beyond the confines of the inside/outside 
dynamic, it is worth briefly examining some of the limitations of this conception within its 
regular setting. Viewed in terms of its own logic, the attempt to preserve liberty against the
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encroaching pursuit of state-centric security is flawed, for there can be no essential notion 
of either security or liberty. Take the position of extreme liberty. Viewed in terms of the 
paradigm of sovereignty, this would be a condition in which there was no state imposition, 
no restricting regulations; it would be approaching anarchy -  a condition devoid of any 
formal order -  the very thing that security rallies against. Liberty then can only be 
comprehended in the context of a sovereign order, an order which itself amounts to some 
measure of security.
Thus there cannot be liberty without security. This is not some Orwellian or 
neoconservative formulation; rather it suggests that the notion of liberty can be seen as 
part of a construct of the world-view of subjects created through the processes of security. 
In this sense neither security nor liberty are objective conditions, both rely on the 
conception of the opposite pole conceived in essential terms to give meaning to the other. 
According to Hindess, this amounts to Foucault's critique of liberty.82 Read in this way, the 
work of Foucault "show[s] how such governmental concern for security can result in a 
commitment to individual liberty. " 83 Whilst liberty may be implicated in the pursuit of 
security, it is not equated with security but neither is it a politics of pure freedom.
Indeed Foucault's account not only problematises the dynamics of the security/liberty 
dichotomy but also that of modern sovereignty. His position suggests that modern rational 
government requires subjects to be free from domination in the traditional sense of liberty, 
but only in order so that they may then regulate themselves. In this way Foucault's 
explanation of liberty and security implicates both sides in such a way that neither is seen 
as objective nor essential, in fact within this figuration they are quite hard to separate. Not 
only has Foucault suggested that these seemingly intractable categories are actually 
conversely in the process of constituting one another, he also suggests that the practice of 
social forms of regulation, the provision of security, takes place most efficiently within a 
liberal conception of politics. That is, he has offered an account of politics in which 
regulation occurs in the manner of, and no doubt in tandem with, modern sovereignty but 
yet also quite independently from it.
82 Barry Hindess, Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1996), 
pp. 123-131.
83 Ibid., p. 126.
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A key element in the regulation of individuals outside of the purview of modern 
sovereignty is the determ ination of social norms. Rendering problematic the 
security/liberty dynamic suggests that liberty is determined by the processes of security. 
The confluence of liberty w ith underlying practices of security can be seen in the 
commitment of individuals to liberal norms. For instance, the political doctrine of liberalism 
aims to create
a nation of free, responsible, law-abiding, and self-reliant men and women... 
w ith healthy bodies and alert and trained minds; enjoying a real equality of 
opportunity to make the most and best of the ir powers for the ir own 
advantage and that of the community, and to choose the way of life for which 
they are best f itte d .84
Clearly evident in this account are commitments to  particular norms, norms that are 
seemingly 'natural' and for the most part not the sole domain of security as ensured by the 
sovereign state. These norms are, however, derived from  subjects created and continually 
shaped within the context of the ongoing pursuit of security.
The problematisation of the security/liberty relationship further suggests that security is 
most efficiently sought via a commitment to the principles of liberty. The com m itm ent to 
the pursuit of liberty, a liberty defined in terms of the commitment to certain 'natural' 
norms, ensures that there is an ideal notion of the individual that is to be pursued. The 
pursuit of this notion of liberty ensures that while on the one hand intrusive state 
regulation is minimized, there w ill be more 'natural' norms or social regulation by which 
certain characteristics of individuals and groups can be measured .85 "Under a liberal 
regime," according to Hindess, "we can expect to find attempts at indirect regulation . " 86 
The prominence of social regulations means that security can be achieved w ithin the 
context of the desire for individual liberty. As Foucault describes it, this com m itm ent to 
security in the pursuit of liberty entails the setting in place of
mechanisms or modes of state intervention whose function is to ensure the 
function of those natural phenomena, economic processes and the intrinsic 
processes of population: this is what becomes the basic objective of 
governmental rationality. Flence liberty is registered not only as the right of 
individuals legitimately to oppose the power, the abuses and usurpations of
84 National Liberal Federation, The Liberal Way: A Survey of Liberal Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1934), pp. 
221-222. Quotation originally cited in Robert Eccleshall, "Liberalism" in Robert Eccleshall et al, Political 
Ideologies: An Introduction (London: Hutchison, 1984), pp. 37-78.
85 Hindess, Discourses of Power, p. 126.
86 Ibid., p.130.
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the sovereign, but also now as an indispensable element of governmental 
rationality itself.87
The role of social norms and regulations, in short social control, allows governmental 
rationality to function with less recourse to overt state control. This critique of the 
domestic conception of the security/liberty debate allows sovereignty to also be 
problematised.
In IR the external security o f the state is seen to  either come at the expense of other 
international actors, or through international cooperation, depending on whether security 
is conceived within the realist or liberal tradition. As mentioned in the initial section of this 
chapter, underlying these traditions is the assumption that the effects of the pursuit of 
security in the external realm will be realised outside of the bounds of the state and 
mediated through the machinations of the state's foreign policy. The diverging currents of 
liberal and realist traditions, however, manifest when considering the capacity of states to 
act collectively according to internationally agreed norms; realists are eternally pessimistic, 
while liberals hold out some optimism. Thus IR is either characterised by the insecurity of 
the security dilemma or the potentia lity of collective security. Despite this variation, it is 
clear that the theorisation of security w ith in the international setting, as equally as it did in 
the domestic, follows the general contours inherited from modern sovereignty. The 
inherited assumption is that w ithin IR there exists no social contract and no articulation of 
general will. Given that there is no formal means of regulation, security outside of the state 
can only be sought through foreign policy, if not outright war.
The pursuit of security in the international sphere is not generally seen to be connected to 
concerns of domestic liberty and security. At least this is the case w ithin 'normal' politics .88 
Under a normal conception of politics, underpinned by the principles of modern 
sovereignty, the state is constituted as a territo ria lly  secure sovereign body. Foreign policy 
is seen to mediate the interests of the state, acting as a mediator between domestic and 
international politics. Working in terms of the binary model of inside/outside, under the 
realist zero-sum gain logic o f the security dilemma, any security gained would be at the 
expense of the national security of other states. Alternatively, under a neoliberal model of
87 Quoted in Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction", in Burchill et al (eds.), The Foucault 
Effect, pp. 1-52, cited in Hindess, Discourses of Power, p. 125.
88 The domestic operation of foreign policy outside of 'normal' politics will be addressed in the subsequent 
section.
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interdependence and cooperation, in the course of the pursuit of security there is the 
likelihood of mutual benefit if free market trade and comparative advantage are allowed to 
occur. Under either conception, however, the pursuit of the state's security w ithin the 
international realm is not understood to negatively impact on liberties.
In the same way that Foucault highlighted the interplay of liberty and security beyond the 
conception of modern sovereignty, the pursuit of security through foreign policy can 
equally be connected to liberty w ithin the state. Foreign policy, as with domestic 
manifestations of laws and regulations, can be seen as a governmental technique in the 
pursuit of security. It is this instrumental rationality that seeks to  achieve certain ends. 
Foreign policy, both conceptually and in terms of its instrumental cartographic orientation, 
is seen to be outside of regular domestic apparatuses that are understood to operate 
according to the consent of the general will to sovereign rule. Given Foucault's concern for 
articulating politics beyond the bounds of sovereign logic, foreign policy can equally be 
seen in this light.
The pursuit of security through foreign policy can be reconnected w ith the domestic 
implications for liberty. Conceived in this way, this suggests a role that is played by a state's 
foreign policy that has not been previously theorised. The power of foreign policy within 
the domestic context can be seen in terms of its ability to influence, determine and 
disseminate social norms. If foreign policy's power within the domestic context may sound 
immaterial and weak, we need only consider the tremendous extent of the coverage of 
foreign policy and the extent to which the norms it propels pervade society. If the exposure 
of foreign policy is broad, then consider also the depth of its penetration. Foreign policy 
objectives and the norms that are both implicit and explicit w ith in these goals determine 
fundamental facets of identity by articulating how one should act towards those who are 
different from us.
Indeed, foreign policy has the potential to act as one of the preeminent organising 
principles of the state, even transcending the concerns of the state as dictated by domestic 
modes of governance. As suggested earlier by Schmitt; what could have greater 
determining influence over social norms and the cohesion of the state than the ability to 
ascribe what is and isn't an existential threat? The role of foreign policy to ascertain and 
mediate threats to national security epitomises the ability to  determ ine such existential
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threats. In this context the ability of foreign policy to affect social control is potentially 
commanding and extensive.
Liberty/security, foreign policy and the state of exception
The previous section demonstrated the way in which foreign policy can shape the domestic 
population, operating beyond the bounds of modern sovereignty. There is, however, a 
more literal sense in which foreign policy can become connected with the domestic 
population. Given the strict divide between domestic and international, foreign policy 
could only exert sovereign power over its own citizens in the event that it contravened the 
parameters laid out by modern sovereignty. This would require a sovereign act that breaks 
the principle of sovereignty. This is precisely what happens in the instance of an act that 
could be described as an 'act of exception'. Indeed, according to Schmitt it is on this basis 
that the sovereign is determined, for the "Sovereign is he who decides upon the 
exception. " 89
This sovereign exception can be seen in relation to periods of crisis for the state. Total war, 
martial law, modern police states, totalitarian police states and states of national 
emergency exhibit elements whereby the power of the sovereign rule of law can be used in 
order to except itself from the rule of law that exists under normal circumstances. The 
emergence of exceptional politics can be seen in times of war or national emergency. For 
instance, the state of 'total war' that characterised World War I and World War II 
demonstrated an exceptional politics. Laws were passed in order to suspend laws, and 
much of the state's resources were directed towards combating an external threat. The 
need to relinquish liberties in exchange for the pursuit of national security abroad became 
recognised, indeed formally demanded, through laws against sedition and treason. A state 
of exception can therefore be understood as a sovereign act of law that enables the 
suspension of the rule of law.
Viewed in this way, the flawed and contradictory logic of modern sovereignty gives rise to a 
fundamental legal paradox that can devastate democratic politics. As Agamben suggests
if exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis and, as such, 
must be understood on political and not juridico-constitutional grounds, then 
they find themselves in the paradoxical position of being juridical measures
89 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 5.
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that cannot be understood in legal terms, and the state of exception appears 
as the legal form of what can have no legal form .90
While Agamben's concern over the paradoxes of sovereignty demonstrates the rise of a 
serious phenomenon, he casts the scope of his analysis too narrowly. He adopts a largely 
legal-philosophical perspective, which not only obscures some of its more pervasive effects 
it also restricts the ways in which it can be challenged. As we have seen, sovereignty was 
effectively presupposed in order to give rise to that very sovereignty, making it 
foundationally paradoxical in nature. To regard it then as a complete and all-encompassing 
system would be to buy into the illogical paradox that sustains it.
This is not to dismiss Agamben's analysis. His genealogy of the state of exception and his 
analysis of its manifestation within contemporary politics is highly compelling as it exposes 
an extensive but obscured tradition of exceptional politics.91 Additionally his coverage of 
the debate between Schmitt and Benjamin prompts the re-emergence of Benjamin's 
observation that "the 'state of exception' in which we live is the rule. " 92 The state of 
exception is generally conceived as being a pragmatic, emergency situation that requires 
the temporary suspension of laws and procedures in order to re-establish normal order. 
Agamben's reinterpretation of the contemporary state of exception using the insights of 
Benjamin suggests that it is not a pragmatic situation, and indeed that the state of 
exception may have become the rule. Agamben even goes so far as to say that it is now a 
paradigm of government.93 Accordingly, he argues that the state of exception needs to be 
rethought and theories need to be developed in order to better understand the dynamic 
between the state of exception and the modern legal conception of sovereignty.94 In that 
context, the relationship between foreign policy and the domestic population will be 
addressed in relation to the state of exception as it was in relation to the more subtle 
determination of social norms.
As with the more subtle articulation of foreign policy control, the implications of the state 
of exception can be conceived with reference to the relationship between security and 
liberty, and in terms of the inside/outside dichotomy. Under the conditions of the state of 
exception, the pursuit of security is given clear precedence over the maintenance of liberty.
90 Agamben, State of Exception, p. 1.
91 Ibid., ch. 1.
92 Ibid., p. 57.
93 Ibid., ch. 1.
94 Ibid., ch. 6.
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The pursuit of security, under the state of exception, however, is not normal state 
regulation, through regular policing and welfare. Nor is it the security achieved through the 
social norms that are pervaded as a result of a commitment to liberty. Rather, this pursuit 
of security is against a threat that, regardless of whether it originates from outside or 
within, is deemed significant enough that it is privileged over the pursuit of security under 
'normal' conditions. While this threat could be something that threatens the coherence or 
existence of the state, it could also be a cynical ploy, akin to the 'diversionary theory of 
war' mentioned earlier, that seeks to undermine the principles of democratic governance.
The link between foreign policy and its domestic population becomes manifest in times of 
exceptional politics. Where the state of exception is a result of an internal threat, this 
exceptional security would come at the expense of liberties. The role of foreign policy, both 
within the domestic and international setting would be minimal as the external pursuit of 
security would come second to the internal concerns. Given that the state of exception 
presupposes a properly functioning system of modern sovereignty so that it may enact the 
exception, the threat is unlikely to originate within the state. After all, properly functioning 
state sovereignty requires a relatively ordered and homogenous political system. Even if 
the threat were to originate within, it would be quickly eliminated within a normal state of 
affairs, most likely as a result of being linked to an external threat. Thus the state of 
exception is most likely to occur in response to the perception of an external threat.
In the case of a state of emergency in response to an external threat, the mediation of this 
threat through foreign policy will take utmost priority within the affairs of the state. As it 
will take precedence over the pursuit of regular domestic security, the consequences of 
foreign policy will be clearly felt inside the state. Furthermore, foreign policy will be 
brought into the domestic, in which the pursuit of security comes at the expense of liberty. 
In short, the pursuit of foreign policy will come at the expense of concerns for individual 
liberty in a state of exception. Relocated in this way, concerns over personal freedoms in 
the face of encroaching state foreign policy are less likely to be heard and neither will 
accompanying trends of social change be well attended to. Domestic society will be drawn 
together behind consuming foreign policy goals, whether they are at war or in ideological 
conflict.
The domestic manifestation of foreign policy under a state of exception takes on a literal 
form. Rather than operating via a governmental rationality such as biopolitics it is based on
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the operation of overt sovereign power which is much less efficient in its methods of 
control and only under very extreme manifestations could it achieve the pervasiveness and 
scope of foreign policy when dispersed through norms. Given that the operation of 
sovereignty lacks subtlety, enacting pervasive social control would have major domestic 
social consequences. Domination would be common and at that point the sovereign state 
would be approaching something akin to a fascist regime or a totalitarian police state.
From the analysis of foreign policy in relation to the security/liberty dichotomy, this section 
has established two senses in which foreign policy can have an effect on, and even control 
over, the domestic society in whose name it acts. The first is a more subtle articulation that 
is ongoing and operates through norms. The second articulation is a more material 
conception that operates through direct sovereign rule of law, in order to suspend the rule 
of law. When this state of exception occurs in relation to an external threat, the mediation 
of this threat surmounts the regular pursuit of security and takes precedence over the 
maintenance of liberty. In this sense then, this pursuit of external security will come at a 
major cost to individual liberty. Whilst these two articulations of foreign policy can be seen 
to be working concurrently up to a point, any intense or extended state of exception is 
likely to have severe effects on liberty and disrupt governmental efficiency, breaking down 
the dispersal of foreign policy norms. Thus the contemporary question of 'whether the 
exception has become the rule' has important implications for the analysis undertaken in 
later chapters. For the most part, however, foreign policy operates domestically via subtle 
mechanisms of control.
In conclusion, this chapter demonstrated that foreign policy can be understood as an 
apparatus that operates across the conceptual boundaries separating inside and outside as 
equally as it operates across boundaries separating states. Framed in subtle terms, a 
disciplinary analysis can comprehend the extent to which foreign policy pervades and is 
intimately implicated in domestic politics. Employing the insights of Foucault into 
rationality and modernity in order to critique orthodox accounts of IR suggests another 
'dark side' to foreign policy that manifests as domestic social control. Having articulated 
how this other side of foreign policy can be understood, subsequent chapters will apply this 
disciplinary analysis to historical and contemporary case studies. The proceeding chapter 
addresses the onset of the cold war in Britain, in which foreign policy against Soviet 
communism abroad came to pervade Western societies as a rampant anti-communism 
within.
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PART II
Case S tudies of foreign policy as dom estic  d iscip line and  con tro l
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Chapter 4
Cold war foreign policy as discipline and social control
This thesis seeks to examine how foreign policy pervades and structures domestic politics. 
Viewed in such terms, foreign policy cannot simply be seen as the external actions of states 
as agents of International Relations. It needs to be recognised equally as a discourse that 
both constrains and enables the actions of those within the state. Foreign policy creates 
structures within the state, which accordingly shape the behaviour of each citizen, in both 
overt and subtle ways. This can be seen in a number of ways. For instance, foreign policy 
determines what kind of actions are seen as acceptable in a particular national security 
environment, and what kind of language is acceptable as part of public discourse. 
Consequently, foreign policy infuses thoughts and actions; it exists as a generalised 
discourse of national security obligations, subtly informing the decisions and actions of 
each citizen. The goal of this chapter is to map the way in which foreign policy shapes and 
influences domestic politics and society. In particular, this chapter seeks to articulate the 
way in which foreign policy discourse shapes human agency within the state. Understood 
as a process and a discourse which suffuses individuals, groups and structures, human
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agency will be analysed to reveal both the subtle and overt relationships that exist between 
citizens and their foreign policy. To this end, the operation of foreign policy discourse in the 
British political scene during formative stages of the cold war will be examined.
The case studies of the early cold war period in Britain offered in this chapter seek to 
highlight the role of foreign policy discourse in the formation of agency. In particular two 
case studies will be offered. The first is an analysis of the Information Research 
Department (IRD) which was a secret British cold war intelligence agency that operated out 
of the Foreign Office from 1948 to 1977. Ostensibly a 'foreign policy' organisation, its 
subtle forms of propaganda shaped and disciplined human agency inside Britain in ways 
that are still not fully understood by most of the British public. The second case study 
offered in this chapter is an account of British Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson (1964- 
1970; 1974-1976). This analysis will demonstrate the ways in which an individual's human 
agency may be shaped and disciplined by a foreign policy discourse. Indeed, Wilson himself 
developed a paranoiac world-view, giving rise to a seif-fuifilling cycle of conspiracy amongst 
both his supporters and detractors alike. The limitation of this conspiratorial approach is 
that in trying to find -  or perhaps more accurately construct -  complex and obscured plots, 
it ignores other modes of political agency. It is these, more subtle relationships between 
human agency and foreign policy that this chapter seeks to explore.
Accounts of the cold war, in particular, are susceptible to a conspiratorial approach to 
explanation. The cold war was an era suffused with narratives of espionage and intrigue, 
narratives that arose in response to the presence of an external threat and the perception 
that it may manifest internally. The conspiratorial style of explaining politics seems to be 
based on the sense that there is 'something else going on' in political narratives. Rather 
than embracing this uncertainty, and recognising that events are highly contingent, the 
attempt to ascribe collective intent and direct causality seems to be couched in a fear that 
no one is in control, manifesting in an insecurity that there is no conspiracy out there. In 
this way perhaps the conspiratorial approach can be seen as symptomatic of an ontological 
anxiety, a kind of intellectual 'comfort food'. To ascribe intent to complex institutions or 
nebulous associations is an attempt to code and classify something that is itself not 
necessarily rational or coherent. The underlying shadowy motivations assumed to be 
linking these actors together as part of a coherent agenda, in many instances do not exist.
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For example, key book length studies of the Information Research Department and Harold 
Wilson refer extensively to "the British state"1 or "the secret state"2, conferring to these 
organisations the status of actors.3 While these case studies do feature secret organisations 
and hidden plots, they are not unified or straightforward in terms of causal effect.
While this period of history may be replete with 'spies, secrets, and espionage', it is not 
enough to simply determine which groups did what and why. This chapter does not seek to 
uncover -  or indeed construct -  new conspiracies from this era. Instead, this chapter seeks 
to highlight the role that these discourses of security (particularly that of anti-communism) 
had in shaping and disciplining human agency. In this sense, it consciously deviates both in 
substantive focus and method from what has been portrayed as shadowy conspiracies in 
British politics. Within the context of the United States, a number of studies have 
highlighted the potent anti-communist rhetoric that operated during the 1950s and '60s.4 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the transatlantic operation of this cold war foreign 
policy discourse within British politics and society, highlighting its presence throughout the 
Western democratic landscape. In this sense foreign policy was at once a global discourse 
(evidenced in the foreign policies of Western states) with localised effects on agency (seen 
in the disciplinary effects on the respective domestic societies).
Towards a discursive conception of agency
In order to track the discipline and control enacted by cold war foreign policy it is necessary 
to develop a conception of agency that can interpret these processes in discursive terms. 
Such a conception of agency means that despite the latent conspiratorial tropes evident in 
the case studies, they can be understood in terms of wider political discourses and 
everyday social interactions. Existing accounts of these case studies tend to explain political 
agency by materialising shadowy subterfuge between political groups in a manner that
1 Paul Lashmar & James Oliver, Britain's Secret Propaganda War (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1998).
2 Stephen Dorrill & Robin Ramsay, Smear! Wilson and the Secret State (London: Grafton, 1992).
3 Stafford highlights this "conspiratorial mindset" in his review of Lashmar & Oliver; David Stafford, "Book 
Review", Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, 2000, p. 148.
4 Athan Theoharis & Robert Griffith (eds.), The Spectre: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of 
McCarthyism (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974); Athan Theoharis, Seeds o f Repression: Harry S. Truman and 
the Origins o f McCarthyism (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Michael Parenti, The Anti-Communist Impulse 
(New York: Random House, 1969); Michael Paul Rogin, The Intellectual and McCarthy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1967); Alan Wolfe, The Rise and Fall o f the Soviet Threat: Domestic Sources of the Cold War (Boston: South End 
Press, 1984) and; Martin J. Medhurst, et al. (eds.), Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1990).
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employs a frame of reference drawn from the genre of spy fiction and spy movies.5 In many 
respects this is understandable; the cold war saw the prospect of the external threat of 
communism manifest domestically. The anti-communist discourse of the early cold war 
began to pervade the Western democratic landscape, blurring the perceived lines between 
foreign and domestic as fears of foreign communist aggression increasingly informed the 
parameters of domestic political rivalry. This, however, is a not simply a case of the covert 
encroachment of state power upon domestic freedoms, but an intensification of national 
security prerogatives within wider social discourse. Everyday politics in this sense takes on 
the contours of the emerging global conflict. The disparity between the domestic socialist 
left and the capitalist right became an insurmountable gulf as the global rivalry between 
socialism and capitalism increasingly became an issue of national security.
These are the dynamics that a discursive conception of agency and foreign policy discipline 
are able to demonstrate. This section will draw from the work of two authors -  one 
academic, one a novelist -  whose work coalesces into a revealing conception of human 
agency whereby wider discourses shape and influence people's thoughts and actions. First, 
Roland Bleiker examines various forms of political dissent preceding the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989. Bleiker highlights, on the one hand, mass political protest, but then also 
demonstrates a range of other cultural forms that while not formally 'political', were 
equally important in these events. This account suggests that agency is highly fluid. 
Following that the work of novelist Don DeLillo will be examined as another insight into the 
operation of human agency. Fiction is of relevance to a discursive account of cold war 
Britain, as the lines often blur between fictional and political narratives. For instance, the 
case studies in this chapter demonstrate that the British literary scene was very much 
intertwined with the London political scene. As well as associating with one another 
authors such as the novels of authors such as Orwell were used as accessible frameworks 
for understanding the cold war. Similarly, for the purpose of this and subsequent chapters, 
the novels of DeLillo offer a way of understanding how the wider processes influence and 
even shape the actions of individuals. A re-occurring theme in the novels of DeLillo is the 
attempt by characters to unravel conspiracy and paranoia. The attempt to do so, however, 
tends to reveal little by way of actual conspiracy, only more rumour and conjecture.
5 I am thinking here of the spy films of Alfred Hitchcock and Fritz Lang and the novels of Ian Fleming but also 
earlier pulp novels and films that precede the cold war.
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DeLillo's concern with fluid notions of agency is made explicit in the dialogue of his novels 
as characters seek to explain conspiracies that become ever more elusive.
‘Constantly becoming something else': Roland Bleiker and human agency
Bleiker draws his discursive conception of human agency from case studies of popular 
dissent in East Germany in the lead up to the collapse of the regime in 1989.6 He suggests 
that there are multiple ways of understanding politics and agency in the cold war but 
stresses the importance of the discursive dimension. This discursive conception sees 
extensive overlap and integration between international and domestic politics and seeks to 
highlight the way in which the global cold war fed into domestic politics and society. 
Indeed, for Bleiker, such cartographical distinctions are largely irrelevant insofar as they 
have little influence on the movement of discourse. Consequently, political explanation 
should not be constrained by the spatial limitations placed by borders, nor should agency 
be necessarily understood only in terms of individuals consciously participating in mass 
political movements.
Towards this end Bleiker offers a number accounts, all important to understanding the 
collapse of East Germany. The first is a traditional account, highlighting the role of mass 
rallies where individuals are understood to be exercising popular consent as part of a 
unified political protest.7 While Bleiker does not dispute this account, he suggests it is not a 
sufficient explanation of the agency involved, and indeed that no single over-arching 
framework can capture the complexity of the events of 1989.8 Bleiker offers further 
explanations that were equally instrumental in political change, explanations grounded in a 
wider social and cultural context.9 These include the influence of the West German media, 
the bases of resistance found in Protestant churches, the cultural influence of East German 
refugees and the importance of East German underground bohemian poets who upset 
traditional modes of thought using new linguistic forms. Present in each of these accounts 
is a 'transversal' dissent that is not constrained by spatial limitations of the modern 
sovereign state or by notions of individual agency grounded in informed popular consent. It 
was these practices of transversal dissent that were able "to challenge the spatial giveness
6 Roland Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), pp. 146-184.
7 Ibid., p. 122-127.
8 Ibid., p. 121.
9 Ibid., pp. 146-184.
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of cold war politics. " 10 Accordingly the conceptual distinctions between the foreign and 
domestic are not useful in grasping the fluid movement of discourse. In-line with this, and 
contrary to most conceptions of agency in global politics, this chapter does not seek to 
ground its conception of agency or structures firmly in either national or international 
realms.
Orthodox accounts of international politics locate agency within the spectrum of what is 
referred to as the 'structure/agency debate'. This debate maps the discussion of how 
agency operates within IR and to what extent it resides within individuals or within 
determining structural mechanisms. Given the lack of formal powerful mechanisms of 
governance in the international realm, structure in IR generally refers to, as Olav Knudsen 
puts it, "recurrent patterns of behaviour in social settings. " * 11 For instance, neorealists 
assert that the structures of International Relations determine action and that the agency 
of individual states has little importance. Contrarily, neoliberal internationalists suggest 
that states and certain non-state actors exercise a high level of individual agency and there 
is little if any constraint by the structures of International Relations. Under the influence of 
constructivist thinking, the structure/agency debate moves beyond these binaries 
suggesting that there is some balance of individual rational agency exercised by actors and 
some measures of constraint by structural, institutional or moral forces. Such accounts 
suggest the emergence of sophisticated models of agency within IR.
This conception of international agency closely mirrors that of the domestic conception of 
individual agency offered by Bhaskar or Giddens. 12 Bhaskar's scientific realist 'stratified 
depth ontology' conception argues that while not empirically observable, structures are 
able to exert determining influence to the point that they can be declared 'real' . 13 Agency 
in this structural context is exercised strategically. Those actors that benefit from the 
structures possess greater power, while those disadvantaged have greater incentive. In 
more socially constituted terms, Giddens suggests that while individuals "are intrinsically 
involved with society and actively enter into its constitution", they cannot be 'outside of'
10 Ibid., p. 123.
11 Olav Knudsen, "Context and Action in the Collapse of the Cold War European System: An Exploratory 
Application of the Agency-Structure Perspective" in Walter Carlsnaes & Steve Smith, European Foreign Policy: 
The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1994) p. 208.
12 Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, p. 10.
13 Jonathan Joseph, "Hegemony and the Structure-Agency Problem in IR", Review of International Studies, vol. 
34, no. 1, 2008, p. 115.
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social structures. 14 Society therefore is not simply a maelstrom of chaotic individual acts, 
nor is it determined solely by macro-level social forces; there is interaction between 
individual agents and structures. As Giddens and Pierson suggest, "society only has form, 
and that form only has effects on people, in so far as structure is produced and reproduced 
in what people do. " 15 Giddens in this way offers a model of individual action that is 
mediated but not entirely controlled or determined by the context of wider social forces. 
As equally as individuals are constrained by social forces, they are also aware of social rules 
and norms, shaping their actions accordingly; neither agency nor structure predominates. 16
Despite the subtlety of this sociological approach, by 'internationalising' Giddens' 
conception, the structure/agency debate in IR essentially transposes individuals with 
states. Where individuals are seen to function within a society of social forces and norms, 
constructivists such as Wendt equally see states operating in the same manner within 
International Relations. 17 The justification for this level of analysis shift is on the basis that 
"as long as states are dominant actors in international politics, it is appropriate to focus on 
the identity and agency of the state rather than, for example, a transnational social 
movement. " 18 Echoing within this observation is an implication that seems entirely at odds 
with the fundamental constructivist insight. 19 While the continued focus on the core 
ontological units of traditional IR is based on the seemingly astute logic of the empirical 
observation, it seems to belie the core constructivist premise. This premise is that the 
theorising, policy-making, or description of international politics within a particular 
intellectual framework reinforces this way of knowing IR. In short, a so-called objective 
empirical observation is being made in regards to something that is said to be socially 
constituted, to say nothing of the fact that this observation in turn reconstitutes this 
supposed empirically factual object. As Hollis and Smith suggest, any attempt to theorise
14 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution o f Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), p. 120.
15 Anthony Giddens & Christopher Pierson, Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 77.
16 Giddens' theory of structuration is similar to Foucault's model of governmentality, although the latter would 
deny both the distinction between, and the attempt to balance, individual agency and social structure. For 
Foucault they are inseparably fluid.
17 Take for instance the claim that "states are people too", Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 215-224; see also Alexander Wendt, "The State as 
Person in International Theory", Review o f International Studies, vol. 30, no. 1, 2004, pp. 289-316.
18 Mlada Bukovansky, "Identity and Agency in the International System", quoted in Bleiker, Popular Dissent, 
Human Agency and Global Politics, p. 10.
19 For instance, Wendt suggests that world-systems structural approaches and neorealist state-based positions 
produce mutually constituted accounts of structure and agency, see Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure 
Problem in International Relations Theory", International Organization, vol. 41, no. 3, 1987, p. 339.
104
the nature of international politics -  in this instance the question of structure and agency -  
cannot be separated from the kinds of assumptions that underlie these observations.20 The 
continued commitment to this ontology of the sovereign nation-state ensures that there is 
a continued recreation of an inside/outside view of politics at the expense of the nuanced 
elements that are present within global politics.21
A discursive conception of agency can avoid this continued construction of inside/outside. 
According to Bleiker, agency beyond the constrictive bounds of the state can be 
understood in terms of movement and dissent. Agency is by definition something that is 
not fixed or static; it suggests a change in place or state.22 Movement is normally 
conceptualised in terms of movement within or across borders, domestic movement or 
international movement. Movement conceived in these terms recreates the sovereign logic 
of the modern state and the modern individual. It reinforces the notion of movement as 
something an individual - who is a citizen of a particular state - does in relation to their 
state or that of another. In so doing, it discourages, or even actively disallows, attempts to 
grasp the subtleties of human agency and interaction. Indeed, Chapter 5 of this thesis 
highlights the operation of modes of control that are essential to this spatial logic. Perhaps 
the link between movement and dissent can be better understood in terms of the 
movement and transfer of ideas and practices, movement can thus also entail shifts in 
thinking and action. This, no doubt, may entail spatial movement of ideas or people within 
or across borders but it need not be subordinated to this conceptual interpretive 
framework. Movement is the becoming of what it is not, regardless of whether it results in 
definitive change. To the extent that these processes evade, challenge or are incompatible 
with the interpretative frameworks of modern sovereignty, these conceptions can be 
understood as a form of popular dissent.
As may already be clear, discursive agency by virtue of its lack of fixity cannot be firmly 
defined. Agency in this way is not ontologically grounded. Rather, agency can be found in 
the way in which "we think about human action and its potential to shape political and 
social practices." According to Bleiker, the "mutually constituted and constantly shifting 
relationship between agents and discourses thus undermines the possibility of observing
20 Martin Hollis & Steve Smith, "Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations", Review o f 
International Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, 1991, p. 395.
21 Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International 
Relations Theory", European Journal o f International Relations, vol. 3, no. 3, 1997, pp. 372-375.
22 Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, p. 278.
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social dynamics in a value-free way."23 While this may seem to point one off in the path of a 
nihilistic oblivion, where power is ubiquitous and avenues for political change indistinct, it 
is simply a recognition of the fact that "a conceptualisation of human agency can never be 
complete [and] that the very power of human agency is based in a constant process of 
becoming something else than what it is."24 It is these movements, whether they are 
between, across or without the spatial lines of modern sovereignty that Bleiker, like 
Campbell, refers to as 'transversal' politics.25 These transversal flows can be found in the 
contests over knowledge and dissenting political forms, which challenge the modern 
reading of the sovereign state and sovereign individual. Global politics in this sense can also 
be seen as a multitude of intertwined and criss-crossing transversal movements. Viewed in 
this way, the question of inside and outside in global politics becomes increasingly 
irrelevant if an analysis is to keep up with these discursive flows.
'Everything is connected in the end’: Don DeLillo and discursive agency
Happiness is taking part in the struggle, where there is no borderline between
one's own personal world, and the world in general.
Lee Harvey Oswald, quoted in the preface to De Li II lo, Libra (1988).
As equally as the line between reality and fiction was earlier shown to have the potential to 
blur, fiction can also shed light on subtle conceptions of political agency. From the 
narratives of Don DeLillo we can arrive at an account of agency that operates via discourse 
as much as it does through the clearly articulated actions and intents of individuals. This 
American novelist is instructive when considering a diffuse conception of agency, 
particularly in regards to paranoia and conspiracy. In an interview, DeLillo suggests that the 
impact of the JFK assassination "invented" him as an author.26 He suggests his first eight 
novels all "collect around the dark center of the assassination" and grapple with the 
question of explanation in light of this event.27 Not only was it a defining event in his own 
life as a writer, DeLillo suggests the assassination in Dallas has been a defining moment in 
the explanatory world-view of Americans. According to DeLillo, "what's been missing over 
the last twenty-five years is a sense of manageable reality. Much of that feeling can be
23 Ibid., p. 16.
24 Ibid., p. 278.
25 Ibid., p. 2; and David Campbell, "Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics and the Anarchical World", in Michael 
J. Shapiro & Hayward R. Alker (eds.), Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 7-31.
26 Quoted in Anthony DeCurtis, "An Outsider in This Society: An Interview with Don DeLillo" in Thomas Pietro 
(ed.), Conversations with Don DeLillo (Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2005) p. 56.
27 Ibid.
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traced back to that day in Dallas. We seem more aware of elements like randomness and 
ambiguity and chaos since then."28 Thus the link between conspiracy and explanation in his 
work stems from "the shattering randomness of the event, the missing motive, [and the] 
violence that people not only commit but also seem to watch simultaneously from a 
disinterested distance."29 For DeLillo, the telling of American narratives in this sense has 
been "engineered" by this moment.30
The JFK assassination is demonstrative of the discursive construction of meaning, even 
beyond the influence of this event that is suggested by DeLillo. The interpretative 
framework of this event was itself to some extent shaped by both fiction and the cold war 
context. For instance, the geopolitical superpower conflict provided fertile discursive 
ground for The Monchurion Candidate, the 1958 novel by Richard Condon and subsequent 
film adaptation. Featuring a plotline in which the brain-washed protagonist shoots an 
American politician, The Manchurian Candidate consolidated and indeed pre-empted many 
cold war tropes of "alien communist conspiracies... political assassinations, red-baiting, 
mind control and espionage."31 Indeed it eerily prophesised elements of the assassination 
of President John F. Kennedy and only added to the confusion and conspiracies 
surrounding attempts to understand what actually transpired that day in Dallas. The 
assassination of JFK highlights how both fiction and the wider geopolitical context are 
interwoven into attempts to interpret events and construct political narratives.
DeLillo's ninth novel, Libra (1988), speculates in fictional form upon the events in the lead- 
up to the JFK assassination. The impact of the assassination on the American psyche is 
captured in the novel when a retired CIA agent describes it as "an aberration in the 
heartland of the real."32 In the same way that narratives of history have been shaped by the 
social resonance of this event, people's motivations are also tied to wider discourses. 
According to Helyer, DeLillo displaces "the individual agency [of his characters] onto 
outside forces" and whilst there are esoteric discussions of paranoia, conspiracy and 
astrology throughout his novels, such red herrings are merely a playful attempt to obscure 
his placement of individual decision making within a much broader socio-political
28 Ibid.
29 DeLillo interviewed in Adam Begley, "The Art of Fiction CXXXV: An Interview with Don DeLillo", Paris Review 
35, p. 299.
30 Ibid., p. 303.
31 Tony Shaw, "Book Review", Journal o f Cold War Studies, vol. 10, no. 3, 2008, p. 186.
32 Don DeLillo, Libra (New York: Viking, 1988), p. 15.
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tapestry.33 Agency is not located discretely within the actions of individuals or institutions, 
but rather is embedded within a common social discourse.
This conception of agency is a common thread woven throughout the work of DeLillo. It 
can be seen both in the explanation of the underlying motivations of characters and 
vocalised in their attempts to understand the world. In Libra, for instance, a paranoid Army 
General struggles to defend America against what he describes as the 'Real Control 
Apparatus'. 'The Apparatus' has "paralysed not only our armed forces but our individual 
lives, frustrating every normal American ambition, infiltrating our minds and bodies."34 This 
attempt to articulate the threat to American society could equally function as a 
characterisation of the fluidity of a discursive conception of agency. The paranoid General 
continues, suggesting that any attempt to describe 'The Apparatus'
is like naming particles in the air, naming molecules or cells. The Apparatus is 
precisely what we can't see or name. We can't measure it, gentlemen, or take 
its photograph. It's the mystery we can't get hold of, the plot we can't 
uncover. This does not mean there are no plotters. They are elected officials of 
our government, Cabinet members, philanthropists, men who know each 
other by secret signs, who work in the shadows to control our lives.35
This is reminiscent of a passage from Great Jones Street (1973) in which DeLillo juxtaposes 
the radicalism of underground groups with the esotericism of political discourse. In this 
exchange, a misanthropic counter-cultural rock star in the mould of Mick Jagger or Bob 
Dylan is told,
[t]he true underground is the place where power flows. That's the best kept 
secret of our time. You're not the underground. You're people aren't 
underground people. The Presidents and Prime Ministers are the ones who 
make the underground deals and speak the true underground idiom.... This is 
the underground network. This is where it happens. Power flows under the 
surface, far beneath the level that you and I live on.36
The suggestion in both cases is that social and political power is concentrated in a familiar 
conspiratorial fashion amongst political elites. The actual nature of agency offered in this 
context, however, is radically different from traditional conceptions. As best one can 
determine through the layers of irony, DeLillo here moves away from material notions of
33 Ruth Helyer, "Refuse Heaped Many Stories High: DeLillo, Dirt and Disorder", Modern Fiction Studies 45:4, 
1999, p. 987.
34 DeLillo, Libra, p. 282.
35 Ibid., p. 282.
3bDon DeLillo, Great Jones Street (Boston M.A.: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 231-232.
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individual and institutional agency, offering instead one that is highly fluid and diffuse. If 
agency is in any way centred in this conception, it is anchored in political discourse, 'the 
true underground idiom'.
Evident also in the writing of DeLillo is the importance of discourse in creating people's 
worldviews. The central section of the novel White Noise (1984) is shaped by what is 
termed 'the airborne toxic event', during which students and staff are evacuated as a cloud 
of toxic gas approaches their campus.37 While the toxic cloud remains distant, it gains a 
threatening force of its own and "the more characters talk the more it begins to loom."38 
From the perspective of both reader and the central characters the airborne toxic event 
becomes a powerful phenomenon and irrespective of whether or not there is any threat, 
its meaning has been entirely socially constructed. Thus for a significant part of the novel, 
all the main characters are embedded within a general air of threat, a threat that is only 
ever realised through discourse, never manifesting in any material sense. The extent to 
which it is real is largely irrelevant as the effects are not dispersed by it directly.
Similarly, Don DeLillo's epic novel Underworld (1997) offers a counter-cultural secret 
history of the cold war, describing in particular the way in which the logic of its politics 
infuses everyday life in a multiplicity of ways. Knight describes it as a "post-paranoid epic" 
that "strategically hacks into the flate-90s] resurgence of conspiracy thinking... rewiring and 
upgrading that popular epistemology."39 Underworld follows the lives of a range of people 
from the '50s through to the '80s, some who intersect, some that never connect with any 
central element of the narrative except the overarching cold war logic that defined the era. 
This cold war logic imbues many characters with an anxious paranoia, although rarely does 
it manifest in overt panic. Rather it is a fundamental element of the identity of the 
characters and as such presents as banal everyday rather than psychopathology. For many 
characters the attempt to rationalise the highly complex events of the cold war results in 
an overriding concern with conspiracy theory. Take for instance the following exchange 
between Nick and Sims:
Nick: There's this word in Italian. Dietrologia. It means the science of what is
behind something. A suspicious event. The science of what is behind an event.
37 Don DeLillo, White Noise (New York: Picador, 1984), pp. 109-164.
38 John Freeman, "Lurking Around Society's Edges", The Age, 22/02/06. Accessed from www.theage.com.au/ 
news/books/around-societvs-edges/2006/02/21/1 140284064551 .html on 20/01/09.
39 Peter Knight, "Everything is Connected: Underworld's Secret History of Paranoia", Modern Fiction Studies 
45:3, 1999, p. 832.
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Sims: They need this science. I don't need it.
N: I don't need it either, I'm just telling you.
S: I'm an American. I go to ball games.
N: The science of dark forces. Evidently they feel this science is legitimate 
enough to require a name.
S: People who need this science, I would make an effort to tell them we have 
real sciences, hard sciences, we don't need imaginary ones.
N: I'm just telling you the word. I agree with you, Sims. But the word exists.
S: There's always a word. There's probably a museum too. The Museum of 
Dark Forces. They have ten thousand blurry photographs. Or did the Mafia 
blow it up? 40
Here Nick attempts to classify his paranoia as something akin to a science. Sims resists and 
it later emerges that rather than rejecting conspiracy and paranoia, he views it as so 
pervasive and all-encompassing that nothing can ever really be known -  everything is 
connected thus connections are ever-present and arbitrary, even absurd.41 Paradoxically 
Nick's paranoia manifests in more than just a conspiracy theory but expands into an 
impossible attempt to definitively map the multiplicity of connections. DeLillo seems to be 
suggesting that Nick's rationality is illogical and Sims' irrationality is sensible in the face of 
such complexity. For Sims there is a comfort in knowing that the complexity of social 
relations can never be fully quantified but that this should not obscure attempts at 
understanding. What it does reveal is that knowledge and understanding will never be 
final, "everything is connected in the end. " 42
Foreign policy discipline and the Information Research Department
I have chosen the historiography surrounding the Information Research Department (IRD) 
intentionally and somewhat provocatively. The subject matter, it will become clear, is the 
very stuff of conspiracy theories, a shadowy secret organisation whose explicit remit -  at 
least amongst those who knew of its existence -  was a campaign of disinformation 
designed to deceive enemies both at home and abroad. Seemingly an organisation straight 
out of a narrative of spies and cold war conspiracy, this account will instead demonstrate 
that outright collusion and direct causal linkages are not required to offer an explanation 
for the way in which the IRD propelled British politics. Agency in this context need not be
40 Don DeLillo, Underworld: A Novel (New York: Scribner, 1997), p. 280.
41 Knight, "Everything is Connected", pp. 820-821.
42 DeLillo, Underworld, p. 826.
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grounded solely in the policies of the IRD and its agents, nor does it need to be described in 
terms of a superstructure of the cold war conflict. Agency here is linked to a range of 
competing discourses, particularly those of foreign policy and national security, which put 
in place various social imperatives that shape human agency. Thus, this explanation will 
avoid crossing the line into conspiracy theory, but will also deliver on the sense that 'there 
is something else going on' by suggesting that it is not a hidden conspiracy waiting to 
become uncovered, but rather a constitutive dynamic of discourse that is embedded in the 
familiarity of the everyday and accordingly is easily overlooked.
The IRD was a cold war intelligence agency that was established with the exclusive aim of 
combating the foreign threat of Soviet communism. It operated under the auspices of the 
Foreign Office from 1948 until 1977 and employed up to 300 staff.43 The perceived need for 
the IRD was identified shortly after World War II, at which point the cold war had not really 
been coined as such, nor had the grip of anti-communist sentiment taken hold throughout 
the Western democratic landscape. Britain felt that the Soviets had been undermining the 
newly formed United Nations (UN), using it as a public forum to proclaim the virtues of 
communism and the vices of capitalism. Such dispersions were viewed by the British as 
misrepresentations of global politics and an exploitation of the intended function of the 
UN. The iRD was designed as a response to counter this sub-diplomatic sparring. The stated 
(although not publicly) goals of the IRD was to present a positive image of the "vital ideas 
of social democracy and Western civilisation" and to downplay the attraction of 
communism so as to support the national security goals of Britain particularly in regards to 
the threat of communism. 44 In this way the intentions of the IRD were to subtly yet 
deceptively manipulate the politics of other countries, so as to present a positive image of 
British democracy. Framed in Clausewitzian terms, this strategy could be seen as a cultural 
'war by other means'.
Despite the 30 years since details began to emerge, many Britons are unlikely to know 
much about the IRD.45 This is in no small part due to the fact that regardless of the 30 year 
rule for releasing classified files to the public, many of its files remain classified.46 It is safe
43 David Leigh, "Death of the Department that Never Was", The Guardian, 27/01/78, p. 13; and Scott Lucas, 
"British Ministry of Propaganda", Independent on Sunday, 26/02/95, p. 20.
44 Paul Lashmar, "Covert in Glory", New Statesmen and Society, 3/3/95, p. 14.
45 Scott Lucas, "British Ministry of Propaganda", Independent on Sunday, 26/02/95, p. 20.
46 Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945-1958: The Information Research 
Department (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2004), p. 14.
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to say that the IRD was a highly secretive organization in its time, for there are relatively 
few details available even now. Given this lack of immediate public visibility it would seem 
that any effect it had on British domestic politics would be covert interventions, the stuff of 
brazen conspiracy theories. Such accounts are evident throughout many of the media 
accounts of the IRD. For instance, sounding much like a spy film, The Observer reported that 
the IRD "covertly planted material in Britain" as part of a "secret propaganda war" waged 
by the Foreign Office.47 Such narratives suggest that there was a government conspiracy 
aimed at misleading the domestic populace. The effects of any direct measures, however, 
are greatly outweighed by the subtle but panoptic disciplining enacted by the foreign policy 
agenda of the IRD. For while the IRD was not a highly visible institution -  indeed it was an 
invisible institution -  it was in a position to generate and contribute to knowledge that was 
not only highly visible but also influential in generating political culture and social norms. 
Indeed it will become clear here that its very invisibility as an institution further contributed 
to the effectiveness of its panoptic discipline.
The IRD was not alone in its operations; late in World War II Britain developed a 
department to counter the cultural programs propagated by the Soviets. The Cultural 
Relations Department (CRD) preceded the IRD by a number of years and exists now as an 
office to distribute scholarships to foreign students. Like the IRD, the CRD was based in the 
Foreign Office but ultimately less is known of the details of its operations.48 Defty suggests 
that it sought to "combat communist domination of international youth groups, most 
notably the National Union of Students (NUS)."49 Towards this end, it had a significant role 
in British domestic affairs, liaising with anti-communist student organisations and 
"brief[ing] them on communist tactics."50 It also organised a rival International Youth 
Conference that was held in London during August 1948 to counter the Soviet-run World 
Federation of Democratic Youth.51 These operations undertaken by the CRD sound rather 
benign in comparison with the dramatic narratives of cold war espionage and intrigue. The 
Foreign Office, however, placed a great deal of value in the information-based strategies
47 Richard Fletcher, George Brock & Phil Kelly, "How the FO waged Secret Propaganda War in Britain", The 
Observer, 29/5/1%, p. 2.
48 The most comprehensive account is Richard J. Aldrich, "Putting Culture into the Cold War: The Cultural 
Relations Department and British Covert Information Warfare", Intelligence and National Security, vol. 18, no. 2, 
2003, pp. 109-133.
49 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, p. 49.
50 Ibid.
51 Aldrich, "Putting Culture into the Cold War", p. 112.
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and while such approaches do not involve the same level of secret conspiracy and 
subterfuge as other programs, they can be equally as effective in influencing norms and 
practices at home and abroad.52 By developing information based strategies "the Cultural 
Relations Department and the Foreign Office had developed tactics for countering 
communist control of international organisations which laid the foundations for the work 
of the IRD."53 With its wider scope of operations, the IRD consolidated these ad-hoc 
measures into an institutionalised global campaign.54
The Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Christopher Mayhew, was the principle 
architect of the IRD. According to Mayhew, the British attempt to counter the international 
image of Soviet communism should comprise
a small section in the Foreign Office to collect information about communist 
policy, tactics and propaganda [in order] to produce material for our anti­
communist publicity through our Missions and services abroad.55
Despite being the architect of Britain's cold war information/propaganda campaign, 
Mayhew was hardly a secretive figure. Mayhew was the public face of the Labour party on 
the BBC broadcasts and in 1955 infamously took mescaline as part of the BBC's Panorama 
program.56 Despite his public persona Mayhew was the "driving force behind the 
establishment of the [IRD] at the British Foreign Office in 1948."57 Mayhew's media 
background in many ways complemented the goals of the IRD, which while secretive were 
designed to use the powers of mass media to create a very public message praising a 
particular British way life, contrasted with the flaws of Soviet communism.
Proposals for the IRD were initially based heavily on wartime propaganda models of covert 
manipulation. Ivone Kirkpatrick, a diplomat with experience in wartime propaganda who 
had been in charge of the European services of the BBC, outlined a number of key elements 
for effective counter-propaganda. These included "the cooperation of Government 
Ministers; the support of the BBC and domestic media; and the closest coordination of
52 Ibid., pp. 128-129.
53 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, p. 53.
54 Ibid.
55 CP (48)8, CAB 129/23, quoted in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "IRD: Origins and Establishment of the 
Foreign Office Information Research Department 1946-48", Historians in Library and Records Department, No. 
9, Aug 1995, p. 7.
56 "Past Faces of Panorama -  Christopher Mayhew", BBC News, 4/02/09. Accessed from news.bbc.co.uk/1/ 
shared/spl/hi/pop ups/08/programmes past faces of panorama/html/7.stm 6/03/09. Panorama transcript 
available from web.ukonline.co.uk/sotcaa/sotcaa.html7/sotcaa/hidden/mayhew01.html, accessed on 6/03/09.
57 Tony Shaw, "Politics of Cold War Culture", Journal o f Cold War Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, Fall 2001, p. 63.
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domestic and foreign propaganda. " 58 This initial proposal received negative responses from 
a number of ministers, in particular Foreign Office Secretary Ernest Bevin and Under­
secretary Mayhew, for whom a campaign based around an "appeal to unite the forces of 
social democracy was somewhat more palatable than [a] reversion to wartime tactics. " 59 
According to Lucas and Morris, Mayhew's position on the IRD was not entirely one of 
principle, rather it was determined by the pragmatic concerns of the Labour politics.60 Any 
aggressive campaign directed solely at socialist tenets would prove unpalatable to left-wing 
factions. Accordingly Mayhew advised Bevin to "balance anti-communist [positions] with 
anti-capitalist arguments so as to reassure the parliamentary Labour Party. " 61 Accordingly, 
initial IRD proposals sought to describe British social democracy as a Third Force' 
alternative to both Soviet communism and American capitalism. 62 While the Third Force' 
ideas may have reflected some idealism, it was more likely "a clever Foreign Office 
response to Truman's anti-communist crusade. " 63
The IRD sought maximum mass popular influence rather than direct control of politics. Part 
of the inspiration for the IRD being a covert organisation stems from its chosen method, 
which was distinctively panoptic in terms of its subtlety and pervasiveness. The IRD wished 
to be heard, not seen; it wished its message to be pervasive, not by virtue of being state- 
sanctioned but rather as a result of the social influence of those who dispersed it. 
Accordingly the IRD messages were directed towards opinion-makers such as journalists, 
novelists and politicians, "the principle being that it is better to influence those who can 
influence others than attempt a direct appeal to the mass of the population. " 64 In his book 
on the IRD and its methods, Defty concludes that "the most effective propaganda was the 
truth and that propaganda of any kind was more likely to be believed if it was not seen to 
emanate from an official source. " 65 In this sense the power and influence of the 
information was seen to be more effective and more pervasive if it was spread through
58 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945-1958, p. 41.
59 Ibid., p. 42.
60 W Scott Lucas & CJ Morris, "A Very British Crusade: The Information Research Department and the 
Beginnings of the Cold War", in Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51 
(London: Routledge, 1992), p. 92.
61 Letter from Christopher Mayhew to Ernest Bevin quoted in Lucas & Morris, "A Very British Crusade", p. 92.
62 For a discussion of the "Third Force" idea in IRD see Chapter 2 of Hugh Wilford, The CIA, The British Left and 
the Cold War: Calling the Tune? (Southgate, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), pp. 48-81.
63 Dianne Kirby, "Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo-American Cold War Alliance and the Defence of Western 
Civilization and Christianity, 1945-48", Journal o f Contemporary History, vol. 35, no.3, 2000, p. 397.
64 Sir Claude Schuster, permanent secretary to the Lord Chancellor's Office quoted in Phillip M. Taylor, British 
Propaganda in the 20' Century: Selling Democracy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 27.
65 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, p. 248.
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established social and cultural lines of communication rather than official state-sanctioned 
notices. Defty's account thus moves away from conspiratorial explanations of the IRD's 
methods suggesting that "while the IRD sought to counter reactionary views, there is no 
evidence of a coordinated campaign primarily directed at the manufacture of public 
opinion in Britain."66
Thus despite being based w ithin the Foreign Office, the IRD was not simply an externally 
orientated organisation. Speaking in 1946, however, Prime M inister Clement Atlee 
confirmed in non-specific terms the principle that propaganda should be externally 
orientated, stating that "any matter of propaganda, or anything of that kind is a m atter for 
the Foreign O ffice."67 Flere Atlee is affirm ing the theory and practice of the divide between 
domestic and international politics as it is defined by sovereign boundaries. Aldrich, 
however, highlights that while the IRD and other information projects sort to maintain an 
exclusive external focus, they quickly found their work "was [being] conducted in a global 
arena w ithout clear boundaries, rather than an international arena clearly separated into 
domestic and foreign constituencies."68 The attem pt to counter communism was not just a 
war by other means that could be fought abroad; fronts were rapidly emerging within 
Britain. Socialist discourse in Britain, despite a tradition of "non-insurrectionary socialist 
po litics",69 became linked with the prospect of Soviet influenced communism manifesting 
domestically. In order to thw art the potential traction of revolutionary communism at 
home, the anti-communist information campaign of the IRD turned inwards, occupying a 
grey area between providing information and managing domestic public opinion, at least 
during in its early campaigns. Revisionist critics suggest tha t the IRD conspired to 
manipulate domestic politics.70 Defty, as mentioned, suggests there was no coordinated 
campaign directed at the manipulation of domestic British public opinion.71 This chapter 
holds that to suggest there is no conspiracy is not to suggest that the IRD did not influence
66 Ibid., p. 249.
57 Address to the House of Commons, 7 March 1946, quoted in John Tulloch, "Policing the Public Sphere -  The 
British Machinery of News Management", Media, Culture and Society, vol. 15, 1993, p. 378.
68 Aldrich, "Putting Culture into the Cold War", p. 111.
59 See Hindess' chapter "The Labour Party and Socialist Strategy" on Barry Hindess, Parliamentary Democracy 
and Socialist Politics (Routledge & Kegan Paul Pic: London, 1983) pp. 85-117.
70 See for instance, Scott Lucas, "The Dirty Tricks That Were Made in England", The Independent on Sunday, 
20/08/95. Accessed from findarticles.com/p/articles/mi qn4158/is 19950820/ai nl4001405 on 16/03/09; Paul 
Lashmar & James Oliver, Britain's Secret Propaganda War (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1998); and 
Bernard Porter, Plots and Paranoia: A History of Political Espionage in Britain: 1790-1988 (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989), pp. 175-196.
71 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, pp. 35-53.
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domestic politics and public opinion. Neither, however, would the existence of conspiracy 
explain the scope of the effects. One must take a different view of agency in the cold war, 
recognising the scope for the IRD information campaigns to influence discourse and 
accordingly to shape political action and society.
Why is it that the domestic operations of the IRD have been so controversial, represented 
in terms of conspiracy and errant government? The foreign operations of the IRD and even 
foreign policy in general equally involve manipulation and conspiracy. Departments and 
bureaucracies are organised around a particular strategic aim, individuals exposed to levels 
of classified secrets, all in aid of serving the national interest. The nature of modern 
sovereignty, which divides states and gives rise to national interests means that foreign and 
domestic action is considered to be intractably distinct. A Machiavellian modus operandi is 
the norm of International Relations between states, necessitated and perpetuated by the 
territorial structures on modern international politics. Indeed, were a foreign policy not to 
operate according to these principles, it would seem naive or even a threat to the national 
interest. Within the domestic realm, however, this conspiratorial bureaucratic mindset is 
considered exceptional and therefore a lack of transparency is seen as a threat to the 
democratic processes of the state. For instance, when Lyn Smith's breakthrough article on 
the IRD suggested that covert propaganda was "used covertly as part of the government's 
mechanism for conducting relations with other states as well as influencing opinion on the 
domestic scene", it was the latter part of this statement that was exceptional. 72 Revelations 
of the external propaganda operations of the IRD were not greeted with the same level of 
surprise and outrage, given that it ultimately serves the broad existing remit of British 
foreign policy. This is not the case with regards to the domestic operations of the IRD. As a 
secret section of the Foreign Office, intervening within Britain, it affected its own citizens. 
This is remarkable insofar as it goes against the established theory and practice of politics, 
in which a state's foreign policies are directed towards foreign states rather than its own 
citizens.
The means by which the IRD operated were not outright lies and conspiracy, at least in the 
beginning. Its information campaigns are often described as 'grey' propaganda, as opposed 
to untruths and clear misinformation, i.e. 'black' propaganda. The IRD exaggerated cases of
72 Lyn Smith, "Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department: 1947-77", Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies, vol. 9, no. 1,1980, p. 67.
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anti-British plots and ensured full political capital was gained from incidences of Soviet 
atrocity. As well as generating politically advantageous information abroad it also offered 
speaker's notes to politicians, businessman and journalists, which contained beneficial 
information that the IRD wished to be publicly disseminated. The secrecy of the IRD had as 
much to do with the effectiveness of its information operation as it did with being in 
possession of highly classified information. The secrecy of the IRD allowed it to function in a 
panoptic manner, insofar as the general public would access information they believed and 
trusted, unaware it was government information. The contacts that it selected to be given 
information were to be credible amongst the public audience and well-known. The 
information that the IRD distributed was given on the condition that it was to be non- 
attributed and on a condition of anonymity. By operating in this way the IRD was able to 
effectively generate public mass knowledge that was both credible, and highly visible. Upon 
being briefed of the early achievements of the IRD, George Kennan "remarked that [it] 
represented a sophisticated and mature program, ahead of what the US had to offer."73 
Indeed, the model of informational and cultural contest constituted part of what Kennan 
had originally envisioned in his articulation of containment, rather than the narrow and 
military-backed version of containment that became the central plank of US cold war 
foreign policy.74
British propaganda methods were more discrete than those of the US. Focussing on the 
Western world the IRD sort to influence opinion-makers in contrast to overt CIA-sponsored 
interventions and broadcasting operations such as Radio Free Europe. As a 1950 Foreign 
Office review of the two approaches described it:
It seems our general approach is often somewhat different from that of the 
Americans and, on the whole, the discreet and personal approach of our 
Information Officers get more material effectively placed than the American 
reliance on volume of output. The rather aggressive portrayal of the American 
way of life is not always welcome and may be self-defeating. In any case it is 
preferable to maintain two independent lines of approach, since both together 
cover more ground than either could hope to do working alone.75
The propaganda techniques of the US were much more overt and prominent but because 
of this they were also able to be directly targeted at overseas audiences. Operating through 
its 'Radio Free Europe' the CIA was able to achieve much greater overseas coverage,
73 Aldrich, "Putting Culture into the Cold War", p. 110.
74 George F. Kennan, "Containment Then and Now", Foreign Affairs, vol. 65, iss. 4, spring 1987, pp. 885-890.
75 Adam Watson quoted in Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, p. 252.
117
however, the tremendous "scale of [its] output did not necessarily guarantee its impact."76 
For the Americans the "concept of influencing public opinion" was a new one and by the 
early 1950s, British liaison to the US intelligence services, Adam Watson, reported that 
Americans were beginning to accept that "the struggle for men's minds [was] a major 
feature of their general struggle with the Kremlin."77 In contrast to the Americans' 
megaphone propaganda, the effectiveness of the British approach to cold war propaganda 
was not measured by the size of the audience and the power of the message but rather its 
reception amongst those with influence and the subsequent effect of this information on 
the public discourse of the day.
In the pursuit of its mandate of countering communism, the IRD was employed 
domestically against the left-wing of the Labour movement. Examining the interventions 
within the Labour movement, Wilford declares that the "IRD played [an important] part in 
the postwar history of the British left."78 These interventions were still grounded in the 
information strategies rather than direct manipulation of politics. Under-Secretary Mayhew 
suggested to Foreign Secretary Bevin "that IRD material should be sent to Cabinet ministers 
regularly and that it should be included in their speeches."79 Ministers were also asked to 
present anti-communist speeches to the IRD so that they may be distributed through the 
BBC.80 These talking points and speakers' notes were also distributed to 'friendly' MPs to 
help them in "combating communist-inspired opposition in the Labour party and the Trade 
Union movement."81 The role of the IRD in regards to the Labour movement was not 
straight-forwardly partisan; rather it was driven by the pragmatic foreign policy doctrine of 
countering the communist threat. Rather than denouncing the Labour movement en masse 
the information strategy of the IRD sort influence within the Labour movement, seeking to 
drive a wedge between those who might harbour socialist aspirations and those for whom 
such aspirations might be seen as a threat to the state.
Through its operations within the Labour movement, the IRD directly intervened in British 
domestic politics despite being part of the Foreign Office. Accordingly, Peter Weiler, like
76 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, p. 249.
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other revisionist scholars, has taken a strong position in regards to the domestic role of the 
IRD.82 He suggests that IRD propaganda facilitated political manipulation within the British 
Labour movement in order to prop up right-wing elements and ostracise the left, 
regardless of whether they were communist or not.83 Weiler's account is somewhat 
conspiratorial in its tenor and ascription of causal intent, suggesting there was a clear and 
determined effort to construct consensus around an anti-communist sentiment. To the 
extent that there was such a concerted effort, however, it was ultimately only conducted in 
a coordinated manner by a relatively small group of people. Despite this, however, his 
accusation of collusion is ultimately hard to refute. In this respect the IRD was subject to 
partisan manoeuvring, which saw the right-wing of the Labour party smear socialist 
members of the left.84 As is the case with many bureaucratic institutions across the political 
spectrum, the official goals of the IRD in a number of instances were subverted in order to 
serve the pragmatic goals of personal and partisan interest. This, however, is quite 
different from the institution being conspiratorial. Conceptions of agency here are 
important insofar as such partisan collusion could not alone explain this broad affect. There 
has to be a wider resonance throughout the discourses of the Labour movement, 
suggestive of an existing support for anti-communist ideas. Ultimately the determining role 
of the IRD was one of influence, quite possibly very subtle, rather than one of control.
Writers and journalists contributed to the dispersion of the IRD information amongst the 
public in its most subtle manifestation. There are, however, instances when the IRD is 
reported to have directly intervened in the media. For instance, in March 1946, Bevin asked 
the editor of The Times to adopt a more definite position on foreign policy issues, 
particularly in regards to the position of E.H. Carr, who had been writing pro-Soviet 
pieces.85 Hugh Greene, BBC Director-General from 1960-69, suggested that there was an 
understanding that the BBC was to "pillory the communist regime and display it as being 
ridiculous as well as cynical and evil."86 The IRD also had contacts with a large number of 
journalists, indeed by 1977 it is suggested that more than 100 journalists had wittingly or
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unwittingly assisted the IRD by using its material.87 The effectiveness of the IRD operations 
w ithin the media, however, did not rely on direct intervention, and only in part relies on its 
sheer number of contacts. Unlike politicians, who are seen to  be party political and not 
legitimate sources of information, the news media was more readily trusted by the public, 
particularly if it appeared factually based. Compared with government statements, the 
w ritten output of journalists is more likely circulated amongst private social networks, 
amongst family, friends and co-workers, in so doing becoming a potent and trusted form  of 
knowledge. The idea was not to mass broadcast falsity through whatever means possible 
but rather to provide beneficial but believable information to influential and trusted 
sources. The IRD in this sense was not designed to punish dissenters but rather to 
strategically contribute to a consensus based on a particular image of British social 
democracy and a sense of mission in regards to the threat from  communism.
In the first scholarly publication on the IRD, Lyn Smith focuses on a number of the 
publications released under its direction. While "the vast majority dealt w ith subject- 
matter relating to the merits of social democracy and the demerits of communism", the 
tone of these 80 or more books, by and large, is barely propagandists and does not seem a 
worthy result of clandestine intrigue. Taken individually they constitute anti-communist 
opinion pieces. For instance the edited collection, Why Communism Must Fail, contained 
chapters by philosopher Bertrand Russell, trade union leader Vic Feather and biographer 
Leonard Shapiro.88 While the opinions of these authors are certainly influential, it does not 
in any functional way constitute a substantial undermining of the democratic 
independence of the public by the state. What it may have played a part in was to 
contribute to a broad developing discourse and consensus around an anti-communist 
sentiment. This, however, is somewhat more indirect in its effect, hardly warranting being 
called propaganda given the negative connotations of the term . The irony of the IRD 
information campaign was that in attempting to paint the privation of Soviet life under 
Stalin it did not have access to the relevant facts and accordingly underestimated the 
extent of the suffering that occurred. Mayhew reflects that "when IRD set out to tell the 
brutal tru th  about the Soviet Union, it actually understated the horrors and the number of 
political prisoners and so on. And this was simply because we d idn 't know."89 Furthermore,
87 Ibid.
88 Smith, "Covert British Propaganda", p. 77.
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120
as Guy Burgess -  a Soviet asset who later defected to Moscow -  was a member of the IRD 
staff in early 1948, it is quite likely that the Russians knew about its operations from the 
start.90
The IRD also operated through the journal Socialist Commentary 91 Socialist Commentary 
was the journal of the Socialist Vanguard Group, a militant organisation active prior to 
WWII that denounced the Soviet Union in 1939 and from this point emerged "as the 
principle intellectual voice of the Labour Party's right wing."92 The title is in this sense apt, 
for at first glance it suggests a forum for discussion or even promotion of socialism. After 
condemning Soviet socialism, however, the commentary it published was much more 
critical. Through this journal anti-communist sentiment could be consolidated and a 
process of subtle self-surveillance enacted upon those with left-wing socialist leanings, 
particularly in the Labour Party. An overt instance of foreign policy discipline occurred in 
1961 when Socialist Commentary published a list of fifteen individuals who it suspected of 
being 'crypto-communists'. Describing this fifteen, it announced that
(t)he hard-core is made up -  let us face it as there is no point in mincing words 
-  of many who would, almost certainly belong to the Communist Party, if 
communism had any chance of political success in this country. Not only are 
the political attitudes identical with the communists in that they are 
perpetually fighting the cold war on the side of the Soviet Union, but they 
pursue the same strategy and use the same methods.02
Prominently included in this list were two Labour politicians, Tom Driberg and Kolli Zilliacus. 
In many ways neither of these inclusions are particularly surprising or controversial; the 
latter having been expelled from the Labour Party and later readmitted, was a vocal left- 
wing critic of government policy, while the former was rumoured to have been an occultist 
as well as a homosexual and Soviet asset.94
Driberg was an extremely colourful character in British politics, who may well have been 
blackmailed by the Soviets. The politics of this, however, are by no means clear-cut. The life
90 Smith, "Covert British Propaganda", p. 80.
91 For information on a number of other publications through which IRD was able to exert domestic influence, 
see Lashmar & Oliver, Britain's Secret Propaganda War, pp. 105-115.
92 Peter Barberis, John McHugh & Mike Tyldesley (eds.), Encyclopedia o f British and Irish Political Organisations 
(London: Continuum, 2000), p. 293.
93 Dorrill & Ramsay, Smear!, p. 29.
94 The accusation of occultism is based on Driberg having had an affair with occultist Meister Crowley. See 
William G. Stewart, "Tom Driberg and Me: A Personal Portrait by William G. Stewart", BBC Four, 19/03/09. 
Accessed from www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/search/?q=tom%20driberg on 20/03/09.
121
and politics of Driberg was the subject of a 2009 BBC documentary that highlighted the 
ongoing battle to balance his socialist leanings with his prominent position within the 
London establishment and the dictates of a cold war against communism.95 Driberg was a 
close friend of Evelyn Waugh at Oxford and was part of the same elite social circle. Like 
Waugh he left Oxford without taking a degree and under the guidance of Edith Sitwell 
become a gossip columnist on Fleet Street. Driberg's societal and political prowess 
stemmed his ability to embed himself deeply in London high society. Driberg's personal 
politics were complex; he proclaimed himself a life-long Catholic, socialist and homosexual. 
He was a member of the Great Britain Communist Party but was expelled in 1941 when 
Anthony Blunt (himself later revealed as a Soviet agent) exposed him as an MI5 informer.96 
Driberg also had friends amongst the Royal family, including Lord Mountbatten for whom 
he spread a rumour amongst the left that Prince Phillip was a devoted socialist following an 
outcry over his lavish wedding in the post-WWII years of hardship.97 As longstanding 
parliamentary whip, Tom Driberg was influential in ensuring Labour had the numbers in its 
legislative votes. The suggested blackmail of Driberg occurred while he spent a month in 
Moscow conducting interviews with Guy Burgess, a British intelligence agent who had 
defected. According to Soviet defector, Vasili Mitrokhin, Driberg was photographed in a 
'honeytrap' operation and blackmailed into providing both societal and political 
information to the Soviets, although no official proof ever emerged at the time.98
Evident here are the kinds of rhetorical and discursive strategies that equate support for 
British socialism with Soviet communism, understood one-dimensionally as an external 
threat. The simple statement that the 'hard-core' of the 15 would join an effective 
Communist Party is largely correct, for many within the left sought after an effective 
manifestation of socialism. The unstated implication, when understood in the wider 
discursive context of the cold war, was that communism would embody a threat to the 
sovereignty of the state by functioning as a proxy of the USSR. This seemingly simple 
statement about communist party membership is thus impossible to dissociate from its
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foreign policy context of defending against the Soviet threat. Accordingly it begins to 
develop a discursive taint. Further, this rhetorical strategy relies, whether consciously or 
unwittingly, on the simplistic portrayal of domestic politics and International Relations. It 
simplifies the account of domestic politics, falling back on the popular understanding of 
socialism and communism as it is understood in relation to the USSR in an international 
setting, drawing from a caricatured amalgam of Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism. In 
relation to the portrayal of International Relations, it relies entirely on a not particularly 
nuanced realist account that places strong emphasis on the danger that the Soviet Union 
poses. The world-view implicit in the statement by Socialist Commentary carries with it a 
commitment to the ontology of states/nations as the primary international actors. As such 
there is a continuous state of tension between the UK and the USSR, and given the 
ideological conflict and mutual security and strategic interests in mainland Europe, conflict 
is seen as unavoidable. Thus actions by the Soviets and by association, socialists, are seen 
as stemming from a calculation of interests in favour of acting aggressively and seeking to 
expand at the expense of Britain.
Thus a zero-sum interpretation of the Soviet Union as a militarily aggressive and 
expansionist international actor coalesces with that of the subversive socialist who poses a 
challenge to the established political orthodoxy. The domestic political intentions and 
personal allegiances of eccentrics such as Driberg are simplistically connected through a 
foreign policy 'discourse of danger' to the internationalisation of the Soviet threat. The 
national security prerogatives of defending against external threat amalgamate with 
domestic notions of deviance and disorder, in so doing becoming incorporated within 
domestic mechanisms of regulating social order. The foreign policy consensus in this sense 
informs what is to be politically correct. To suggest, however, that the British government 
or even the IRD are exploiting foreign policy discipline domestically is to over-ascribe the 
extent to which these institutions are unified actors. The operation of this foreign policy 
discourse occurred at many diffuse levels throughout society. For instance, critics of the 
domestic operations of the IRD point to the right wing focus of it political interventions." 
That there was a "right wing complexion [to] some of IRD's approved contacts" need not
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suggest that there is anything more at play than normal partisan politics.100 Rather than 
being an exceptional incident, suggestive of a right-wing conspiracy, it is rather the 
everyday of domestic politics in which pragmatic actors employ available discourses as 
wedge politics against political rivals. This, however, would not be possible without a 
broader discursive consensus around the notion of external threat. Hence there emerges a 
combination of pragmatic party politics, social regulation and foreign policy. The weaving 
of foreign policy into domestic mechanisms of order gives rise to domestic actors seeking 
to encourage a particular image of normal behaviour and patriotism within the state in an 
attempt secure the state from external threat; i.e. social control in aid of raison d'etat.
One of the most surprising actions by the IRD within British literary and social circles was 
the recruitment of well-known novelist and essayist George Orwell. In 1948, the IRD 
approached Orwell, who was at the time terminally ill at the Cranham sanatorium, asking if 
he could in any way assist in countering the threat posed by Soviet communism.101 
Overseeing this recruitment of Orwell was Adam Watson -  later a scholar of international 
Relations and interlocutor of Hedley Bull -  who, being friendly with many members of the 
'literary left', was in charge of finding suitable “ left-of-centre intellectuals" for IRD 
operations.102 A member of Watson's staff was Celia Kirwan, a friend of Orwell's, to whom 
the writer had once proposed marriage.103 Accordingly, the request at the Cranham 
sanatorium came not from an anonymous agent but rather Orwell's friend-cum-femme 
fatale, Kirwan. She was able to obtain from Orwell a list of those who in his "opinion [were] 
crypto-communists, fellow travellers, or inclined that way and should not be trusted as 
[potential British] propagandists."104 Orwell's list of those not to be trusted included a 
surprising array of names. Many lesser-known writers and journalists populated the list, yet 
it also included amongst these founding International Relations scholar E.H. Carr, historian 
AJP Taylor, Labour parliamentary whip Tom Driberg, Soviet expert (and critic of Orwell) 
Isaac Deutscher, editor of the New Statesman, Kingsley Martin and actor Charlie Chaplin.105 
Orwell further granted that his novels 1984 and Animal Farm could be widely translated
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and distributed abroad as part of the IRD information operations to warn people of the 
dangers of totalitarianism.106
The decision by Orwell to cooperate with the state seems to represent a major rupture in 
his personal politics. Furthermore, he must have been aware that the list he provided 
would not only be used in determining those who were unsuitable for IRD operations but 
may also be used to subject these individuals to further scrutiny. Surely he connected 
discussions of the IRD information campaign with the Ministry of Truth 'newspeak' from 
1984? The extent to which Orwell was swayed by the principle of protecting the British way 
of life or by the influence of his former flame is impossible to determine, although 
something dramatically shifted his personal principles.107 Take for instance a statement 
made shortly before he was recruited by the IRD.
Specifically, the danger lies in the structure imposed on socialist and on liberal 
capitalist communities by the necessity to prepare for total war with the USSR 
and the new weapons, of which of course the atomic bomb is the most 
powerful and the most publicized. But danger also lies in the acceptance of a 
totalitarian outlook by intellectuals of all colours.108
Trying to reconcile this statement with his decision to collaborate with the IRD would 
require a great deal more space, but it certainly suggests that the foreign policy obligations 
of defending a British way of life against totalitarian communism profoundly impacted and 
played a part in shaping Orwell, causing him to compromise or at least modify a core 
principle that resonates through much of his work. The Daily Telegraph witheringly 
suggested the Orwell revelation was "as if Winston Smith had willingly cooperated with the 
Thought Police in 1984." 109 This dynamic, the effect of foreign policy on an individual, is 
explored in the second case study in relation to the discipline enacted upon British Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson. This next section suggests that as equally as it operates through an 
institution such as IRD, this same cold war discourse also shapes and controls individuals, 
each in a specific and detailed way.
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The p u b lic  and p riva te  d is c ip lin in g  of Harold Wilson
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was a brilliant mind and a crafty politician. He was, 
however, seemingly overwhelmed with paranoia, making him less and less effective as a 
politician, a process which was only accentuated as he surrounded himself with a close-knit 
group of advisors who shared his suspicions. It is worth noting that revisionist accounts 
have since suggested that he might have been right to hold the suspicions that he did.110 
Indeed, a 2006 BBC documentary suggested that there was a conspiratorial plot against 
Wilson that in 1974 very nearly resulted in a coup against the Labour government.* 111 
Despite suggestions of a web of conspiracy surrounding Wilson, however, there is equally a 
complex process of foreign policy discipline enacted upon Wilson, both in terms of his own 
discipline through seif-surveillance and also through coercive instances of overt discipline 
enacted by others. An analysis of the complex politics of Harold Wilson's turbulent 
leadership demonstrates that human agency is shaped by broader social discourses and 
practices. More specifically, the agency of Wilson was shaped by the foreign policy and 
national security discourses of cold war Britain. Thus, this discursive account of cold war 
agency suggests that it was foreign policy discipline that shaped Wilson rather than a web 
of conspiracy.
Wilson's political trajectory rose fast and burned bright. He was a brilliant student with a 
reputation for having the most impressively detailed memory and he subsequently became 
the youngest Oxford Don in 1937 at the age of 21. Likewise his political career followed a 
similar steep trajectory serving as the youngest member of cabinet at the age of 31. He was 
associated with the radical 'Bevanites', initially following Aneruin Bevan into the factional 
left of the Labour Party. This alignment, which saw him go against the grain of the more 
powerful right of the party did not stop him from later ascending to the leadership in 1964. 
Despite this apparent allegiance to the party left, his politics remained complex, defying 
simple characterisation.
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The death of Labour Party Leader Hugh Gaitskell in 1963 was hard to separate from foreign 
policy concerns and the subsequent rise of Harold Wilson. Foreign policy discipline thus 
became intertwined with the more familiar internal party politics. Gaitskell was aligned 
with the stronger right-wing of the party. Following a visit to the USSR where he met with 
Khrushchev, Gaitskell died suddenly from an otherwise not note-worthy immune-related 
problem.112 In the subsequent three-way leadership contest, Wilson ran against two 
candidates from the right. With the conservative vote split Wilson, the former leftist was 
elected to the party leadership. This remarkable chain of events set off rumours that the 
sudden death of Gaitskell was an assassination by the KGB in order to make way for Wilson 
who supposedly held greater sympathies with the Soviet cause.113 Other than a pragmatic 
and convenient 'confirmation' by Soviet defector Anatoliy Golitsyn, there was little ever to 
suggest there was any veracity to this rumour, although it certainly gave credence to 
Wilson's paranoia that there were enemies who wished to end his political career.114 
Evident here is the way in which the politics of gossip and scandal associated with partisan 
party politics was permeated by stereotypes of external communist threat propagated by 
cold war foreign policy. Competing leadership aspirations is the petty everyday of politics; 
assassinations by a foreign power in order to gain influence and subvert a sovereign state is 
another thing altogether.
As far as Wilson was concerned the plots gathering against him were more than just 
rumours and mud-slinging; a possible coup was brewing. This belief that members of the 
intelligence services, the royal family, the military and the political right were conspiring 
against him have been subsequently supported in a 2006 BBC documentary. It suggests 
that in the wake of Watergate, Wilson wished to make the plot public and approached two 
journalists suggesting,
[djemocracy as we know it is in grave danger. Prominent people are coming 
under attack. I think you journalists should investigate the forces which are 
threatening countries like Britain, the dirty tricks that have been going on 
against myself and also my government.115
Despite the Prime Minister effectively offering himself as 'Deep Throat' the plot against him 
never broke into the public arena as had the Watergate scandal. As well as making the case
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that Wilson feared the forces working against him, the documentary also suggested that his 
suspicions were justified. In an interview with Lord Hunt, the former cabinet secretary 
under Wilson candidly suggests
I don't think [the security services] were people who were in any sense evil.
They were people who on the whole followed a train of thought that Russians
used to try and entrap everybody. They must have tried with [Wilson], they
must have succeeded.116
Lord Waldegrave, who later entered Parliament in 1979 described the social malaise and 
great malcontent under Wilson suggesting that amidst a collapsing economy and tensions 
surrounding Vietnam, "[t]here were people talking about coup d'etats. Lord Mountbatten 
[a colonial viceroy and royal] was going to become head of some kind of junta." British 
general Sir Walter Walker reportedly drafted an address for the Queen to read that would 
transfer power to the army and when asked if the army might rule Britain replied, 
"[p]erhaps the country might choose to rule by the gun in preference to anarchy."117 To 
date MI-5 denies such a plot ever existed and beyond Wilson's own paranoia it is hard to 
determine to what extent such plans transpired.118
A prominent figure in the movement to discredit Wilson was the CIA 'spy catcher' James 
Jesus Angleton. Angleton had headed CIA counter-intelligence since 1954 when he was 
appointed at the age of 37. Angleton was later to be dismissed from his post in 1975 due to 
alcoholism and paranoia regarding Soviet influence that was long an obsession in his work. 
The dedication of Angleton to unearthing a KGB "monster plot" designed to bring down 
Western governments can be traced to the betrayal by his mentor, British spy Kim Philby, a 
double agent who defected to the Soviets.119 From this longstanding pivotal position within 
US intelligence, Angleton was in a unique position to disseminate a state of mind that 
favoured suspicion and paranoia as a defining modus operandi. Angleton acted as a go- 
between amongst members of the intelligence services, and the political right in order to 
undermine Wilson.120 Angleton's key source was his trusted Soviet defector, Anatoliy
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Golitsyn, who first suggested the Soviet 'master plan' to deceive the West and suggested 
that all future Soviet defectors would be KGB plants. 121 Acting on accounts provided by 
Golitsyn, Angleton believed that Gaitskell had been assassinated and further suspected 
many international figures were Soviet agents, a list that extended to British Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme, 
Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson and US National Security Advisor and Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger. 122
Angleton's intense paranoia highlights an important insight into the politics of conspiracy 
and the wider effects of paranoia. Zizek highlights that Angleton's paranoia had a self- 
fulfilling tendency as his belief was so strong that he could only act as if there was a 
'monster plot' . 123 From his paranoid point of view the only seemingly rational thing to do 
was to trust those who confirmed the existence of the plot. This caused him to send back 
Soviet defectors -  no doubt to imprisonment or death -  who were unable to confirm the 
details of this plot.124 Ironically this did "grievous harm" to effective intelligence gathering 
under Angleton and "all but crippled the agency['s]" ability to unearth actual Soviet 
moles. 125
The ultimate condemnation of Angleton's paranoia is that it doesn't matter if 
Angleton was sincerely duped by the idea of the Monster Plot... in both cases 
the result is exactly the same. Therein resides the truth of the paranoiac 
stance: it is itself the threat, the destructive plot against which it is fighting. 126
What Zizek is suggesting of Angleton, and is equally applicable to Wilson, is his belief in a 
'monster plot' was itself a worthy 'monster plot' and that his search for Soviet moles was 
more destructive than if he himself had been a mole. He himself had become as great an 
internal threat as that which he feared to be coming from abroad. In short then, Zizek
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Accessed from //query.nvtimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE4D9103EF933A05755C0A967958260 on 
20/01/09.
126 Slavoj Zizek, "Philosophy, the 'Unknown Knowns" and the Public Use of Reason", Topoi, 25, 2006, p. 138.
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suggests the very idea of suspicion needs to be put under suspicion. 127 Thus, the actual 
existence of a conspiracy or plot is to a point irrelevant insofar as its debilitating effects of 
paranoia may indeed outweigh it. Instead, it is the extent to which people subject 
themselves to a belief in a plot and condition their actions accordingly that enacts the 
political effect. In short, it is the self-discipline in response to the perceived conspiratorial 
plot rather than the mechanics of any actual plot that creates the political effects. 128
The discipline imposed upon Wilson did not stem simply from external sources. To 
whatever extent that there were conspiratorial plots by shadowy groups surrounding 
Wilson, however immanent the prospects of a coup may have been, ultimately it was as a 
result of a belief in these plots against him that Wilson enacted discipline upon himself. The 
available scope of realistic political action in Wilson's worldview had been shrunken-down; 
the political agency of Wilson was constrained. It was not, however, that his agency had 
been taken away by another actor (a zero sum conception of individual agency), nor was it 
the alignment of political events and bureaucratic machinations (a structural conception) 
that constrained Wilson's actions. Rather, Wilson had become implicated in a discourse of a 
foreign communist threat, a discourse that resonated throughout much of the Western 
democratic landscape, which allowed those that opposed him to attempt to further 
consolidate this linkage with an image of external others. Wilson was painfully aware of 
this convergence of pragmatic personal politics with the discourse of foreign threat, 
causing him to refashion his personal and political outlook to avoid this scrutiny and to 
adhere to the normative image of a prime minister as a rational statesman serving the 
national interest. The powerful linkage between discursive structures of foreign threat and 
processes of self-discipline were enacted, consciously and unconsciously, by Wilson 
himself. While the external processes of discipline forces Wilson to act, it is Wilson who 
creates this discursive linkage by enacting self-discipline upon himself. Of course, no man 
may remain an island, isolated hermetically from these social forces but the extent to 
which these forces act either as constraints or as process of productive self-fashioning 
agency depends on the interaction of an individual with this wider discourse.
Wilson trusted few. Or at the very least he did not accord to any great extent with his 
cabinet, most of whom had served under the previous Gaitskell leadership. Indeed, the
127 Zizek, For They Know Not What They Do, p. xxxvi.
128 In this formulation of the disciplinary or psychological effects of paranoia, ever the psychoanalyst, Zizek 
seems to be positioning this paranoiac tendency as the externalised self-judging character of the super-ego.
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everyday machinations of party politics, for Wilson, were hard to separate from the plots 
and political conspiracy that -  were they to eventuate -  would have constituted a highly 
exceptional state of affairs. Accordingly, Wilson's political methods were highly secretive 
and insular.129 In an attempt to insulate himself from these plots, Wilson surrounded 
himself with a small number of loyal staff, a 'kitchen cabinet' that handled many key 
aspects of the business of government.130 Central amongst these advisors was Lady 
Falkender -then Marcia Williams -  who functioned in a similar manner to a US Presidential 
Chief of Staff and was said to have been the most powerful woman in English politics.131 
With the benefit of hindsight, Williams and the kitchen cabinet were a prototype for the 
mechanics of modern political management that emerged under the leadership of Tony 
Blair.132 At the time, however, it appeared a highly defensive manoeuvre seen by his 
detractors as an "odd assortment of acolytes" that supported or even fuelled his 
suspicions.133 Evident here is the contrary consequences of a conspiratorial mindset, for 
insofar as Wilson and his inner circle sought to counter potential plots, they effectively 
created one and only further subjected Wilson to a greater level of scrutiny and suspicion.
Wilson was further disciplined through allegations of indiscriminate sexual activities that 
were rhetorically connected to the politics of external threat. An affair between Wilson and 
Ms Williams, for instance, was alleged to have occurred whilst on a trip to the Soviet Union 
in 1956.134 In a clever spin that absolved the allegation of low-blow moral politics, it was 
suggested, however, that the problem was not the sexual activity as such, which had
129 Dorrill & Ramsay, Smear! p. 74.
130 David Childs, Britain Since 1945: A Political History (London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1979), pp. 162-163.
131 Williams had previously been a secretary in the office of the Labour General Secretary, Morgan Phillips and 
asserts she warned Wilson of plots against him in 1956, Marcia Williams, Inside No. 10 (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1972), pp. 103-104. See also Andy McSmith, "Baroness Falkender: The Lavender Lady", The 
Independent, 21/05/06. Accessed from www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/baroness-falkender-the- 
lavender-lady-479040.html on 12/02/09; Simon Walters, "Harold Wilson's Doctor Plotted to Murder Marcia 
Falkender", The Mail on Sunday, 29/9/02. Accessed from www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-140440/Harold- 
Wilsons-doctor-plotted-murder-Marcia-Falkender.html on 12/02/09.
132 Dominic Wring, "Selling Socialism: Marketing the Early Labour Party", History Today, vol. 55, iss. 5, 2005, p. 
41.
133 Wilson's press secretary, Joe Haines, suggests that Williams exploited his weakness and insecurity stemming 
from a fear of plots being waged against him, see Joe Haines, The Politics of Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1977), p. 160; quotation taken from James Margach, The Abuse o f Power: The War Between Downing Street and 
the Media (London: W.H. Allen, 1978), p. 141.
134 This was leveled, for instance, by Wilson's former press secretary Joe Haines, Glimmers of Twilight: Harold 
Wilson in Decline (London: Methuen, 2004). See also Dorrill & Ramsay, Smear! p. 44-48 and Leigh, The Wilson 
Plot, pp. 67-69.
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otherwise made for such intriguing gossip during the 1964 election.135 Rather the allegation 
was that the affair was not simply a moral affront, but an Achilles' heel in the security of 
the nation at the highest level as the indiscretion was photographed and used in order to 
blackmail Wilson, subverting him towards the Soviet cause.13b Thus it was implied that 
Wilson had become compromised above and beyond his own ideological leanings and 
alleged sexual impropriety. Thus it was not just matter of the sleazy politics of character 
assassination. The allegations of sexual indiscretions and blackmail were intertwined with 
foreign policy discipline, implying that Wilson had been made a tool of the communist 
threat to the state.
Wilson's intensification of self-discipline can also be seen at a minute physical level. His 
wariness of being perceived as left-wing or possessing Soviet associations was subtly 
integrated into the self-conscious actions of his body language. For instance, in 1963 on 
one of his 12 trips to Moscow, Wilson posed for impromptu photos with a Soviet General 
Malinovski. Amidst a tense cold war backdrop that demanded of its ieaders a robust 
foreign policy stance, Wilson "was well aware whom not to be seen smiling with."137 Indeed 
images of him in Moscow happily smiling with Soviet officials would no doubt further play 
to domestic rumours that he was under the sway of the Soviets. To avoid this Wilson 
ensured he exercised self-surveillance over the most minute of body actions and following 
the photos made a point of remarking to a by-standing media person, "you notice that I 
didn't smile".138 In moments such as this Wilson's sense that he was under close public 
scrutiny and perhaps conspiratorial persecution became physically manifest, highlighting an 
ongoing self-discipline imposed upon himself.
The links between Wilson and the discourse of Soviet threat were not the only way in 
which foreign policy obligations enacted discipline. Wilson was also subject to the foreign 
policy discipline that is imposed on all statesmen and leaders. This, however, is not a 
suggestion that is original to this analysis. It can be seen in Machiavelli's suggestions to the 
Prince and is intrinsic to the practice of state diplomacy in an international realm that is
135 The intrigue into a possible affair was common within the media at the time and was in particular a key 
intrigue of the 1964 election, Colin Seymour-Ure, "Review: Glimmers of Twilight -  Harold Wilson in Decline", 
Public Administration, vol. 82, iss. 2, 2004, p. 540.
136 After circulating as rumour in London it was alleged by Auberon Waugh in Private Eye (19/9/75) and The 
Spectator (19/6/76), quoted in Dorrill & Ramsay, Smear!, p. 45.
137 Anthony Howard & Richard West, The Making o f a Prime Minister (London: Quality Book Club, 1965), p. 47.
138 Wilson quoted in Ibid.
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governed by the principles of realpolitick. As the Prime Minister, the international political 
figurehead of Britain, Wilson was ultimately responsible for foreign policy decisions, made 
on behalf of his domestic constituency. In as much as foreign policy is an instrumental 
policy that acts as a bridge/barrier between inside and outside, the Prime Minister with the 
help of his foreign minister is the figure that embodies this role. For instance, Wilson's 
decision in 1964 to purchase the Polaris submarine from the US reduced the independence 
of Britain's nuclear arsenal, making Britain a strategic port of US global power projection, or 
as Duncan Campbell suggests, an "unsinkable aircraft carrier."139 Faced with having to make 
a decision between two imperfect options, Wilson was forced to decide according to a 
calculated zero-sum game rationale, that is, Wilson was forced to act within a stringently 
performative set of realist foreign policy conventions. For him no doubt this became a 
procedure that was normalised, it appeared simply as the 'way things are', the reality of 
International Relations. In this way International Relations realism can be seen as 
disciplinary as it imposes the norms and constraints of foreign policy on those members of 
the state within which it is practiced. This discipline was only intensified by the foreign 
policy discipline imposed on him by domestic detractors.
Wilson was also subjected to the limitations of trying to balance the competing obligations 
of security and iiberty. As was suggested in Chapter 1, the nature of modern sovereignty 
produces various dichotomies in contemporary politics. In particular is the attempt to 
balance the national interests of the state against the forms of authority according to which 
the individual is subject. Chapter 3 further suggested that the attempt to balance the 
obligations of liberty and security was a false dichotomy, which functioned by 
operationalising the obligations of foreign policy in such a way that it is seen as logical to 
extend to the purview of the state further into the lives of citizens. Shortly after to coming 
to power in 1964 Wilson was told a number of ministers were under MI-5 surveillance for 
possible Soviet links.140 Tapping the phones of serving politicians was objectionable to 
Wilson and in making an argument against this practice he acknowledged the ineluctable 
tensions between liberty and security, stating:
there can only be complete security within a police state, and perhaps not 
even then, and there is always a difficult balance between the requirements of 
democracy in a free society and the requirements of security.... I reviewed the
139 Duncan Campbell, Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier (London: Paladin, 1986), p. 17; see also Stuart Croft, 
"Continuity and Change in British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons", Political Studies, XLII, 1996, pp. 228-242.
140 Dorrill & Ramsay, Smear! p. 65.
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practice when we came to office and decided on balance - and the arguments 
were very fine - that the balance should be tipped the other way and that I 
should give this instruction that there was to be no tapping of the telephones 
of Members of Parliament.141
Despite the pressure of the pragmatic demands of security, Wilson felt it necessary to 
uphold the privacy of ministers. It is clear, however, that he felt the obligation to prevent 
possible links being established with an external threat. In short, he was disciplined by the 
tension between liberty and security.
Wilson's suspicion of secret cabals and political plots was not limited to those that he saw 
as gathering in the wings of the political right. Wilson also staunchly and publicly opposed 
those of the left. Nor was he scared about dealing out discipline, implicating the actions of 
others within a foreign policy context in order to achieve his aims. For instance, Wilson had 
long-favoured a national wage system that would ensure fair incomes but also remove the 
ability for strikes to occur. In this respect Wilson was not a traditional left-winger and as 
such this brought him into conflict with the unions. Wilson opposed a bold wage claim by 
the powerful National Union of Seaman. A consequence was that a strike was called. Not 
willing to be held to ransom over this wage claim Wilson went on the offensive. On 20 June 
1966, Wilson claimed in Parliament that the strikers were being manipulated by a "tightly 
knit group of politically motivated men who... are now saying very blatantly that they are 
more concerned with harming the nation than with getting the justice we all want to 
see."142 The barely hidden subtext of these accusations was that the Communist Party was 
directly interfering and organizing the unions. In this sense, Wilson's allegations of 
conspiracy were not limited just to the political right but also extended to those who were 
certainly not part of any plot to overthrow him.
Wilson's concern for conspiracy suggests he employed a conspiratorial framework of 
understanding, or at least was willing to use it to justify his ends. Expressed differently, did 
Wilson see political conspiracy, both left and right, as something exceptional or rather as 
normal everyday politics? Viewed through these schemas of exception and norm this 
provides two possible accounts of Wilson's politics. In the case of the former, his criticisms 
of the NUS strike from this perspective could reflect an awareness of the pressure exerted
141 Harold Wilson, "Telephone Tapping Debate" in House of Commons, Hansard, 17/11/66, vol. 736, col. 639. 
Accessed from hansard.millbanksvstems.com/commons/1966/nov/17/telephone-tapping on 16/02/09.
142 Harold Wilson, "Seaman's Strike" in House of Commons, Hansard, 20/06/66, vol. 730, col. 42 & 46. Accessed 
from hansard.millbanksvstems.com/commons/1966/iun/20/seamens-strike on 16/02/09.
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by the political right and being forced to employ a reolpolitick in order to overcome the 
wage claim of the unions. However distasteful such an action might be, it is the burden of a 
leader. The latter suggests that a process of overt discipline and paranoiac group think 
likely took place and Wilson may have genuinely believed there was a leftist communist 
conspiracy within the NUS. The condemnation of the NUS could have been a broader 
rejection of the politics of persecution and character assassination, both left and right. 
Either way, Wilson's playing of the anti-communist card should not be seen as incompatible 
with his politics or his desire to avoid partaking in the anti-communist hysteria that 
characterised the Western democratic landscape of the cold war. As to which it was, 
drawing a clear distinction may not be entirely possible. The explanation of politics in the 
language of conspiracy theory misses the broader explanatory point, but then to ignore 
conspiracies entirely avoids the question of why they arise at all. In this sense, it can be 
seen as a non-conspiratorial combination of both normal and exceptional politics; the 
observed collusion being not conspiracy but a pragmatic emergence of mutual interest that 
is better described in terms of a social trend or common cultural practice.
Ultimately, the various manifestations of discipline took its toll on the political career of 
Wilson. His failure to adhere to the statesmanlike image required of him in his position of 
public office and to cope with the deliberate discipline that was enacted by his critics and 
their interlocutors led to a combination of his political and personal undoing. The 
somewhat unorthodox and at times paranoid leadership of Wilson, the deviation from the 
expected norms of prime minister-ship, can be seen as a neurotic form of resistance. As 
Prime Minister, Wilson was tasked trying to maintain a balanced and principled leadership 
during the cold war, a time that demanded clear support for tradition, decisive patriotism 
and unequivocal acquiescence to the requirements demanded by the 'permanent 
government': those powerful figures that rotated amongst the corridors of Cabinet, the 
civil services, party factions and the intelligence services. While foreign policy discipline is 
enacted on all leaders, statesmen and diplomats, that is, the discipline required of a 
political actor in the realist tradition, Wilson however, was subjected to particularly intense 
discipline given the heightened national security atmosphere and its discursive connection 
to his own personal politics. Given this, perhaps it is understandable that after a mixed 
record of two separate, yet relatively short terms in office, and a record number of Labour 
election victories, he resigned in 1976 fearing the early onset of Alzheimer's disease.
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Wilson was inescapably hemmed in; he was torn between personal principle and the 
pragmatic politics of the cold war. Wilson was not, however, simply constrained by the 
actions of external conspirators who sought to end his political career. The account offered 
here suggests that it was much more complex. Wilson was constrained by a world-view 
that circumscribed his political reality in terms of a cold war spy-thriller in which the 
manoeuvrings of external superpower conflict was matched only by the shadowy intrigue 
and deception of his domestic enemies. While there was no simple way to escape this 
popular narrative that was pervaded throughout the media and political gossip circles, 
Wilson's own self-discipline of paranoiac insularity certainly served to substantiate such 
slander and indeed create conspiracy where previously there may not have been such 
distinctly formed plots. In short, the only framework of understanding he had was that of 
those who were the source of his own torment. As a result of these suspicions against him 
the disciplinary language of national security and foreign policy interests of the state were 
being deployed at the highest level against the Prime Minister; the language of the state 
was turning on its premier statesman.
The anti-communism of the early cold war demonstrated that politics and agency is 
unconstrained by the distinctions between domestic and international politics; pragmatic 
political party goals shape overseas engagements while foreign policy disciplines and 
controls those at home. In particular, this chapter has examined the politics of intrigue and 
intense personal scrutiny in Britain that gave rise to pervasive narratives of political agents, 
spies and conspiratorial collusion. This chapter sought to describe these narratives in terms 
of a fluid conception of agency, in which wider social and political discourses shape 
people's thoughts and actions. These cold war narratives enact personal and social 
discipline through discourses that demand an unambiguous anti-communism in the face of 
an external Soviet threat. The mandate of the IRD to counter communist influence 
wherever it emerged saw this secret Foreign Office department disperse information 
campaigns that acted -  both inadvertently and deliberately -  against British citizens, 
embedding them in a transatlantic discourse of communist threat. The pressures of office 
placed upon Prime Minister Harold Wilson amassed around his ability to confront the 
spread of communism, bringing his left-wing socialism into sharp focus, associating him 
with the external Soviet threat and seemingly pitting all those with a claim to a non­
socialist brand of British nationalism -  both within the Labour Party and British politics 
generally -  against him. Foreign policy, in this sense is no different from any other
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government apparatus insofar as it disciplines and controls those on whose behalf it 
operates. If anything, the pervasive social effects of foreign policy upon its citizens are 
greater than domestic-oriented bureaucracies, given the paramount importance placed on 
issues of national security. Subsequent chapters will take up this argument further in 
relation to the contemporary practice of the war on terror in the United States.
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Chapter 5
Bodies, space, politics: Post-9/11 intensification of spatial 
control
The Western democratic landscape of post-September 11, 2001 politics has featured highly 
politicised debates over how best to respond to the threat of terrorism.1 The approach 
favoured by the US Administration of George W. Bush (2001-2009) and its allies has been 
framed in terms of the traditional domestic and international separation, a commitment to 
the inside/outside dichotomy, favouring conventional warfare abroad against Afghanistan 
and Iraq, paralleled at home by a reorganisation and intensification of domestic intelligence 
and surveillance methods. The implementation and effects of this inside/outside approach, 
however does not so clearly reflect this dichotomy.
1 Throughout this chapter I will be referring to September 11, 2001 as '9/11' insofar as it is a convenient short­
hand for the date and, more importantly, captures the onset of a general emergency mentality that 
predominates in contemporary politics. This is also in line how it is used in politics and popular culture more 
broadly. For more on this emergency mentality see Robin W. Cameron, "Self-discipline in a Time of Terror: US 
Foreign Policy and the US Self", Theoria, 114, 2007, pp. 74-101.
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The fluid nature of contemporary politics challenges the established distinctions between 
inside and outside. As Shapiro suggests, "the current security and intelligence policies 
dissolve many of the former distinctions between domestic crime-fighting and global 
warfare. " 2 The inability to secure an effective post-conflict peace situation in Afghanistan 
and Iraq has given cause for many to question the effectiveness of conventional war­
fighting tactics in the war on terror. It has also seen the emergence of a greater focus on 
policing and order abroad. The Iraq war in particular has raised a much wider level of 
dissent within US politics over the motivations behind the decision to go to war and the 
appropriateness of the invasion in effectively countering terrorism. The extra-legal 
detention and abuse of prisoners held at the US controlled Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo 
Bay detention facilities have received wide condemnation. Within domestic politics there 
has been fierce debate within the media and political pundits over the balance between 
security and civil liberties and the appropriateness of torture as a tool of interrogation.3 
The Bush Administration passed legislation -  whose legality was supported by sympathetic 
intellectuals -  that facilitated greater presidential powers. At the other end of the 
spectrum, citizens were also called upon to act out national security prerogatives.
These exceptional measures are accompanied by an intensification of less overt 
mechanisms of control that are equally justified according to principles of national security. 
For instance, surveillance -  albeit for the most part passive -  has moved into many aspects 
of our day-to-day lives. Indeed, most of our technologically assisted communications and 
interactions with the world by those who are integrated with advanced technological 
society are now surveilled. Within the US surveillance has become widespread and 
immersive: telephone records, telephone conversations, internet usage, electronic funds 
transfers, cash withdrawals, overall consumption and spending patterns, even library 
borrowing records are all either passively surveilled or are able to be checked. As data- 
mining become more extensively employed this surveillance will become largely passive 
but will nonetheless be constant. Similar systems are employed throughout most
2 Michael Shapiro, "Every Move You Make: Bodies, Surveillance and the Media", Social Text 83, vol.23, no.2, 
2005, p. 27.
3 This has continued into the current Obama administration, seen particularly in the criticisms offered by former 
Vice-President Dick Cheney that investigations into CIA interrogation procedures will damage national security. 
See Stephen F. Hayes, "Cheney Statement on CIA Documents/Investigation", Weekly Standard, 24/08/09. 
Accessed from www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/08/cheney statement on cia docume.asp 
on 25/09/09 and; John Cochran, "Cheney vs. Obama: CIA Abuse Probe 'Political'", ABC News, 30/08/09. 
Accessed from abcnews.go.com/Politics/storv?id-8448550 on 25/09/09.
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developed states. In the immediate proximity of strategic sites -  whether it is a transport 
hub, government or corporate building, state monument or any populated public area -  
surveillance is carried out to counter possible threats, whether general or specifically 
related to terrorism. Thus, in many densely populated areas bodies move within space that 
is highly controlled by processes of passive or active surveillance. While terrorism is not the 
sole risk this pervasive surveillance seeks to negate, it is the predominant threat paradigm 
against which such measures are seen as necessary and are accordingly justified.
The emergence of instances of overt discipline and pervasive surveillance cannot occur in a 
discursive or contextual vacuum. The adoption of wider executive or wartime powers is not 
only the result of a particular genesis of extraordinary events but also of processes through 
which the political space throughout the Western political landscape has become 
securitised. 9/11 has given rise to an exceptional state of politics although this is not 
necessarily the result of a formal suspension of the law or an out-and-out declared state of 
emergency. The response to the threat of terrorism has imbued politics with a general 
tenor of national security, which has derived a measure of support for practices that would 
otherwise be unacceptable within the Western democratic landscape. The presence of 
divergent perspectives within Western nations has ensured that these developments have 
been far from uncontested and that there has been much resistance. This, however, has 
not stopped the emergence of these measures, which given the tenor of the national 
security discourse, takes a significant amount of courage and fortitude to refuse. This was 
particularly the case in the initial years following 9/11 when such refusal would be to 
equate oneself with the nation's enemies, in what is a clear demonstration of the operation 
of foreign policy discipline upon domestic citizens.4
Contemporary politics thus poses some very stark questions to observers of US, and by 
extension, international politics about the effect of war and the external threat of terrorism 
upon domestic democratic practice. These questions directly concern the central thematic 
of this thesis and the substance of these questions is the central concern of this chapter. 
This chapter seeks to address these challenges that could be described as an attempt to 
create security by regulating bodies and the space in which they interact. The initial 
discussion examines the notions of exceptionality, securitisation and spatial understandings
4 For a detailed account of the nature of the war on terror discourse see Richard Jackson, Writing the War on 
Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).
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of control and then uses them to analyse contemporary responses to the threat of 
terrorism and its subsequent effects. Having outlined this basic framework, through which 
the spatial processes of control are enacted on bodies and space according to dictates of 
foreign policy, this chapter will then turn to contemporary case studies.
The first case study examines the discourse of 'super-empowerment'. This term was coined 
by Thomas Friedman to capture the disproportionate effects that highly motivated actors 
were able to exert, to the point of becoming significant actors in global politics. This 
discourse became more potent after 9/11, capturing the tenor of the times and resonating 
within academia, emergent military doctrine and popular culture. This chapter suggests 
that in response to the exceptional super-empowered actions of 9/11, a form of discipline 
has been operationalised that compels everyday individuals to consider themselves in 
exceptional circumstances and in turn validates the perceived necessity for 'super- 
empowered' extra-judicial action, such as torture and abuse. The 'normal' individual thus 
becomes securitised and embedded within spatial relations that take on the characteristics 
of exceptionality. These processes of spatial control will be demonstrated in terms of 
effects that can be described as topological in nature. Topology is a relational form of 
spatial representation based not around linear cartography but rather the dynamic 
relations between moving or changing objects. In this sense it is useful for understanding 
the processes of control and effects of securitisation on bodies as they move within 
particular spaces. The final case studies will use this notion of topology to examine the 
effects of security procedures on cities and the attempt to regulate mobility across borders.
Securing bodies and space after 9/11
Space is a crucial concept in International Relations, both for orthodox accounts and for 
those that challenge this orthodoxy. Orthodox IR presupposes a series of spatial 
configurations that are literally the manifestation of a relationship between power and 
knowledge, inscribed into political space. For instance, the knowledge practices of foreign 
policy reinforce both the borders of, and differences between states in such a way that 
difference is demarcated by political spaces. Similarly, this chapter suggests that foreign 
policy is a practice that delineates space but also shapes the social and political order 
within these spatial boundaries. In this sense, the emergence of any foreign policy response 
instils that policy's values within the space that it defines. Consequently, foreign policy can 
feed into spatial processes of control and regulation within a domestic space. The process
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of securitisation whereby foreign threats demand a concerted domestic response is not a 
direct or linear process. Subtle understandings of how foreign policy feeds into spatial 
mechanisms of control are required in order to understand this effect.
Exception, securitisation and space
The rise of an exceptional state of affairs following 9/11 suggests the presence of a politics 
in the manner described by Schmitt. This can be seen in the potent reassertions of 
sovereign authority that occurred during the Bush Administration, particularly in regards to 
the extension of executive presidential wartime powers. Schmitt defined sovereignty not in 
legal terms but in terms of the ability to  act, and the ability to  decide, especially in times of 
emergency. According the Schmitt, the "[s]overeign is he who decides upon the 
exception."5 The Bush Administration drafted legal opinions conferring wide-ranging 
wartime presidential powers, including the potential for the m ilitary to be employed 
domestically against te rror suspects.6 The drafting o f such memos authorising greater 
domestic power and willingness to act unilaterally abroad was an attem pt by the Bush 
Administration to act decisively in the face of the 9/11 attacks, demonstrating it would not 
be held hostage to acts of terrorism or wait for the tide of public opinion to determine its 
course of action. Such actions, understood in Schmittian terms, were an attem pt to 
reassert the coherence of the state in the face of actions tha t undermined its authority. The 
integrity of the state became paramount, elevated above established practices of 
international law and normal rules and procedures -  some constitutional -  designed to 
protect domestic liberty.
Schmitt thus advocated what could be described as a radical variant o f realpolitik. Under 
this conception not only would the national interest of the state be placed above that of 
others states but above also its own liberal democracy. Such a position arose out of 
Schmitt's critique of liberalism, which he fe lt was unable to address the harsh realities of 
politics, suggesting that it has "attem pted to transform the enemy from  the viewpoint of 
economics into a com petitor and from  an intellectual point into a debating adversary."7 
Schmitt's withering disdain for the weak-willed politics of liberalism in many ways captures
5 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 5.
6 Neil A. Lewis, "Bush Administration Memos Claimed Vast War Powers", New York Times, 03/03/09. Accessed 
from www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/world/americas/03iht-terror. 1.20553923.html on 22/08/09; David G. 
Savage, "Bush Administration Memos on Presidential Powers Stun Legal Experts", LA Times, 04/03/09. Accessed 
from articles.latimes.com/2QQ9/mar/04/nation/na-bush-memos4 on 22/08/09.
7 Schmitt, The Concept o f the Political, p. 28.
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the way in which calls for a more robust politics in the face of an emergent terrorist 
security threat prevailed over progressive voices in the post-9/11 political landscape. In the 
face of the threat of terrorism the friend/enemy distinction had become a potent force 
within US politics. As Schmitt suggests, "every concrete antagonism becomes that much 
more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy 
grouping."8 Other concerns, whether they be economic, legal, intellectual or ethical, 
become subsumed by expressly political demands as the distinction between friend and 
enemy grow more stark.9
The exceptional politics of Schmitt is captured by the literature on securitisation, emerging 
largely from the Copenhagen School. This school of thought seeks to add a further 
theoretical dimension to security studies, drawing on the constructivist agenda within 
International Relations.10 Within securitisation theory, security is not understood as an 
objective process but as the outcome of a process whereby notions of security are socially 
constructed by what these authors describe as 'speech acts', essentially a narrowly defined 
notion of discourse. Ole Waever, a key proponent of securitisation theory, suggests that 
"(i)t is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one."* 11 Securitisation theory 
can thus be understood as "the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a 
saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects."12 While Schmitt did not employ 
explicitly constructivist terms, securitisation theory "mirrors the intense condition of 
existential division, of friendship and enmity that constitutes Schmitt's concept of the 
political," so as to consolidate the state in order to face the threat.13 Michael C. Williams 
seeks to expand the scope of securitisation, suggesting that the processes whereby 
enemies are identified and threats are constructed is not limited just to words or 'speech 
acts'.14 Williams instead locates securitisation within "a broader vision of communicative 
action", in which images play an equally important role.15 Drawing on the provocation of
Ibid., p. 27.
9 Ibid., p. 37.
10 For the key thinkers and key text in this school of thought see Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Barry Buzan & Jaape 
de Wilde, Security: A New Framework fo r Analysis (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
11 Quoted in Rita Taureck, "Securitization Theory and Security Studies", Journal o f International Relations and 
Development, vol. 9, no. 1, 2006, p. 54.
12 Carsten Bagge Lausten & Ole Waever, "In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization", 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 29, no. 3, 2000, p. 708.
13 Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics", International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 4, 2003, p. 516.
14 Ibid., pp. 511-531.
15 Ibid., p. 524.
143
Williams it can be suggested that securitisation implicates a wider range of discursive 
processes than simply speech per se, or for that matter, images. Security as we have seen is 
intimately bound to the creation of identity and domestic processes of discipline. 16 
Securitisation should thus be seen as a highly fluid process that cannot be separated from 
the constitution of social order. Indeed this chapter will highlight its role in the spatial 
mechanisms of control.
Critical geographers concerned with spatial relations of control draw from the work of 
Foucault on discipline and panopticism. As is the case with this thesis there is a concern for 
subtle processes of power and control. Rather than examining foreign policy, however, 
they examine how similar effects are operationalised within particular contemporary 
spaces. 17 This chapter seeks to bring together the focus of this thesis on foreign policy with 
those who are concerned with spatial control. Foucault's concern was to demonstrate 
"how power is exercised in particular sites and settings. " 18 Spatiality is important within 
these accounts insofar as they involve regulation that occurs when individuals are subject 
to relations of visibility within space. 19 It is this awareness of visibility within a specific 
spatial context that internalises discipline within bodies, memorably typified in Foucault's 
figuration of control in the Panopticon. 20 Discipline, in this sense, "is above all an analysis of 
space. " 21 Processes of control for Foucault are fluid and unbounded; it is not externally 
enforced but rather embodied within subjects. Given that as configurations of space for 
present purposes are only important insofar as they produce processes of regulation and 
control, it follows that the conception of space will not be bounded or linear but rather 
relational. For an explicit formulation of spatial regulation we should briefly turn to Deleuze 
who responds directly to Foucault's disciplinary model. Deleuze describes these processes 
of discipline in more fluid terms, suggesting there is constant movement through multiple 
"spaces of enclosure. " 22 Given the lack a single over-arching space, bodies are not so much
16 Campbell, Writing Security.
17 For an overview of the critical geography that draws from the work of Foucault see Matthew Hannah, "Space 
and the Structuring of Disciplinary Power: An Interpretive Review", Geogafiska Annaler: Series B, Human 
Geography, vol. 79, no. 3, 1997, pp. 171-180.
18 Felix Driver, "Bodies in Space: Foucault's Account of Disciplinary Power" in Colin Powers & Roy Porter (eds.), 
Reassessing Foucault: Power, Medicine and the Body (New York: Routledge,1994), p. 117.
19 John Allen, "Spatial Assemblages of Power: From Domination to Empowerment", in Doreen Massey, John 
Allen & Phillip Sarre (eds.), Human Geography Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 201-204.
20 Hannah, "Space and the Structuring of Disciplinary Power", p. 171.
21 Foucault, quoted in Stuart Eiden, "Plague, Panopticon, Police", Surveillance & Society, vol. 1, no. 3, 2003, p. 
245.
22 Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", October, vol. 59, 1992, pp. 3-7.
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'moulded' according to one form of discipline but rather 'modulated' by variable processes 
of control that constantly shift through time and space.23
A number of scholars have engaged with the intensification of control in the post-9/11 
environment, particularly as it relates to the operation of these processes within cities and 
urban spaces. This field of research seeks to understand the complex relations within cities 
rather than viewing them as bounded entities, no more than the sum of fixed addresses 
and street names. Stephen Graham and Patsy Healey challenge the reliance on 
"'containered' views of space and time" pointing instead to the need for a "relational 
understanding of time, space and cities."24 Stephen Graham suggests the war on terror 
discourse creates
imaginative geographies of US cities... as 'homeland' spaces which must be 
reengineered to address supposed imperatives of 'national security' [while on 
the other hand] Arab cities have been imaginatively constructed as little more 
than 'terrorist nest' targets to soak up US military firepower.25
Graham highlights the operation of foreign policy in such a way that it folds foreign policy 
and national security obligations into the very space in which bodies interact. Gregory 
suggests that this spatial ordering process is not a straight forward linear geography, rather 
it "folds distance into difference through a series of spatializations."2b The folding of 
discourses has the effect of stretching and compressing time and space, calling for a 
"topology... that overwhelms the fictions of boundaries, limits, fixity, permanence [and] 
embedment."27 These perspectives from within critical geography suggest that in the post- 
9/11 landscape, foreign policy discourses have given rise to an altered spatiality, of which 
the associated processes of control warrant further examination in this chapter.
Bringing these analyses together this chapter will suggest that the very space of Western 
democracies and the way that bodies move within it have been shaped by the process of 
securitisation. In this sense the responses to 9/11 have given rise to the creation of 
exceptional laws, the suspension of normal ones and a process of securitisation that alter 
spatial mechanisms of control. The threat of terrorism means that bodies are now
23 Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", p. 4.
24 Stephen Graham & Patsy Healey, "Relational Concepts of Space and Place: Issues for Planning and Practice", 
European Planning Studies, vol. 7, no. 5, 1999, p. 623.
25 Stephen Graham, "Cities and the 'War on Terror", International Journal o f Urban and Regional Research, vo. 
30, no. 2, 2006, p. 255.
26 Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 18, quoted in Ibid.
27 Richard G. Smith, "World City Topologies", Progress in Human Geography, vol. 27, no. 5, 2003, p. 565.
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understood as possessing the potential to be super-empowered, of being able to act in an 
exceptional manner with effects far beyond what is expected of normal individuals. The 
space in which these bodies act has also been affected by the foreign policy attempt to 
counter the threat of terrorism. When viewed in terms of a 'topology' -  a relational rather 
than geographical perspective -  we can see that it is not only spaces such as Guantanamo 
or Abu Ghraib that is subject to an exceptional politics but also that much of the underlying 
order of urban space throughout the Western democratic landscape is being shaped by 
these national security prerogatives.
9/11 and terrorist super-empowerment
The terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, Bali and London between 2001-2005 heralded 
the advent of those who are willing enact destruction on a level disproportionate to that of 
'normal' bodies. The incidence of terrorist violence dramatically upsets not only the regular 
movement of people -  as will be shown later in the chapter -  but also the assumptions of 
what they are capable of. This is not just a moral threshold that has been crossed but the 
fundamental understanding of each individual's ability to act and the scope of subsequent 
effects. In this sense, terrorism challenges the orthodox ontological assumptions of the 
power of individuals to act on the world stage. The topographical logic that underpins our 
understanding of populations assumes a collection of average individuals, who have a 
regular and proportional ability to affect the space around them. That is, they are 'normally 
empowered' in terms of intelligence, abilities and motivations. The ability and willingness 
of the perpetrators of terrorist actions to enact violence that is disproportionate or 
asymmetrical to scale upsets the regular topology of populations in terms of affect but also 
undermines the prior assumption of 'normally empowered' individuals.
Thomas L. Friedman picked up on this theme prior to 9/11, pioneering the emergence of 
those he describes as "super-empowered angry men."28 Friedman tapped the late-20th 
century pop-IR Zeitgeist, depicting a Francis Fukuyama-style post-cold war liberal 
ideological triumphalism, tempered by a Robert Kaplan-esque 'present anarchy' of 
dissatisfied individuals on the wrong end of venture capitalism, played out along the lines 
of rupture outlined in Samuel Huntington's civilisational clash.29 In this new post-cold war
28 Thomas L. Friedman, "Angry, Wired and Deadly", New York Times, 22/08/98, p. 15.
29 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", The National Interest, Vol. 16 (Summer), 1989, pp .3-18; Robert D. 
Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994. Accessed from
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world order Friedman describes in his usual catchy gloss a situation of "states bumping up 
against states, states bumping up against supermarkets and states bumping up against 
super-empowered individuals."30 Super-empowered individuals in this formulation are 
those who are able to act on the international stage with a high degree of influence and 
impact "directly on the world stage w ithout the traditional mediation of governments, 
corporations or any other public or private institu tions."31 Thus for Friedman, globalisation 
is giving rise to an interdependent relationship between the state, neoliberal capitalism and 
those individuals he has labelled 'super-empowered'. Friedman maps this three-way 
dynamic in terms of a triangulated relationship in which conflict stems from competition 
between states and high finance over economic control, the attem pt by states to reign-in 
illegitimate violence by super-empowered individuals, and the accordant discontent of 
super-empowered individuals incensed by inequality that stems from  the ruthless 
profligacy of high finance.32 While somewhat trite , Friedman's form ulation suggests three 
interrelated challenges that question contemporary global governance. In the first instance, 
what is the relationship between high finance and the state and can the state retain control 
over the speculative drive of the market? Secondly, how can the state mediate, manage or 
defend against the discontents of perturbed dissenters and religious fundamentalists? 
Finally, can the source of this initial discontent be assuaged, or is it inevitable that super­
markets and those who are super-empowered are going to  come into conflict?
In light of 9/11, Friedman's notion of super-empowerment seems quite prescient. This is 
particularly the case upon returning to one of his earliest formulations of the concept in the 
introduction to Lexus and the 0//Ve Tree. Suggesting that "[s]ome of these super- 
empowered individuals are quite angry, some of them quite wonderful", Friedman then 
goes onto to cite the example of
Osama bin Laden, a Saudi millionaire w ith his own global network, declared
war on the United States in the late 1990s, and the U.S. Air Force had to
www.theatlantic.com/doc/199402/anarchy on 17/04/08 and; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of 
Civilizations?", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, 1993, pp. 22-49.
30 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Anchor Books, 
2000), p. 13.
31 Ibid., p. 14. On the new post-cold war world, see Thomas L. Friedman and Ignacio Ramonet, "Duelling 
Globalizations: A Debate Between Thomas L. Friedman & Ignacio Ramonet", Foreign Policy, Vol. 116 (Fall), 1999, 
pp. 110-127.
32 Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, p.192.
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launch a cruise missile attack on him as though he were another nation-state.
We fired cruise missiles at an individual!33
Here Friedman pre-empts not only the agent of the 9/11 attacks but also offers a 
theoretical framework through which to interpret the attacks. Underlying his triangulated 
schematic of contemporary conflict is a relatively sophisticated grasp of the ontological 
dimension of these encounters. Accentuating the distinctive motives of these three actors 
are diverging assumptions of what constitutes the essential agent of global politics: the 
state, the free market and the individual. Here, Friedman seeks to update the array of 
international actors. Rather than fundamentally altering the realist ontology of the state, 
Friedman's understanding of globalisation simply expands the register of actors who are 
able to  act in the manner of states. This ambitious attem pt to merge the ontological 
paradigm of realism with his interpretation of the neoliberal present, in this way seems to 
have been both salvaged and also vindicated by the 9/11 attacks.
W riting tw o days after 9/11 Friedman highlights the way in which the super-empowered 
terrorists struck out at the symbols of both supermarket and state, the other actors in his 
triangular formulation.
What makes them super-empowered, though, is their genius at using the 
networked world, the Internet and the very high technology they hate, to 
attack us... And th ink of what they hit: The W orld Trade Center - the beacon of 
American-led capitalism that both tempts and repels them, and the Pentagon - 
the embodiment of American m ilitary superiority.34
While Friedman's notion of super-empowered individuals seems well suited to the 
ambiguous terrain of post-cold war contemporary politics, such figures in the highly 
politicised 'w ith or against us' post-9/11 landscape are more readily being labelled in 
contrasting terms as 'terrorists' or 'heroes', depending on the ir aims. The parochial 
demand for unity, infamously defined by the logic o f the presidential statement 'you're 
with us or you're w ith the terrorists', calls for black and white certainty and unequivocal 
patriotism .35 By suggesting that there are super-empowered individuals, some evil, some
33 Ibid., p. 14.
34 Thomas L. Friedman, "World War III", New York Times, 13/9/01. Accessed from www.nytimes.com/2001709/ 
13/oninion/l 3FRIE.html 22/08/09.
35 George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20/09/01", White House: 
President George W. Bush. Accessed from georgewbush-whitehouse .archives.gov/news/re leases/2001/09/ 
20010920-8.html on 22/08/09; see also Dawn Rothe & Stephen L. Muzzatti, "Enemies Everywhere: Terrorism, 
Moral Panic, and US Civil Society", Critical Criminology, vol. 12, no. 3, 2004, pp. 327-350.
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good and no doubt some relatively ambivalent is to place these individuals on a continuum 
from one another, to map a relation between them.
Indeed, as a highly regarded and nationally syndicated opinion columnist, prominently 
situated within this parochially-charged environment, Friedman himself has made little 
mention of the positive notion of super-empowerment, focussing solely on the threat of 
super-empowerment. As he suggests,
in a networked universe, with widely diffused technologies, open borders and 
a highly integrated global financial and internet system, very small groups of 
people can amass huge amounts of power to disrupt the World of Order. 
Individuals can become super-empowered. In many ways, 9/11 marked the 
first full-scale battle between a superpower and a small band of super- 
empowered angry men from the World of Disorder.36
That the writing of Friedman has taken on a more pessimistic tone since 9/11 is 
understandable. The demands of US foreign policy, I would suggest, is enacting more than 
just a steely resolve in the work of Friedman. Since 9/11 Friedman has not promoted, nor 
even mentioned a positive conception of super-empowerment. 37 The emergence of this 
somewhat less sophisticated and highly polarised view of the world in the work of 
Friedman is understandable given the demand for unequivocal patriotism since 9/11. It also 
suggests a level of self-discipline. For Friedman to continue to suggest that the clear 
polarisation between heroes and terrorists can be represented in the dialectically 
synthesised form and common terminology of super-empowerment would likely make 
many uncomfortable. This discipline, whether enacted by a parochial public, his publisher 
or by Friedman himself emerges because his initial formulation of super-empowerment 
tacitly admits, if not to the Janus-face of super-empowered heroism, then at least to a 
mutually generative relationship between heroism and popular representations of 
terrorism.
This interconnected, generative relationship that Friedman has shied away from is exactly 
what I am going to argue below. In short, I will argue that the representation of super-
36 Thomas L. Friedman, "Peking Duct Tape", New York Times, 16/02/03. Accessed from www.nytimes.com/ 
2003/02/16/or>inion/r>eking-duct-tar>e.html on 22/08/09.
37 Friedman only employs the negative connotation in each of the following, Thomas L. Friedman, Longitudes 
and Attitudes: Exploring the World After September 11 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), p. 30, 80, 
211; Friedman, "World War III"; Friedman, "Peking Duct Tape"; Thomas L. Friedman, "Under the Arab Street", 
New York Times, 23/10/02. Accessed from www.nytimes.com/2002/10/23/opinion/23FRIE.html on 22/08/09; 
and Thomas L. Friedman, "No Mere Terrorist", New York Times, 24/03/02. Accessed from www.nytimes.com/ 
2002/03/24/opinion/no-mere-terrorist.html on 22/08/09.
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empowered terrorists demands and enacts instances of super-empowered heroism. The 
advent of terrorism, understood to have been ushered in by 9/11, has witnessed relatively 
small groups of individuals inflict major damage in terms of casualties, destruction of 
buildings and wider social effects.38 That such devastating attacks were carried out by a 
small number of individuals has suggested for many a new style of combat, an 
intensification of guerrilla tactics, has emerged. Non-state actors are able to inflict the kind 
of damage normally associated with states. Given the ineffectiveness of conventional 
military force against something as elusive as terrorism, given the limitations the law places 
on the kind of action deemed acceptable and given that domestic policing doesn't in either 
practical or symbolic terms address the sheer magnitude of attacks such as 9/11, an 
equivalent actor to the terrorist may seem, to some, necessary.
Friedman's prescient argument that Western states will be forced to deal with those who 
are 'super-empowered' suggests the likelihood that these ideas will penetrate widely 
amongst mainstream narratives of International Relations. Indeed, Michael Ignatieff has 
taken up this notion in his commentary on, and utilitarian justification for, the use of 
torture in the interrogation of those with suspected terrorist links, a commentary that I will 
take up later in the context of an engagement with the torture debate. The deployment of 
the notion of super-empowered terrorism, I'll suggest shortly, bears distinct parallels with a 
number of popular culture representations that are not easily dismissed. Within these 
parallels there is evidence to suggest that Friedman, Ignatieff and others who have taken 
up this notion have been influenced by the interpretive framework of popular culture 
portrayals of fictional characters who possess 'super-powers'. The influence of these 
popular portrayals goes well beyond what was consciously intended by these authors. They 
certainly go further than is intended by Ignatieff, who does not usually employ turns of 
popular phraseology as extensively as Friedman. As well as unwittingly drawing from this 
popular discourse of exceptional actors, Freidman and Ignatieff have further propelled and 
ascribed a measure of academic authenticity to it.
This terminology of super-empowerment has been echoed in areas of emerging popular 
military theory. Military theory on the evolution of war-fighting holds that there are a 
number of identifiable generations of technologies and tactics that are instrumental to the 
development of modern armies.
38 The latter will be examined in Chapter 6.
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The first generation of modern war was dominated by massed manpower and 
culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation, which was quickly 
adopted by the world's major powers, was dominated by firepower and ended 
in World War I. In relatively short order, during World War II the Germans 
introduced third-generation warfare, characterized by maneuver. That type of 
combat is still largely the focus of U.S. forces. [Fourth-generation war is an] 
evolved form of insurgency us[ing] all available networks—political, economic, 
social, military—to convince the enemy's decision makers that their strategic 
goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. 39
Thus fourth-generation warfare can be seen as the modus operondi behind guerrilla 
warfare and informs the initial interpretations of terrorism. Viewed in these terms, 
terrorists are seen as a series of individuals, organisations and tactics that are highly fluid 
and indistinguishable from the wider society.40 It is thus not a conventional 'hard' military 
force. The emergent generation of warfare is likewise a variation on the unconventional 
force but with greater exactable destructive yield.
This notion of super-empowerment is argued to be the key premise informing what is 
known as 'fifth-generation warfare' or a new stage of warfare.41 In contrast with that of the 
fourth-generation, fifth-generation warfare, it is suggested, is characterised by the 
emergence of the 'super-empowered' individual.42 The emergence of super-empowerment 
is suggested to be seen as an extension or multiplication of the offensive yield of fourth- 
generation tactics as way of countering asymmetry of conventional military forces, in the 
case of suicide bombing.43 Those who suggest we are seeing the emergence of fifth-
39 Thomas X. Hammes, "4th-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths," Armed Forces Journal, 
November 2004, pp. 40-44. Accessed from www.armedforcesiournal.com/2004/ll on 14/03/2008.
40 See William S. Lind et al, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation", Marine Corps Gazette, 
October 1989, pp. 22-26. Accessed from www.defense-and-societv.org/fcs/4th gen war gazette.htm on 
14/03/2008; Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Op-Ed: The Problem with Fourth-Generation Warfare", Strategic Studies 
Institute of the US Army War College Newsletter, February 2005. Accessed from www.strategicstudiesinstitute. 
armv.mil/pdffiles/pub674.pdf on 14/03/08; and Jason Vest, "Fourth-generation Warfare", Atlantic Monthly, 
December 2001. Accessed from www.theatlantic.com/doc/200112/vest on 14/03/2008.
41 Thomas X. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges", Military Review, May-June 2007, p. 
21; see also Matthew B. Stannard, "Hezbollah Wages a New Generation of Warfare", San Francisco Chronicle, 
06/08/06. Accessed from www.sfgate.com on 14/03/2008.
42 Thomas X. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges", Military Review, May-June 2007, 
pp. 14-23; Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St Paul, Minnesota: Zenith 
Press, 2004), pp. 274-275, 289, 290-291; John Robb, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fifth Generation 
(5GW)", Global Guerrillas: An Open Notebook on the First Epochal War of the 21st Century, 16/10/2006. 
Accessed from globa lguerrillas.typepad.com/globa lguerrillas/2006/10/ on 14/03/2008; and John Robb, On 
Superempowerment and 5th Generation Warfare" Global Guerrillas: An Open Notebook on the First Epochal 
War of the 21st Century, 20/02/2008. Accessed from globa lguerrillas.tvpepad.com/globalguerrillas/2008/02/ on 
14/03/2008.
43 Thomas P. Barnett & Bradd C. Hayes, "System Peturbation: Conflict in the Age of Globalisation" in Raymond 
W. Westphal Jr. (ed.), l/l/or and Virtual War: The Challenges to Communities (Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 
2003), pp. 5-18; William S. Lind, "Fifth Generation Warfare?", Military.com, 03/02/2008. Accessed from
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generation warfare envisage clandestine wars by, or even between, small groups of 
individuals utilising a combination of superior acumen, advanced technological know-how, 
conspiratorial planning or simply a willingness to die for the cause. Accordingly, 
technologies such as biological weapons, 'dirty bombs' and even, at some stage, 
nanotechnology could be used in order to wage a new form of war. Complex political 
schemes such as deep-cover 'sleeper cells', double agents like cold war spies Kim Philby 
and the Cambridge Five, or perhaps even some kind of secret society or cult movement 
could also be employed to co-ordinate or enhance the political effect of these strategies. 
Further, it is argued that in the development of tactics to counter super-empowered 
terrorists
the application of [US] military power will mirror the dominant threat to a 
significant degree. In other words, we will morph into a military of super- 
empowered individuals (e.g., special operations-like forces) fighting wars 
against super-empowered individuals (e.g., transnational actors) . 44
Thus we begin to arrive at a model of war-fighting in which highly independent arid mobile 
actors will at once slip the net of conventional offensive and defensive strategies whilst 
exacting maximum impact. John Robb even goes so far as to suggest that the ultimate 
trajectory of the super-empowered war-fighting will be "the ability of one man to declare 
war on the world and win. " 45
What is emerging here, and what will be further demonstrated, is that in the process of 
contingency planning these military theorists have constructed an image of future wars 
that resembles the vigilante heroism of the battles fought by super-heroes or action- 
adventure television series in which exceptionally talented super-agents battle the 
messianic evil genius of their enemies. This may, at this stage, seem the exclusive domain 
of military transformation planners and war theorists engaging in collective wish-fulfilment 
to an audience of over-zealous military academy students. This may to some extent be 
true. Flowever, writing in Esquire magazine, Thomas Barnett reiterated the following to a 
decidedly larger and more mainstream audience.
www.militarv.eom/NewContent/0.13190.Lind 0203Q4.0Q.html on 14/03/2008; and William S. Lind, "War or 
Not War?" Defense and National Interest - On War #251, 19/02/2008. Accessed from dni2.wordpress.com/ 
2008/02/19/on-war-251-war-or-not-war/ on 14/03/2008.
44 Thomas P.M. Barnett & Arthur K. Cebrowski, "The American Way of War", Transformation Trends, January 
2003, p. 4. Accessed from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/transfonnation/trends 165 transformation trends 
13 january 2003 issue.pdf on 14/03/2008.
45 John Robb, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End o f Globalization (Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2007), p. 8.
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So if the United States is in the process of "transform ing" its m ilitary to meet 
the threats of tom orrow, what should it end up looking like? In my mind, we 
fight fire w ith fire. If we live in a world increasingly populated by Super- 
Empowered Individuals, we field a m ilitary of Super-Empowered Individuals.46
This article has since been expanded into a popular book, The Pentagon's New Map and a 
follow-up, Blueprint fo r  Action.47 Beyond the expanding influence of the idea of super­
empowerment and the pervasion of m ilitary jargon and political pop phraseology, 
however, is the reflection of a broader social phenomenon. This phenomenon is the 
tendency since 9/11 to interpret events though the context of an embedded American 
exceptionalism, such that extraordinary events, challenging politics and social complexity 
continue to fuel a demand for exceptional personalities and exceptional politics.
Complementing the 'super-empowerment' of terrorists, I'd suggest are a number of other 
'powers' that are present in contemporary narratives of terrorism. As well as the 
disproportionate motivations and means that are exercised by terrorists, popular 
representations in news reporting, government policy and fiction have bestowed upon 
Islamic terrorists a number of other 'super-powers' that are drawn from, or at least 
parallel, those of super-villains. Firstly, terrorists are invisible. Or at the very least they are 
able to change the ir form. This power is exercised through the suggestion that terrorists 
blend into society, burying themselves deeply through 'sleeper cells'. The terrorist threat, 
further, may not even be external, it might emerge 'home grown' from  within. While still 
'other', they are said to  be indistinguishable from a neighbour or any other everyday man 
or woman. In the second instance, they are immortal. Or at least as Butler suggests, have 
been portrayed as exceptional post-humans because "they are effectively reducible to a 
desire to k ill."48 Because Islamic terrorists are said to fervently believe they will be taken to 
paradise upon death, whereupon they are said to  be bestowed w ith virgins, this then 
allows them to take on the characteristics o f one who is immortal as they are not subject to 
the same existential fears and restraints as a secular liberal whose humanist views leave 
them afraid of death. Finally, terrorists are paralleled particularly w ith super-villains insofar 
as they are co-ordinated by a criminal mastermind. As w ith all good arch-villains, terrorists
46 Thomas P.M. Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map", Esquire, 1/03/03. Accessed from www.esquire.com/ 
ESO03Q3-MAR WARPRIMER on 18/04/08.
47 Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York: 
Putnam Publishing, 2004) and Blueprint fo r Action: A Future Worth Creating. (New York: Putnam Publishing, 
2005).
48 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004), p. 78.
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are led by an evil genius. In the post-9/11 narrative, this is Osama bin Laden who himself is 
super-empowered through his Machiavellian genius and evil scheming, rather than as a 
result of his ability to directly enact disproportional asymmetrical effects. Once bestowed 
with such traits, this invites, nay demands, sufficient exceptional responses to counter such 
super-villainy. The demand for such a response can be seen in the public debate over 
torture and the particular contribution to this debate by the television show, 24.
24 and the super-empowerment of citizens
If the narrative of 9/11 represents the actions of a small number of super-empowered 
individuals, extraordinary rendition, indefinite imprisonment and 'enhanced interrogation' 
represent the proportionate response to such acts. The justificatory rationale for these 
actions is widely dispersed through a combination of two channels. Firstly, the public 
debates on the validity of torture methods in exceptional circumstances suggest a direct 
channel through which this logic and moral stance is dispersed.49 In the second instance, 
the operation of discipline is more subtle, pervaded through popular culture 
representations of torture. An example of this is the post-9/11 US television action series 
24. While recognising that there is nominally a distinction here, this section argues that this 
highly politicised TV show morphed with the high profile but low-rent nature of much of 
popular news-media reporting which dominated public debate on terrorism. In short, news 
and debate become entertainment, entertainment becomes debate and an ethical 
compass. The 'real-time' and 'real-life' representations of 24's super-hero Jack Bauer 
provided the road map by which US citizens would discipline their beliefs in accordance 
with US foreign policy priorities.
This foreign policy disciplining of domestic audiences through media entertainment can be 
seen particularly in regards to debates surrounding the use of torture as a strategy of anti­
terrorism. The intensification of one's obligations as a citizen due to foreign policy 
discipline occurs when individuals are asked to consider themselves in hypothetical 
situations in which the torture is the heroic course of action. The ethical dilemma posed in 
such debates over the use of torture asks individuals to consider 'what would I do?' 
Deploying ethical debate in this way asks people to consider themselves, in the first
49 Matthew Hannah. 'Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a Geographical Imagination of 
Power/Knowledge", Armais o f the Association o f American Geographers, 96:3, 2006, pp. 622-640; see also, 
Sandford Levinson (ed.), Torture: A Collection (NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), in particular Michael Walzer, 
"Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands", pp. 61-76.
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instance, as objects that need to be protected from terrorism. Beyond this, however, it has 
the effect of asking individuals to consider themselves as agents of security. Society is not 
just what is secured from terrorism by the state but also the active agent that must take 
action against terrorists. Society in this sense is not fixed as civilian; it occupies 
simultaneous roles alternating fluidly between citizen and soldier. Thus the portrayals 
found in both entertainment and informative accounts feed into the notion of super­
empowerment. Narratives of vigilante heroism, as portrayed on shows such as 24, asks 
everyday citizens to consider the demand for an intensification of the agency of everyday 
political actors on one hand, and acts of interrogation carried out by secret agents played 
by Hollywood actors on the other.
Amidst the fall-out from the revelations of torture and prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, it 
began to emerge that the Bush Administration had given such tactics a measure of 
approval and legitimacy, if not a legal standing.so This prompted a highly visible and long- 
running debate over the legitimacy of such 'enhanced interrogation' tactics in the war on 
terror.51 Throughout 2007-2008, the inescapable saturation reporting by the US news- 
media of the macabre ins and outs of water-boarding ensured that this idea remained 
highly pervasive.52 In this chapter I suggest it has been the simple presence, rather than any 
particular element of this debate, which has operationalised a virulent mode of foreign
50 Dana Priest & R Jeffrey Smith, "Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture", Washington Post, 8/06/04, p. 
A01 and Dana Priest, "Justice Department Memo Says Torture May Be Justified", Washington Post, 13/06/04. 
Accessed from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Junl3.html on 28/04/08. Specifically in 
the case of Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush see Arthur Kane, "Guardsman: CIA Beat Iraqis with 
Hammer Handles", Denver Post, 27/07/05. Accessed from www.denverpost.com/news/ci 289219 on 28/04/08; 
and Josh White, "Documents Tell of Brutal Improvisation by GIs", Washington Post, 3/08/05. Accessed from 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080201941.html on 22/08/09; in the 
case of Canadian Maher Arar see Jane Mayer, "Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 
Extraordinary Rendition Program", New Yorker, 14/02/05. Accessed wvvw.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/ 
050214fa fact6 on 28/04/08; in the case of British citizen Martin Mubanga see David Rose, "How I Entered the 
Hellish World of Guantanamo Bay", Observer, 6/02/05. Accessed www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/06/world 
.guantanamo on 22/08/09; a collection of these papers can be found in Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel 
(eds.), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
51 See Karen J. Greenberg (ed.), The Torture Debate in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); 
Alan Dershowitz and Ken Roth interviewed in Wolf Blitzer "Dershowitz: Torture Could Be Justified", CNN.com, 
4/03/03. Accessed from edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/Q3/03/cnna.Dershowitz/ on 28/04/08; Associated Press, 
"Poll Finds Broad Approval of Terrorist Torture", MSNBC, 9/12/05. Accessed from www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
10345320 on 28/04/08:
52 Bill O'Reilly, "Telling the Truth about Torture", Talking Points -  Fox News, 9/10/07. Accessed from 
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,300359,00.htmI on 24/04/08; Bill O'Reilly, "Blocking War on Terror Tools", 
Talking Points -  Fox News, 15/02/08. Accessed from www.foxnews.com/storv/0,2933,330782.00.html on 
24/04/08; Keith Olbermann, "Special Comment: On Waterboarding and Torture" Countdown -  MSNBC, 
5/11/07. Accessed from www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21644133 on 24/04/08; CBS, "Waterboarding: Interrogation 
or Torture?", CBS News, 1/11/07. Accessed from www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/01/national/ 
main3441363.shtml on 28/04/08.
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policy discipline. Accordingly, I will not be outlining all of the many facets and varying 
subtleties of the debate nor offering a unique argument of my own. Suffice to say, 
however, that a position corresponding with the argument of this chapter is offered initially 
by Slavoj Zizek and has since been more carefully enunciated by Alex Bellamy. 53 This 
position is that a decision to undertake torture and the implicit ethics involved in such an 
undertaking cannot be properly made except in the moment of actually making it . 54 
Furthermore, the likelihood of such a scenario arising and the possibilities for variability are 
so great that any debate is essentially conjecture. 55 On this basis torture is not something 
that cannot be legislated for, in which case the moral integrity of the legal artifice may as 
well stay intact.
The implications of the use of the 'enhanced interrogation' by the Bush Administration 
should not be solely defined by the question of whether or not it employs legal violence on 
terror suspects or violates civil liberties at home. Were this to be the case it would be 
excluding the possibility of levelling a range of other important questions. For instance, the 
very consideration of torture as a tactic to be used in the war on terror highlights the 
operation of foreign policy discipline. While it may seem that to debate the issue of torture 
is the responsible and ethical path to pursue, the very fact that it is perceived as necessary 
suggests that the imperatives of national security and the contemporary foreign policy 
stance is enacting domestic discipline. By entering into this debate people are embedded 
within a social context where torture is already considered a legitimate option. Even if 
stated in purely hypothetical terms, even if portrayals of torture are for purely 
entertainment purposes, this discourse stills presumes the presence of an emergent 
malevolent threat in an undefined realm 'out there', growing steadily closer to the ultimate 
aim of a massively destructive attack. That the depiction of an external threat demands of 
its citizens that they consider partaking in such scenarios that they may otherwise find 
repugnant means that once firmly held ethical positions placed into question by the 
pressures of foreign policy discourse.
53 Alex Bellamy, "No Pain, No Gain? Torture and Ethics in the War on Terror", International Affairs, 82:1, 2006, 
pp. 121-148.
54 Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Similar Dates (London: 
Verso, 2002), p. 103.
55 Given the utilitarian nature of arguments deployed that suggest the necessity of torture, that is the slippery 
slope position, given sufficient hypothetical threat the most brutal hypothetical acts of torture can be justified.
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Engaging with this debate, Michael Ignatieff argues for the necessity of extra-legal violence 
in order to counter the threat of super-empowered terrorism; he describes this as the logic 
of the 'lesser evil'.56 Like a number of other humanitarian advocates of the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, Ignatieff in recent years found himself in an unholy alliance with the Bush 
Administration in his willingness to countenance illiberal means towards liberal ends.57 
Ignatieff's work on ethics in the war on terror takes a similar, although more measured 
turn, advocating that Western democracies adopt what he calls an ethic of the 'lesser evil', 
which is essentially a utilitarian justification for the decision of the state to commit illiberal 
acts in order to protect its freedom and democracy in a time of emergency. Ignatieff's 
position suggests that "necessity may require us to take actions in defense of democracy 
which will stray from democracy's own foundational commitments to dignity."58 In 
particular he directs this argument toward the prospect of "a new world, in which terrorism 
might transmute from an eternal but manageable challenge to liberal democracy into a 
potentially lethal foe" and ultimately the question of whether "democracies are strong 
enough to cope with these dangers."59 Following a discussion of the necessity for methods 
that occupy a grey area between "permissible and impermissible interrogation, between 
coercion and torture," Ignatieff engages the concept of super-empowered individuals.60 
Such individuals for Ignatieff are the greatest threat to liberal democracy and while not 
necessarily Islamic, they are nihilists who cannot be deterred as they do not fear death.61 
Ignatieff makes the argument that if such individuals deployed weapons of mass 
destruction, they could take on a state and end its system of liberal democracy.62 In such a 
context, what could be considered the 'lesser evil' could extend very far.
The TV action series 24 most directly captures this kind of disciplinary pressure. The 
hero/protagonist Jack Bauer optimises the everyday man being forced to deal with a range 
of gritty and immediate threats, which the audience view in 'real time'. In this show Jack
56 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 150.
57 While not strictly of a through and through IR pedigree, Ignatieff's later career has offered firm engagements 
with the ethics surrounding the liberal humanitarian cases for and against war. More recently, Ignatieff has 
advocated a position that could be seen as a robust interpretation of the 'responsibility to protect' doctrine. 
Other such advocates of the 2003 Iraq War included Jean Bethke Elshtain, Lee Feinstein, Francis Fukuyama, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Shawcross. See Anthony Burke, "Security" in Richard Devetak, Anthony 
Burke & Jim George (eds.), An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives (Port Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 151.
58 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 8.
59 Ibid., p. x-xi, see also pp. 145-170.
60 Ibid., p. 140.
61 Ibid., p. 150.
62 Ibid., pp. 153-154.
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Bauer's daughter and the US President are equally likely to come under direct attack. By 
the same token, or at least the other side of it, Jack Bauer is also forced to torture his own 
brother in order to protect America from Islamic extremism. These threats are constant 
and so immediate that they don't bear reflection; they must be acted upon immediately 
and instinctively. This is accentuated by the show being filmed in 'real time'. The events of 
each one hour episode take place as one hour in the narrative of the show. Each 24- 
episode season supposedly represents one day's worth of action. The thesis of Paul Virillio 
regarding the condensing of space into time lives large in this show, as it presents the world 
as an impossibly dangerous and action packed series of events that condense space into 
time while the show's re-occurring motif -  a ticking clock -  literally ticks.63 The re-occurring 
motif of the ticking clock in 24 and its concern with acting out the super-empowered hero 
manifests what has been described as the 'ticking bomb' scenario. This hypothetical 
scenario provides the foundational logic for the use of torture in order to extract 
information.64 It acts to provide an exaggeratedly exceptional scenario that exponentially 
magnifies the discipline enacted by foreign policy by forcing individuals "to countenance 
[the] potential use [of torture] in extreme cases."65 According to such logic there can 
always be a hypothetical scenario in which torture can be justified.
This theme of super-empowerment and the ethics of an indefinitely escalating response 
resonates throughout representations of torture. This diffuse disciplinary pressure blends 
and overlaps the lines between what ought to be a studied ethical debate and what 
purports to be entertainment. Thus, rather than being posed as a direct ethical conundrum 
in the news-meets-entertainment media, it operates via a number of media platforms and 
popular discourses to inform a general ethic of obligation in the American tradition of 
patriotic heroism. This ethic compels exceptional actions be undertaken in order to combat 
those who are understood to be super-empowered individuals. This notion of super­
empowerment informs the obligation that one has when faced with such a scenario. This 
logic is essentially an inversion of the dictum made famous by the Spider-Man super-hero 
franchise; "with great power comes great responsibility."66 This logic can be observed here, 
writ large across the debate on terror; when faced with the responsibility of protecting a
63 Paul Virillio, Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology (New York: Semiotext(e), 1977).
64 Bellamy, "No Pain, No Gain?", pp. 121-148
65 Hannah. "The Ticking Bomb Scenario", p. 624.
66 See also Chris Brown, "Do Great Powers Have Great Responsibility? Great Powers and Moral Agency", Global 
Society, vol. 18, no. 1, 2004, pp. 5-19.
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vast number of individuals one -  whether it be the state or an individual -  is faced with the 
ethical problematic of whether or not to exercise the great power of torture. This theme of 
heroic exceptionalism and the disciplinary compulsions it places on citizens informs the 
parameters of the debate on extraordinary rendition, coercive interrogation and torture, 
where when faced with the ability to obtain life-saving intelligence there is little scope but 
to act as a super-empowered individual. This tradition of patriotism can itself be seen as 
stemming from a long-standing tradition of American exceptionalism.
In addressing this ethical problem of torture, former US President Bill Clinton in 2007 
suggested that despite the unenviable burden of responsibility to act there should be no 
formal exception to the use of torture. This means "if you happen to be the actor... if you 
actually happen to have the Jack Bauer moment -tha t's  what I call it - you should be willing 
to live with the consequences."67 Here Clinton nominally enunciates a similar position to 
that of Zizek and Bellamy described earlier; that if one were to find themselves in such a 
position there may be a duty to act, but given the unlikelihood, he suggests, it should not 
be legislatively condoned. In doing so, however, it seems clear in his language that his mind 
is already made up in favour of the need to undertake torture in exceptional circumstances. 
Furthermore, in addition to undermining the basic premise of this position, it is evident 
that in making this decision he is influenced by 24 protagonist, Jack Bauer. This influence 
goes beyond the unintended irony of his play on the 'actor'. His conceptualisation of the 
ethical dilemma is informed by the macho hip-thrust drive of super-empowered patriotic 
heroism and American exceptionalism. Further to the right of the political spectrum, 
conservative radio talk show presenter, Laura Ingraham makes this interplay more explicit 
in advocating the use of torture. "The average American out there loves the show 24, OK? 
They love Jack Bauer, they love 24. In my mind that's as close to a national referendum that 
it is OK to use tough tactics."68 Thus, it could be suggested that despite the vast width and 
varying depth of the public debate on torture, within the broad population it has been 24 
that has defined the parameters of this debate.
67 Bill Clinton interviewed by Tim Russert, "Meet the Press", MSNBC, 30/09/07. Transcript available from 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21065954/. Accessed from www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvoFmvcVlug on 28/04/08.
68 Laura Ingraham interviewed on Bill O'Reilly, "The O'Reilly Factor", Fox News, 13/09/06. Accessed from 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=LrsQPK-GrDw on 28/04/08.
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24 was created by self-confessed "right-wing nut job", Joel Surnow.b9 24 was first aired two 
months after 9/11 and quickly captured the general sentiment of the post-9/11 political 
landscape. The show consistently averaged well over 10 million viewers per episode across 
seven seasons and has received widespread critical acclaim.70 Like many neoconservative 
Republicans, Surnow believes in the use of hard force and torture in interrogation because 
it is seen to achieve necessary ends. "I think torture does work. It would work on me! I 
believe torture has been around since the beginning of time because it works."71 This ethos 
informs what would have to be 24's central credo: 'everyone breaks, eventually'.72 Tasers, 
defibrillators, electric wires, hot scalpels, syringes filled with sodium pentathol pain serum, 
knives, drills, shooting people, beating people to within an inch of their lives, denying 
medical help to a woman with a gunshot wound, extreme sensory overload, complete 
sensory deprivation, etcetera are all torture tactics that you will see used on 24. While the 
creators of the show may argue that it bestows the show with a measure of authenticity, 
some suggestions will be offered shortly as to how the show, equally, gives torture its own 
measure of authenticity. Each of these scenarios is the same; the problem-solving 
protagonist is faced with an individual who either possesses crucial information relating to 
potential terror attacks, or even is an unfortunate innocent on the wrong end of a bad 
situation. This starkly posed and purportedly ethical question faced by the protagonist 
inevitably ended badly for the suspect, who is subjected to far less than due process in a 
grim show of pop-torture fetish.73
Former Department of Homeland Security head, Michael Chertoff, believes he understands 
the attraction to the show. "I think people are attracted to [it] because frankly it reflects 
real life. That is what we do everyday. That is what we do in the government, that is what 
we do in our private lives."74 Chertoff made these comments at a Heritage Institute forum 
entitled, '24 and America's Image in Fighting Terrorism: Fact, Fiction or Does it Matter?'
69 John Patterson, "We're Trafficking in Fear: Interview with Joel Surnow", The Guardian, 22/01/07. Accessed
from www.guardian.co.uk/media/2007/ian/22/television.mondaymediasection on 28/04/08.
70 Ratings peaked at 16 million in 2007 during the airing of season 6 and its key demographic is 18-49 year old 
men. 24 was listed as the 6th greatest TV show ever by Empire. Viewer ratings for each seasons available from 
24.wikia.com/wiki/24; see also www.empireonline.com/50greatesttv/defauIt.asp?tv=6 accessed on 21/08/09.
71 Patterson, "We're Trafficking in Fear".
72 Jane Mayer, "Whatever it Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind '24'", The New Yorker, 19/02/07. Accessed 
from www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/Q70219fa fact mayer on 28/04/08.
73 See for instance Keith Olberman, "Special Comment: On Waterboarding and Torture", Countdown -  
MSNBC.Com, accessed from www.msnbe.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/21645654#21645654 on 14/03/2008.
74 Speech given at a Fleritage Institute forum '24 and America's Image in Fighting Terrorism: Fact, Fiction or 
Does it Matter?', 23/06/2003. Broadcast on "The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer", CNN, accessed from 
www.youtube.com/watch7v-UNKG2a7JDgM on 28/04/08.
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which roundly extolled the virtues of 24 . Also invited were conservative radio-host Rush 
Limbaugh and Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. The Heritage Institute forum 
organizer, James Carafano, suggests that "Jack Bauer is a metaphor for all the great people 
that we have out there everyday that really are working hard to make us safe."75 In 
describing the 'everyday' function of the government employee and of the private 
individual, Chertoff and Carafano re-emphasize the show's two central themes: that of the 
compression of the events portrayed into a day and that of the role of the 'everyday' 
person. What is dispersed through this show and what has been captured by Chertoff is the 
constant and inescapable nature of the terrorist threat and the corresponding everyday 
duty of the citizen, a duty that pervades the public and the private realm. This vision of 
everyday danger and duty has seen 24 fittingly described as "either a neocon sex fantasy or 
the collective id of our nation unleashed" depending on the respective political perspective 
one takes.76
What we are witnessing in public debate and in elements of popular culture after 9/11 is 
interplay between national security, moral equations crossed with the narratives of super­
heroes and evil villains to create a discourse of super-empowerment, exceptional 
circumstances, and extra-legal vigilante action. The influence of 24 in the debate fits into 
the broader terrain of the culture wars and wider neoconservative strategies. George 
suggests a neoconservative cultural agenda is based around
the re-invocation of strong nationalism and cultural unity in modern Western 
societies; the value of a simple religious and philosophical morality, and 
(ultimately) of a 'war culture' as the basis for maintaining such unity; the use 
of maximum force by the Western democracies in the face of endemic 
threat...77
This agenda is essentially a checklist of the contributions that 24 has made to the torture 
debate, and within post-9/11 politics more generally. Furthermore, the widespread support 
it has found amongst influential conservatives is indicative that this contribution is not just 
one of passive resonance with contemporary politics but rather an active attempt to shape 
it. Neoconservative culture war strategies draw foreign policy prerogatives into domestic
75 Interview on "The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer", CNN, accessed from www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=UNKG2a7JDgM on 28/04/08.
76 Devin Gordon, "Die Another Day", Newsweek, 12/01/2008. Accessed from www.newsweek.com/id/52582 on 
16/03/2008.
77 Jim George, "Leo Strauss, Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: Esoteric Nihilism and the Bush Doctrine", 
International Politics, vol. 42, no. 1, 2005, p. 174. [pp. 174-202]
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culture, a potent process that reshapes political space and at once securitises and super- 
empowers bodies.
The effects of 24 are not limited solely to diffuse disciplinary effects on politics and culture. 
The operation of the discourse enacted by 24 can result in a direct transfer of these tactics 
onto the actions of soldiers or other public officials. This 'worrying trend' was identified in a 
CNN report on 24 by reporter Carol Costello, who, presumably unschooled in Baudrillardian 
notion of 'simulacra' in which the simulation becomes the reality that it seeks to portray, 
could only offer the following. "It's hard to wrap your mind around it; a TV show 
influencing professional soldiers?"78 The CNN report highlighted a study by the Centre of 
Strategic Intelligence Research, an intelligence think-tank overseen by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency. This study highlighted that
[m]ost observers, even those within professional circles, have unfortunately 
been influenced by the media's colorful (and artificial) view of interrogation as 
almost always involving hostility and the employment of force -  be it physical 
or psychological -  by the interrogator.79
Furthermore, this report also found that "there may be no value to coercive techniques."80 
The findings of this study were not coincidental nor directed solely at the news media. In 
direct reference to the plot-line of 24 it suggested that
Prime-time television increasingly offers up plot lines involving the incineration 
of metropolitan Los Angeles by an atomic weapon or its depopulation by an 
aerosol nerve toxin. The characters do not have the time to reflect upon, much 
less to utilize, what real professionals know to be the "science and art" of 
"educing information." They want results. Now. The public thinks the same 
way. They want, and rightly expect, precisely the kind of "protection" that only 
a skilled intelligence professional can provide. Unfortunately, they have no 
idea how such a person is supposed to act 'in real life'.81
Such accounts suggest that 24 is not so much reflecting a tendency within the military 
community but actively shaping it.
78 Carol Costello reporting on Wolf Blitzer, "The Situation Room", CNN, 14/02/2007. Accessed from 
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0702/14/sitroom.03.html on 16/02/2008.
79 Centre for Strategic Intelligence Research, "Educing Information -  Interrogation: Science and Art (Phase One 
Report)", Intelligence Science Board (Washington: National Defense Intelligence College, 2006) p. 95. Accessed 
from www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf on 28/04/08.
80 Josh White, "Interrogation Research is Lacking: Report Says", The Washington Post, 16/01/07. Accessed from 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/15/AR2007011501204.html on 22/08/09.
81 Quoted in Jane Mayer, "Whatever it Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind '24'", The New Yorker, 19/02/07. 
Accessed from www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/Q70219fa fact mayer on 28/04/08.
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The Dean of West Point, Brigadier-General Patrick Finnegan, was so concerned over the 
negative effect that the show was having on his students that he felt obliged to visit the set 
of 24 to protest its portrayal of torture. "I'd like them to stop. They should do a show 
where torture backfires. The kids see it and say, 'if torture is wrong, what about 241'" 
Finnegan, elaborates this effect saying, "the disturbing thing is that although torture may 
cause Jack Bauer some angst, it is always the patriotic thing to do."82 Brigadier-General 
Finnegan suggests that 24 presents emotionally effective, one-sided arguments on the 
question of torture that has made it harder for him to have his students obey the law. 
Indeed in the context of super-empowered unconventional non-state actors, 24 offers a 
convincing tactic of responding in kind, a tactic that manifests the demand for super- 
empowered heroism in the war against terrorism. Somewhat ironically, upon hearing for 
the first time of the Brigadier-General's plea, Kiefer Sutherland, the actor who plays Jack 
Bauer exclaimed,
The US army are worried about the sequences in our show? They should be a 
lot more worried about their behaviour in Abu Ghraib than they should about 
our television show. What happened in Abu Ghraib was criminal. As a nation, 
we're trying to tell people that democracy and freedom are the way to go, and 
then we go and behave like that. Inexcusable. But the army complaining? 
That's ludicrous.83
For Sutherland and the producers of 24, they are in the business of entertainment. 
Sutherland, a Flollywood actor with a strong liberal pedigree, seems unwilling to 
countenance that he might be involved in producing individuals who commit acts of 
torture. The unfortunate irony of Sutherland's statement is that the military's use of 
coercive interrogation in Guantanamo can be directly linked to his acting role.
In the book Torture Team, Philippe Sands, a Queen's Council from England investigates the 
legal implications of the breach of the Geneva conventions. In particular Sands examines 
the potential culpability of senior members of the Bush Administration and the potential 
for them to be charged with war crimes under Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.84 According to Sands, there is a distinct possibility that personal responsibility 
can be attributed to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Vice-President Dick
82 Andrew Buncombe, "US Military tells Jack Bauer: Cut the Torture Scenes... or else!", The Independent, 
13/02/07. Accessed from www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-military-tells-iack-bauer-cut-out- 
the-torture-scenes-or-else-436143.html on 28/04/08.
83 Steven Armstrong, "Rough Justice: Interview with Kiefer Sutherland", New Statesman, 19/03/07. Accessed 
from www.newstatesman.com/200703190032 on 28/04/08.
84 Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty and The Compromise o f Law (London: Allen Lane, 2008).
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Cheney and the staff lawyers whose role was to provide legal counsel. Sands offered this 
opinion on the basis of two factors having been satisfied. Firstly, in the case of Hamdan vs. 
Rumsfeld, a five-to-three partial ruling handed down by the Supreme Court in July 2006 
determined that, contrary to the legal position offered by the Bush Administration, 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention applies in the case of Guantanamo. This ruling 
is in line with directives of the US Army Field Manual. This application of these guidelines 
suggests that suspected al-Qaeda detainees are not regarded as being participants in 'wars 
of an international character' and thus do not have rights as prisoners of war. Common 
Article 3 and the US Army Field Manual, however, does ensure that detainees have the 
right to humane treatment, which many have not received. The second factor that has to 
be satisfied in order to prove culpability concerns evidence of a traceable chain of causality 
stemming from members of the Bush Administration. That is, there must be evidence of a 
'top-down' command structure that authorised abuse or torture. Such a suggestion would 
be contrary to the position of the Bush Administration, which views this abuse as the 
actions of a few' bad apples' and a 'bottom-up' structure. It was in the course of the 
investigation into the chain of causality that Sands came across the presence of 24 within 
Guantanamo.
Sands found evidence that suggests 24 played a role in creating the highly exceptional 
space of Guantanamo. It further suggests that the operation of foreign policy discipline is 
not confined just to the territorial space of the US. In order to prove causality Sands 
undertook interviews with many figures throughout all levels of the US military command 
structure at Guantanamo. Following an interview with Dianne Beaver, the lawyer at 
Guantanamo, Sands was puzzled by reference to '24' and 'Bauer'. Following a Google 
search, Sands became aware of the influence of 24 within Guantanamo. The interviews 
with Beaver confirmed that 24 was not only amongst the programming broadcast at the 
facility but that it was watched by large groups of soldiers and staff. According to Beaver, 
"24 had many friends at Guantanamo."85 The timing is also telling. The second season of 24 
went to air at the end of October 2002, just as the coercive interrogation methods were 
taking place. Furthermore, the second season of 24 opens with a scene in which torture is 
used to effectively elicit information; that is, circumstantially there seems to be a direct link 
between the show and the implementation of these techniques.
85 Sands, "I Googled 24 and Jack Bauer".
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Thus there is circumstantial evidence unearthed by Sands to suggest 24 played a direct role 
in prisoner abuse, or at least was part of a wider discourse that imbued the exceptional 
space of Guantanamo with the logic of super-empowerment. Indeed, Sands suggests "you 
can see in this way how popular culture... played into individual decision-making directly on 
the ground in Guantanamo."86 This revelation about the influence of 24, however, seems to 
undermine the argument by Sands that the decision to undertake new, more forceful 
measures in the attempt to elicit information was a top-down generated directive. Sands 
does go on to say he later found "that individuals like Michael Chertoff, [head of Homeland 
Security and then in the criminal justice division at the Department of Justice] was also a 
great fan of 24."87 Returning to the Supreme Court ruling of July 2006, Sands suggests that 
of the three dissenting rulings against the enforcement of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention, two of the judges -  Justice Antonin Sealia and Justice Clarence Thomas are also 
great fans 24, creating a remarkable circle of influence that linked through one television 
show. "What 24 did was create an environment in which popular culture basically said, 
'there's no problem doing this stuff, it works, you're part of this whole system so proceed." 
88 Thus, Sands' argument is that the influence of 24 upon the space of Guantanamo is not 
simply specific but systemic.
Abu Ghraib is another space of US exceptionality carved into the international realm. A 
great amount of media attention has been paid to the abusive interrogation techniques 
and general de-humanisation carried about by US and British soldiers within Abu Ghraib. 
Here again, as with Guantanamo, the demands of the war on terror have created an 
exceptional zone in which securitisation has shaped the bodies within this space to the 
point where the obligation to respond to foreign policy becomes normalised and banal. The 
demand for super-empowered bodies in this context is the rule. That these events occurred 
during the course of the third season of 24 does not prove a direct linkage as there is no 
evidence to suggest a direct connection. That there is no direct link, however, is not to 
suggest that it did not play a role as it is implicated in a much wider discourse. The prisoner 
abuse in Guantanamo can be seen as an ill-deployed and somewhat deformed version of 
the wider logic of super-empowered heroism that was succinctly captured and effectively 
popularised by 24. The foreign policy discipline of super-empowerment which manifests
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
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the instrumental use of violence toward strategic ends in this sense has broken down, in 
giving way to a debauched and incompetent brutality. Implicating a misguided logic of 
super-empowerment suggests that while 24 may not have caused the infamous abuse 
photos at Abu Ghraib, its logic may have been influential.
The ill-deployment of super-empowerment can be seen in stark terms in the case of US 
Army Reservist Lynndie England and the prisoner abuse photos in which she featured. 
Conservative radio and TV host Glenn Beck captures this ill-deployment, describing the 
ineffectuality of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse in relation to 24. "Now me, I'm for more 
Jack Bauers. The Jack Bauer that has to extract information, that's one thing, but Lynndie 
England taking pictures of, you know, a naked pyramid? That was just stupid and 
pointless."89 So while denying the practical applicability and usefulness of England's naked 
human pyramids, he does demonstrate the operational logic of super-empowerment at 
play and its miscalculated deployment. Such actions according to this logic were 
unnecessary because in this case there was no cause, no parochial responsibility, to use 
one's super-empowerment. The prisoners were not an imminent threat, they were 
subdued by virtue of being imprisoned. These grotesque and blatantly dehumanising 
actions, represent the operationalisation of notions of super-empowerment by those who, 
subject to its influence and unable to think critically for themselves, literalise its ugly 
evocation. In this sense it is a ghoulish manifestation of the patriotic heroism demanded 
and deployed by the logic of interplay between the torture debate and 24.
A comparison of Lynndie and Jack Bauer in this context is telling. What is it that makes one 
right and one wrong? Why is it that the application of the logic of torture generates pride 
and admiration amongst many fans, whereas the other causes widespread revulsion and 
condemnation? Jack Bauer is a lone agent, operating outside of any formal chain of 
command in an environment that rapidly changes hour by hour. Bauer moves so rapidly 
through various recognisable domestic settings that notions of space and time 
fundamentally collapse; a day in the life of Jack Bauer feels like months. Furthermore, 
Bauer is responding to real and present dangers to American soil. Contrarily, Lynndie 
England was part of a formal chain of command, subject to prescribed rules and 
procedures. England existed within a highly regulated space, in which time is stretched, 
perhaps determined only by routine duty. Within this highly controlled environment there
89 Accessed from transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0611/30/eb.Ql.html on 24/04/08.
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is little threat, particularly to American soil. Bauer, it is clear, has no choice other than what 
he determines for himself; there is no structure, only threat. He is a corporeally embodied 
archetype of pure pragmatic reolpolitick. England is represented as bored and uneducated; 
unable to follow the most banal instructions or exercise even base restraint. Her actions 
don't enter into any kind of utilitarian calculus, rather they seem a form of perverse 
expression. Acting as a selfless hero on behalf of a nation, defenceless in the face of new 
and exceptional threats, Jack Bauer exists in an ethical framework where torture is justified 
and offers a normative ideal for citizens to aspire toward.
Thus whether deployed domestically or abroad, torture debates discipline individuals 
simply by posing a question along the lines, 'would you allow torture to be carried out 
against someone if it meant that it would prevent a foreign threat to the state and its 
citizens?' While framed as an ethical problematic, it is ultimately a contest over both the 
retrospective and ongoing justification of the US government's practice of extraordinary 
rendition, indefinite imprisonment, and 'enhanced interrogation' of persons who are 
suspected of involvement in, or possessing knowledge of, terrorist groups. The pervasive 
debate on torture within the US is one manifestation of foreign policy obligations, 
obligations which demonstrates the transferral of foreign policy norms into domestic 
politics. This is not to suggest that an easy solution can be found in re-imposing a 
separation of foreign and domestic politics but as has been suggested this very dichotomy 
is one that is ultimately not sustained upon closer examination.
The disciplinary effects in this case are those stemming from the expectation that an 
individual ought to be willing to act exceptionally and extra-judicially in order to prevent a 
threat to the nation. Presented this way in a moral utilitarian schema, one would have to 
seem cowardly and unpatriotic to refuse this duty. Framed more realistically, however, this 
demand should be seen as a highly improbable demand -  to the point of being hypothetical 
-for an act of heroic patriotism necessitated by a threat to the nation that is statistically 
unlikely. This moral/ethical question of individuals as super-empowered saviours-cum- 
torturers is so unlikely it should not bear thinking about. This discourse warrants critical 
reflection for it seems to stem from the pusillanimous will-to-power of unfulfilled 
Nietzschean uber-mensch/supermen who, in their day-to-day lives as armchair (or in some 
cases, tenured) political ethicists, are politically impotent. Perhaps more alarming is the 
wider function of this torture debate, which plays to subliminal super-hero narratives and
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public discourse fantasies that affirm those who see themselves as soldier-citizens and 
obliges those who don't.
What I am suggesting is that the securitizing effects of the torture debate have intensified 
the perceived threat of terrorism. As this debate became more widely propagated, 
increasing its social and political pervasion, citizens become implicated in the process of 
security. In this process of securitization the wider population is positioned as the referent 
object that needs to be guarded against in particular threat scenarios, such as the 
foundational justification for torture, the ticking bomb scenario. The substantive claim that 
have been addressed in the above sections, in short, is that by placing the population as the 
referent object of security, acts of torture can be justified in a utilitarian framework of 
understanding if there is a threat to the population. There are many arguments based on a 
range of contingent factors that suggest that this should or should not be the case.90 
Beyond this, however, this chapter has made the argument that the debate on torture had 
a broader, diffuse effect; an effect informed by the norms of foreign policy and the dictates 
of national security. This effect is one that is disciplinary in its effects upon the individual, 
and biopolitical in its effects on the population at large.
In short, the effect of the torture debate is to implicate citizens in the process of 
securitisation; not only as objects of security but as agents. As was suggested in the 
arguments relating to portrayals of terrorists and heroes on television shows such as 24, 
the effect is to instil a demand for patriotic heroism, as a counter-super-empowerment of 
citizens in response to the representation of super-empowered terrorists.91 The demand 
for vigilante acts by citizens against terrorists is one that for the most part is not carried 
out, at least against terrorists. It does, however, embed citizens within a context of external 
terrorist threat and patriotic duty, giving rise to citizens who are shaped according to this 
demand for super-empowered heroism. The shaping of the citizenry by foreign policy 
interconnects the construction of individual identity with the normalisation of the 
population. Individuals are shaped by foreign policy as a result of being embedded in an 
ever-present national security discourse. The collective influence of the foreign policy 
threats and national security priorities on the population as a whole serves to reinforce, 
and in turn mutually constitute, the construction of the individual. The level of
90 The best of these are Bellamy, "No Pain, No Gain?" and Hannah, "Torture and the Ticking Bomb".
91 24 is not the sole example in this regard. Television shows such as Alias and Sleeper Cell also contain scenes in 
which torture is an ethically justifiable measure against the threat posed by terrorists.
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pervasiveness and impact of this discourse will vary across certain cross-sections of the 
population, with the trends of its impact ultimately reflecting the respective influence 
within groups of individuals. In the post-9/11 landscape, this discourse poses the stark 
choice between a particular image of heroic masculinity of the homeland contrasted with 
the externalised terrorist threat. Because of the high-profile nature and the priority 
accorded to issues of national security or foreign policy threat, the space of the Western 
democratic landscape is effectively embedded in this discourse.
Terror, topology and biopolitical bodies
A normal social order can be defined in spatial terms by uniform and predictable patterns 
of movement, or what could be described as a consistent topology. Such a topology occurs 
when a particular geographically bounded population such as the nation state is subject to 
regular and expected patterns of movement, density and numbers. Topology is a 
representational way of viewing or understanding, in this case, movement and order. 
Topology is drawn from geometry and cartography and seeks to represent the continuous 
essential relation between points amongst broader complexity or even as they move.92 For 
example, perhaps the most famous example of topological cartography would be the map 
of the London underground. It captures the relational essence of movement and 
connections without ail of the complexity that would obscure these relational 
characteristics. Further complexity could be created by adding information regarding the 
direction and size of flows of people and the location of high-flow hubs or nodes. 
Accordingly, a topological perspective is not viewable in literal terms and in this sense 
differs from the more familiar topographical cartography of maps. Rather, topology should 
be seen as a conceptual representation that presupposes some kind of regulation or order.
The movement of people within the state, while ostensibly random and chaotic when 
viewed from the perspective of an individual, form an ordered and predictable order when 
viewed according to a topological logic. What I am suggesting is that a topological logic 
informs and orders public space and is a manifestation of a biopolitical regulation of a 
population. The movement of people for the most part involves transit from designated 
residential housing zones to commercial, industrial or public areas for the purposes of work 
or leisure. While there may be some amount of overlap between residential and
921 am drawing the idea of topology from Hannah, "Torture and the Ticking Bomb".
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commercial areas such as mixed use residential/commercial zones, these movements are 
largely predictable from this topological perspective. Within highly-populated areas these 
movements are compressed and intensified. Within busy public spaces, such as a mall for 
instance, one can deduce points of high-flow thoroughfare versus quieter locations with 
lower rates of pedestrian transit. This can be deduced without resort to specific labelling of 
these points, by simply observing the movement of individuals. The relevant information 
relating to each individual -  such as who they are, where they are going and why -  can be 
excluded when assessing the movement of people in public space. Such simple 
assessments are made possible by employing a topological logic. Similarly, when viewed in 
this way the everyday chaos of transit can be seen as normal. Further, however, a common 
understanding of this logic suggests why certain kinds of disruptions cause unease amongst 
the population and in particular amongst authorities that manage transit and general public 
order.
Rapid changes to this regular and expected spatial order will dramatically upset normal 
topology and likely trigger emergency state responses. For instance, a radical shift in the in 
patterns of movement within densely populated centres stemming from a protest march, 
even if it receives prior planning approval, will mobilise an extensive logistical police 
operation to control anything other than regular and orderly even-paced marching. 
Likewise, a sudden influx of people through borders as a result of a large amount of 
displaced peoples resulting from a humanitarian crisis triggers action by the border 
customs services and police, perhaps even by the military. With terrorism being the most 
highly anticipated threat to domestic order within most Western states, extraordinary or 
unanticipated movements of people are likely to be seen in terms of potential terrorist 
incidents.93
The APEC meeting of heads of government in Sydney, in August 2007, witnessed a lock- 
down of major parts of the city, a range of temporary exceptional powers and a security 
operation that cost approximately $170 million.94 On one level these operations by the 
New South Wales state police authorities was a literalisation of foreign policy discipline 
upon the citizens of Sydney. This was particularly the case for those who ventured into the
93 Ray J. Dezzani and TR Lakshmanan, "Recreating Secure Spaces" in Susan L. Cutter, Douglas B. Richardson & 
Thomas J. Wilbanks (eds.), Geographical Dimensions o f Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 169-178.
94 Tim Johnston, "APEC meeting fizzles to an inconclusive end", International Herald Tribune, 9/09/2007. 
Accessed from www.iht.com/articles/20Q7/09/Q9/news/apec.php on 18/03/2008.
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'core declared areas' of the central city, for within these areas they were removed of many 
normal rights; visitors could only travel within specific cordons; workers needed official 
permission to enter buildings and individuals could be searched or even removed at a whim 
if deemed necessary.95 Further, an undisclosed list of 'excluded persons' detailed those 
who were to be prohibited entirely from entering the 'declared areas' . 96 These measures 
were undertaken in order that heads of state could continue the ongoing APEC trade 
discussions and to extend the purview of the forum to discuss the topical threat of 
international terrorism. Australia also hoped, as a result of the conference, to boost its 
international profile. In this sense there was an extraordinary level of discipline exacted on 
domestic citizens in order to further the aims of foreign policy.
From a broader biopolitical perspective, what was being attempted was the complete 
disruption of the city as a public space. It would be too simplistic to suggest that in this way 
it parallels terrorist actions, which also acts to disrupt the topology of public space. Rather, 
what was being attempted was to neutralise the city as a terrorist target. By reducing, 
diverting and generally controlling the flow of people, planning measures effectively sought 
to reduce or negate the topology of risk, to insure against the contingency of the public 
space. Given the heightened attractiveness of an APEC conference, risk could never be 
reduced to nil. These measures were an attempt to exert as much control over the risk as 
possible. This attempt to phase out the basic level of contingency meant that in two senses 
terrorism would be much harder to perpetrate. Most obviously, because of the intense 
security that accompanies international leaders such as former US President George W. 
Bush, terrorist actions would be logistically very challenging. Furthermore, however, 
because the city was already of an atypical topology, the scope for effective terrorist 
violence that would upset the topological order would be reduced. With key sites in the 
city either empty or effectively fortified, an attack would appear more like an assassination 
on a prominent figure rather than a public act of terror. In essence, the tactic was to place 
the city under something like a state of siege or state of exception and temporarily disrupt 
it as a normal public space.
The extraordinary measures undertaken to ensure protection at APEC also reveals the 
coalescence of protests groups and terror threats. This can be seen in the proceedings of a
95 Jane Sanders, "Special Police Powers During APEC Conference" Shopfront Legal Centre, July 2007. Accessed 
from www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/data/portal/00000005/public/02603001186532890034.doc on 18/03/2008.
96 Ibid.
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December 2006 press conference given by then Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) Director-General, Paul O'Sullivan, in which he outlined the expected 
security environment and potential security threats that would be faced at the APEC 
conference. The list of the five most likely planning scenarios was as follows:
politically motivated violence in the form of protest violence or terrorism;
violence between elements of various communities, generally in response to 
conflicts in their ancestral countries;
hoaxes against a range of targets including visitors, venues, and transport modes; 
chemical, biological and radiological attacks; or
maverick acts on the part of individuals or small groups without any previous 
record of taking action or coming to notice in a security sense.97
In this list the first point covers both protest and terrorist violence. The second refers to 
something like that of the inter-ethnic urban conflict or between rival sporting fans.98 The 
third points to the potential for a stunt, like that which was carried out by the Australian 
comedy sketch show, The Chaser. "  The fourth and fifth relate to extreme or entirely 
unexpected acts. Thus, in a list of five somewhat haphazard potentialities, terrorism and 
protests are co-associated with one another.100
This intersection of the measures against terrorism and those designed to prevent violent 
protest represents an intensification of the operation of both literal and subtle discipline. 
The binding link between protesters and terrorists is their ability, indeed their goal of 
disrupting the normal topology of public space. Protesters, like terrorists are sometimes 
even willing to use violence to achieve this disruptive end. This is not to suggest they are 
the same. Indeed, except for very extreme cases there is little else common between them. 
This topological linkage is not just an obscure linkage, for it has implications for how both
97 Paul O'Sullivan, "Intelligence and the APEC 2007 Threat Environment", transcript of speech given at APEC 
Australia Security Conference, 11/12/2006. Accessed from www.asio.gov.au/Media/Contents/ APEC security 
conference 20Q6.aspx on 20/03/2008.
98 Ethnic-related violence has occurred most notably in the 2005 'Cronulla Riots' and between fans in soccer, 
rugby league and even tennis: See "Mob Violence Envelops Cronulla", Sydney Morning Herald, 11/12/05. 
Accessed from www.smh.com.au/news/national/mob-violence-envelops-cronulla/2005/12/11/1134235936223 
■html on 20/08/09; "Soccer Club Suspended Over Fan Violence", The Age, 4/05/2005. Accessed from 
www.theage.com.au/ news/Soccer/Soccer-club-suspended-over-fan-violence/2005/05/04/1 115092540653 ,html 
on 20/03/2008; ABC Sport, "League Fan Segregation an Option to End Violence", 19/03/2006. Accessed from 
www.abc.net.au/sport/content/200603/sl595419.htm on 20/03/2008; The Age, "World's Media Pounce on 
Melbourne's Flooligans", 17/01/2007. Accessed from www.theage.com.au/news/tennis/ worlds-media-pounce- 
on-melbournes-hooligans/2007/01/16/1168709752635.html on 20/03/2008.
99 ABC News, "11 Charged over APEC Stunt", 6/09/2007. Accessed from www.abc.net.au/news/stories/ 
2007/09/06/2026372.htm on 20/03/2008.
100 O'Sullivan, "Intelligence and the APEC 2007 Threat Environment".
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are sought to be mitigated by state authorities and apparatuses. Indeed, it is the reason 
why protesters have been mentioned alongside terrorists. The surveillance methods 
employed to track both protestors and terrorists alike rely on the tracking of social 
linkages, which to some extent is a reasonable predictor of potential crime. When mapped 
out, these social linkages offer a topology of possible threats or even the elements of what 
could be a terror cell. This mapping of data can be done through traditional cross- 
referencing and field surveillance or as is increasingly the case, through phone records and 
data-mining techniques.
Smart borders and the regulation of m obility
The US is now seeking to cancel out the contingent topology of the constant stream of 
citizens and foreigners entering its borders. It is seeking to do this by rendering the 
movement of all people across it borders governable according to the principles of risk 
management. In 2004 the US government contracted Accenture, the largest global 
consultancy firm, to develop a $10 billion program called the 'United States Visitor and 
Immigration Status Indicator Technology' (US VISIT). The Department of Homeland Security 
website describes
US-VISIT [as] part of a continuum of biometrically-enhanced security measures 
that begins outside U.S. borders and continues through a visitor's arrival in and 
departure from the United States. It incorporates eligibility determinations 
made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of 
State.101
It employs 10-digit fingerprinting and/or facial scans at each point of entry, which are cross- 
matched with residency status, visa validity and relevant watch lists. This allows the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State to plot a clear, biologically 
verified map of who is leaving and entering the country. In the three years following its 
inception in January 2004, the US-VISIT program processed more than 76 million visitors to 
the US.102 In many ways, however, this is only an updated, technologically and biometrically 
enhanced version of the existing physical passport regime. It is in this sense only a '2- 
dimensional' topology, insofar as it maps those who enter and leave the US, using only data
Department of Homeland Security, "Fact Sheet: US-VISIT", 5/06/06. Accessed from www.dhs.gov/xnews/ 
releases/pr 1 160495895724.shtm on 10/04/08.
102 Department of Homeland Security, "Testimony of Robert Mocny, Acting Director, US-VISIT Program 
Department of Homeland Security, Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, 
Technology and Homeland Security", 31/01/2007. Accessed from www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimonv/testimony 
1170348170488.shtm on 10/04/08.
173
taken at the physical entrance and departure point of the territorial border. These 
measures, however, are the measures that were in place as of the end of 2005; they aim to 
secure the territorial borders. These logistical fence-building measures, however, are only 
the basic foundation of the overall program.103
The broader ambition of the 10 year project, according to Accenture, is to create a Virtual 
border'. This conceptually radical and logistically ambitious aspiration is described in the 
Accenture media release:
The end vision for the Smart Border Alliance solution is built around the 
concept of a virtual border. The virtual border is designed to operate far 
beyond U.S. boundaries to help DHS assess the security risks of all U.S.-bound 
travelers and prevent potential threats from reaching U.S. borders. It helps 
DHS locate and remove U.S. travel violators without increasing waiting times 
at the border. Most important, the virtual border makes U.S. border inspectors 
the last line of defense, not the first, in identifying potential threats.104
This will expand upon the currently implemented combination that sees the DHS biometric 
border screening system interact with the Department of State's 'BioVisa' program, a 
program that gathers biographical data on visa applicants and checks them against watch 
lists. This expansion aims to institute the 'virtual border' by supplementing these programs 
with the Automated Targeting System (ATS), an extensive data-mining of information on 
potential entrants to the United States.105
By processing vast amounts of data, the virtual border will be put in place by the automatic 
generation of a series of entrant risk profiles or scores, prior to their encounter with the 
physical border.106 Louise Amoore quotes an Accenture official who describes advantages 
of the new system over the previous one:
There may be 20 passengers that are just barely in the risky range, and if they 
are on 20 different planes you wouldn't worry about it. But put them together 
on the same flight, and they could be a risk. CAPPS (Computer Assisted 
Passenger Prescreening System) can really only check the single person who is 
walking out to the plane. [Accenture's] system will check your associates. Plus
Department of Homeland Security, "Press Room: DHS Completes Foundation of Biometric Entry System", 
30/12/05. Accessed from www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press release 0823.shtm on 10/04/08.
104 Accenture Newsroom, "US Department of Homeland Security Awards Accenture-led Smart Border Alliance 
the Contract to Develop and Implement US-VISIT Program", 1/06/04. Accessed from newsroom.accenture.com/ 
article display.cfm?article id=4112 on 10/04/2008.
105 Ryan Singel, "US Airport Screeners Are Watching What You Read", Wired -  Online Edition, 20/09/07. 
Accessed from www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/09/flight tracking on 11/04/08.
106 Ryan Singel, "DHS Passenger Scoring Illegal?", Wired -  Online Edition, 7/12/06. Accessed from 
www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/12/72250 on 11/04/08.
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it will not just go on flight data. It will ask if you have made international 
phone calls to Afghanistan, taken flying lessons, or purchased 1,000 pounds of 
fertilizer.107
By mapping individuals prior to reaching the border, prior to boarding their flights, US-VISIT 
provides something of a '3-dimensionar topology of those who are seeking to enter the US. 
It does not simply map them at a single point of entry but rather through multiple 
trajectories prior to undertaking travel, prior to even planning to undertake travel. It maps 
a clearer picture of possible associations between individuals and highlights potentially 
suspicious or irregular behaviour, which is then integrated with risk assessment data. These 
risk profiles of individuals are then assigned colour-coded representations of risk.108 Under 
this system, as suggested in the Accenture sales pitch above, the physical border will 
become the last line of defence, not the first.
US VISIT is an attempt to create a biopolitical border that categorises and maps individuals, 
essentially assigning them an identity before arriving at the border. Essentially this process 
disembodies individuals from their identity. By obtaining an identity prior to the corporeal 
body arriving -  as far as the US surveillance apparatus is concerned -  it creates a virtual 
space between the individual's identity and their potential ability to manifest physical 
violence. Thus, US VISIT represents an attempt to implement massive border surveillance 
and institutionalise "new ways of visualizing and governing deviant populations’’ according 
to a topological rationale and pre-allocated risk factors.109 In this sense it is not just a 
matter of the operation of micro-political discipline according to foreign policy goals; there 
is an overarching system of categorising and ordering of those who travel in and out of the 
US. The border under this new system is defined not by geography but by destination or 
even of travellers. Developments such as these necessitate the topological viewpoints as 
spatial conceptions of borders are radically redefined. This, however, does not necessarily 
supplant or diminish the operation of individualised foreign policy discipline. Indeed, in the
Quoted in "The Price of Protecting the Airways, Business Week Online, 04/12/2001. Accessed from 
www.businessweek.com/print/technoloev/content/dec2001/tc2001124 0865.htm on 24/4/08, originally cited 
in Louise Amoore, "Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror", Political Geography, 25, 
2006, p. 340.
108 Kim Rygiel, "Protecting and Proving Identity: The Biopolitics of Waging War through Citizenship in the Post- 
9/11 Era" in Krista Hunt & Kim Rygiel (eds.), (En)Gendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflaged 
Politics (Burlington Vt.: Ashgate, 2006), p. 155.
109 Mariana Valverde & Michael Mopas, "Insecurity and Dream of Targeted Governance" in Wendy Larner & 
William Walters (eds.), Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 
240.
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context of international travel, the self-awareness and foreign policy discipline exercised by 
each traveller is greatly intensified.
The various stages of security screening involved in international travel impose a strict 
dressage of corporeal performativity. Since 9/11 this is particularly so in the case of air 
travel. Throughout the flight a strict seriousness is imposed, security related issues are to 
be treated by travellers with utmost earnest diligence. Joking can be punishable by 
imprisonment and hefty fines. One must prove their identity, verify that they packed their 
own luggage and declare that they have no flammable or sharp objects. Any liquids larger 
than tiny vials are often not allowed on international flights, and even those tiny portions 
must be collected and sealed into transparent bags that are to be displayed as one 
approaches the metal detectors and x-ray bag screening. Once again each body and its 
belongings are subjected to inspection and scrutiny. Physical bodily searches are carried 
out if initial scans are inconclusive. Random individuals can also be selected for personal 
searches to check for explosive residues on hands, pockets and zips. Once the plane is 
boarded -  orderly and single-file -  passengers are asked to observe instructions on safety 
and emergency protocols. Through the duration of the flight a particular decorum is 
enforced. Upon approaching the border entrants form orderly queues, categorising and 
dividing themselves as residents and aliens. In order to pass through customs each 
individual must pass a three-fold identity verification procedure. Bodies must be visually 
and biometrically verified against their accompanying documents, documents that may 
have been pre-assigned a risk assessment rating. These bodies and documents must then 
be matched, in what is quite an interpretative exercise, with the answer to the question, 
'what is the purpose of your travel?' in order to be granted entry.
At each stage of the security process each individual must check and re-check themselves, 
their body and their possessions and reaffirm that there is nothing to construe them as an 
external threat. In the post-9/11 era, the foreign policy objective of countering the threat 
of Islamic terrorism means that each individual must, at each point, revise and enact upon 
themselves all the ways in which they are not a terrorist. For many this performance is 
easy. Those, however, who bare signifiers of Islamic terrorism may be subjected to further 
security screenings or at least become somewhat of a spectacle of public scrutiny and 
intrigue. Mark Salter describes this security process as a 'confessional complex', in which a
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strict decorum of earnest tru th-te lling is imposed and signs of guilt are "w ritten  on the 
body in terms of embodied anxiety and signs of un tru th . " 110 Incorporated in this way, 
through each individual's self-awareness and their very bodily actions, the ordering effect 
of the biopolitical and increasingly virtual border is enacted in a manner that is at once 
specific to each individual yet coordinated through a common surveillance apparatus.
The biopolitical border seeks to alleviate the contingency and insecurity of the outside by 
virtually displacing it from the physical state. In seeking to ensure a risk assessed and 
readily categorised inflow into the US, the US-VISIT system aims to buttress the security 
and order of the inside. In short these measures seek to maintain a biopolitical consistency 
and topological order. Terrorist actions in the contemporary context define what is 
perceived to be the most likely threat to  this vision of domestic order. Measures 
undertaken 'outside' the border to mediate this threat, like the vast waves of international 
travellers, are no longer confined to  the inside or outside. Indeed, the measures 
undertaken through these border programs are subtlety inscribed upon the bodies of those 
who cross the borders, citizen and alien, self and other alike. Each carries an individualised 
inscription, writing them (perhaps inconclusively) into or out of the expected domestic 
norm. This collective movement of people across borders, itself a temporary liminal 
population, carry this instilled order fu rther supplementing an existing and demanded 
regulation. The diffusion of this co-ordinated foreign policy discipline is not limited just to  
the movement of people. These measures to create and recreate an inside coalesce w ith 
those supposedly domestic discourses that, informed by foreign policy images of threat, 
seek to maintain order.
The earlier examples of disturbance to  the regularly ordered movements of people 
highlighted the way in which the topological logic of populations, when defined spatially, 
can be disrupted by factors other than terrorism. Protests, ethnic or social conflict, 
environmental disasters even sport can also disrupt the flow  of everyday order and 
cohesion, upsetting the normalcy of life. Foreign policy goals and national security 
prerogatives fuse and merge w ith the ebb and flow  of everyday life. Not only do these 
obligations inform popular culture and the construction of identity, as suggested in the 
initial sections of the chapter, it informs the daily movement of people in public spaces. It
Mark B. Salter, "The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, 
Bodies and Biopolitics", Alternatives, 31, 2006, p. 181.
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has been demonstrated through this chapter that instances where order breaks down, 
whether it be cultural, social or even topological order, invites the enaction of discipline. As 
the effectiveness of biopolitical coordination is challenged, the subtle control that foreign 
policy and national security engender begins to break down, inviting parochialism or even 
overt state discipline.
This is not to suggest that a strengthening or a broadening of biopolitical measures, say for 
instance a 'hearts and minds' campaign, would necessarily halt terrorism. The immediate 
terrorist threat, in the short-term, is likely to be halted mainly through security-based 
measures, although these are not themselves without risk. In the medium-to-long term the 
importance of how effective governmental measures are in working against terrorist 
actions is vital to understand. Measures that act to bridge the way in which people think, 
creating a common logic, may act to quell the social angst felt amongst some 
disenfranchised groups, potentially averting the emergence internally of what is being 
called 'home-grown terrorism'.111 This, however, is not a clear-cut issue as such efforts 
have greater or less traction within target communities, to some extent it is a question of 
marketing the message correctly. Depending on the extent to which it would be carried out 
in a spirit of ingenuousness or as Derrida describes it, hospitality, would largely determine 
its effectiveness.112 Framed in terms of a shallow tolerance it is more likely to be taken in 
the spirit of integration, perhaps even further exacerbating the social tensions.
This chapter has suggested that contemporary social order cannot be understood solely by 
recourse to laws, rights and sovereignty. These alone are not enough to explain the 
continued reproduction of social order post-9/11. The explanation offered here employs a 
range of methods that highlight both the subtle and sometimes overt mechanisms of 
control that imbue bodies and space with the language of securitisation and exception that 
has resulted from the perceived external threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 landscape. 
Post-9/11 national security obligations have generated a discourse in which terrorist others 
are understood as being super-empowered, as being as able to disproportionately affect 
the space around them and in turn justifies exceptional super-empowered vigilantism to be 
acted out upon associated others. By employing a non-linear, relational interpretation of
111 Matt McDonald, "Emancipation and Critical Terrorism Studies", European Political Science, vol. 6, 2007, pp. 
252-259.
112 Jacques Derrida, "On Cosmopolitanism" in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London: Routledge, 2001), 
pp. 1-24; see also Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle invites Jacques Derrida to Respond (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2000).
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space, this chapter subsequently highlighted the way in which cities are imbued with 
processes of control that regulate flow and mobility of people according to principles of 
foreign policy. Thus by analysing the spatial processes of control enacted by foreign policy 
this chapter has demonstrated that the war on terror has produced highly regulated 
domestic spaces that discipline those within both subtly and overtly according to foreign 
policy priorities.
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Chapter 6
Health, terror, population: Post-9/11 mass psychological effects
This chapter articulates the wider social effects of the Bush Administration's US foreign 
policy stance throughout war on terror upon the population at large. This chapter begins by 
highlighting the gendered nature of the post-9/11 medical discourses that address the 
effects of terror on children and families. It then turns to the psychological effects on the 
population at large, exploring the literature on the mediated and secondary effects of 
terrorism. The chapter concludes by examining the effects of public management 
mechanisms such as the colour-coded terror alert warning system. This engagement will 
highlight that this socio-medical discourse is a broad-based logic that shapes and manages 
populations in order to maintain the health of the nation in the face of an external terror 
threat. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates the role of foreign policy in the biopolitical 
processes that are designed to maximise the health and productivity of society. It will 
suggest that national security prerogatives play a role in determining what is considered 
healthy and productive in the face of the threat of terrorism.
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This first section aims to reconcile critical gendered perspectives with those that claim to 
offer apolitical and objective studies of the psychological effects of 9/11. Narratives of 9/11 
focus on the men who died, making them heroes. Women are to an extent written out of 
the political action of the 9/11 narrative, represented as neither heroes nor villains. 
Consequently, women are not seen as 'actors' but rather identified as passive and 
submissive recipients of the effects of 9/11 violence.1 Women in this context may even be 
resented or seen as 'lucky' for being in a social position in which they didn't 
overwhelmingly die in 9/11.2 Despite their perceived passivity, however, women were 
subjected to very subtle forms of political disciplining. After all, such narratives of women's 
domicility accentuate the pre-existing demand -  even a duty -  to maintain the home and to 
honour the heroism of dead husbands and fathers. This gendered dimension can be seen 
particularly in regards to the attempt to ameliorate the psychological effects of 9/11. In 
attempting to create 'resilience' as a familial coping strategy, psychology and financial 
support was designed to reinforce the discipline of the home. Nationalism and patriotism in 
light of 9/11 consolidated the institution of the home. Patriarchy becomes a national 
security imperative. Further, this tends to suppress potentially innovative community- 
based coping strategies that might emphasise solidarity and mutually co-operative 
opportunities for caring for children.
The home plays a vital productive role in society. Alongside schools, it is the institution that 
has the greatest formative influence on the shaping of identity. This chapter seeks to show 
that this space is not a neutral space of freedom but rather a productive, but nonetheless 
politicised space that enables a range of disciplinary processes vital to processes of order 
and control in society including, as I will suggest, that of foreign policy and national 
security. While the link between foreign policy and the home may seem a distant
This chapter seeks to locate itself amongst a range of accounts that seek to critically engage with the 
gendered effects of 9/11 and the war on terror. See Gillian Youngs, "Feminist International Relations in the Age 
of the War on Terror: Ideologies, Religions, and Conflicts", International Feminist Journal of Politics, vol. no. 1, 
2006, pp. 3-18; Laura J. Shepherd, "Veiled References: Constructions of Gender in the Bush Administration 
Discourse on the Attacks on Afghanistan Post 9/11", International Feminist Journal of Politics, vol. no. 1, 2006, 
pp. 19-41; L.H.M. Ling, "Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire From September 11", 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 48, no. 4, 2004, 517-538; Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, "Sex, 
Gender and September 11," The American Journal o f International Law, vol. 96, no. 3, 2002, pp. 600-605.
2 As will be highlighted in this chapter, statistics highlight rate of mortality in the 9/11 attacks was three times 
greater than that of women. Beyond the proportion of men of killed in the attacks, it is also their position 
within society which has caused great impact. For an overview of statistics see '9/11 by the Numbers', New York 
Magazine, 5/09/02. Accessed from nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/lyear/numbers.htm on 9/04/09.
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connection to draw, it is these boundaries between foreign and domestic that this thesis 
seeks to challenge. According to Foucault,
[p]erhaps our life is still governed by a certain number of oppositions that 
remain inviolable, that our institutions and practices have not yet dared to 
break down. These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for 
example between public space and private space, between family space and 
social space, between cultural space and useful space, between space of 
leisure and that of work.3
This chapter examines the effects of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror on the 
psychological well-being in the United States. In doing so it demonstrates how foreign 
policy feeds into biopolitical processes that shape and regulate the health of the 
population.
Discourses of foreign threat are not insulated from the lives and homes of individuals. The 
colour-coded alert system announces current terror threat levels as it trails along the 
bottom of morning breakfast entertainment shows. Post 9/11 victim compensation funds 
sought to reconstruct the family unit following the loss of a spouse in the terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Centre. Meanwhile, critical voices within psychology warn against the 
politicisation of the private sphere, at the same time as they try to reconstruct it as a place 
of sanctuary.4 Here a foundational image of the home as a space of neutrality is reinforced 
by certain practices that are seen as normal, while at the same time it is buttressed against 
others seen as political. According to Dumm,
Home, in our contemporary democracy, is comprehended as a private place, a 
place of withdrawal from the demands of common life, a place of fixed 
meaning where one is protected from disorientation, but also from the 
possibility of democratic involvement.5
Thus, the attempt to defend oneself against the external threat of terrorism by reinforcing 
the image of the home as a place of sanctuary socially isolates people, restraining them 
within the domestic space as they seek to escape a confusing, uncertain and threatening 
outside world. Thus the operation of foreign policy reinforces the normalisation of such 
domestic institutions ensuring that the level of political opposition remains within the
3 Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces", in Joanne Morra & Marquard Smith (eds.), Visual Culture: Spaces o f Visual 
Culture (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 94.
4 Roxie L. Foster, "Editorial -  Assessing Children's Response to Terrorism", Journal fo r Specialists in Paediatric 
Nursing, vol. 6 no. 4, October-December 2001, pp. 159-160.
5 Thomas L. Dumm, united states (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 155.
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bounds of familiar political discourse. Furthermore the coalescence of disciplinary effects 
stemming from the home and foreign policy remain largely invisible.
The operation of such discipline, both those of foreign policy and domestic institutions, is 
not without resistance. The medical and psychiatric discourses, in seeking to counter the 
effects of 9/11, offer critical insights while also in many respects further instantiate these 
social mores of patriarchy and the discipline of home. The nature of the critical insights 
varies in both type and form. For instance a range statistics drawn from psychological 
surveys suggest that forms of secondary social mediation, in particular via the media, plays 
a significant role on perpetuating the trauma of 9/11. Likewise in the professional, and 
arguably political, opinion of a number of psychologists, the terror alert warning system is 
in many senses ineffective and arguably politically motivated. A subsequent issue stems 
from conceptualising how to respond to these insights, in many instances the suggestion is 
that the sanctuary of the home should be further re-instantiated. In this sense, critical 
insights or resistances momentarily escape disciplinary modes or suggest a criticism of 
them, but are then recaptured and assimilated within orthodox knowledge forms.6 Such 
tracing of these instances of resistance highlights contested knowledge in the struggles 
over the place of critical events and social movements within a political narrative. It is this 
interplay between orthodox psychological perspectives on the effects of 9/11 and a more 
critical or reflective stance that this section seeks to reconcile.
'Won't somebody think of the children?' Psychological effects of 
terrorism on the home
This section seeks to explore the prospect that a generation of children will grow up 
potentially surrounded by the ambient threat of terrorism. Inasmuch as any adult is even 
able to, children are less able to undertake an accurate assessment of potential risks of 
terror upon themselves, or even fully conceptualise what it is. Children are not able to 
thoughtfully engage with the discourse of terrorist threat and deploy their own utilitarian 
cost-benefit weighed personalised security outlook. In this sense, children may be shaped 
according to the discourse of the terrorist threat; they will be developmentally disciplined 
by foreign policy. This, however, is nothing new. There have been many generations of
6 This is a common theme throughout their work, see for instance Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: Continuum, 1987), p. 62, 178.
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children subject to the looming prospect of nuclear annihilation across the world. As has 
been seen in the classic archival footage, US children were trained in school to 'duck and 
cover' under desks and avoid windows, each child painstakingly drilled to respond in the 
event o f a nuclear attack for fear of being turned into a burnt husk or a shadow on a wall.7 8
In this sense, the logic of the 'balance of te rror' did not only predominate cold war grand 
strategy, it also structured domestic social order. The presence of nuclear and terrorist 
survival drills in schools represents a literal convergence of foreign policy discipline with 
this key disciplinary institution of education. In order to  understand the effects of terrorism 
on children it is important to understand the function of another important disciplinary 
institution in the shaping of social order; the home.
The discipline o f home
The spirit and tone of your home will have great influence on your children. If
it is what it ought to be, it w ill fasten conviction on their minds, however
wicked they may become.
Richard Cecil, 1850s
The question of children takes the inversion of the high politics concern to its logical 
conclusion, focussing on those who are seen to act almost entirely apolitically and remain 
literally w ithin a child-like innocence. The orthodox liberal theorisation of children as 
apolitical non-actors leaves them solely w ithin a domestic confine. Indeed, they are 
embedded deeper w ithin the domestic, kept indoors w ithin the domestic household. 
Children are kept further inside the 'inside' of international politics; inside the home. State 
sovereignty and the modern subjectivity it produces is replicated inside the home and thus 
the inside/outside of the state and the international system is doubled w ith the subjectivity 
of the domestic abode. The protective borders of the state and the home are seen to 
provide dual protection for children. The discourse of terrorism, however, is not limited by 
these borders, indeed these representations of inside the home and inside the state define 
and create individuals w ithin this context. Brocklehurst critiques the orthodox view of 
children's apolitical status, who in this doubly domestic context, "are denied causality, and 
by extension a place in the political and so in International Relations."9 In light of this, 
Brocklehurst draws attention to the ongoing presence of children in strategic practices and
7 See the "Duck and Cover' instructional video. Accessed from www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixy5FBLnh7o on 
14/04/09.
8 Quoted in Jabez Burns, Mothers o f the Wise and Good (Boston: Gould, Kendall and Lincoln, 1850), p. 123.
9 Helen Brocklehurst, Who's Afraid o f Children?: Children Conflict and International Relations (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2006), p. 142.
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IR generally, suggesting that "the categorization of such social groups as non-political... is 
politically disabling, and as the politicization of children's bodies shows, incorrect. " 10 
Inasmuch as such views of children by an IR orthodoxy denies the political status of 
children, it follows that it will be similarly unaware of the role that a nation's foreign policy 
can enact upon children. The permeation of foreign policy can be felt even here, even 
within this realm of domesticity within the domestic. Indeed within this doubly domestic, 
sub-civic realm the resonance takes on its most protectively virulent form, an unhomely 
transmogrification of what could be termed the maternal and paternal impulses of 
protection and nurture.
The typical representation of the home is as a neutral space, free from outside politics. 
Classic literary quotations bring to mind this image, in particular the well-known and almost 
definitive homely lyrical adaptation by Payne, 'be it ever so humble, there's no place like 
home.' Analysing the provision and design of housing for the lower class, Lee Rainwater 
describes the house as "a refuge from the noxious elements of the outside world... as a 
locale where [one] can regroup their energies for interaction with the outside world. " * 11 
Rainwater's analysis of public housing resonates with something of the traditional view of 
the home. This is particularly evident when he describes the house as "the place of 
maximum exercise of individual autonomy, minimum conformity to the formal and 
complex rules of public demeanour," that is, a sanctuary or haven free from politics; the 
foundational premises of negative freedom . 12 This view of the autonomy and freedom of 
the home is bound to a world that is structured by a particular world view, one that can be 
conditioned by factors such as time, place and class. Indeed, the prevailing view of the 
home, it is suggested by traditionalist historian John Lukacs, is not something natural but 
rather specific to the enduring greatness of the upper class. "Domesticity, privacy, comfort, 
and the concept of the home and of the family: these are, literally, principal achievements 
of the Bourgeois Age. " 13 Lukacs in this sense whole-heartedly embraces what might 
otherwise be seen as a critique of the notion of home, stemming from the view of it as a 
politicised and historicised institution.
10 Ibid., p. 142.
11 Lee Rainwater, "Fear and House-as-Haven in the Lower Class", Journal of the American Planning Association, 
32:1, 1966, p. 23.
12 Ibid.
13 John Lukacs, The Passing of the Modern Age (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 200; quotation drawn from 
David L. Klubal, "Our Last Literary Gentlemen: the Bourgeois Imagination", in Harry R. Garvin, Twentieth Century 
Poetry, Fiction and Theory (New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1977), p. 29.
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The political neutrality of the home is far from the case. The home is the dwelling -  or 
perhaps even institution -  that enshrines a nuclear familial organisation of society in the 
West. Household settings are synonymous with the everyday normality of the nuclear 
family, ascribing a teleological expectation to the status of each individual's living 
arrangements. The predominant social expectation and norm within the West is that 
individuals will work towards a point at which they reside within a domestic situation with 
a consensual heterosexual partner and one or more children. Even as this becomes less and 
less the reality of everyday living arrangements it is still held by many, including often the 
state, as the ideal.14 Indeed, the notion of the normality of the domestic is something of an 
ontological core of the West. The domestic domicile parallels the image of safety that the 
domestic realm of the state conveys, contrasted with the anarchy of the international 
outside. Within the home, individuals in this sense are seen to be sovereign; as the old 
saying goes, 'a man's house is his castle'. It is suggested that many of the early references 
to 'home' refer to country or land then became domesticated as it increasingly referred to 
the local village, before referring to a family dwelling or house. 15 The origins of the home 
can thus be seen as highly political and the modern home a key political institution.
Thus, the home cannot be simply seen as a neutral, domestic space. For instance, the 
imaging of the safety and security of the domestic home is undermined by a dark shadow 
of domination and domestic violence. As early as 1924, Eleanor Rathbone argued that the 
cost of a wife's financial dependence on her spouse was borne out in the form of "violence 
and sexual exploitation."16 Further, The National Centre for Children Exposed to Violence 
(NCCEV) documents that as many as 10 million children in the US witness violence in the 
family, 60% of which is directed against children.17 David Sibley suggests that the happy 
phenomenology of the home is a shallow interpretation of this site, an impression that is 
altogether "too cosy."18 What is lacking from 'the house as haven' thesis, Sibley suggests, 
"is a recognition of the [dichotomised] tensions surrounding the use of domestic space,
14 Brian Williams, Stacey Sawyer & Carl Wahlstrom, Marriages, Families and Intimate Relationships (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Pearson Press, 2005), p. 120; Amy Benfer, "The Nuclear Family Takes a Hit: Census Data Deals a 
Blow to an American Icon", Salon, 7/06/2001. Accessed from archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2Q01/ 
06/07/familv values/on 6/06/2008.
15 Jeanne Moore, "Placing Home in Context", Journal o f Environmental Psychology 20, 2000, p. 208-209.
15 Eleanor Rathbone, The Disinherited Family: A Plea For the Endowment o f the Family (London: E. Arnold, 
1924), p. 71.
17 Press Release, "Forum Slated to Focus on Children and Violence", The National Centre fo r Children Exposed to 
Violence, 6/9/02. Accessed from www.nccev.org/us/press-releases/pr2002 0906.pdf on 20/9/08.
18 David Sibley, Geographies of Exclusion: Society and Difference in the West (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 94.
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tensions which become part of the problem of domination within fam ilies . " 19 W ithin such 
critiques of the home as a neutral space there is a tendency to portray it, on the other 
hand, as inherently dangerous and threatening. While this can certainly be the case, this is 
something of a moot point as homes can equally be a site for familial care and productive 
creation of individuals, and on the whole, society. What should be taken from these 
critiques is that the home is an intense site of political rendering, a process, which w ithout 
due care may result in violence and an unnecessary and even exploitative domination. 
Thus, accounts of the home should "avoid any romanticised image of the domestic which 
fails to recognise its darker sides, which are normally screened out in conventional ideals of 
the home . " 20 In this sense, these two images of the domestic -  that of a safe sanctuary of 
freedom and that of a site of domination and violence -  ultimately coalesce into something 
more pervasive and benign. The home is a site of social control and regulation, in which 
individuals are explicitly formed and disciplined by their parent(s) and through this proxy 
subjected to a range of more subtle disciplinary measures.
The apolitical portrayal of the home as a quaint domicile is undermined by the extent to 
which it is permeated by wider social forces. David Morley characterises the modern home 
as
a 'phantasmagoric' place, to the extent that electronic media of various kinds 
allow the intrusion of distant events into the space of domesticity. In Zygmunt 
Bauman's terms, this represents the problematic invasion of the 'realm of the 
far' (that which is strange and potentially troubling) into the 'realm of the 
near' (the traditional arena of ontological security). Thus, the 'far away' is now 
irredeemably mixed in with the space of the near, as processes of migration 
and of media representation bring actual and virtual forms of a lterity into 
jealously guarded 'home territories' of various sorts .21
In this sense, Morley moves beyond images of the home as either a sealed space of nurture 
or a site of domestic violence. In Morley's depiction, the fam iliarity o f the home -  its 
homeliness -  becomes inextricably bound with the unheimliche -  the unhomely -  a sense 
of estrangement or of the uncanny. The unheimliche is the feeling of strangeness and 
unease that stems from a displacement or reflection upon the familiar. The uncanny nature 
of the home and the penetration of foreign policy discipline was literalised in the infamous
19 Ibid.
20 David Morley, Home Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 60.
21 David Morley, “Belongings: Place, Space and Identity in a Mediated World", European Journal o f Cultural 
Studies, vol. 4, no. 4, 2001, p. 428.
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'kitchen debate' between President Richard Nixon and Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The 
leaders of the cold war superpower states met at a Moscow homewares fair in 1959, in a 
highly staged attempt to demonstrate the commitment of each side to the principle of 
dialogue and early attempts at detente. After debating the relative merits of American 
versus Soviet kitchen appliances the two leaders stood together in a mock-up everyday 
American kitchen and through translators smilingly threatened one another with mutually 
assured destruction. This surreal event thus placed the high politics of diplomacy and 
deterrence within the domestic setting, in so doing bringing home the balance of terror 
that at that time held much of the world's populace to ransom.
Reflecting on the cold war, however, suggest that the effects of this foreign policy discipline 
on children are ambiguous. The operation of the most overt cold war discipline within the 
US perhaps reached its peak during the McCarthy era of the 1950s and the heyday of the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). The palpable sense of fear and 
suspicion that predominated in America during this time was equally reflected in schools. 
Civil defence was a key concept that sought to unite communities and employ everyday 
citizens to ensure a sense of security within local neighbourhoods. Children in this sense 
could not escape the threat of communism both within and from outside of America, nor 
could they escape the duties and responsibilities it demanded of them. Observing this 
generation 10-20 years later, however, the children raised during an era of entrenched cold 
war discipline and immanent fear of death were known later as a generation of protesting 
hippy students and bohemians rather than well-formed, staunch patriots. Accordingly, it is 
important to consider not only the way in which foreign policy produces a homogeneous 
domestic population but also the sites of resistance it provokes, both within academic 
literature and the population at large.
The following account of the psychological effects of the 9/11 attacks seeks to reconcile 
these critical insights with the orthodox medical literature. As equally as feminist informed 
positions might question the way in which masculinist institutions have prevaricated to 
isolate women and children within the home, resistance to the operation of foreign policy 
can also be seen in psychological literature that seeks to offer somewhat apolitical and 
empirical studies. The argument presented so far sought to show the limitations of the 
view that children are apolitical and that locked in homes and schools they will invariably 
be fine. In an age of pervasive and sensationalised media, representations of danger readily 
pervade the home. Similarly, such representations of danger generate a fear of danger,
188
seen perhaps in the rise of household security systems and even gated communities. The 
argument made here suggests that it is more likely that children will be harmed or at least 
developmental^ influenced by the representations or fear of danger and that this 
constitutes a more significant effect than the marginal chance of actual real danger. In 
short the intense will to familial and household security could be seen as a particular form 
of psychopathology based in phobia or neurosis.
Psychological effects of terrorism on children
There is an extensive literature on the effects of terrorism on children. Much is drawn from 
studies on trauma and disaster management,22 some is based on data from previous terror 
attacks,23 and more recently there has emerged studies of the impact of 9/11.24 
Understandably, the most immediate concern for the medical profession is to shape 
appropriate responses for those children who are directly affected by the loss of a family 
member. This fits with the logic of a triage approach to dealing with psychological trauma. 
The 'pattern of loss' as a result of 9/11 would initially seem to radically challenge the 
security and the confidence in the home as a social unit, particularly in those New York and 
New Jersey communities most directly affected. For instance 98.6% of victims were over 18 
years, with a modal age category of 35-39; males made up 75.6% of victims; and 79.9% of 
victims were white.25 Combining the cross-sections of race and gender reveals that at 
62.6% the overwhelming category of those killed in the attacks were white males followed 
next by white females who made up 17.3%.26 Statistics of marital status were not initially 
available but emerged with data provided for financial remuneration of victims' families. In
22 Limor Aharonson-Daniel, Vehezkel Waisman, Yehuda L. Dannon & Kobi Peleg, "Epidemiology of Terror- 
Related Versus Non-Terror-Related Traumatic Injury in Children", Paediatrics, vol. 112 no. 4, October 2003, p. 
280.
23 Jon A. Shaw, "Children Exposed to War/Terrorism", Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review, vol 6 no 4. 
2003, pp. 237-246; Avi Sadeh, Shai Hen-Gal & Liot Tikotzky, "Young Children's Reaction to War-related Stress: A 
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Wanda P. Fremont, "Childhood Reactions to Terrorism-Induced Trauma: A Review of the Past 10 Years", Journal 
of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, vol. 43, no. 4, April 2004, p.381; and Mark 
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24 Mark D. Seery, Roxanne Cohen Silver, Alison E. Holman, Whitney A. Ence & Thai Q. Chu, "Expressing Thoughts 
and Feelings Following a Collective Trauma: Immediate Responses to 9/11 Predict Negative Outcomes in a 
National Sample", Journal o f Consulting and Clinical Psychology, vol. 76 no. 4, August 2008, pp. 657-667; and 
Robin H. Gurwitch & Betty Pfefferbaum, "Impact of Terrorism on Children: Considerations for a New Era", 
Journal o f Trauma Practice, vol. 1, iss. 3/4, 2002, p. 101-124.
25 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2001: Uniform Crime Reports (United States 
Department of Justice, 2002), p. 303. Accessed from http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius 01/01crime5.pdf on 20/9/08.
26 FBI, Crime in the United States 2001, p. 303.
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a report detailing the disbursement of compensation funds, 64% of victims were listed as 
married with the remaining 36% assumed to be single; 72% of victims left at least one 
dependant; and nearly all victims lived and worked in the United States, although a small 
number of these were citizens from abroad.27 Overall, when viewed in terms of the 
population breakdowns of age, gender and race it emerges that the victims of 9/11 were 
overwhelmingly middle-aged, white males.
This cross-section of the victims of 9/11 was reflected in initial strategies for managing 
ongoing trauma effects in children. The predominantly affected groups were found to be 
Caucasian families who had experienced the loss of a husband/father.28 The immediate 
response to the pattern of effects of the 9/11 attacks was to attempt to recreate the 
normality of the familial unit and the home. Strategies such as the GOALS (Going On After 
Loss) program sought to avoid pathologising 9/11 and instead encourage normalisation and 
resilience amongst families. The family home in this context was treated as a 'wider 
ecology' that can either exacerbate or diminish the affects of trauma rather than focussing 
solely on individuals.29 Mothers were encouraged to recreate the familial home 
environment and avoid transmitting grief to children through over-memorialising the event 
or being over-protective; children are likely to be highly influenced by parents' reactions.30 
This strategy thus reflects the discipline of the home, witnessed here in a positive or 
productive context, as a central political institution that can create and recreate patterns of 
behaviour considered normal within society. Similarly the financial imbursements paid by 
the September 11 Victims' Compensation Fund 2001 sought to negate the financial loss 
incurred by families to the extent that they may continue as a regular nuclear family. The 
overwhelming amount of the fund (80%) was paid to households in which there was a 
dependant spouse or minor child of the victim.31 The consolidation and normalisation of 
the home was in this instance an explicit government policy goal.32 Thus the key social
27 Kenneth R Feinberg, Camille S. Biros, Jordana Harris Freedman, Deborah E. Greenspan & Jacqueline E. Zins, 
Final Report of the Special Master fo r the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund o f 2001 -  Volume 1 (United 
States Department of Justice, 2002), p. 54. Accessed from www.usdoi.gov/final report.pdf on 20/9/08.
28 Maureen Underwood, John Kalafat & Nicci Spinazzola, "Children and Terrorism: A Family Psychoeducational 
Approach", Bruce Bongar, et al (eds.), Psychology of Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 
311-337.
29 Ibid., p. 312.
30 Ragnhild Dybdahl, "Children and Mothers in War: An Outcome Study of a Psychosocial Intervention 
Program", Child Development, vol. 72, no. 4, 2001, pp. 1214-1230.
31 Feinberg et al, Final Report o f the Special Master for the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund o f 2001, p. 
54.
32 Ibid., pp. 56-62.
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priority response to the pattern of loss due to the 9/11 terror attacks focussed largely on 
the families who had lost husbands/fathers and sought to preserve the status of the 
traditional home and familial structure.
The provision of public information for children and families in light of 9/11 similarly 
reinforces the importance of home and re-affirms its imagery of security discussed 
previously. For instance, children searching for advice on terrorism will be directed to the 
website of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Flere FEMA's 'spokescrab', 
Herman the Hermit, provides advice for children, emphasising the importance of the 
'perfect shell' that is "windproof, waterproof, earthquake proof and fireproof".33 Here the 
message, while mixing slightly unclear metaphors of home, emergency shelter and 
psychological strength, seems to be the importance of a secure and impenetrable home. 
The use of the shell metaphor to denote the security of home recalls the cold war-era 'duck 
and cover' public information campaigns in which a cartoon turtle is seen to draw into the 
safety of his shell in the event of a nuclear explosion. The public/private distinction is 
reinforced by contemporary school drills to teach children safety in the face of terror 
threats. In the public sphere of the school, rather than emphasising the safety of homely 
domesticity, the importance of order within a larger group instead becomes paramount. 
For instance, schools in and around New York City have conducted 'terror drills' in which 
students are gathered "into windowless or sealed rooms as a rehearsal for possible 
chemical or biological attacks".34 Furthermore, an instance was reported in which children 
were instructed to walk out of the school, through the woods and stand in the middle of 
parking lot as practice should "something worse than a fire occur."35 Children generally are 
not said to display immediate signs of stress or anxiety during the drills, indeed it is 
suggested that most seemed to be accustomed to them and "they've gotten used to living 
with threat".36 This does not, however, exclude the incidence of indirect symptoms 
occurring.
Immediately following 9/11 an editorial in the Journal fo r Specialists in Paediatric Medicine 
foreshadowed these emerging concerns. The editorial casts its concerns for children much 
wider than those who are immediately affected by the New York attacks, suggesting that
33 FEMA, "Herman and the Hunt for a Disaster-Proof Shell", FEMA for Kids Website. Accessed from 
www.fema.gov/kids/herman/hermanstoryl.htm on 18/8/08.
34 "Children on Heightened Alert", USA Today, 24/03/03, p. 6d.
35 Marek Fuchs, "Duck and Cover, Redux", New York Times, 24/10/04, p. A l.
36 Harold Koplewicz quoted in "Children on Heightened Alert", USA Today, 24/03/03, p. 6d.
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"[n]ews of real and potential terrorism now permeates our daily lives as we struggle to 
cope with the tangible and intangible threats."37 Thus the editorial is concerned with the 
effects that have been put into place and, importantly, continue to be mediated by 
secondary means such as the media. The editorial cites a 1990 study by Terr that stresses 
the importance of what is described as "indirect exposure through media coverage of the 
events and through exposure to people more directly involved."38 It highlighted interviews 
undertaken with children across the country who had viewed the 1986 Challenger space 
shuttle disaster that determined nearly all children "developed new fear or exaggerated an 
old one."39 This opinion was supported by the findings from initial surveys conducted in the 
months after the 9/11 attacks. For instance a study by Phillips and Schiebelhut examined 
the responses of elementary school children in Washington, DC, to the September 11 
terrorist attacks. Parents (primarily mothers) of children in kindergarten through to Grade 6 
and children in Grades 4 to 6, including 47 matched parent-child pairs, completed 
questionnaires regarding exposure, stress reactions, and constructive actions taken 3 
months after the attacks. Parent reports and, to an even greater extent children's self- 
reports, revealed a high level of negative reactions in response to the attacks.40 These 
reactions were said to be best understood in the context of their exposure to the attacks, 
primarily through television news, and the reactions of, and coping assistance provided, by 
their parents.
The clearest quantitative data on the effects of terrorism on children is drawn from surveys 
that seek to understand the effects on wide samples drawn from the population more 
broadly. In a survey conducted between November 9 and 28, 2001 on 395 parents across 
the country, Stein et al. found that 30% percent of parents reported "more than four 
terrorism related emotional or behavioural reactions in their child."41 As with the vast 
majority of reactions, these are secondary reactions that have been mediated through 
familial, educational, media or other social means. For instance, of these parents surveyed, 
nearly 40% reported having had discussed terrorism with their children for more than an
37 Roxie L. Foster, "Editorial -  Assessing Children's Response to Terrorism", Journal fo r Specialists in Paediatric 
Nursing, vol. 6 no. 4, October-December 2001, pp. 159-160.
38 Lenore Terr cited in Foster, "Editorial", p. 159.
39 Lenore Terr, Too Scared to Cry: Psychic Trauma in Childhood (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 327.
40 Phillips D, Prince S & Schiebelhut L, "Elementary school children's responses 3 months after the September 11 
terrorist attacks: a study in Washington, DC.", American Journal Orthopsychiatry, 2004, 74:4, pp. 509-28.
41 Bradley D. Stein, Lisa H. Jaycox, Mark N. Elliot, Rebecca L. Collins, Sandra Berry, Grant N. Marshall, et al, 
"Emotional and Behavioural Impact of Terrorism on Children: Results from a National Survey", Applied 
Developmental Science, 8:4, 2004, pp. 184-194.
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hour. Of those discussions, the three most common themes were children's fears for their 
safety, precautions against anthrax, and avoiding heavily populated areas.42 Beyond the 
family setting, two-thirds of parents reported their children being involved in terrorism- 
related school activities such as class-room activities or assemblies, counselling, or being 
provided with materials to give to parents.43 While this survey did not analyse media 
effects other studies have. In a similar national study by Schuster et ol., interviews with 
parents were conducted in order to gauge the effects of terrorism on children. From these 
surveys one-third of parents reported that their children demonstrated at least one of five 
stress reactions and more than half reported that children worried about their safety or 
that of family members.44 Furthermore, however, in seeking to discern the way in which 
these effects are mediated this study found a positive correlation between television 
exposure and stress reactions. In addition, a study by Galea et ol. found that distance from 
the attacks was not so significant a factor in the incidence of effects stemming from 
terrorism, as individuals relied on television, internet and radio to learn about what 
happened on 9/11. Accordingly, they also found a positive correlation between media 
exposure and the degree of stress symptoms demonstrated.45
The effects of terrorism on children are not necessary limited to terrorism per se, rather 
they can be connected to other foreign policy decisions. As mentioned above children that 
have "proximal contact with terrorism" such as 9/11 are prone to a range of symptoms 
such as PTSD, while research also suggests that children both "proximal and distal to the 
attack are exposed to a vast amount of attack-related media coverage and exposure to 
such media coverage is associated with post-attack post-traumatic stress disorder 
symptomology."46 Gurwitch et ol found that two years after the Oklahoma bombing of 
1995 "16% of children and adolescents presented with symptoms of PTSD despite the fact 
that they were not directly exposed to the incident and were not related to anybody who
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Mark A. Schuster, Bradley D. Stein, Lisa H. Jaycox, Rebecca L. Collins, Grant N. Marshall, Mark N. Elliot, et al, 
"A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks", New England Journal of 
Medicine, 345, 2001, pp. 1507-1512.
45 Sandro Galea, Jennifer Ahern, Heidi Resnick, Dean Kilpatrick, Michael Bucuvalas, Joel Gold et al., 
"Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York City", New England Journal of 
Medicine, 346, 2002, pp. 982-987.
46 Jonathan S. Corner & Phillip C. Kendall, "Terrorism: The Psychological Impact on Youth", Clinical Psychology: 
Science and Practice, vol 14 iss 3, 2007, pp. 179-212.
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had been killed in that incident."47 In short, symptoms of trauma amongst children are 
associated with exposure to 'attack-related' media coverage regardless of whether or not 
they were close to an attack. Indeed, child psychologists are reported to have observed an 
upsurge of children's anxiety and stress resulting from the 2003 Iraq War following a 
decline as the memory of 9/11 began to fade.48 The effects resulting from terrorism at this 
point become harder to track as the psychological effects of 9/11 coalesce with, and are 
sustained by, media coverage of the Iraq War and its association with fears that further 
attacks may occur.49 The fear of external threats according to these accounts seems to feed 
into symptoms of trauma amongst children and could account for a range of stress 
reactions. Ultimately, however, the exact cause of the effects observed is inconclusive as 
there are a number of correlative relationships whether they are direct exposure, 
secondary mediated exposure to the terrorist event, or simply a more general although 
highly pervasive mediated fear of external threats.
What emerges is a combination of professional opinions and statistical surveys suggesting 
that terrorism has a much wider effect on children than simply those who have witnessed 
terrorism or have experienced the loss of a parent. While not clearly supported by scientific 
data, a number of practice-orientated health professionals have expressed a concern with 
the effects of media portrayals of the war on terror and its effects on children based on 
their own initial observations and encounters.50 Accordingly many suggest that further 
research is required in order to fully understand the wider effects of terrorism on 
children.51 Determinative research towards this end may be hard to fully realise as surveys 
highlight correlative relationships but not necessarily clear causation or the best way in 
which to counter these effects. Given that it is hard to establish clear quantitative
47 Betty Pfefferbaum, Robin H Gurwitch et al, "Posttraumatic Stress Among Children After the Death of a Friend 
or Acquaintance in a Terrorist Bombing", Psychiatric Services 51, pp. 386-388.
48 Sucheta Connolly quoted in "Children on Heightened Alert".
49 "Parents' Guide for Talking to their Children about War", National Centre fo r Children Exposed to Violence. 
Accessed from www.nccev.org/docs/children war.pdf on 20/09/08.
50 Juliette H. Walma van der Molen, "Violence and Suffering in Television News: Toward a Broader Conception 
of Harmful Television Content for Children, Paediatrics, vol. 113 no. 6, June 2004, pp. 1771-1775; Katy Clark, 
"Emotional Effects of Terrorism on Children", Annals o f the American Psychotherapy Association, vol. 5, 2002. 
Accessed from www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docld=5002509973 on 20/10/08; Caroly Pataki, 
"Psychological Effects of Terrorism on Our Children: An Expert Perspective", New York Post, 26/9/2001. 
Accessed from newyorkpost.healthology.com/mental-health/mental-health-news/articlell69.htm on 
20/10/08; and Vincent lanelli, "Terror Threat Advisory and Your Kids", About.com -  Paediatrics, 6/03/08. 
Accessed from pediatrics.about.com/cs/weeklyquestion/a/122103 ask.htm on 20/10/08.
51 Jonthan S.Comer and Phillip C. Kendall, "Terrorism: The Psychological Impact on Youth", Clinical Psychology: 
Science and Practice, vol. 14 iss. 3, 2007, pp. 179-212; and Wanda P. Fremont, "Childhood Reactions to 
Terrorism-Induced Trauma: A Review of the Past 10 Years", Journal of the American Academy of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry, vol. 43, no. 4, April 2004, p.384.
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information on the matter, the opinions of medical practitioners should still be seen as 
important but they can no longer be considered fully objective for, like everyone else, their 
opinions are influenced by the contemporary politics and debates surrounding the 
domestic impacts of the war on terror. In short, the discipline of the war on terror comes 
into effect within the study of psychological effects of terrorism, whether it be for or 
against, supporting or resisting the contemporary norms of foreign policy. To this end, 
professional suggestions or policy positions designed to ameliorate these effects upon the 
population will become part of the wider social formation and control processes stemming 
from foreign policy discipline and should be understood as such.
Children are subject to many of the indirectly mediated psychological effects of the wider 
adult population, but are less able to rationally evaluate risk or reconstruct a sense of 
normality. At an American Psychiatry Association panel discussion on the mental health 
effects of terrorism, panellist David Spiegel suggested that 9/11 could be seen as an 
"overwhelming sensory input" which affects an individual's cognitive ability to carry on 
everyday routine, it was an attack on each individual's sense of social order.52 Responding 
to these comments David J. Schonfeld concurred, suggesting the same can be said of 
children, as they too have a sense of social order albeit one that is tied more to the home 
and the strength of familial bonds rather than social relations and discourse. Children, 
Schonfeld suggests, have a harder time reweaving the social fabric than adults because 
they have not fully developed their social skills.53 To this end, he suggests it is important to 
create environments where children feel it is safe to ask questions, to learn, understand, 
and make meaning out of the events of 9/11. Drawing from this line of argument it can be 
suggested that children are not as firmly embedded in the disciplinary apparatuses that 
constitute everyday order. Depending on age and scholastic level they may be aware of 
some disciplines, such as basic manners and etiquette; others may come as fleeting 
impressions, for instance basic understanding of popular culture and political events such 
as wars and terrorism; whereas others will escape them completely such as the discipline 
of productive labour and fiscal responsibility. It is in this sense, when Schonfeld refers to 
the underdeveloped social skills of children he is suggesting that we can understand them 
as having only fragmentary and illogical glances of external threats. Accordingly the threat
52 David J. Schonfeld quoted in Jim Rosack, “ Mental Health Effects of Terrorism Focus of APA-Sponsored Panel", 
Psychiatric News, 37:1, 2002, p. 4. Accessed from pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/37/1/4-a on 
18/8/08.
53 Rosack, "Mental Health Effects of Terrorism Focus of APA-Sponsored Panel".
195
of terrorism may seem to children dangerously confusing or overwhelmingly exaggerated. 
Thus children are subject to the same disciplinary and psychological effects of terrorism but 
they may be experienced in a socially disconnected or phantasmagorical way.
W ithin the context of the comments made above, David Spiegel further suggests that the 
breakdown of social fabric and everyday order can be seen at the w ider level of the 
population. This effect is not necessarily one that is entirely negative as it can foster 
collective resilience amongst people who can identify w ith the event as a group. According 
to Spiegel,
[o]ne of the rather odd advantages of this terrorist attack is that it was an 
attack on all of us. It was an attack on our social fabric. In the aftermath, 
building social connections -  talking about it -  really helped many people to 
weave the social fabric back together.54
What Spiegel is describing here is the operation of a collective solidarity amongst national 
and sub-national communities, but also a form of biopolitics. Biopolitics is operating here in 
the attem pt to reconsolidate the social body in response to the attacks of 9/11 and is akin 
to a biological logic operating at the level of a group or a population. In order to function 
effectively an effective biopolitics also requires some measures of resilience, or discipline 
amongst individuals. This collective solidarity and individual resilience in the community 
and family are strategies emphasised in many of the leading psychological approaches to 
post-trauma situations, in particular that of the GOALS program mentioned previously. 
Biopolitical and disciplinary strategies of solidarity and resilience in this context are positive 
forms of social production and control in that they act to unite communities and overcome 
the negative effects o f te rro r attacks. This is not to  suggest it is w ithout critique, indeed it 
w ill be suggested in the fo llow ing sections that it closes o ff opportunities for reflection and 
innovative solutions. Furthermore it fosters a sense of solidarity at the expense of and in 
opposition to, others.
The study of the mediated effects of terrorism  and its impact on children can be 
understood in the broader context of its effect on the wider population. Given the lack of 
specific research on the effects o f these mediated representations of terrorism  on children, 
this chapter will take up this question in regards to the wider population. In doing so, it w ill 
rely upon the literature on the mediated psychological effects of terrorism. Within such
54 Quoted in Ibid.
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analysis the psychological effects on children can be understood in terms of the ambient 
presence of a threat of terrorism insofar as they are either themselves aware of this threat 
or perceive fear in parents or authority figures. While children may not be in a position to 
fully comprehend global events and potential external threats they are no less subject to 
the simplistic warnings and discourse that seeks to securitise people against a terrorist 
threat. This research can also be further and more clearly reconciled with the ideas of 
construction and control of populations that can be drawn from Foucault's notions of 
biopolitics and governmentality. In this wider context, the effects of terrorism and medical 
and policy responses to it can be understood in terms of a process of social production, 
ordering and control.
Terrorising the masses: Psychological effects of terrorism on the 
population-at-large
The direct effects of terror on members of the public that witness attacks and first 
responders can be understood in terms of the psychological effects of disasters. Yet, there 
is a much wider occurrence of psychological effects that are mediated socially and through 
the media, making it much harder to measure and respond to. Furthermore, there doesn't 
currently seem to be a clear way of describing these effects within the medical or 
psychological literature. Understanding these wider effects seems to implicate each, but is 
not fully explained by the combination of critical social theory, psychology, psychiatry and 
medical practice. This section seeks to explore these issues in relation to the broad 
psychological effect of terrorism on populations. To what extent is the population seen as 
being actively shaped by terrorism and counter-terrorism? Or is it understood en masse as 
being static, a device by which to determine what is normal? It will also examine a number 
of existing possible diagnoses, examining to what extent they accurately capture the 
psychological affliction upon the wider population and to what extent they may be 
reconciled with critical social theories. In short this section seeks to map those effects of 
terrorism on the margins of the both medical and critical social literature.
The literature on the psychological effects of terrorism is complex and varied, even within 
single works. One important dynamic -  which is at times not recognised or perhaps ignored 
-  is the interplay between the direct effects of terrorism and the indirect effects of the 
threat or fear of terrorism. For instance, in "Psychological Consequences of Actual or 
Threatened CBRNE Terrorism", Sullivan and Bongar fuse the analysis of the effects of actual
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terrorism with the mass fear of terrorism regardless of whether an event has actually 
occurred.55 Initially this seems to correspond with Goodin's definitional and effects-based 
argument that terrorism does not require violence, only the creation of fear, an argument 
that in turn prompts Goodin to suggest that terrorism does not even require terrorists per 
se, but can be deliberately or inadvertently created by states.56 Sullivan and Bongar, 
however, from the outset ground their analysis in the definitive (yet unsupported) 
statement that "[t]he acquisition of biological, radiological and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) 
weapons remains a priority of several terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda."57 Bongar 
and Sullivan are not simply stating the less-problematic, although somewhat contested, 
objective fact of the existence of a terrorist threat but are also ascribing to them an intent. 
Regardless of the actual intent of individuals who may or may not be intending to commit 
terrorism, what should be of foremost concern when exploring psychological effects of 
terrorism are the psychological effects insofar as they may occur regardless of whether 
they are objectively real or not. Indeed, such an approach would be more consistent with 
the claim that "[f]or every physical injury, [one should] expect 10-100 times as many 
psychological categories."58 This is not to simply suggest it is 'all in our heads' but rather 
that there is a complex but not necessarily direct relationship between the fear that we feel 
and the threat 'out there'.
Populations are a crucial element of understanding the psychological and medical effects of 
terrorism. Analysis of populations allows data to be obtained relating to the incidence of 
various health effects. Despite the centrality of an analysis of population there is, perhaps 
quite paradoxically, little understanding of how terrorism affects the wider population. The 
population in this instance is not the object of study but rather a statistical device to 
determine a norm by which individuals may be compared and an overall incidence may be 
determined. What has become clear in light of 9/11 is that the effects of the terror attacks 
are pervasive and pose serious challenges for how the wider effects can be determined. 
This is not to suggest that this wider effect is unknown or ignored within the literature. For 
instance, a number of studies describe terrorism as a "pervasive generator" of
55 Glenn R. Sullivan & Bruce Bongar, "Psychological Consequences of Actual or Threatened CBRNE Terrorism" in 
Bruce Bongar, eta! (eds.), Psychology of Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 153-163.
56 Robert E. Goodin, What's Wrong with Terrorism?(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), pp. 2, 49.
57 Sullivan & Bongar, "Psychological Consequences of Actual or Threatened CBRNE Terrorism", p. 153.
58 Ibid., p. 161.
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psychopathological symptomology, suggesting that it has a range of indirect effects beyond 
those seen amongst people directly affected by the terror attacks.59
The Oklahoma City bombings of 1995 provide both the clearest comparison and clearest 
data sets. Studies into the Oklahoma City bombings to some extent have captured the 
wider social and psychological fallout events. The key study on the Oklahoma City bombing 
surveys those directly affected, finding the expected predictors of PTSD in women and 
those with pre-existing conditions.60 What was interesting was that in comparison with 
other disasters it found slightly lower rates of the incidence of PTSD (34%), which is 
referred to as "increased resilience" given that it bucks the expected rate of affliction.61 
What was more interesting for this section was that while PTSD diagnoses were low, the 
presence of one or more of its symptoms was very high, virtually ubiquitous at 96%. This 
suggests that while direct effects evidenced by PTSD were not as great as expected they 
were highly pervasive.6" Another study also observed that following the attacks there were 
higher rates of smoking, alcohol consumption and stress within the city compared with 
outside the city.63 A study examining the impact of the bombing on the Oklahoma City 
middle and senior school student population sort to measure the extent to which students 
had been psychologically affected and the means through they were exposed, including 
direct proximity, knowing someone injured or killed or, importantly, television. As it was a 
school day when the attacks occurred, very few were themselves directly exposed, 
although all experienced it in some manner. Amongst the school population over 60% 
reported hearing and/or feeling the explosion, more than 20% reported knowing someone 
killed or injured, 11% had a friend or relative killed or injured and more than two-thirds
59 Carol S. Fullerton, Robert J. Ursano & Ann E. Norwood, "Planning for the Psychological Effects of
Bioterrorism" in Robert J. Ursano, Carol S. Fullerton & Ann E. Norwood (eds), Bioterrorism: Psychological and 
Public Health Interventions (London: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 4; see also Harry C. Holloway, Ann E. 
Norwood, Carol S. Fullerton et al, "The Threat of Biological Weapons: Prophylaxis and the Mitigation of
Psychological and Social Consequences", Journal o f the American Medical Association, vol. 278, no. 5, 1997, pp. 
425-427; Carol S. North, Sara Jo Nixon, Sheryll Shariat et al, "Psychiatric Disorders Among Survivors of the 
Oklahoma City Bombing", Journal o f the American Medical Association, vol. 282, no. 8, 1999, pp. 755-762; and 
Carol S. North & Betty Pfefferbaum, "Research on the Mental Health Effects of Terrorism", Journal of the 
American Medical Association, vol. 288, no. 6, 2002, pp. 633-636.
60 North, Nixon, Shariat et al, "Psychiatric Disorders Among Survivors of the Oklahoma City Bombing", pp. 755- 
762.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 David W. Smith, Elaine H. Christiensen, Robert Vincent & Neil E. Hann, "Population Effects of the Bombing of 
Oklahoma City", Journal o f the Oklahoma State Medical Association, vol. 92, no. 4, 1999, pp. 193-198.
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reported that most or all of their television watching was bomb related.64 Post-traumatic 
stress symptoms amongst those whose television exposure was mostly or all bomb-related 
was at a similar or higher level than those who had a friend, relative or someone else they 
new killed or injured. Furthermore, the primary predictor for ongoing symptoms was 
television exposure rather than knowledge of someone killed or injured.
There are limitations in using the Oklahoma City bombings as a psychological descriptor of 
the possible effects that are likely to occur as a result of the 9/11 terror attacks and 
subsequent war on terror. The key focus in post-disaster situations is on the incidence of 
PTSD. The results from the Oklahoma City bombing suggested that while the incidence of 
PTSD was lower than expected, the incidence of psychological symptoms was extensive. 
Furthermore, the study of the school students employed a methodology that examined the 
psychological effects in contrast with a control group. While this may be possible in an 
isolated event, assuming a reasonable demographic, cultural and social contiguity within 
the two comparison populations, it becomes hard to determine a 'normal' control group 
following a highly pervasive mass mediated event such as 9/11, or even to a lesser extent, 
the Oklahoma City bombings. For instance, the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) has widened the definition of PTSD from 
that of the previous edition (DSM-III) in line with common clinical practice, albeit not 
without some controversy.65 The included traumatic stressors for PTSD have been 
expanded beyond the previous experiences such as near-death, witnessing death, rape, 
torture or internment and now include a range of stressful but not potentially fatal 
experiences.66 Given the nature of the results and the extent to which post-traumatic 
symptoms were associated with high levels of television exposure, it is reasonable to 
expect that various psychological effects, if not actual PTSD, could be widespread and long- 
lasting.
64 The remaining students were exposed to lesser amounts of television coverage or less directly knew someone 
injured. Betty Pfefferbaum, Sara Jo Nixon, Ronald S Krug et at, "Clinical Needs Assessment of Middle and High 
School Students Following the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing", American Journal of Psychiatry 156, July 1999, 
pp. 1069-1074.
65 Naomi Breslau and Richard J. McNally, "Epidemiology of 9/11: Technological Advances and Conceptual 
Conundrums" in Yuval Neria, Raz Gross, Randall Marshall, Beverley Raphael, Ezra S. Susser (eds.), 9/11: Mental 
Health in the Wake o f Terrorist Attacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 523.
66 "309.81 -  Post-traumatic Stress Disorder" in American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th edn.) (Washington DC: APA, 1994). Criteria also available at "Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder DSM-IV Criteria", Mental Health Today. Accessed from www.mental-health- 
today.com/ptsd/dsm.htm on 12/12/08.
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Media representations of terrorist danger are not an accurate measure of potential threats 
and are particularly prone to being inaccurately and disproportionately characterised. Take 
for instance the anthrax attacks that followed 9/11. While the level of public discourse 
surrounding the potential threat of anthrax attacks has all but subsided, the tenor of public 
concern peaked when anthrax was mailed to media outlets and the Democratic Senate 
offices of Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, killing five and infecting as many as 17 others.67 
As a result 32,000 people who felt they may have been potentially exposed to anthrax were 
given the post-exposure prophylaxis antibiotic, Cipro.68 Emphasising that this was a limited 
precautionary measure, the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) warned of the potential for negative medical side-effects and 
suggested prescribing doctors be judicious in responding to requests for Cipro and also 
consider other antibiotics.69 Despite these Federal statements, the potent post-9/11 media- 
storm surrounding the anthrax attack fatalities ensured the demand for Cipro leapt 
dramatically.70 Accounts from many of the 32,000 people who were administered with the 
drug suggest, however, that little information was provided to them by their employers or 
the CDC and their main source of information was the media, which influenced decisions to 
obtain Cipro.71 There are estimated to be thousands of further cases unreported to the CDC 
in which individuals treated themselves with Cipro and many more where it has been 
purchased.72 Responding to this panic, an editorial in the British Medical Journal argues 
that chemical and biological weapons have limited actual destructive potential; rather the 
threatened or actual use of such weapons is designed to "wreak destruction via
67 Eric Lichtblau & Eric Wade, "F.B.I. Details Anthrax Case but Doubts Remain", New York Times, 18/8/08, p. A l;
68 Associated Press, "Anthrax Antibiotic Used by 32,000", The Michigan Daily, 9/11/2008. Accessed from 
www.michigandaily.com/content/anthrax-antibiotic-used-32000 on 24/11/2008; Lemer suggests that "the vast 
majority of the roughly 30,000 people who took Cipro in the Anthrax scare were treating fear rather than 
exposure [and that due to anthrax mutation] the effectiveness of the best-selling drug was undermined even as 
its sales were skyrocketing." See Sharon Lemer, "Risky Chickens: Bayer Refuses to Withdraw Animal Antibiotic 
that Cause Resistance in Humans", Village Voice, 4 December 2001, p. 45.
69 Mary Ellen Buller, "Thousands Taking Antibiotics", US Medicine, December 2001. Accessed from 
www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articlelD=317&issuelD=33 on 24/11/2008.
70 News reports tended to over-report and sensationalise the incidence of the attacks and the prescription Cipro 
but under-report government public safety instructions, and specific details such as anthrax not being 
transferable, that Cipro is a post-exposure rather than preventative antibiotic and the availability of alternative 
post-exposure antibiotics. See Felicia Mebane, Sarah Temin & Claudia F. Parvanta, "Communicating Anthrax in 
2001: A Comparison of CDC Information and Print Media Accounts", Jo urn al o f Health Communication 8, 2003, 
pp. 50-82.
71 Katherine A. Comely, Biological Terrorism: The Anthrax Scare of 2001", National Centre fo r Case Study 
Teaching in Science, 2005. Accessed from www.sciencecases.org/anthrax/anthrax.pdf on 24/11/2008; Janice 
Blanchard & Yolanda Haywood et al, "In Their Own Words: Lessons Learned From Those Exposed to Anthrax", 
American Journal of Public Health, vol. 95, no. 3, March 2005, pp. 489-495.
72 Dworkin quoted in Daniel L. Friedlin, "Just Say No: The Cipro Craze and Managed Care -  Applying the Hand 
Formula to Managed Care Decisions", Hofstra Law Review 30, 2001, p. 1356.
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psychological means, by inducing fear, confusion and uncertainty into everyday life."73 
Accordingly, the predominant affliction was not the limited casualties from anthrax but the 
widespread public fear and media hype in the wake of 9/11.74
Managing the effects of the anthrax attacks has as much to do with understanding the 
wider psychological effects of terrorism. Examining the communication of risk during the 
anthrax attacks, Chess and Clarke suggest that social and professional networks are as 
important to effective communication as centralised government responses because they 
are more readily trusted.75 The dispersal of positive information through social networks 
can also function in reverse, transmitting suboptimal information and ineffective reactions 
amongst social groups.76 The effects of terror alerts are biopolitical insofar as they shape 
the overall health of the population. Regardless of the extent to which these effects are 
positive or negative, the role of wider social networks in perpetuating psychological effects 
is thus of vital importance. In seeking to offer advice on how to approach the issue of 
terrorism Dr Katona emphasised the importance of 'taming terror' or gaining a sense of 
perspective on future terrorist attacks. This, he argues, would minimise the psychological 
damage. Katona suggests that "bioterror is best fought through perspective. Taking a bath 
or eating your dinner is statistically more lethal than the chances of dying from anthrax."77 
The point being made is that the incidence of psychological damage stemming from the 
fear of future attacks far outweighs the risks of attacks actually occurring. This sense of 
perspective is supported by prominent member of the AMA, Dr Nielson, whose concern 
was that "[l]ong after the physical damage is cleaned up and rebuilt, long after the medical 
aspects of anthrax are dealt with, we physicians will continue to deal with the enormous 
aspects of the mental health implications" of the anthrax letter attacks.78 This is supported 
by the leading experts on mass sociogenic illness (which will be discussed shortly) who 
suggest that media effects amplify immediate acute psychological effects, increasing the 
likelihood of social fears, anxiety and long-term psychological effects. It is these mediated
73 Simon Wessely, Kenneth Craig Hyams & Robert Bartholomew, "Psychological Implications of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons", British Medical Journal, 2001, p. 323.
74 Vadim V. Demidov, "Anthrax-related Panic is More Dangerous than the Disease", Trends in Biotechnology, 
vol.20, iss. 3, 2002, p. 97.
75 Caron Chess & Lee Clark, "Facilitation of Risk Communication During the Anthrax Attacks of 2001: The 
Organizational Backstory", American Journal of Public Health, vol. 97, no. 9, September 2007, pp. 1578-1583.
76 Eric A. Posner, "Fear and the Regulatory Model Counterterrorism", Harvard Journal o f Law & Public Policy 25, 
2001-2002, pp. 681-698.
77 Quoted in Rosack, "Mental Health Effects of Terrorism Focus of APA-Sponsored Panel".
78 Ibid.
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effects that may ultimately be more detrimental to the overall population than the actual 
or even suspected terrorist incident itself.79
While the 9/11 attacks were understood to be an attack on the United States as a national 
whole, the effects are somewhat ambiguous insofar as it creates unity within the wider 
population. According to Schuster et al:
[The] television coverage was immediate, graphic and pervasive. Newscasts 
included remarkable video footage showing two airplanes crashing into the 
World Trade Center and the aftermath of four airplane crashes. People who 
are present at a traumatic event often have symptoms of stress, but there is 
evidence that adults and children need not be present to have stress 
symptoms, especially if they consider themselves to be similar to the victims.
The events of September 11 were widely described as attacks on America, and 
most or all Americans may have identified with the victims or perceived the 
attacks as directed against themselves.80
Terrorism, particularly insofar as it has been associated with al-Qaeda since 9/11, is 
understood to be an indiscriminate attack on a non-specific cross-section of society and as 
suggested by Schuster et ol accordingly is understood widely as an attack on the nation as a 
whole. Because it is portrayed and responded to as an external threat upon the national 
population, post-9/11 terrorism has much in common with the kind of fear that stems from 
the long-standing tradition of inter-state threats. It is akin to the threats that characterized 
the cold war more than terrorism, which specifically targets particular political or social 
cross-sections of the population. While on one hand this means that the effect of 9/11 is 
extensive throughout the majority of the population, it also acts to bind a diverse range of 
groups and world-views toward this common foreign policy goal. Addressing the post-9/11 
AMA meeting, Psychiatrist David Spiegel describes the psychiatric dimensions of this effect: 
"one of the rather odd advantages of this terrorist attack was that it was an attack on all of 
us, it was an attack on our social fabric."81 Again here, we see that the psychological effects 
of terrorism, even at the level of the individual need to be understood within the context of 
the wider population.
The effects of the 9/11 attacks can be seen in the presence of a homogenising tendency 
within public opinion. For instance there has been a rather clear bifurcation of the
79 Simon, Wessely, Kenneth Craig Hyams & Robert Bartholomew, "Psychological Implications of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons", British Medical Journal 323, October 2001, pp. 878-879.
80 Schuster et al, "A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks" p. 1508.
81 Rosack, "Mental Health Effects of Terrorism Focus of APA-Sponsored Panel".
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American political landscape not necessarily along partisan line but according to one's 
position on the perceived success of contemporary foreign policy and domestic counter- 
terrorism policies. For instance, support for and against the Iraq War, torture, exceptional 
rendition and even attempts to uncover foreign threats through illegal government 
wiretapping strongly divided Americans as to whether they considered these actions 
legitimate or necessary tactics in the post-9/11 war on terror. The psychological effects of 
9/11 and their continued perpetuation through media representations and debates over 
foreign policy positions are best understood in this context as a psychological effect that is 
'environmental'. In this sense, it is not experienced solely by an individual but rather acts 
upon a wide population. It is the psychology of, as Vice President Dick Cheney described it, 
a "new normalcy" of terrorism; a psychological effect that is not abnormal or exceptional 
within national populations.82 In order to gain insight on mass psychological effects and 
attempt to reconcile them with social theory approaches, it is necessary to examine 
medical diagnoses in which the symptomology was either mass-mediated or occurring 
within the context of effects seen across a wider population. Such diagnoses include post- 
traumatic stress disorder and mass sociogenic illness.83
Studies into the psychological effects of terrorism focus overwhelmingly, indeed almost 
exclusively, on the incidence of PTSD within populations. PTSD, according to the DSM-IV, is 
the development of a particular range of symptoms as a result of the following criteria:
(1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or 
events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat 
to the physical integrity of self or others (2) the person's response involved 
intense fear, helplessness, or horror.84
There is some controversy surrounding the definition of PTSD, particularly in regards to the 
breadth of the DSM definition, which since its inception has become more expansive. 
There are those such as Alexander Bodkin who suggest that there is "a lack of solid 
evidence that post-traumatic stress is biologically different from depression not triggered 
by a specific event", a suggestion that effectively questions whether PTSD as a discrete
82 Dick Cheney, 25/10/2001, quoted in James W. Cortada & Edward Walin, "The Bumpy Road to a New 
Normalcy" in Betting on America: Why the US Can Be Stronger After September 11 (Upper Saddle River: 
Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 3.
83 The later is also known as mass psychogenic illness, somatisation, somatoform disorder, generalised anxiety 
disorder or medically unexplained symptoms.
84 "309.81 -  Post-traumatic Stress Disorder".
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condition exists at all.85 PTSD was first recognised by the medical profession in 1980 with 
the publication of the DSM-III following the Vietnam War. Despite similar symptoms to 
other conditions, it was considered distinct because it was triggered by the traumatic 
events of war or violent events which undermine the victim's sense of social order and 
create a breakdown in meaning.811 PTSD is unique in that it is defined by what causes the 
symptoms rather than the symptoms themselves. PTSD in this way is the attempt to 
understand the psychological effects of war, disasters, terrorism and other potentially 
traumatic events.
Despite the status of PTSD as the key trauma-related disorder, it does not capture the 
wider, pervasive effects of a mediated event such as terrorism. The incidence and severity 
of PTSD as a result of 9/11, for instance, has a very strong geographical correlation, being 
most concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Manhattan and decreasing further outside 
of New York City.87 At its highest, in the area south of Canal St, PTSD was diagnosed in 20 
percent of respondents taken from a random sample, whereas amongst all of Manhattan it 
occurred amongst 7.5 percent of respondents.88 The key hindrance to capturing the wider 
effects of terrorism using the category of PTSD is that it requires exposure to a traumatic 
stressor; it is not transmitted through social interaction. It is only recently that clinical 
practice has begun to consider television exposure a traumatic stressor, although despite 
this PTSD still primarily concerns those who are directly affected. It is now recognised that 
'environmental' or 'ecological' factors -  that is, the social context -  can influence the 
severity and duration of PTSD.89 Furthermore, as mentioned previously studies suggest that 
exposure to television or a major breakdown in social order can also give rise to PTSD. The 
widening of the definition of what counts as a traumatic stressor in the incidence of PTSD is 
quite controversial. Given that the symptoms of PTSD occur widely throughout normal 
society, a widened definition may dilute the usefulness of PTSD as a category and as a way
85 Quoted in Roxanne Khamsi, "Doubt Cast on Definition of PTSD", New Scientist, 21/03/07. Accessed from 
www.newscientist.com/article/dnll423-doubt-cast-on-definition-of-ptsd-.html on 20/12/08; see also Derek 
Summerfield, "The Invention of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and the Social Usefulness of a Psychiatric 
Category", British Medical Journal 322, 2001, pp. 95-98.
86 Margaret S. Gibbs, "Factors in the Victim that Mediate Between Disaster and Psychopathology: A Review", 
Journal o f Traumatic Stress, vol. 2, iss. 4, 2006, pp. 489-514.
87 Galea, Ahern, Resnick, Kilpatrick, Bucuvalas, Gold et al., "Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 
Terrorist Attacks in New York City", pp. 982-987.
88 Ibid., p. 982.
89 Fran FI. Norris, "Community and Ecological Approaches to Understanding and Alleviating Postdisaster 
Distress" in Yuval Neria, Raz Gross, Randall Marshall, Beverley Raphael, Ezra S. Susser (eds.), 9/11: Mental 
Health in the Wake o f Terrorist Attacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 141-156.
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of responding to those severely affected by trauma. Tension lies in determining what 
constitutes 'exposure' to trauma and the extent to which the mental health problems for 
those directly exposed are substantively different to the wider population that has been 
indirectly exposed.90
There are two contradictory dynamics that stem from the shock that 9/11 caused to the 
national social order and individuals' perception of reality and meaning. The incidence of 
trauma and the onset of PTSD stems from an event that powerfully shocks and undermines 
an individual's sense of social meaning and order.91 Accordingly, in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11, health experts predicted that there would be a national mental illness 
'epidemic' and accordingly the US federal government mobilised massive resources to 
combat this potential mental health crisis.92 On the other hand, however, an individual's 
perception of social order and meaning is embedded within a wider social context, a 
broader social environment or 'ecology' that mediates one's world-view.93
This suggests that the implications for mental health in the wake of 9/11 and throughout 
the ongoing war on terror may be ambiguous, complex and may not conform to previous 
studies of PTSD in the wake of disasters. Whilst the sheer scale of 9/11 affects a huge 
portion of the population this also suggests a wide commonality of experience and lays the 
foundations for community resilience; social order and meaning shifts for everyone and 
relative to the rest of the population the effect for each individual may not be as great. 
What it does suggest is that the focus of PTSD upon direct exposure limits its ability to 
comprehend the complex and varied effects of 9/11 on populations. This should not be 
seen as an argument for the wholesale widening of the category of PTSD to all those 
affected by 9/11. Indeed, there is weight to the criticisms against widening the definition of 
PTSD to encompass a range of even at times everyday experiences such as work disputes or 
medical misdiagnoses. Furthermore the increased focus on PTSD seems also to be
90 Naomi Breslau and Richard J. McNally, "Epidemiology of 9/11: Technological Advances and Conceptual 
Conundrums" in Yuval Neria, Raz Gross, Randall Marshall, Beverley Raphael, Ezra S. Susser (eds.), 9/11: Mental 
Health in the Wake o f Terrorist Attacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 522-525.
91 Elana Newman, David S. Riggs & Susan Roth, "Thematic Resolution, PTSD, and Complex PTSD: The 
Relationship Between Meaning and Trauma-Related Diagnoses", Journal o f Traumatic Stress, vol. 10, no. 2, 
1997, pp. 197-213.
92 Christina Hoff Sommers & Sally Satel, One Nation Under Therapy: How the Helping Culture is Eroding Self- 
Reliance (New York: St Martin's Press, 2005), pp. 177-214.
93 Fran H. Norris, "Community and Ecological Approaches to Understanding and Alleviating Postdisaster 
Distress" in Yuval Neria, Raz Gross, Randall Marshall, Beverley Raphael, Ezra S. Susser (eds.), 9/11: Mental 
Health in the Wake o f Terrorist Attacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 141-156.
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constructing experiences of trauma throughout the population, medicalising the 
everyday.94 Medicalisation will be further addressed later in this section, but it is 
symptomatic of the inability of PTSD to address the broader psychological effects of 
terrorism given its focus on individual psychopathology rather than that of a social or group 
dynamic.
Mass sociogenic illness can be found in multiple occurances of acute physical symptoms of 
illness amongst a population stemming from no direct obvious cause. MSI falls under the 
diagnostic category of 'somatoform disorders', that is, a condition brought on by the mind. 
A definition offered by two leading authorities describe it as
[t]he rapid spread of illness signs and symptoms affecting members of a 
cohesive group, originating from a nervous system disturbance involving 
excitation, loss or alteration of function whereby physical complaints that are 
exhibited unconsciously have no corresponding organic aetiology.95
Mass sociogenic illness is a psychiatric condition that in many ways eludes rational 
explanations of individual actors and material causation. It relies on some combination of 
pre-existing stress, community fears, and interpersonal or mediated social transmission, 
although this transmission is largely discursive rather than physical. Many documented 
cases reflect such non-rationai elements. For instance, Japan's 'Pokemon panic' of 1997 
saw hundreds of children admitted to  hospital as a result of watching a particular episode 
of a children's cartoon. In the highest rating program for its time-slot -  watched by millions 
-  Pikachu seeks to counteract a "virus bomb" deployed by his nemesis Polygon using his 
lightning powers, which were represented using a series of screen flashes. Within forty 
minutes 618 children were taken to hospital presenting symptoms ranging from "trance­
like hypnosis" to "vomiting and convulsions".96 Subsequent media reporting of the 
illnesses, which replayed the flashing sequence, led to up to a reported 12,000 children 
being admitted to hospital, 7,000 presenting seizures. While initial 'index cases' were 
diagnosed as rare cases of photosensitive epilepsy, ultimately the many thousands that 
subsequently became affected can only be explained by transmission via the media
94 Peter Conrad, "Medicalization and Social Control", Annual Review of Sociology 18, 1992, pp. 209-232.
95 Robert E. Bartholomew and Simon Wessely, "Protean Nature of Mass Psychogenic Illness: From Possessed 
Nuns to Clinical and Biological Terrorism Fears", British Journal o f Psychiatry, vol. 180, no. 2, 2002, pp. 300-306.
96 Benjamin Radford, The Pokemon Panic of 1997", Skeptical Inquirer Magazine, May/June 2001. Accessed from 
www.csicop.org/si/2001-05/pokemon.html on 24/11/08.
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frenzy.97 Similarly an outbreak of severe illness amongst nearly one-third of a class of 48 
Taiwanese students was attributed to mass hysteria or MSI despite, or perhaps because of, 
the belief amongst many of the students that they were affected by supernatural evil 
forces.98 The illness was so great that six cases continued to present symptoms for a week 
or longer. These cases both highlight clear physical symptoms that in the overwhelming 
majority of cases stem as a result of a complex group psychology.
In the post-9/11 Western psychological landscape, collective fears regarding terrorism have 
been reflected in identified cases of MSI. In 2005 there was a mass evacuation of 
Melbourne airport, in which a triage unit was set up and medical staff donned protective 
clothing as a resulted of a suspected outbreak of toxic poisoning. The chain of events was 
as follows.99 Three airport services workers in and around a newsagency collapsed citing 
dizziness, nausea and trouble breathing. A security guard was also taken ill and after 
reporting it to his union all members were asked to present to health services to be 
checked. Four more security guards reported ill, although two were suggested to have 
checked in only as per instructions from the union. An outdoors triage unit was set up by 
the health services and a further two check-in staff, located above the newsagent reported 
to triage complaining of symptoms. At this point the southern domestic terminal was 
closed and evacuated and air sample testing conducted. In total 57 were treated at the 
triage centre, the majority of which were taken to hospital presenting very minor 
symptoms.100 The EspHn Report subsequently conducted into the incident suggested that 
there was no causal agent and that food, water and air poisoning were not responsible, in 
many instances heat stroke was suggested to be a factor. Ultimately, however, the Esplin 
Report determined the event to be a mystery with no ascertainable cause. Bartholomew 
suggests, however, that mass hysteria or mass sociogenic illness was most likely 
responsible on the basis that the "outbreak began with a dramatic singular incident (an 
index case) and was primarily spread by line-of-sight and sound, and later
97 Benjamin Radford & Robert Bartholomew, "Pokemon Contagion: Photosensitive Epilepsy or Mass 
Psychogenic Illness?", Southern Medical Journal, vol. 94, no. 2, 2001, pp. 197-204.
98 Cheng-Shen Chen, Cheng-Fan Yen, Hsui-Fen Lin & Pingchen Yang, "Mass Hysteria and Perceptions of the 
Supernatural Among Adolescent Girl Students in Taiwan", The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, vol. 191 
no. 2, 2003, pp. 122-3.
99 Chronology of events outlined in the Esplin report.
100 AAP, "Melbourne Airport Sickness Baffles Inquiry", The Age, 4/4/05. Accessed from www.theage.com.au 
/news/National/Melbourne-airport-sickness-baffles-inquiry/2005/04/04/1112489396342.html on 24/11/08.
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telecommunications. Symptoms were transient and benign, with a rapid onset and 
recovery, and were consistent with anxiety."101
Post-9/11 there have been many overreactions to real or perceived terrorist threats. This 
can be seen in the accounts of the Anthrax scare detailed above and no doubt everyone 
living in the Western world could offer at least one story in which a suspicious person, 
event or thing was construed as a terrorist threat -  in all likelihood because of its 
foreignness or being out of place -  causing widespread overreaction and anxiety. Mass 
sociogenic illness, according to Bartholomew and Wessely exists on this same spectrum of 
overreaction but is on the extreme end in which it is accompanied by acute psychological 
and physical symptoms and can be considered a psychopathology.102 Indeed these 
psychological disturbances are not only likely associated with the threat of terrorism but 
are also likely to "amplify" the popular perception of it.103 MSI is also most likely to mirror 
prominent social concerns of the times and in this way reflects societies' ability to 
"construct reality" as the "perceived danger needs only to be plausible in order to gain 
acceptance within a particular group and generate anxiety."104 MSI, like PTSD, seems to 
capture many of the psychological effects of terrorism. Yet in maintaining a strict focus on 
mental illness and individuals or population groups that deviate from accepted 
psychological normalcy, MSI does not address the effects throughout society more 
generally. The analysis offered by Bartholomew and Wessely, as with attempts to broaden 
the definition of PTSD mentioned earlier, seek to keep pace with the suggestions within the 
medical community that there are broad effects on populations, although ultimately these 
categories are not designed in diagnostic, methodological or prescriptive terms suited to 
subtle and pervasive psychological effects.
What emerges from this survey of the literature on the psychological effects of 9/11 is the 
sense that there is a wider, pervasive, and indirect effect on the wider population. This, 
however, emerges as much from the opinion of the experts within this field as it does from 
their research. Depending on who one reads there is either insufficient research or 
methodological limitations that prevent these wider effects being demonstrated. There is
101 Robert E. Bartholomew, '"Mystery Illness' at Melbourne Airport: Toxic Poisoning or Mass Hysteria?", Medical 
Journal o f Australia, vol. 183, no. 11, 2005, pp. 564-566.
102 Robert E. Bartholomew & Simon Wessely, "The Protean Nature of Mass Sociogenic Illness: From Possessed 
Nuns to Chemical and Biological Terrorism Fears", British Journal of Psychiatry 180, 2002, pp. 300-306.
103 Ibid., p. 303.
104 Ibid., p. 304.
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also disagreement as to whether this effect is 'real' in psychological terms, or perhaps is 
something from the domain of social analysis. This is precisely the line of rupture between 
social and psychological disciplines that this chapter seeks to engage. Frequently political 
opinion emerges from psychological studies, for instance Vernberg suggests that "as a 
nation, we have invested in deterrence, surveillance, and revenge rather than addressing 
the profound psychological costs of terrorism . " 105 This is not limited exclusively to the 
concerns of liberals, progressives and the left, although conservative positions tend to be 
more implicit emphasising the importance of the status quo and patriotic duty of 
psychological resilience in the face of terror. For instance, Sullivan and Bongar suggest the 
promotion of "psychological resilience and minimizing psychological trauma in the wake of 
terrorist attacks has therefore become a matter not only of individual health but also of 
national security."10b Therefore by way of recommendation they suggest that "civilians are 
not merely the potential victims or indirect agents of terrorists but also combatants in the 
war against terrorism." Flere we see an attempt to implicate the entire population in 
national security, suggesting it should rally together in the face of a foreign and abnormal 
threat.
The creation of medical categories such as PTSD and MSI is not an objective process of 
observation whereby static and discrete etiologies or symptoms are labelled. Instead it is a 
constantly shifting process subject to social, political and cultural dynamics. 107 Indeed, the 
origins of PTSD in the immediate aftermath of the war in Vietnam highlights the attempt to 
address not only the psychological sequelae of war but also to achieve a measure of social, 
medical and financial support for individuals and communities suffering the effects brought 
home from war. 108 The complexity surrounding psychological categories and the 
accompanying treatment of such afflictions is thus not simply limited to trying to classify 
medical phenomena that are in a constant state of flux, as these categories are in turn also 
shaping and influencing the society that experts seek to classify. As Breslau and McNally 
suggest, one does not want to assume that classification of trauma occurs in a 'cultural 
vacuum', rather
105 Eric M. Vernberg, "Psychological Science and Terrorism: Making Psychological Issues Part of our Planning and 
Technology" in Science at a Time o f National Emergency (Merrill Advanced Studies Center) no. 106, June 2002. 
Accessed from merrill.ku.edu/publications/2002whitepaper/vernberg.html on 8/12/08.
106 Sullivan & Bongar, "Psychological Consequences of Actual or Threatened CBRNE Terrorism", p. 153.
107 Peter Conrad, "Medicalization and Social Control", Annual Review of Sociology 18, 1992, pp. 209-232.
108 W J Scott, "PTSD in DSM-III: A Case of the Politics, Diagnosis and Disease", Sociological Problems, 37, pp. 294- 
310.
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the concept of trauma and its close link to psychological disease has leaked 
into the discourse of everyday life, encouraging people to interpret the 
vicissitudes of everyday life through the lens of trauma. Emotional responses 
to life's misfortunes are increasingly experienced as symptoms of disease.109
It is in this sense that psychological categories such as PTSD can be said to be socially 
constructed; not only are these attempts to label a fluid and indistinct population group 
but also a process in which subjects may be increasingly shaped in this mould.110 As has 
been seen in the discussion of PTSD, the complex interaction between medical 
classificatory regimes and the population has given rise to a growing number that are 
included in the definition of PTSD, an expansion that can be attributed to both definitional 
'bracket creep' and social adaptation to such categories.
As discussed in Chapter 2 there are a range of social and political approaches that can shed 
light on the way in which foreign policy operationalises mechanisms of social control 
outside of the diplomatic arena of interstate relations. As has been reviewed in this chapter 
9/11, terrorist threats and the wider war on terror give rise to a range of direct 
psychological effects, particularly PTSD as well as indirect effects such as MSI. The medical 
literature, however, was not able shed sufficient light on the more pervasive (indeed more 
social) psychological effects that occur throughout normal society. As suggested by many in 
the medical and psychological field, the post-9/11 landscape has given rise to something of 
a 'new normal'. The widespread incidence of PTSD symptomology amongst those indirectly 
affected by terrorism and the potential for MSI that accompanies a general mood of 
terrorism-related anxiety suggests that there is a subtle undercurrent of disquiet and 
unease throughout the wider population. While this may not and should not be considered 
a disease there are psychological effects present.
A central nervousness system: Psychological effects of terror alerts 
on the population
To conclude this chapter, this section overviews the psychological effects of the 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) colour-coded terror alert warning system. This 
chapter has sought to highlight the psychological effects of terrorism at the level of the 
population. The discussion of the psychological effects of terrorism and the subsequent
Breslau & McNally, "Epidemiology of 9/11", pp. 523-524.
110 C E Rosenberg, "Disease and Social Order in America: Perceptions and Expectations" in E Fee & D M Fox 
(eds.), AIDS: The Burdens of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 12-31.
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effects stemming from attempts to mediate foreign threat has taken place at the 
intersection of the medical and socio-political discourses. From this discussion it has 
emerged that these effects are not limited just to the direct effects of terror attacks but are 
also connected to contemporary counter-terrorism measures and foreign policy positions. 
In this sense the psychological effects are also highly pervasive and play a role in shaping 
and ordering society. This discussion will seek to draw on the preceding discussions and 
highlight in particular the way in which the colour-coded terror alert system enacts 
mechanisms and processes of social ordering that operate at the level of the population 
but affect each individual specifically.
The colour-coded terrorist alert system, or the Homeland Security Advisory System, has 
from its inception been highly controversial. There have been many critiques within 
security studies literature and the alerts have been subject to much popular ridicule. 111 This 
section will not delve into such criticisms nor focus in detail on the chronology of the threat 
level indicators. This section will focus instead on the psychological effects and the role 
alerts play in shaping domestic order, although such criticisms may, however, draw from or 
make implicit criticisms in seeking to understand the psychological and social effects.
Even if it were possible to effectively utilise the full spectrum of the colour-coded alert 
system, it has insecurity built into its very architecture. The lowest possible threat level -  
which has not yet been employed -  would indicate that there is a 'low' (green) likelihood of 
a terrorist attack. Even if judged to be 'low' (green) there still exists some level of threat, a 
level of insecurity. 112 Furthermore, within this colour-coded vocabulary there are no words 
(no such colour) for 'no threat' or for an end to insecurity. The notion of an end to 
insecurity, in this sense, has been deemed irrelevant to our immediate future. While 
ultimate security may remain ever ephemeral and unreachable, at the very least its 
prospect would offer some kind of hope for the future, something for individuals to work
111 Lawrence Freedman, "The Politics of Warning: Terrorism and Risk Communication", Intelligence and 
National Security, vol. 20, no. 3, 2005, pp. 379-418; Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara Kay Cohen, "Color Blind: Lessons 
from the Failed Homeland Security Advisory System", International Security, vol. 32 no. 2, 2007, pp. 121-154; 
George M. Gray and David P. Ropiek, "Dealing with the Dangers of Fear: The Role of Risk Communication", 
Health Affairs, vol. 21, no. 6, 2002, pp. 106-117; John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism 
Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 1-12; 
John Brigham, "Anti-Anti Terror: Color-Coding and the Joke of 'Homeland Security'", New Political Science, vol. 
27, no. 4, 2005, pp. 481-496.
112 At this lowest level the government recommends developing a family emergency plan, an emergency supply 
kit and locating a place of shelter. See Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Citizen Guidance on the 
Homeland Security Advisory System", 30/05/08. Accessed from www.fema.gov/arevoureadv/ 
homeland security advisory system,shtm on 20/12/08.
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towards. It simply seems overly pessimistic not to include a colour that represents 'safe' or 
'secure' or better yet; 'safe and secure'. Without this colour of safety and security, it 
enshrines the notion that the war on terror is in fact 'the new normalcy' that Dick Cheney 
referred to.113
In practice the system has been even less effective. The functionality of the five-tiered 
system is ham-strung by the negative effects it is likely to have on the wider populace, 
which is an unfortunate irony given that it is a mechanism designed precisely to have a 
beneficial effect on the population. The terrorist threat level has consistently hovered at 
levels of yellow or orange and on occasions in specific areas in New York, been increased to 
red ('severe'). For the most part 'severe' is not used as it suggests that either an attack is 
taking place or is extremely imminent. Blue ('guarded') and green ('low') have never been 
used for fear that an unpredicted (or indeed an unpredictable) attack might occur. This 
means that the possibility of a terrorist attack has been judged to be consistently at a 
yellow ('elevated') or orange ('high') level, making it effectively a vague and inflexible two- 
tiered system. Thus the terror alert system is functionally only able to inform the 
population of a continuing somewhat high level of vague and undefined threat.
The absence of a substantial attack taking place since September 11 suggests that a 
'guarded' (blue) threat level must have at some point been justified. Terror attacks are by 
nature hard to predict; if, however, the logic for the continued level of 'elevated' (yellow) 
or 'high' (orange) alert levels is based on the argument that threats are hard to predict and 
that it is easier to criticise with the benefit of hindsight, then this seems to undermine the 
very case for even having an alert system at all. Indeed, the fundamental role of the alert 
system is to inform and prepare populations based on available knowledge to facilitate 
effective self-management based on individual perceptions of risk. A lack of detailed 
knowledge of the security environment should not necessarily be construed as indicating 
threat, particularly as it overexposes the population to undue perceptions of danger, 
causing effective risk management within the population to break down.
Given the sensitivity surrounding the issue of terrorism and the purposeful high visibility of 
the terror alert system, any flaws are likely to have accompanying psychological affects. 
Furthermore, the psychological effects will be inherently broad and pervasive in nature
113 Graham, "Cities and the War on Terror", p. 262.
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given that the terror alerts are designed to facilitate mass communication. Unlike most of 
the post-9/11 studies into illness such PTSD, the direct effects of the terror alert system will 
inherently be indirect. As was evident in general research into the psychological effects of 
terrorism, methodologies and quantifications of mental illness associated with terrorism 
tend to focus on PTSD. While there are some studies with data relating to terror alerts, the 
psychological literature relating to broader, 'normal' people employs theories of social 
psychology in order to understand widespread effects. According to Zimbardo, "social 
psychology seeks to understand human behaviour within its broader human context; it 
looks at all the ways in which people are influenced by other people."114 McDermott and 
Zimbardo suggest three main effects are taking place.115 Firstly, shifts in the terror alert 
level produces negative outcomes amongst individuals with existing PTSD or anxiety issues. 
Second, the designation of a constant threat to the nation produces what is described as 
'heightened in-group bias' and 'mortality salience', which in turn greatly increases political 
support for incumbent rule. This also gives rise to, finally, a process of social and cultural 
homogenisation.
As with psychological studies examined in the previous section clear data on psychological 
effects has only been obtained in relation to the direct effects of terrorism. The key study 
to this point was undertaken by Kramer et al and obtained data from nearly 2,000 World 
Trade Center disaster-relief workers, 28% of whom had prior diagnoses of PTSD or major 
associated symptoms.116 The study sought to observe the effects of changes in the terror 
alert status amongst both those with and without existing psychopathology, measured in 
terms of PTSD, general anxiety or depression. During the course of the study there were 
nine shifts between 'elevated' (yellow) and 'high' (orange). The first two changes (10/9/02 
and 7/2/03) produced no significant change in reported symptoms. The next two 
elevations, however, gave rise to "increased symptoms of physiological arousal, general 
and phobic anxiety and depression" amongst both those who were and were not already
114 Previous social psychology work by Zimbardo includes the infamous 'Stanford Prison Experiment'. Philip G. 
Zimbardo, "Episode 19 -  The Power of the Situation", Discovering Psychology (Updated Edition), 2001 (1990). 
Accessed from www.learner.org/vod/login.html?pid=1516 on 20/12/08.
115 Rose McDermott & Philip G. Zimbardo, "The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts" in Yuval Neria, 
Raz Gross, Randall Marshall, Beverley Raphael, Ezra S. Susser (eds.), 9/11: Mental Health in the Wake of 
Terrorist Attacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 358.
116 Michael E. Kramer, Adam D. Brown, Lisa Spielman, Cezar Giosan & Michelanne Rothrock, "Psychological 
Reactions to the National Terror-Alert System", The Id: Graduate Faculty Psychology Society Bulletin, vol. 1, 
no.l, 2003, p. 68. Accessed from www.newschool.edu/nssr/bulletin/pdfs/vol01no01/Kramer03.pdf on 
20/12/08.
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anxious.117 A follow-up study found that following the first two rises, anxiety levels also 
increased when threat levels were lowered.118 These findings are consistent with a 
'habituation effect', in which "people cease to take such notices seriously, as calls to action, 
after the first three or four times."119 Furthermore, a sense of frustration, anxiety and 
helplessness is likely to have emerged in light of the "violation of an effective alarm 
principle" in which threat indicators are meant to be tied to credible information.129 Instead 
the "tacit message [is] that the system is arbitrary and is not linked to actual threats."121
The results gleaned from this study may have been affected by the nature of the second 
raise in the terror alert level, which was either badly handled or cynically motivated. On 7 
February 2003, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge 
announced that the terror threat level would be raised to 'high' (orange) on the basis of 
specific information pertaining to credible threats from al-Qaeda. In a follow-up interview 
on ABC News, when asked about the so-called 'specific information' Ridge offered the 
following obfuscatory and contradictory statement: "we get general information and 
specific information but none of the specific information talks about time, place, method or 
means."122 Information containing no detailed facts must go a long way to satisfying the 
definition of 'general' as opposed to 'specific'. Two days later, David Paulison, fire 
department administrator and later director of FEMA, intensified the sense that citizens 
were directly under threat within their homes. By advising Americans to stock up on 
"plastic sheeting and duct tape" to protect themselves from radiological or biological 
attack, Paulison created a widespread rush on hardware stores by worried citizens seeking 
to protect themselves.123 Such alarmist sentiments seemed to contradict the continued 
reassurance that individuals should go about business as usual, whilst also finding time to 
"take some time to prepare for emergencies."124
117 Ibid., p. 69.
118 Kramer et al, quoted in McDermott & Zimbardo, "The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts", p. 
363.
119 McDermott & Zimbardo, "The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts", p. 360.
120 Ibid., p. 359-360.
121 Shapiro & Cohen, "Color Blind", p. 132.
122 Tom Ridge quoted in Jon Stewart, The Daily Show, 10/02/03. Accessed from www.thedailyshow.com/ 
video/index.ihtml?videold-l 11995 on 20/12/08.
123 Jeanne Meserve, "Duct Tape Sales Rise Amid Terror Fears", CNN, 11/02/03. Accessed from edition.cnn.com/ 
2003/US/02/11/emergency.supplies on 20/12/08; See also, Keith Olbermann, "The Nexus of Politics and 
Terror", Countdown, 12/10/05. Accessed from www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/9677220 on 20/12/08.
124 Fox News, "Terror Threat Level Raised to Orange", 07/02/03. Accessed from www.foxnews.com/story/O, 
2933.77885.00.html on 20/12/08
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The second way in which terror alerts engender psychological effects is through social 
psychological notions of increased 'in-group bias' and a heightened 'm orta lity salience'. 
McDermott and Zimbardo suggest that in light of 9/11 and the continued threat of terror 
attacks, most prominently signified by the terror alerts, there has been an "increase in­
group identification among Americans... and simultaneous out-group denigration or hatred 
of foreign groups perceived to be responsible for the violent acts", in short, nationalism 
and racism. 125 A number of studies have been conducted in this area using terror 
management theory (TMT), the central proposition of which suggests "tha t awareness of 
the inevitability of death is a core human problem that lies at the root of a broad range of 
superficially unrelated forms of human behaviour."126 Despite the title , TMT is not a theory 
of terrorism but rather the examination of the effects of the threat or fear of death on 
individuals and their cultural worldview. The te rro r alerts, however, act as constant a 
reminder of the potential for apocalyptic terrorism. Insofar as TMT holds that "human 
behaviour is significantly affected by anything that makes people aware of their own 
potential death or sensitizes them to their m ortality," the continued scrolling of terror 
alerts across of the bottom of television screens ensures m orta lity salience will remain a 
permanent feature of the political landscape.127
The psychological effect of the mortality salience created by terror alerts can be
extrapolated from a number of TMT studies. Initial TMT studies established the central
proposition that "reminding people of their mortality increases attraction to  those who
consensually validate their beliefs and decreases attraction to  those who threaten their
beliefs."128 Mortality salience also gives rise to a tendency towards cultural solidarity and
political homogenisation. Pyszczynski et ol suggest once an
individual has become committed to a particular worldview as a basis for 
security, he or she becomes motivated to maintain faith in it. Thus, 
information consistent w ith that worldview is sought and information 
inconsistent w ith it is avoided or explained away.129
125 McDermott & Zimbardo, "The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts", p. 363.
126 Jeff Greenberg, Jamie Arndt et al, Proximal and Distal Defenses in Response to Reminders of One's Mortality: 
Evidence of a Temporal Sequence", Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, vol. 26, no. 1, 2000, p. 91.
127 McDermott & Zimbardo, "The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts", p. 363.
128 Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski et al, "Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality 
salience on reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview", Journal o f Personality and Social 
Psychology, vol. 58, no. 2, 1990, p. 308.
129 Tom Pyszczynski, Jeff Greenberg et al, "Why Do We Need What We Need? A Terror Management 
Perspective on the Roots of Human Social Motivation", Psychological Inquiry, vol. 8, no. 1, 1997, p. 9.
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Predominant cultural worldviews are further consolidated in the face of threats as 
individuals faced with mortality salience tend to "increase stereotypic thinking and 
[demonstrate] preferences for stereotype-confirming individuals."130 In relation to political 
leadership, individuals were offered a choice between a strong, charismatic political leader 
and an understanding, relationship-oriented leader. In a situation in which death was 
salient individuals showed increased preference for the stronger leader, whereas free of 
this they chose the relationship-oriented leader.131 Mortality salience was also shown to 
incline a group to vote for Republican George W. Bush in the 2004 election when they 
would otherwise have voted for Democratic candidate John Kerry.132 Specifically in relation 
to the policies of the Bush presidency, mortality salience was shown to increase support for 
the administration's counter-terrorism policies and reminders of 9/11 increased support 
for the presidency of Bush.133 Particularly interesting for the purposes of this section was a 
sub-section of this research that established that "subliminal exposure to 9/11-related 
material brought death-related thoughts closer to consciousness."134 It assessed this 
association by asking subjects to complete words such as 'coff..', which could be completed 
as death-related (eg coffin), or a range of neutral terms (eg coffee, coffer etc). On some of 
the completion tasks 'WTC' or '911' was flashed for a consciously imperceptible 26 
milliseconds and in such instances subjects tended towards death-related responses. This 
aspect of the study thus found that "the increased accessibility of death-related thoughts 
outside of focal attention -  the condition shown to engender symbolic defences -  occurs at 
an unconscious level" suggesting the psychological effect of terror alerts would be subtle 
and pervasive.135 Furthermore, while this test assessed the political effects associated with 
death salience, such reminders are also shown to have significant social effects. In 
conjunction with social identity theory, mortality salience is shown to increase a bias
Jeff Schimel, Linda Simon et al, "Stereotypes and Terror Management: Evidence that Mortality Salience 
Enhances Stereotypic Thinking and Preferences", Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 77, no. 5, 
1999, p. 905.
131 Florette Cohen, Sheldon Solomon et al, "Fatal Attraction: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Evaluations of 
Charismatic, Task-Oriented and Relationship-Oriented Leaders", Psychological Science, vol. 15, no. 2, 2004, pp. 
846-852.
132 Florette Cohen, Daniel Ogilvie et al, "American Roulette: The Effects of Reminders of Death on Support for 
George W. Bush in the 2004 Election", Analyses o f Social Issues and Public Policy, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, pp. 177- 
187.
133 Mark J. Landau, Solomon Sheldon et al, "Deliver Us From Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience Reminders of 
9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush", Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30, 2004, pp. 1136- 
1150.
134 Ibid., pp. 1141-1142.
135 Ibid., p. 1141.
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towards those individuals they consider as similar (in-group) and unfavourable judgements 
they consider different (out-group ) . 136
There are certainly lim itations to TMT research. A review of this body of work describes it 
as "experiments [that] manipulate the subjects' mental reactions... the results [of which] 
are extrapolated to world political conflicts between diverse cultures of peoples. " 137 In 
short, insights into highly complex inter-cultural social and political relations are being 
extrapolated from highly staged and controlled experiments on small groups of American 
students. Again, the methodological lim itations of social psychology -  as was the case with 
statistical surveys of mental illness -  prevent a clear, scientifically verifiable understanding 
of the wider psychological effects of terrorism on the w ider population being obtained. 
Critics of TMT and Zimbardo's work on terrorism suggest that statistics obtained by these 
studies are not able to unambiguously speak for themselves and conclusions reflect the 
beliefs of the authors rather than the results of their w ork . 138 Indeed, within the bounds of 
the ir research, an individual's fear of death in this way can be used to explain almost any 
kind of action; it is a broad and general catch-all explanation of human behaviour. 139 Once 
again, the wider psychological effects o f terrorism remain illusively between medical and 
socio-political discourses.
The th ird  and final psychological effect suggested by McDermott and Zimbardo only further 
affirms this intellectual and academic limbo. Indeed the final psychological effect 
highlighted is not so much psychological as it is political in its effects on public perception, 
although this only serves to further highlight the overlap between these effects. 
McDermott and Zimbardo ponder the question of why the colour-coded te rro r alert system 
is so ineffective; is it political manipulation or incompetency? The drawn conclusion is that 
evidence points to  both but importantly wider public perception and accompanying 
psychological effects overwhelmingly suggest the former, seen in public cynicism and 
conspiracy theorising. There is a great level of scepticism amongst critics o f the terror-alert
Eddie Harmon Jones, Jeff Greenberg et al, "The Effects of Mortality Salience on Intergroup Bias Between 
Minimal Groups", European Journal o f Social Psychology 26, 1996, pp. 677-681.
137 Lynne DeLisi, "Book Forum: In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror", American Journal of Psychiatry 
160, 2003, p. 1019.
138 DeLisi, "Book Forum: In the Wake of 9/11" and for a rebuttal to Philip Zimbardo see Bob Nichols, "Invited 
Response from Dr Bob Nichols" in "Political Psychology of Terrorist Alarms", APA Online, 28/02/08. Accessed 
from www.apa.org/about/division/terrorism.html on 20/12/08.
139 Delroy L. Paulhus & Paul D. Trapnell, Terror management Theory: Extended or Overextended", Psychological 
Inquiry, vol. 8, no. 1, 1997, pp. 40-43; Mark R. Leary and Lisa S. Schreindorfer, "Unresolved Issues With Terror 
Management Theory", Psychological Inquiry, vol. 8, no. 1,1997, pp. 26-29.
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system regarding the extent to which the upgrading of alerts respond to objective threats 
and verifiable intelligence information leading them to suggest they are part of deliberate 
ploy to politically intervene and unduly control individuals.140 Indeed, the extent of the 
correlation -  as opposed to coincidence -  of terror alert status upgrades with significant 
political events suggests it would be unreasonable to think that there is not some level of 
political opportunism taking place. Regardless, however, of the balance between the 
benefits and ineffectiveness of terror alerts, and the extent to which political manipulation 
may be occurring, the overview by McDermott and Zimbardo suggest the cumulative 
psychological effects of colour-coded system has been to create fear and anxiety amongst 
those directly affected by 9/11, cynicism amongst critics and unthinking political support
141amongst supporters.
Before concluding this chapter, I'd like to suggest that the kind of analysis offered 
throughout this thesis can offer some refinement to the argument offered above. Such an 
account concerns the question posed previously regarding ineffectiveness and 
manipulation. This is in many ways a false opposition, the presence of manipulation is 
unlikely to be total as individuals are exposed to terror alerts -  whether manipulated, 
ineffective or beneficial -  within a socio-political discursive context. Above and beyond any 
attempt to directly control individuals directly, the terror alert system has a far greater and 
more subtle control and regulatory effect. The terror alert system acts as a hub for the 
dissemination of discourse in a much broader sense than simply the communication of 
information and/or disinformation. Furthermore this discourse is interpreted specifically by 
each individual in light of their own perspective and world-view. The terror alert system is 
individualising yet coordinating, not unlike the panoptic system Foucault detailed, which 
operationalises discipline amongst the population; ordering without directly controlling.
Brian Massumi's analysis of the terror alert system sets out these diffuse mechanisms of 
control. The effects of the terror alerts are not likely to be clearly observable in the 
emergence of psychopathology. According to Massumi, the effects of the terror alerts is to 
link individuals as a population, to create psychological connections where social
See for instance, R. Wilier, "The Effects of Government-Issued Terror Warnings on Presidential Approval 
Ratings", Current Research in Social Psychology, vol. 10, no. 1, 2004. Accessed from 
www.uiowa.edu/~grpproc/crisp/crisp.html on 20/12/08 and; Keith Olbermann, "The Nexus of Politics and 
Terror", Countdown, 12/10/05. Accessed from www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/9677220 on 20/12/08.
141 McDermott & Zimbardo, "The Psychological Consequences of Terrorist Alerts", pp. 357-370.
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connections don't otherwise exist through the normative influence of these security 
prerogatives. In this sense the alerts are
perceptual cues... designed to train into the population wirelessly jacked 
central government functioning directly into each individual's nervous system.
The whole population became a networked jumpiness, a distributed neuronal 
network registering en masse quantum shifts in the nation's global state of 
discomfiture.142
Despite an analysis of the psychological effects of the terror alerts that calls to mind 
science fiction, Massumi resists the impulse toward a dystopian diagnosis of an 
authoritarian uniformity. Rather, control in a diffuse sense operates through common logic 
-  govermentality -  impelled by the threat to national security. Control is not total, indeed it 
is unpredictable.
Jacked into the same modulation of feeling, bodies reacted in unison without 
necessarily acting alike. Their responses could, and did, take many forms.
What they shared was the central nervousness. How it translated somatically 
varied from body to body.143
This 'central nervousness system' suffuses non-specific information pertaining to threats 
from outsiders. Whether they be foreign threats or threats from deviant groups, individuals 
are left to make their own decisions according to a generalised but parochially insistent 
logic of war on terror and national foreign policy. In this way "the object of power [has 
become] correspondingly formless and contentless: post 9/11, governmentality has molded 
itself to threat. A threat is unknowable. If it were known in its specifics, it wouldn't be a 
threat. It would be a situation."144
Terror alerts can thus be seen as security provided through non-obligatory 
recommendations. This is referred to as responsibilisation of citizens who also interpret 
such recommendations as is relevant to their scenario. This positions the state as if it were 
a supplier or provider of security and is an attempt to create some measure of 
transparency. The attempt at openness or transparency seeks to transfer part of the 
decision-making process relating to one's provision of security to the individual. Towards 
this end, publicising terror alerts aims to allow individuals to interpret necessary security 
measures according to their own condition and thus to achieve a more efficient outcome. It
142 Brian Massumi, "Fear (The Spectrum Said)", positions 13:1, Spring 2003, p. 32.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid., p. 35.
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also allows this more effective and specialised security to be transferred to each individual 
-  effectively 'in-sourced' -  thus achieving a theoretically more effective and lower cost 
security than if security sought to more comprehensively cover a broader range of aspects 
of each individual's life. In this sense, it is a clear demonstration of how state bureaucracies 
that are charged with managing or protecting against external threat, through providing 
this security, are able to structure and organise society without directly interfering or 
intervening in the political process. Furthermore, it does so in such a way that it allows 
individuals to continue to exercise free choice -  freedom, narrowly defined -  while in the 
pursuit of security. This governmental freedom of the citizen-cum-consumer allows them 
to make choices relating to some issues of risk.
The operation of a subtie mode of foreign policy discipline can thus be seen in the attempt 
to oblige citizens to make informed choices. What these terror alert systems do -  with 
varying levels of intrusiveness and effectiveness -  is to securitize the rational decision- 
making process of individuals; the notion of the individual decision-making process being 
the essential premise of the free liberal individual. 145 This premise frames the individual as 
the consumer but what is being consumed, or at least is subject to consumer choice, is 
security. In this sense security and liberty are bound to together in the process of deploying 
the citizen as someone who exercises rational free-choice in determining some measure of 
their own security in relation to external threats, although these threats are conceived as 
penetrating the domestic realm through acts of terrorism. The freedom and rationality 
within this individual decision-making is constrained by the influence of the discursive 
background in which such decisions are made. The prevalence of foreign policy norms and 
the steady background noise of national security ensure that such choices are instead 
made in reference to, with or against, contemporary policy positions. 146 This undermines 
the scope for such an approach to enact a genuine and effective system of individual choice 
and the logic of self-determined security fails to gain traction with individuals, causing them 
to become cynical or apathetic. In short, the governmental effectiveness of individual 
choice within a broad over-arching discursive logic is breaking down. Perhaps then, as 
much as this governmental freedom resembles traditional negative freedom where one is 
notionally free to choose, it is also the kind of freedom that one might find in a shopping 
mall; nominally free, but ultimately constrained.
145 See the arguments regarding positive and negative freedom presented in Chapter 3.
146 Individuals are forced to adopt to the model of security rather adopting to model of security to individuals.
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This chapter demonstrated that the combination of the psychological and social effects of 
9/11 are massive, constituting a wholesale reorganisation of the USA. The war on terror has 
not only extended overseas into faraway lands, it has been ingrained throughout the 
internal social and political landscape. As equally as US-led wars disrupted global politics 
these actions have reshaped its own political order. This calls to mind the argument made 
by Vivienne Jabri, who demonstrates that global conceptions of war act as a transformative 
project both within societies as well as throughout global relations.147 Attempting to 
capture the psychological scar of 9/11 on the national psyche, Irwin Redlener and Stephen 
S. Morse compare the effects of 9/11 with those of Pearl Harbour. They suggest it entailed
a transformation of the country and its citizens from a heterogeneous, though 
internationally isolated, nation still recovering from the great economic 
depression of a decade or so earlier to a suddenly united, invigorated 
protagonist in one of the greatest wars in all of history.148
The parallels eluded to here are not simply to the oft-cited moral justifications for a 
retaliatory call to war but rather the panoply of accompanying psychological effects and 
social change it engenders domestically in the pursuit of this foreign policy face-saving 
mission. 9/11, however, represents a much greater and indeed more pervasive 
psychological effect. Americans were not only required to respond abroad to the 9/11 
attacks as they had after Pearl Harbour; they also had to recover at home.
147 Vivienne Jabri, War and the Transformation of Global Politics (Basingstroke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007), see in particular Chapters one and two.
143 Irwin Redlener & Stephen S. Morse, "Life Under the 'New Normal': Notes on the Future of Preparedness" in 
Neria et al. (eds.), 9/11: Mental Health in the Wake o f Terrorist Attacks, p. 594.
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Conclusion
This thesis has argued that foreign policy affects its own citizens and populations. The 
primary argument of this thesis is that these effects can be understood as a form of 
discipline that shapes domestic order and engenders processes of social control. This thesis 
demonstrated this argument in two parts. The first established a theoretical framework 
through which International Relations scholars can better identify, conceptualise, and 
analyse the disciplinary effects of foreign policy. This has involved engaging in a critique of 
current conceptualisations of the international system as well as imagining a new 
framework through which we can re-connect the flows of power and knowledge between 
the international and domestic realm. The second part of this thesis demonstrated the 
primary argument through a number of case studies from Western liberal democratic 
states. The case studies were chosen to show that foreign policy can be understood as a 
form of discipline that shapes domestic order and engenders processes of social control. 
Sometimes this is done in ways which are explicit and obvious, even to the most 
unobservant citizen travelling between cities or countries. In other cases, however, this 
thesis demonstrates that there does need to be an explicit conceptual framework that 
challenges us to search for the links, and to evaluate their consequences.
In addition to, and indeed connecting, the two parts of this thesis there has been an 
additional process undertaken which focuses on five central themes. These five thematic
223
concerns connect the conceptual framework of part one with the case studies of part two. 
The central focus of this thesis has been to describe foreign policy as a mechanism of order 
and control. To actualise this argument a number of key themes have sought in specific 
ways to demonstrate the operation of discipline, order, and control in the domestic 
context. These themes include the constitutive role of sovereignty, an analysis of the 
regulative processes within liberal democracy, human agency, and the biopolitical 
processes of order and control stemming from spatial regulation and the maintenance of 
the health of the population. These processes, and this is not an exhaustive list, work as 
conduits through which foreign policy, both subtly and overtly, directs, disciplines, and 
controls the opportunities, behaviours, practices, and experiences of citizens within liberal 
democratic states.
The first major theme that was examined in this way was sovereignty. The particular focus 
of this thesis was the way in which sovereignty constitutes the individual and the state. This 
was the central focus of Chapter 1, where it was argued that modern processes of 
sovereignty give rise to an inside/outside view of International Relations. Consequently, the 
state and the international realm are seen as distinct, the former being ordered by a range 
of governmental processes and the latter subject to the foreign policy prerogatives of state 
actors. Foreign policy has been presented as the 'mediator', between a domestic, ordered 
internal realm, and an anarchical international state-based system. This thesis, however, 
has actively demonstrated that this distinction should in fact be considered as mutually 
constituting. Furthermore, the investigation of modern processes of sovereignty reveal 
global politics to be far more interconnected, particularly in regards to the effects of 
foreign policy. Similarly, the sovereign realm of the state is conceived of as a space where 
the individual is both protected and bounded by external practice. This thesis, however, 
has suggested that these same external practices regulate and produce individuals within. 
In short, foreign policy shapes the internal in ways beyond those that are immediately 
obvious.
These processes were demonstrated through a number of case studies in the second part 
of this thesis. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the spatial and interpretive designation of 
inside/outside was compromised in order to connect British socialism with the cold war 
foreign policy discourse of Soviet communist threat. Chapter 5 specifically examined the 
politicised and securitised nature of space within the bounds of the state. Rather than 
being simply a site for domestic political issues, the movement of bodies and the regulation
224
of space within the state were shown to be heavily pervaded by foreign policy discourse 
and the obligations of national security. Chapter 6 examined the psychological 
consequences of, and governmental attempts at responding to, the transgression of 
inside/outside that 9/11 has represented. Attempts to restore normality to the domestic 
population become increasing infused with the external objectives of foreign policy. In this 
sense, these case studies highlight that the production of boundaries of inside/outside by 
modern sovereignty obscures the operation of foreign policy within the state.
Furthermore, the boundaries of inside/outside obscure the folding of foreign policy into 
domestic processes of liberal democracy, the second key theme of this thesis. Chapter 2 
surveyed a range of approaches that sought to understand the regulatory processes 
inherent within liberalism or what was described as the 'dark side' of a liberal politics of 
freedom. Within these approaches was consistent concern for how rationality gives rise to 
efficiency and productivity as equally as it does an 'iron cage' that produces and restrains 
individuals. Thus, as liberalism frees individuals from the direct regulation of the state, a 
range of social mechanisms operate in its stead. Processes of mass cultural production, for 
instance, create widespread passivity. Drawing from Foucault, it was argued that 
government policies enact a wider range of disciplinary effects upon social order. It was in 
this wider context of social control that this thesis sought to understand the domestic 
effects of foreign policy. Chapter 4 highlighted the synergy between culture and discipline, 
which was created by the politics of media spectacle, paranoia and conspiracy surrounding 
former British Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Similarly, the British Foreign Office's 
Information Research Department sought to produce a culture that supported national 
security objectives in order to enact a range of wider social and political effects. Chapter 5 
demonstrated how the US television program 24 both responded to and then in turn 
proliferated the idea that individuals can act with 'super-empowered' purpose. The 
plotlines of 24 feature an individual undertaking whatever is necessary to further the goals 
of national security and in so doing has shaped popular debate on torture and provided a 
metric by which the commitment of everyday individuals can be contrasted. Chapter 6 
highlighted the wider social and disciplinary effects that result from government policies 
designed to recreate healthy and normal populations in the face of a perceived terrorist 
threat.
The third major theme of this thesis was agency. Agency, it was argued, is a way of 
understanding how foreign policy can discipline and control domestic order. Chapter 4
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explored the politics of agency and the way in which foreign policy discourse shapes actions 
at both a group and individual level. Chapter 4 overviewed debates regarding the question 
of individual agency versus the wider structures -  such as states and governments -  that 
determine people's actions. Drawing from Roland Bleiker's work a discursive model of 
human agency was expounded, in which wider discourses shape but don't ultimately 
determine human action. This model of agency was used to understand the role of cold 
war foreign policy in British politics and society. Furthermore, this approach was contrasted 
with existing explanations of role of the IRD and of the politics surrounding British Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson, which relied on conspiracy and intrigue by way of explanation. The 
case study of the IRD highlights how the foreign policy objectives of this department with 
regard to Soviet communism was initially focussed abroad, however its mandate turned 
inward as it sought to limit the influence of, and in turn discipline, socialist elements within 
the British Labour Party. Likewise, an intensified mode of foreign policy discipline was 
brought to bear on Harold Wilson, who as Prime Minister felt very keenly not only the 
obligations of national security but also his perceived association with Soviet communism 
as a result of past socialist sympathies. The question of agency was also evident in Chapter 
5, in which popular representations of national security in regards to the threat of 
terrorism influenced people's individual agency. In particular, the debate over the use of 
torture had the effect of asking each citizen whether they would torture in order to counter 
the threat of terrorism. As with Chapter 4, this demonstrated that foreign policy discourse 
was disciplining how people were willing to exercise agency.
Chapter 5 investigates the broad theme of spatial modes of regulation and how this can be 
understood in the context of foreign policy. It suggests that the war on terror has imbued a 
range of sites throughout the Western democratic landscape with an exceptional politics. 
This is not simply strategic sites such as airports or government buildings but many urban 
spaces which have been highly regulated since 9/11. The effects of this include but are not 
limited to the regulation of the mobility of bodies. Chapter 5 furthermore suggested that a 
key factor in the attempt to regulate space was the changed calculus of affect that was 
ushered in by 9/11 when a small number of hijackers were able to kill thousands and 
completely disrupt a city of millions. The war on terror effectively securitised terrorism as 
an existential and omnipotent threat to national security and given the spatial effects of 
terrorism, the operationalisation of this foreign policy has had the consequent effect of 
securitising the urban centres of many large Western cities. Spatial modes of control are
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also demonstrated in Chapter 6 in the discussion of the effects of terrorism on the home. 
This 'doubly domestic' space was actively re-affirmed and strengthened by policies 
designed to help affected populations recover from 9/11. Thus attempts to normalise and 
secure society against external threats engender a range of effects on domestic spatial 
order.
Chapter 6 investigated the mediated effects of terrorism and counter-terrorism on the 
overall health of the population. In this sense this chapter sought to consolidate the theme 
that was addressed throughout the thesis regarding the wider effects of foreign policy on 
domestic order and control. Using the concept of biopolitics it investigated the regulation 
of the health of populations as a thematic by which the domestic effects of foreign policy 
can be understood. The major focus of this thematic was on the psychological effects of 
9/11, subsequent attempts to remedy these mental health effects, and counter-terrorism 
measures designed to organise and inform populations in the face of possible threats. 
Examining the psychological effects of terrorism on the home and financial remunerations 
for affected families, Chapter 6 addressed the gendered dimension of responses to 
terrorism, which sought to resecure the home of as a site of sanctuary and domesticity. 
Chapter 6 surveyed the psychological literature on the psychological effects of terrorism in 
an attempt to understand the secondary or mediated social effects of terrorism. These 
mediated effects were addressed specifically in relation to the governmental effectiveness 
-  or lack thereof -  of the colour-coded terror alert system. Foreign policy and national 
security obligations were shown in Chapter 6 to regulate and manage the health of the 
wider domestic population. In this regard foreign policy very much functions as a 
mechanism of social control.
This thesis has demonstrated the effects of foreign policy on domestic politics and social 
order. Foreign policy in this domestic context can be understood in terms of shaping 
domestic order and as a mode of social control. Such an 'inverted' analysis of foreign policy 
has not been previously undertaken in International Relations, nor for that matter has the 
effects of foreign policy been systematically analysed in terms of domestic order and social 
control respectively within either sociology or criminology. Accordingly, in order to address 
this gap within -  or perhaps between -  these disciplines this thesis provided a framework 
that can conceptualise and demonstrate the effects of foreign policy on the social, physical, 
cultural and psychological dimensions that constitute domestic order. Moreover, by 
employing a Foucauldian approach, this framework for analysing the domestic effect of
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foreign policy finds traction within and indeed provides a linkage between the critical 
studies of foreign policy in IR, critical social theories in sociology and political theory and 
elements of critical criminology. The case studies examined in this thesis are only very 
initial explorations of how foreign policy shapes internal order; the inverted or internalised 
dimensions of foreign policy suggest a complex and extensive future area of research.
The conceptual framework for analysing the effects of foreign policy on domestic order and 
control is not only new and original but also vital and significant. As was suggested in the 
brief account of the break-down of order in Cronulla that introduced this thesis, there is a 
distinct but not always immediately recognisable presence of foreign policy discourse that 
further inflames or polarises domestic tensions over racial difference and nationalism. 
Chapter 4, for instance, examined the way in which foreign policy intensified factional 
divides within the British Labour Party. As equally as this thesis can bring to the fore subtle 
under-currents of foreign policy that inform 'normal' domestic politics, it can also be used 
to analyse the use of foreign policy in cynical and deliberate attempts to manipulate 
domestic constituencies. This thesis, for instance, examined in Chapter 5 the emergence of 
an exceptional politics that has been generated by deliberate attempts to bring policy 
obligations to bear on everyday citizens. Similarly Chapter 6 examined suggestions that 
elements within the Bush administration were deliberately exploiting for political gain the 
fear resulting from an increased threat of terrorism. The framework articulated here can 
address both the subtle and the direct modes in which foreign policy functions 
domestically.
The contention made in this thesis is simply that foreign policy affects domestic 
populations in ways that traditional approaches to International Relations do not readily 
recognise, acknowledge, or often understand. Broadly speaking this thesis does not make a 
claim to whether this is necessarily a good, bad, pernicious, conspiratorial, underhanded, or 
even an avoidable process. The case studies in this thesis, however, have addressed 
respective eras in which foreign policy has become particularly politicised and enacted a 
wide range of quite often negative effects. Within the context of the cold war and the war 
on terror this thesis has sought to show that the effects are not limited simply to direct 
foreign policy effects and overt interference but also enacts a range of subtle processes of 
regulation that are ingrained in domestic order and control. In this sense, foreign policy 
discipline does not arise simply in instances of 'exceptional' politics but is equally a 
constitutive element of 'normal' politics and everyday order.
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The understanding of foreign policy as discipline and control offered in this thesis suggests 
that we should be aware of these processes, and have at our disposal the tools to 
understand it. In this sense, this thesis has been an understated advocate of 
multidisciplinary approaches to International Relations and has sought to break down 
barriers between disciplinary understandings rather than reinforce them. Consequently, 
this thesis has borrowed from the work of political theorists, philosophers, sociologists, 
cultural theorists, feminists, criminologists and historians in order to construct a 
comprehensive argument. It has also delved into the sub-areas of socio-medical politics, 
social control theory, discourse analysis, and cultural studies in addition to the more 
familiar terrorism studies and traditional and critical International Relations theory. While 
considering this ultimately a piece of International Relations scholarship, this thesis has also 
tried to work beyond and across disciplinary boundaries in order to reconnect themes and 
politics that have hitherto been isolated from one another.
This thesis has offered an account of foreign policy that seeks to keep pace with a 
contemporary politics that is increasingly less unconstrained by boundaries of knowledge 
or territory. As the boundaries between inside/outside, war/peace, public/private, 
security/liberty become increasingly indistinct this thesis has offered a way of 
understanding foreign policy as a broad process of governmental control. The instrumental 
functioning of foreign policy abroad is accompanied by a range of largely unintended 
domestic effects. The accounts offered in this thesis have demonstrated that while overt 
processes of domestic state control are far from absolute, beyond sovereign power liberal 
democratic order is constituted by a range of secondary and mediated regulations, 
regulations in which foreign policy plays a significant role. In this sense, the value and 
importance of this thesis, is to be able to conceptualise and demonstrate the constitutive 
role that foreign policy plays in the maintenance of everyday social order.
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